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The impact of cMl society networks on the
global politics of sustainable development:
Abstract of the thesis
International networks of non-governmental organisations have assumed increasing importance in
global politics over the past two decades. Attention to issues of environment and sustainable
development in particular present a strong rationale for their engagement as active participants at every
level of decision-making. Over the same period, significant advances in communication technology
have changed the nature of global dialogue, and made it possible for organisations to interact globally
in new ways.
However, many International Relations theorists consider Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as
significant actors principally to the extent that they influence inter-governmental deliberations. This
ignores a wealth of material which illustrates the diversity of objectives NGOs prioritise in the global
polity. In particular, the functions and principles evident in the work of international NGO networks
suggest much more complex and diverse goals and ways of working.
This thesis presents a novel consideration of ways in which interaction between NGOs collaborating
internationally is significant. It explores the different functions international NGO networks exist to
perform, and the ways in which these challenge established understandings of the role of non-
governmental actors in global governance. Attention is also given to the distinctions between issue-
specific networks, established to enhance collaboration in particular policy areas, and broader networks
which attempt to transcend these divisions. Problems and tensions which can arise within international
NGO networks are also addresse&
The thesis includes a detailed study of international NGO networking before, during and after the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. It draws on an extensive array of
primary material from the UNCED process and subsequently which has not previously been widely
available, and considers ways in which 'sustainable development' has been interpreted by organisations
which exist to challenge prevailing economic and social norms.
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Chapter 1:
Civil Society and Sustainable Development in
Global Politics
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the ways in which civil society organisations collaborate at the
global level and the motivations for such collaboration, with aparticularfocus on the politics of
sustainable development. Over the past twenty years rapid growth in the numbers ofnon-governmental
actors playing an active role in international political processes has occurre4 This has been
accompanied by the emergence ofa multiplicity ofglobal networks which link these entities and assist
them in the pursuit of common goals. The study ofsuch networks can help in understanding why civil
society organisations wish topartic4,ate in global politics and how they gauge influence and success.
It also allows for consideration ofthe internal dynamics ofcivil society networks, and the tensions and
divisions which characterise the participants' interactions. Indeed, particularly in the context of
sustainable development, thesefault lines can be seen as of central importance in the identification of
challenges and dilemmas for the global polity as a whola
My research on these subjects draws on nearly ten years ofworkingfor various non-governmental
organisations which are active in the global politics ofsustainable development. The UN Conference
on Environment andDevelopment (Rio deJaneiro, 1992) and more recently the UN World Summit on
Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002) have gen erated global awareness ofthe challenges of
sustainable development. They have also pro yoked widespread reflection on the role ofcivil society in
global politics, while similar considerations have occurred in other policy areas (human rights, gender
issues, health and so on). My intention here has been to present empirical material on the processes
Pjhg,jch haiben lvM
	 *'hilevJssse ngthed eJwJ!1chMWJ IItLUIJIML
academic analyses help in understanding and explaining their signicance. Ihave relied principally
11
upon an gent-cenc'approach in considering social causation throughout the thesis, and avoided
using more systemic notions such as class, power or gender to interpret mj.jIndings. It may be that my
closeness to many of the events addressed has made it d(fficult to apply the distance necessary to adopt
these analytical perspectives; but more fundamentally, the politics ofsustainable development
accentuates particularity and complexity - so I have been cautious in advancing general conclusions
on the basis of the specfIc contexts considered.
This approach extended to my consideration ofthe impacts and measures ofsuccess used to gauge the
effectiveness of civil society networks in influencing global politics. I havefocused principally on the
stated or evident goals for collaboration, and only addressed underlying structuralfactors such as
North-South issues (and resultant power imbalances) when dealing with tensions and contested
objectives within networks. A  focus on these shared priorities presents some clear challenges to many
analysts' assumptions about the role ofcivil society in global politics and allows a more nuanced
consideration of impacts and effectiveness than would otherwise bepossible
1.1 Introduction
Ken Conca and his colleagues pose a series of challenging questions about analyses of environmental
issues at the global level, and the actors and analytical approaches which are of relevance for those
studying the area:
The study of global environmental politics ... involves the search for co-operative solutions to
ecological dilemmas. The idea that global environmental problems require 'international co-
operation' is widely accepted. But the appropriate scope and content of such co-operation is hotly
contested. Does international co-operation mean formal, treaty-based agreements among
governments? Does it mean a broader 'global bargain' between North and South, linking a
number of issues in a single package? Or does it refer to a still broader process of global
dialogue, not limited to governments, in which different societies move toward a global
convergence of values? Does an increasingly global network of environmental organisations
represent an effective new form of international co-operation or is it simply one more way in
which the strong impose their will upon the weak? Is the goal to create an increasingly dense web
of transnational linkages, one that binds nations to a common future and a common commitment
onmentalrotectiontOr would it be wiser to work toward delinkiig an already tightly
12
coupled world system, so that various localities and regions have more flexibility to pursue
responses appropriate to their unique circumstances? I
Awareness of environmental problems has increased exponentially in recent decades. While elements
of an environmental movement can be discerned over the past 100 years or more,2 widespread concern
over the harmful impacts of human activity on the environment emerged only in the 1960s. Rachel
Carson's book Silent Spring3 presented evidence of the damage caused to wildlife by commonly-used
pesticides, and was used as a spur for to action by European and North American activists who pushed
for changes in laws and for the adoption of alternative practices by pesticide users. Only One Earth,4
written by Barbara Ward and René Dubos for the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm, outhned issues which required international consideration, and began to focus on relations
between environmental, social and economic issues. Yet in international negotiations, environmental
problems were still considered 'individually, simplistically, and overwhelmingly from a developed
western country's standpoint'.5
In recent years, additional perspectives have been grafted onto this approach. Attention to
environmental problems which are transnational or global in scope, such as climatic change or
atmospheric pollution, led to broader conceptions of the ways in which problems could be solved, or
polluters identified. In turn, as dialogue at the global level on environmental issues grew, involving
non-governmental organisations and companies as well as governments, these questions were
increasingly framed by overarching concerns relating to international development and co-operation.
To what extent has the 'internationalisation' of environmental issues resulted in alterations to existing
systems and approaches? The most notable occurrence has been the emergence of 'sustainable
development' as a supposedly holistic set of policy objectives, intended to encompass both
environmental concerns and social and economic imperatives. Sustainable development also recasts the
relationship between the state and other actors, suggesting distinct yet complementary roles for
different sectors of society; environmentalists identi&NGOs and other social movements as the
I Conca, Ken, Michael Albcrty, and Gcofrrey 0. Dabdko. cd. Green !'lwwt 8lue: Environmental Politics froni Stockholm,z to Rio Wcstvicw Press, Boulder
in Britain in 1865. McCom,ick, John The Global E,wimnnwnial Mor,,senI Ilclhavcti Press, London 1989 p.S.
3 Carson, Rachel Silent Spring Houghton Mililin, I3nstnn I iSA I 'X,2.
4 Ward, Barbara and René Dubos On!)' One Earth Penguin Rooks, Ham,ondsnih UK 1972.
5 Holdgate, Martin, Mohammed Kassas, and Gilbert White The World Environnien: 1972-1982 lycooly Press Dublin 1982.
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principal agents for change.6 As will be considered later, both of these factors challenge established
theories of International Relations (IR), which in various forms presume thedominance of the state in
initiating and delivering policy change in international affairs.
All of these issues are alluded to in the invitation from Conca and his colleagues to consider the nature
of 'international co-operation' to solve global environmental problems. They suggest three overlapping
perspectives which could be adopted: formal agreements between governments; a deal between North
and South which incorporates a wider range of issues; and a more diffuse global dialogue on norms and
values involving societies as well as governments. They also assert that increased global convergence
and greater local autonomy constitute alternative approaches to problem-solving in this context, both of.
which could be interpreted as beneficial or detrimental in achieving solutions to ecological dilemmas.
The distinction Conca ez' al. draw between three levels of influence is also important in that it leads us
to consider relations between these different contexts - how, for example, the 'global convergence of
values' in different societies impacts upon, and is shaped by, the negotiation of formal agreements by
governments; whether the linking of issues in negotiations between North and South helps or hinders
attempts to tackle specific environmental problems in more localised contexts; and how principles
underlying notions of a common future are formulated and accepted. In introducing a broader
conception of the actors involved in global politics, and of the fora which are significant, the authors
invite a consideration of the relative influence of these various processes, and of conflicts which might
arise if objectives pursued at different levels are not compatible.
It is useful to establish these perspectives at the outset If we are to consider who is engaged in 'the
search for co-operative solutions to ecological dilemmas', our focus must extend to a veiy broad range
of actors. Consideration of the nature and the functioning of civil society at the global level presents us
with a complex, overlapping web of activities and objectives. These are reflected in the diversity of
structures of association, or networks, established to link groups and individuals with an interest in the
global polity. What unites the participants is a shared intention to contribute in some way to the
establishment or promulgation of norms at the global level.
IJ4II*I*flJT	 J.*UUIIrNj$JI1 IlL J UJJP *t* LW fULIJPJiLi. .J1UJLLL1UtJJ
6 See for example Doyle, Timothy and Doug McEachem Environment and Politics Routledge London 1999 for an extended analysis of this distinction.
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Yet just as Conca and his colleagues establish a schema for their deliberations which allows for
hostility and enthusiasm towards creation of a 'web of transnational linkag&s', so the assertion that
international networks of civil society play a distinct role in global politics should admit their capacity
to do so in divergent ways. Thus networks can function as the means by which non-governmental input
to inter-governmental processes is streamlined, obliging participants to negotiate common positions
and reach compromises in so doing. Conversely, networks may be the medium for oppositional
stances, allowing participants to sirategise and articulate their rejection of the 'mainstream'; or they
could function in other ways, prioritising influence in quite different contexts - on the activities of
transnational companies, for example, or in achieving broader societal change. Given this range of
possibilities, the central purpose of this thesis is to consider the question:
• What is the impact ofcivil society networks on the global politics ofsustainable
development?
This principal enquiry throws up a number of subsidiaiy questions:
• What is meant by 'civil society', and how is this relevant in the global context?
• In what ways does 'the environment' dfferfrom more established concerns of
international politics?
• What is meant by 'sustainable development and what has been the effect of its
widespread acceptance in global politics?
• How have academic theorists explained the exercise of influence by non-state actors in
international affairs?
• Which factors jus4fy afocus on the impact ofglobal non-governmental networks on
global politics? What countervailing perspectives should be taken into account?
In order to place the questions considered so far in a less abstract context, it is useful to consider how
Environment and Development, which serves as a central point of reference for the thesis as a whole.
15
1.2 The Rio Summit
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development took place in Rio de Janeiro in
1992. The Rio Summit, as it has become known, focused global attention on issues of sustainable
development, defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development as 'development
which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs'.7
 Changes in the involvement of non-governmental actors in international politics
which occurred during the UNCED process are also widely cited as significant. 8 Certainly the numbers
of organisations participating in preparatoly meetings and at the Summit were higher than at previous
UN conferences, although not dramatically so. Peter Wiletts notes that UN officials have described the
role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as 'unprecedented', 9
 but qualifies this by commenting
that steadily increasing NGO influence had been apparent in UN conferences since the 1972
Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment: 'Far from the situation being
"unprecedented", the NClOs made such an impact at Rio because the weight of precedents made it
impossible to restrict their numbers and their activities'.'0
Margaret E. Keck and Kathz Silckink also identi15 significant precedents in the Stockholm
Conference for future transnational NGO collaboration:
This first NGO forum parallel to a UN official conference pioneered a transnational process that
would become absolutely central to the formation and strengthening of advocacy networks
around the world. As it developed, the NGO forum format led to dialogue, conflict, creativity,
and synergy. The face-to-face contact helped activists from different backgrounds and countries
recognize commonalities and established the trust necessaly to sustain more distant network
contacts after the conference was over.'1
In one important respect the involvement of NGOs did break new groun± the official texts and public
pronouncements from most UN officials and Heads of State placed greater emphasis on the vital roles
to be played by non-governmental actors than at any comparable event previously. The notion of
7 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future Oxford University Press, UK 1987 p.43.
8 The UNCED texts, most notably Agenda 21, support this perspective. See also the Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighborhood Oxford
University Press, Oxford 1995; and Foster. John Wand Anita Anand cds. Whose IVorldic it Anyway? Civil Society. the United Nations and the Muhilatcml
Future The United Nations Association in Canada. Ottawa Canada 1999.
26 May1994. .	 .	 ,
10 Willetts, Peter 'From Stockholm to Rio and beyond: the impuet ofthe environmental movement on the United Nations consultative arrangements for
NGOs' pp. 57-80, Review ofInternalional Studies No.22, London 1996.
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'partnership' advanced in the official texts also presented a rubric for the involvement of sectors of civil
society in policy formulation and implementation at national and local levels. This constituted a
significant shift from previous practice and conferred legitimacy on national NGOs as participants in
international deliberations on sustainable development.
A number of other aspects of the Rio Summit challenged established theory and practice in global
politics. Environmental degradation in its various forms required the recognition of limits and
imperatives, and the development of new means for collaboration. While international agreements on
environmental issues have a long history, the conventions on biological diversity and climate change,
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and Agenda 21, the non-binding blueprint for
sustainable development, were predicated on the central importance of environmental concerns in
global politics. This in turn was inextricably linked to principles and objectives regarding human well-
being, and the forms of development which could be sustained without long-term damage to the
environment Here again, while international attention to development issues predated UNCED by
several decades, the emphasis on decentralised approaches through involving communities in decision-
making constituted a significant shift in emphasis.
It is also important to note the established concepts which were not challenged through the official
UNCED agreements. Economic growth, through increased international trade, greater use of natural
resources, and higher levels of expenditure, is presented as desirable, despite the obvious difficulties in
reconciling these intrinsic elements with environmental limits. The role of transnational corporations
(TNCs) is considered to be constructive, and their capacity to contribute to progress is not qualified by
any recognition of detrimental, divisive or harmful impacts on humans or the environment fix)m
various industries, which might necessitate international regulation of their activities. Military
expenditure, and the attendant possibility of increased environmental and social harm, is not addressed
at all.
A further qualification in assessing the transformations attributable to UNCED lies in the lack of
evidence of significant change resulting from these inter-governmental agreements. The gap between
theincome of4be2O per centofthewodd's POPU1aLiQiYjng
II Keck, Margaret IZ, and Kathryn Sikkink Activists lkjindIJordct: i1throcyNczwvrks in !,,ternazional Politics Cornell University Press, Ithaca liSA
1998 p.123.
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in the poorest 20 per cent grew from a ratio of 30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 in 1990, and to 74:1 in 1997.12
Species loss, climatic change and desertification show no sign of abating, despite the agreement of
global conventions.' 3 Cynicism arising from the apparent inadequacy of international commitments in
these areas to effect sufficient change was already widespread among NGOs and other commentators
in 1992. The lack of progress towards agreed targets for official development assistance, and the
negligible impact of the plethora of inter-governmental environmental accords were widely
condemned) 4 Nevertheless, there were many at the time who hoped that UNCED's attempt to
introduce new priorities into international collaboration and national policy would lead to improvement
in these areas, and provoke a fundamental shift in the principles governing international affairs.
However, this brief outline of the scope and the shortcomings of the official UNCED process provides
insufficient context for an appraisal of the activities of non-governmental organisations in global
politics. While attempts to influence official negotiations are of great importance to the majority of
organisations participating in such processes, a separate imperative should also be acknowledged - the
need to establish links with each other, and engage in dialogue on issues of common concern. One
objective in such collaboration is frequently to increase effectiveness in influencing governments, but
NGO dialogue also focuses on global problems which govermnents are unable to tackle. One
commentaiy asserts that 'the international NGO community sees itself— and is increasingly seen by
governments - as part of embiyonic institutional structures that will define a different form of global
governance, a model in which citizen action occurs at the global level'.'5
The clearest manifestatin of this perspective in the Rio process is in the negotiation of 'Alternative
Treaties' by NGOs attending the NGO Global Forum (the non-governmental event which took place in
parallel to UNCED in Rio). Participating organisations were not attempting to provide an alternative to
the official agreements, but rather to present common principles and commitments to action shared by
NGOs. These would demonstrate that 'they are moving from being critics of governments to being
12 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 1999 Oxford University Press, New York 1999 p.3.
13 United Nations Environment Pro2jamme Global Environmental Outlook 2000, Earthscan, London 1999 'acknowledges the effoils being made to halt
environmental deterioration but recognizes that many of these are too few and too Iatç signs of improvements are few and fr between. This is fwtha
by the low priority that continues to be alTordcd to the environment in national and regional pIanning,and the sparse finding the environment
Social Po;ivr in Global Environmental Politics pp.306-326, Columbia University Press, New York 1993; and Jakob von Uexkull's foreword to Ekins, Paul
A New 11'orld O,rlcr: Grassroots Moven,ents for Global Change p.vii, Routledge London 1992.
15 Democratic Global Civil Governance Report of the 1995 Benchmark Survey ofNGOs Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Aflirs, Oslo Norwey 1996
p.4.
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inventors and builders of the sustainable society'.' 6 The official texts negotiated through IJNCED also
present a more pluralistic understanding of the functions and roles of orgarisations of civil society.
Section 3 of Agenda 21 contains ten chapters focusing on the roles of the 'major groups' of society.
The introduction to the section, titled 'Strengthening the Role of Major Groups', states that 'broad
public participation in decision-making' is '[o]ne of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement
of sustainable development'.' 7
 The nine chapters which follow consider: Global action for women
towards sustainable and equitable development (24); Children and youth in sustainable development
(25); Recognising and strengthening the role of indigenous people and their communities (26);
Strengthening the role of non-governmental organisations: partners for sustainable development (27);
Local authorities' initiatives in support of Agenda 21(28); Strengthening the role of workers and their
trade unions (29); Strengthening the role of business and industry (30); Scientific and technological
community (31); and Strengthening the role of farmers (32). '
The UN Non-Government Liaison Service described this third section as 'the most extensive and
formalised recognition in a UN Document of the potential and actual contributions of NGOs and other
independent sectors'.' 9 Yet it has been widely criticised for lacking intellectual consistency and for
constituting little more than a sanitised version of theories of civil society which governments at the
UN might find palatable. Dissenting voices have been raised about the questionable value and the
arbitraiy nature of the 'Major Groups' concept. The omission of significant groups of society such as
older people; the education community; parliamentarians; racial minorities; and men have been queried
frequently. When questioned directly on the origin of the term and the implications its coiners felt it
would have, UNCED Deputy Secretary General Nitin Desai has been quite candid in stating that the
UNCED Secretariat intended to expand on previous understanding of the nature of civil society, and
that they had not anticipated any of the conceptual wrangling which has ensued.2°
Given the stated intention of the drafters of Agenda 21 to extend inter-governmental agreement on the
range and importance of contributions made by those outside central government to the achievement of
16 'International NGO Fonim: International steering Committee (1992-1993)' The NetM,*No.29, Centre for Our Common Future, Geneva August 1993.
Fium a paper drafted by Peter Padbwy and circulated at the first session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, New York June 1993.
____	 on Enviivnnzent and Developmenl (Rio deianeiro1 3-14 June 1992) A/CONF.151/26 (Vols I, 11, ifi and kV)
18 The importance of public participation in decision-making and the distinct roles of the vailous major gmupsare also addrcssed in the Rio Declaration, and
in thc texts of the to conventions opened for signature at the Rio Summit, ibid.
19 'E&DFile 1992'E&DNo.31 UNN0n.OovcmmentalLiaisonScrvicc,Genevaiulyl992p.1.
20 Note from the author's participation in discussions with Nitin Desai, April 1994.
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sustainable development, one valid criticism is that the major groups concept has not really helped to
clarify practical steps by which the involvement of organisations of civil soiety in decision-making at
eveiy level can be enhanced. The principles of sustainable development have had a galvanising effect
in many aspects of the work of the UN. As we shall see, UNCED provoked successful calls for the
rules governing NGO involvement in the work of the UN to be updated. Yet the review of
arrangements for consultation with NGOs carried out by the UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) between 1993 and 1996 did not build upon the ideas outlined in the relevant chapters of
Agenda 21, and attempts by a few countries to introduce the 'Major Groups' concept were dismissed as
unworkable in the context of the UN's administrative arrangements.
As Chapter 3 will explore, critics and enthusiasts are united in interpreting the prominence given to
non-governmental actors in Agenda 21 and the pluralistic approach adopted to consider their activities
as responses to broader changes in global politics. Similarly, the emergence of structures such as the
Alternative Treaties process which are intended to facilitate articulation of shared norms is often
attributed to the impacts of aspects of globalisation. This association encompasses the technological
advances which enable organisations and individuals to develop more sophisticated and responsive
systems for communication and interaction and the social and economic transformations which
provoke co-ordinated global resistance.2'
1.3 What is meant by 'civil society', and how is it relevant in
the global context?
The involvement of a wide range of organisations and other actors in the functioning of a democratic
society is widely accepted, and often taken for granted.22 The voices of concerned individuals, trade
unionists, industrialists, representatives of voluntary organisations and professional associations are
heard on matters of concern to them. Their views are frequently sought by policy makers, and their
contribution to domestic political life is well established. Yet despite the fact that many issues of
21 As a number of commentatots have stressed. it is un ponantto avoid oveastatin the impact of gobalisa1ion, er mplyng that its progress has been
Intcr,,aiio,:al Political Economy No.3 pp.565-607. Routledge/ RIPE, London Winter 1996 p.573.
22 ian Aart Scholte suggests that reference to 'civil society' goes back to the 16th ccntury. while mention of'global civil society' has emerged only in the
1980s and 1990s. Scholte, Jan Aart 'Global Civil Socicty Changing thc World?' Centre for the Study ofGlobalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper
No.31/99, Univeesity of Warwick, Coventry UK 1999 p.7.
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interest to such sections of society are addressed at the international level, awareness of the scope for
input and influence has generally been lower regarding decisions taken in inter-governmental fora than
it is for their domestic counterparts. Academic theories of international relations have focused
predominantly on the activities of states, and have taken into account the broader spectrum of actors
which can be termed 'organisations of civil society' only insofar as they influence inter-governmental
decision-making and foreign policy formulation.
Much current analysis of global civil society reveals a similar residual pregccupation with governments
as the pre-eminent actors in international politics, and privileges efforts by civil society organisations to
influence governments over other interactions. Yet this is not consistent with the views or actions of
many of those most closely involved. As this thesis will explore, non-governmental actors collaborate
for a wide variety of purposes other than to attempt to shape inter-governmental deliberations.
An emerging body of work in 1K explores the role of civil society at the international level, arguing that
'the state does not monopolise the public sphere'.23 A range of studies have considered the functions of
civil society at the global or transnational level.24 The term 'civil society' is distinct from NCiOs in that
it is more diffuse. NGOs are constituted to carry out demarcated tasks, consistent with principles and
objectives which are (more or less) clearly stated; the impact of 'civil society' can be understood to
encompass the range of activities carried out by the whole gamut of organisations and individuals not
part of the governmental structure. It is broadly accepted that 'civil society' is outside government
and that it does not include commercial enterprises, or prioritise profit in its activities.26 Yet it does
23 Peterson, Mi 'TtBnsnational Activity, International Society, and World Politics' pp.371-388 Millennium vol2l No.3 London Winter 1992 p375.
24 See, for example, Wapna, Paul 'Politics beyond the Stater Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics' Wodd Politics No.47 pp.311-40, April
1995; the special issue of Millennium on social movements and world politics vel.23 No3, London Wmter 1994; and Florini, Ann M. ed. The Thi,rlFom&-
The Rise of Transnallonal Civil Sociey Japan Center for International Exchange/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Tokyo/ Washington D.C.
2000.
25 Fora more detailed assessment of distinctions between the terms 'NGOs' and 'civil society' see, for example, Stanton, Kimberly 'Promoting Civil Society
Reflections on Concept and Practice' in SchCcht Michael ed. The Revival ofCivil Sociely: Global and Comparative Pe,Tpeclives pp.243-2S1, Macmillan
Press Ltd., Basingstoke UK 1999.	 I-
26 Agenda 21 includes 'business and industlY in its roll call of 'major groups of civil society', which has led to arguments in various contexts over the
in more din	 3.	 of	 n
not themselves profit-making, and individual companies. This has not satisfied many NGOs— there have been sustained aiticisms of the infamce that such
associations should be considered as analogOUs with NGOs: see for example the NGO Task Foite on Business and Industry Can Coiporations be Tnisted?
Towanis Social and Environmental Respon S'bility and .4 ccowstabiliIy in the Corporate Sector The Northern Alliance for Sustainability (ANPED),
Amsterdam Fthnary 1999.
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include a vast range of actors and perspectives: 'civil society exists whenever people mob ilise through
voluntary associations in initiatives to shape the social order'.27
In meetings of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development and various other instances a
distinction has been drawn between individual companies and business associations such as the
International Chamber of Commerce and the World Business Council on Sustainable Development,
which play a representative role and are not themselves profit-making. Those who defend their
presence argue that attempts to tackle global environmental, social and economic problems are
meaningless without the inclusion of this perspective. A series of major group dialogue sessions has
been initiated by the CSD to pursue this rationale. The first, held in 1998, focused explicitly on the role
of the private sector in achieving sustainable development.
This has not satisfied many NGOs, who assert that in pursuing the interests of the private sector, and
according such organisations a status in international processes, the UN has undermined its capacity to
identify the perpetrators of environmental harm and act effectively to curb their activities. The NGO
watchdog Corporate Europe Observatory, for example, cites the lobbying role of the ICC in particular
as a destabilising influence, and quotes Pirelli Board Member Riccardo Perissich to show the degree to
which the ICC's agenda supports that of individual companies and counters the positions taken by
NGOs: 'The interests of companies that do business globally are effectively represented by the ICC in
international fora like the World Trade Organisation. Amid the clamour of the numerous single issue
pressure groups, companies with international reach need a powerful voice.'28
While the terms 'NGOs' and 'civil society' are often considered to be synonymous, 29
 clear distinctions
should be acknowledged from the outset. Although NGOs may constitute an element of global civil
society, they are not all of it neither can all NOOs be located unequivocally within global civil society
- many have strong ties with governments and other state bodies through funding and other links which
call into question their 'independent' status. The Commission on Global Governance concludes that
global civil society 'covers a multitude of institutions, voluntary associations, and networks - women's
groups, trade unions, chambers of commerce, farming or housing co-operatives, neighbourhood watch
IL$UTLFLL 4X11flJJ
	
lit iijmrp1LLumLii$.I.it 1i*Msru.i U	 tt.tz. au27 Scholte, Jan Aart 'Global Civil Society Changing the Woiid?' op. ciL p.7.
28 'ICC: Powetliouse of Corporate-Lcd Globalisation' ICC Fact Sheet l, on the Corporate Europe Observatory website:
hup//www.xs4aII.nt/-ceo/icc/icc_intm.html. Visited 1 September2001.
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associations, religious-based organizations - [which] channel the interests and energies of many
communities outside government, from business and the professions to individuals working for the
welfare of children or a healthier planet'.3° Miguel Darcy de Oliveira and Rajesh Tandon assert that the
citizens' movements which they believe constitute global civil society are 'now a constant, global
phenomenon': 'Solidarity and compassion for the fate and well-being of others including unknown,
distant others; a sense of personal responsibility and reliance on one's own initiative to do the right
thing, the right impulse toward altruistic giving and sharing; the refusal of inequality, violence, and.
oppression.'3'
A related concept is that of '(new) social movements', which can be loosely defined as progressive
groupings within society, constituting a counterbalance to the more conservative tendencies of
governments and other sectors with significant influence in society. Thus Chadwick F Alger writes of
'the massive emergence throughout the world of collective actions which are non-violent and
pragmatic in their methods, non-integrated and multiple in their structures, anti-hierarchical and
networking in their organisations, heterogeneous (cross-class, cross-ideology, cross-age) in their
constituencies, non-coercive in people participation and non-exclusive in their adherence'.32
By contrast, Jan Aart Scholte suggests that much of the activity Alger describes is strongly hierarchical
and exclusive: 'The initiative in transborder civic activity has lain disproportionately with urban-based,
(relatively) high-earning, university-educated, computer-literate, English-speaking professionals. In
sum, participation in global civil society has revealed many of the same patterns of inequality that have
marked the globalising world more generally.' 33 Susan Strange introduces a further caution against
assumptions that the emergence of social movements in the global polity of necessity leads to enhanced
accountability and democracy. The rapid increase in the numbers and influence of transnational
29 See for example the Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighborhood, op. cit.. with its recommendation for the convening of an Annual
Forum of Civil Society; and the World Civil Society Conference held in Motnreal in December 1999.
Siressgf/iening Global Ci'ilSocica'y Civicus World Alliance for Citizen Participation, Washington DC 1994 pp.2.3.
32 Alger, Chadwick F 'CitLens and the UN system in a changing world' in Sakamoto, Yoshikazu ed. Global Transformation: Challenges to the Stale
System pp.301-329, United Nations University Press, Tokyo 1994.
33 Scholte, Jan Aart 'Global Civil Society: Changing the World?' op. cit p.31.
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enterprises and criminal gangs, or maflas, is such that 'their authority in world society and in world
economy rivals and encroaches upon that of governments'
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink find insufficient evidence to support assertions that an
identifiable 'global civil society' exists. They propose a focus on 'transnational advocacy networks',
within which NGOs play a central mobilising role:
Major actors in advocacy networks may include the following: (1) international and domestic
nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations; (2) local social movements; (3)
foundations; (4) the media; (5) churches; (6) parts of regional and international
intergovernmental organizations; and (7) parts of the executive and / or parliamentary branches
of governments. Not all of these will be present in each advocacy network. Initial research
suggests, however, that international and domestic NGOs play a central role in all advocacy
networks, usually initiating actions and pressuring more powerful actors to take positions. NGOs
introduce new ideas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes.35
A common factor in many analyses which address the role of civil society in global politics is the
plurality engendered by processes of globalisation. Michael G. Schechter, for example, argues that
'[globalization has simultaneously contributed to the weakening of states' and intergoverntnental
organizations' abilities to govern, especially in the economic sphere, while strengthening civil society
in many countries in the world and planting the seeds for an evolving global civil society'.36 Rita Knit
argues that the anti-democratic impacts of globalisation constitute the principal spur for organisations
of civil society to collaborate in order to advance democratic principles and norms in global politics.37
A further claim which has been widely advanced is that the development of new technologies and
social and economic globalisation have enabled non-state actors to assume new roles in global politics
- Jessica Mathews writes that
[i]n every sphere of activity, instantaneous access to information and the ability to put it to use
multiplies the number of players who matter and reduces the number who command great
authority. ... By drastically reducing the importance of proximity, the new technologies change
people's perceptions of community. Fax machines, satellite hookups, and the Internet connect
34 Strange, Susan The Retreat oft/ic State: The Djfhsion ofI'ower in the lVorld Econo,.y pp.110-121 Cambridge Upiveisity Press. Cambridge UK 1996.
I(cdc.Margàret and K 	 Sil4ndtisBrjdBonieza: Ath acy Netw,*s b Inteniationa! Politics Comeli University Press, Ithaca USA99 * 	 LS*ti11 UrflLL.Jlf 11	 ir
36 Schcchter, Michael G. 'Glohalizttion and Civil Society' in Schcchtcr, Michael 0. ad. The Revival of Civil Society: Global and Comparative Perspectives,
pp.61-l0l,op. cit p.61.
37 Krut, Rita Globalization and Civil Society: NGOInfiucsicc in International Decision-Making United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
Discussion Paper No. 83, Geneva Switzerland 1997. Available online at http//www.rrojasdatabank.org/toc83.htm . Visited on 1 September2001.
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people across borders with exponentially growing ease while separating them from natural and
historical associations within nations.38
David Held challenges theorists who assert that the growth of global communications and changes in
the structures of economic life, alterations in environmental circumstances, and transformations in
military technology have led to a 'sense of global belonging and vulnerability which transcends
loyalties to the nation-state'. He notes Richard Falk's claim that a common commitment to human
rights, the emergence of a growing global political orientation, and the success of organisations such as
Greenpeace in showing the interconnectedness of the problems they seek to tackle across nations and
regions constitute 'the integral elements of an emerging global civil society'.39 However, Held
concludes that such claims are premature, and asserts that these stimuli also generate an awareness of
difference: 'The evidence points sharply towards the persistence of a plurality of frames of political
meaning and reference - not a universal political history in the making'.4°
Despite these substantial differences in interpretation, the authors noted here share the view that it is
legitimate to identify transformative effects of new technologies and societal and political change, even
if they differ over the validity of attempts to discern normative coherence in these processes. Thus
while the uses to which the term is put are contested, its general significance is increasingly accepted.
Nevertheless, more widespread adoption of the term 'global civil society' does not necessarily signal
the emergence of organisational phenomena evident in the activities of organisations of civil society at
the national level in the international context. As chapter 2 will consider more fully, even a writer such
as Martin Shaw, who discerns global linkages which are 'making a reality of global civil society',
concludes that 'civil society is still predominantly nationally framed'.4'
This brief essay of some recent considerations of notions of globalisation and global civil society
suggests a good deal of conceptual imprecision and ambiguity, as well as disagreement over the
relative significance of various factors in determining consequence. It is intended to sketch out the
38 Mathews, Jessica T. 'Pover Shift', Foreign Affairs vol.76 No. 1 pp.50-66, Washington DC January! Fcbruary 199,7. Located online at
&smson99/afr	
wer hjfl.him. Visited on .1	 2002.
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International Studies, Princeton New Jeney 1991.
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41 Shaw, Martin 'Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements AppmaCh' Millennium vol.23 No.3 pp.647-667, London Winter 1994
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complexities explored by others, before establishing (in chapter 2) the terms on which I will consider
the interaction of civil society organisations in the international context.
1.4 How does 'the environment' differ from more established
concerns of international politics?
Mainstream theories of international relations suggest that the principal concern of states in their
dealings with one another is to safeguard national security. This is most commonly understood to entail
defending tenitory and interests through the exercise of force when necessary, but for the most part
through diplomatic relations, which often entail the creation of procedures and institutions intended to
facilitate interaction and promote co-operation in specific issue areas. The principal external threats are
perceived to be military (and more recently economic). In recent years the conventional approach has
encompassed enviromnental politics by adopting the concept of environmental security. Daniel
Deudney contrasts the ways in which security can be conceptualised according to conventional and
environmental criteria:
•Table 1.1 Conventional and environmental notions of security42
National Security	 Environmental Security
Specific threats	 Diffuse threats
Others as enemy	 Ourselves as enemy
Intended harm	 Unintended harm
Short time scales 	 Long time scales
If danger is posed by the continuation of cunent activities, the maintenance of prevailing economic and
social norms within and between countries can be understood to threaten the stability and well-being
which it is the responsibility of the state to safeguard. US President George Bush was widely quoted
before the Rio Summit as saying that 'the American way of life is not up for negotiation'. 43 This rather
neatly captures the paradox at hand: if external policy is intended to bolster domestic stability, issues of
environment and sustainable development pose some rather awkward questions - not least of these is
IlL	 SnUPf
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How do non-governmental organisations fit into this framework? Claims by such groups to represent
the priorities of the environment, of concerned individuals, of future generations, of women, of local
communities and many others have considerable significance if the earlier points regarding
environmental security are taken to their logical conclusion. In recent years, conflicts have become
increasingly apparent between international environmental priorities (as established in a range of
multilateral environmental agreements) and economic imperatives, particularly those relating to trade.
For example, negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, under the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity, was initially stymied by the USA and allies in the so-called 'Miami Group' in
early 1999. 'The group's interest was to enable free trade of [Genetically Modified] products without
burdensome bureaucratic approval procedures and without allowing room for protectionist trade
barriers masquerading as environmental protection'. These conflicts and evidence of the pursuit of
other priorities in place of environmental principles look likely to increase in future.
1.5 What is meant by 'sustainable development'?
The term 'sustainable development' first came to prominence in 1980, when the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) agreed its World Conservation Strategy.
This established 'the overall aim of achieving sustainable development through the conservation of
living resources'.45
 Prior to this, Bathara Ward had called for action to address what she termed the
inner and outer limits of sustainability. The notion of sustainable development was given general
currency by the Brundtland Commission - the World Commission on Environment and Development,
convened by the UN General Assembly in 1983. In its 1987 Report Our Common Future, the
Commission set out the nature and scale of environmental, social and economic problems to be
confronted.47 It placed the concept of sustainable development at the heart of its proposals for action to
be carried out by governments in co-operation with other key sectors to tackle pressing issues such as
climate change, population growth, poverty, deforestation, and economic inequality between countries.
42 Deudney, Daniel 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security' in Milenniwn vol. 19 No 3, London 1990.
43 Quoted in Environment liaison Centre international Ecofonan vol.16:! ELCI Nairobi March / April 1992 p.2.
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45 IUCN Work! Co,,ser'aiion Sirasegy: living Rerowtiij Co. sc' nionforSustainabkDevelopnienz IUCN, UNEP and WWF, Gland Switzerland 1980.
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It is also worth noting that, first among its recommendations for achieving sustainable development,
the Commission placed '[a] political system that secures effective citizen participation in decision
making". This association between sustainable development and participatoly democracy has become
part of the rhetoric of diplomacy in this area. Take, for example, the words of Sbri Kamal Nath, Indian
Environment Minister, speaking in 1993:
We must recognise that the nature of public administration is changing from an apparatus run on
abstract principles of bureaucratic idealism to one driven directly by the felt needs of citizens and
their demands for goods and public services. Sustainable development, therefore, requires an
added dimension to the agreed policy goals of environmental management and good governance.
It must include the concept of social partnership in which decisions that affect the community are
taken in consultation with them.48
Sustainable development, as elaborated in Agenda 21, is intended to provide a coherent policy
framewoiic within which economic, social and environmental priorities can be addressed. The explicit
claim to span and co-ordinate activities in these spheres suggests that sustainability should be a
governing principle for decision-making at every level, and on every issue, if a pattern of human
activity which is viable in the long term is to be realised.
The 'democratisation' of policy formulation this implies is widely apparent - in the abstract, at least.
Roberto Bissio claims that an earlier draft of Chapter 40 of Agenda 21 on 'Information for Decision-
Making' stated that 'in sustainable development everyone is a decision-maker', an assertion
subsequently reduced to 'everyone is a user and provider of information'. 49 One of the enabling
documents prepared at the outset of the TJNCED process goes a stage further and presumes a set of
shared goals undlying collaboration in pursuit of sustainable development
One of the major challenges facing the world community as it seeks to replace unsustainable
development patterns with environmentally sound and sustainable development is the need to
activate a sense of common purpose on behalf of all sectors of society. The chances of forging
such a sense of purpose will depend on the willingness of all sectors to participate in genuine
46 'Environmental stress sets the outer limits, beyond which the economic conditions for sustainable production break dowm Inequality sets the inner limits -
the extremes within which social cohesion breaks dom The two sets of limits are related, not separate? Paraphrase4 in United Nations Development
Programme The Human Deve1ojnent Reco,i 1999, Oxi Univeisity Press, OxfQnI UK 1999 p.104.
1 Wd C	 G987	 luilI1 SJUIU,1WIU
48 Shri Kamal Nath, Minister for Environment and Forests of India, 'The Unfinished Agenda' Address to the First Sssion of the Commission on Sustainable
Development New York June 1993 p.S.
49 l3issio, Roberto 'Occupying new space for public life: Polities and people in a network society' in Foster, John W. and Anita Anand eds. Whose World is it
Anyway? Civil Society. the United Nations and the Multilateral Future pp.429-460, United Nations Association in Canada, Ottawa Canada 1999 p.437.
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social partnership and dialogue, while recognising the independent roles, responsibilities and
special capacities of each.5°
However, numerous commentators have expressed reservations about the validity of 'sustainable
development' as a focus for significant change on two counts in particular. First, that it sanctions
economic growth as a necessary element in planning for the future; and second, that it deflects attention
from attempts to identify and stigmatise or punish those responsible for environmental degradation by
suggesting that all are 'in the same boat', and should collaborate to find mutually acceptable solutions.
Doyle and MacEachem conclude that, following publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987
'business organisations rapidly came to understand that adopting sustainable development was an
effective response to environmental criticism, not in the sense that it changed how business conducted
itself so as to do less harm, but because it provided a rhetoric to protect the continuation of business as
usuai'5'
Given the degree to which the meaning and the implications of the term are contested, it is perhaps
surprising that 'sustainable development' has assumed a central importance in global politics since the
early 1990s. How are we to account for this growth of interest and recognition, particularly in the
context of the United Nations? Weiss, Forsythe and Coate suggest that the concept has spanned the
ideological divide that otherwise separates actors in the global arena:
In the Rio process and bend, sustainability has served as an important bridge in institutional
bargaining. The associated political process has been characterized more by bargaining among
autonomous and self-interested participants striving for consensus and less as a regime-building
process dominated by consensual knowledge communities. Operating under a veil of uncertainty
about the likely effects of their alternative choices, these participants engage in transnational
alliance formation and politics that link issues. Many participants may be associated with specific
communities of knowledge, but the political process is a pluralistic one in which groups of
participants perceive and act on differing conceptions of problems, values, interests, and stakes.52
It is unclear whether these intersubjective interactions differ markedly from those evident in
collaboration in other issue areas - 'uncertainty about the likely effects of alternative choices' can be
Resolution 44/228 and taking into account other relevant Cicncral Assembly Resolutions: Sticngthcning the Role of Major Groups . Report of the Secretary
General to the Conference', New Yotic 1990.
51 Doyle, Timothy and Doug MacEachem Environment and Politics Routicdgc 1.ondon l99% p.140.
52 Weiss, Thomas G, David P Fors)The, Roger A Coate The United Nations and Changing World Politics Westview Press Oxford 1997 p.256.
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discerned in most aspects of policy deliberation. Even so, this formulation provides a useful starting
point for an appraisal of the conflicting interpretations of the UNCED process.
1.6 How do non-state actors exercise influence in international
affairs?
To what extent do existing academic approaches provide a framework within which these issues can be
explored? JR theory has had to adapt rapidly over the past decade to come to terms with dramatic
change in the previously fixed constellations by which it had charted its course since the Second World
War. The stasis of bipolar politics has given way to much more volatile and complex interactions:
processes of globalisation are leading to new forms of governance, notably the emergence of what
Rosenau terms 'sovereignty-free actors' such as multinational corporations, lransnational societies, and
international organisations? As a result, although the extent and the nature of the impact on the state
system from globalisation is contested, it is widely agreed that influence within the international system
is becoming less concentrated - for example, Susan Strange states that 'the reality of state authority is
not the same as it once was'.
Theories addressing the existence of forms of global governance have emerged as responses to the
perceived inadequacy of the various realist conceptions of global affairs to explain what has occurred
since the end of the Cold War, while more established ideas relating to the activities of international
regimes have been substantially revised.
The notion that some form of order exists at the global level constitutes a direct challenge to the various
realist schools55 of international relations. Timothy Dunne writes that 'The core elements of Realism
are: the state is the key actor and statism is the term given to the idea of the state as the legitimate
representative of the collective will; the first priority for state leaders is to ensure the survival of their
state; self-help is the principle of action in an anarchical system where there is no global government'.
Anarchy is mitigated by the existence of some form of equilibrium in the power at their disposal. Two
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models most commonly cited are a balance of power, which ensures that it is not in the interests of any
one state to act aggressively towards the other(s); and the existence of a hegemonic state, whose
influence dominates international transactions. In both instances, neo-realist theorists such as Kenneth
Waltz would recognise the possibility for co-operation between states to take place. 56 This is more true
in areas categorised as 'low politics' (environment, welfare, human rights) than in 'high politics'
(security). Even so, the extent of such co-operation is limited by the benefit participating governments
expect to accrue to them, or by the damage which might occur through failure to participate. The
influence of inter-governmental institutions can be no more than an amalgamation of the will of the
governments which are active within them, and the role ofNGOs in the work of such institutions is of
negligible significance.
Questions about international regimes have been considered by students of international relations for
over twenty years. In broad terms, they have attempted to account for the emergence of rules-based co-
operation in the international system in certain instances. Stephen Krasner's definition of international
regimes, advanced in 1983, is still the most widely cited:
[regimes are] implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.
around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles
are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Nomis are standards of behavior defined in terms of
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.57
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger identify three schools of thought within the study of international
regimes: 'realists, who focus on power relations; neoliberals, who base their analyses on constellations
of interests; and cognitivists, who emphasize knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities'.58
The last of these appears to offer most scope for consideration of the role of non-state actors, whose
capacity to bring expertise and distinct perspectives has been recognised in this context.59 Nevertheless,
even these refinements do not constitute a dramatic move away from the predominant focus in regime
5(, Wahz. Kenneth Theoiy ofhiternational Politics, McGrawl-lifl, New York 1979.
Intavening Variables' uiKrasn, Stechen Cd. International Regünes pp.!-
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59 Sec br example work on cpistcmic communities - Haas, Peter 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination' in Haas,
Peter cd. International Organization special issue, 46:1, 1992. Haas' focus is on the 'advice' such communities are able to bring to policymakers at the
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theory on the interaction of states. Robert Cox suggest that the top-down approach this suggests is
integral to regime theory:
There is a "mainstream" school of international organisation studies that has privileged the
analysis of "regimes". Regimes are the ways in which multilateral processes in specific issue
areas are conventionally organised, whether through formal organisation and regulation or
through informal expectations of international behaviour. Despite the considerable work
accomplished through this approach, one should bear in mind that the study of regimes in
practice views multilateralism from the top down. It takes on the perspective of those forces
with the most influence on outcomes - the Group of Seven (G7), the principal trading
powers in the GATT, and the agencies of the world economy dominated by the richer
countries. It is centred upon states as the actors in multilateral relations. Regimes analysis is
status quo-oriented and aims at problem solving in this context.60
Are there other theoretical approaches which adopt a less hierarchical perspective on international
affairs? One more recent challenge to the assumptions noted above focuses on the organisational model
they have broadly adopted. Oran Young, writing in 1996, challenges the realist preconceptions and
associations drawn between domestic and international governance systems.6 ' Young argues that the
establishment of order at the international level has been a preoccupation for IR scholars throughout the
20th Century, they have looked to experience at the domestic level for inspiration regarding forms of
governance at international level. Howevec
fundamental flaws exist in many examples of domestic government ... the achievement of
governance does not invariably require the creation of material entities or formal organisations of
the sort we ordinarily associate with the concept of government Once we set aside our
preoccupation with structures of government, it is apparent that governance is by no means
lacking in international society, despite the conspicuous absence of a material entity possessing
the power and authority to handle the functions of government for this society as a whole.
Even so, his consideration of 'governance without government' does not extend to more than fleeting
attention to the impact of non-governmental organisations, which are by implication peripheral to
decision-making in international governance systems. The change in focus does not entail a move away
from the state-centric, top-down perspective which characterises much of the work of Young and
others on international decision-making structures.
IlJIJUJliJjJ L* JLIJU**flIIUL t
	 j.n1*F1ruErpui Uiijj.
60 Cox, Robert 'Forewoiti' in Sakamoto, Yoshikazu ed. Global i)rns.sfririiiatiosi - Clwlknges to I/IC' Slate Syslern, United Nations University Press, Tokyo
1994 pJx.
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James Rosenau suggests that governance 'is a more encompassing phenomenon than government'. It is
'a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority (or, at Least, by the most powerful of
those it affects), whereas governments can function even in the face of widespread opposition to their
policies'.62
 Despite this reframing of the focus of debate, Rosenau pays scant attention to the activities
of non-state actors.
It is also important to note that 'global governance' is a term widely used outside academic contexts.
The Commission on Global Governance was established after UNCED in 1992 at the suggestion of
Willy Brandt, former West Gennan chancellor, and with the support of then UN Secretary General
Boutros Ghali. Its report Our Global Neighbourhood, produced in 1995, includes the following
definition:
Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests
may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and
regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and
institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. ... At the global level,
governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be
understood as also involving non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens' movements,
multinational corporations and the global capital market.63
'Global governance' can therefore be understood to entail the existence of formal or informal processes
at the global level which go beyond the functions of consultation and limited co-operation between
states acknowledged by some realist theorists. The existence of such a system or process can only be
confirmed if it can be demonstrated that decisions are taken or conclusions arrived at which are more
than a reflection of the wishes âf participants with traditional power capabilities, and if these decisions
or conclusions can then be shown to guide the subsequent actions of relevant organisations.
This suggests a further consideration - the degree to which the state can be thought of as a coherent
entity in its actions at the international level. Krause and Knight propose a 'state/society perspective' as
a means by which to incorporate the many and complex ways in which state policy in multilateral
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relations is formulated. Their analysis of the work of the UN emphasises the shift this entails: 'the
basic unit of analysis is not the state but the complex of social relationships that coalesce within and
across states and are projected into the international dimension'. 65
 In the same vein, Douglas Chambers
asserts that 'the state cannot be isolated from civil society: it is defined by the series of links that form
both the state and the societal groups'. 66 Thus in certain instances, groups in society can be understood
to exercise considerable or even controlling influence over policy formulation in given areas. The
correlation between positions taken by state representatives in international fora and the priorities of
various groups within society can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the
complexity of relations between these different groupings.
This formulation is useful in that it assumes a web of interactions between social groupings as an
important determinant in international affairs. Whereas the other theories touched upon are inherently
state-centric, and allow a limited set of functions to non-state actors, Krause and Knight recognise a set
of choices and priorities open to civil society organisations in attempting to realise their objectives.
Associations between different civic groupings at the international level are motivated by complex
calculations of reciprocity, competition, influence and mutual benefit which are not touched upon in
most mainstream international relations theory. These assertions undermine distinctions between state
and society which undeipin much JR theory. If they are not separate at the national level, how can
society and state be considered as wholly discrete in international affairs? Thus while the study of
international regimes and realist and functionalist understandings of international processes provide
valuable insights in considering the global politics of sustainable development, they do not adequately
contextualise the multi-fuceted roles played by civil society organisations.
By contrast, an extensive range of empirical material is available which supports further study of the
activities of civil society organisations. In addition, a growing body of work considers the activities of
'networks' of civil society operating at the global level.
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1.7 Why focus on the impact of non-governmental networks on
global politics?
Various studies have shown the steady, and at times dramatic growth in the number of international
non-governmental organisations. The table below illustrates this process and the issues on which these
groups concentrate, using information from the Union of International Associations.
•Table 1.2 Growth in numbers of international NGOs and their focus67
Issue area (N)	 1953 (N1 10)	 1963 (N=141)	 1973 (N=183)	 1983 (N=348)	 1993 (N=631)
Human Rights	 33	 38	 41	 79	 168
____________	 30.0%	 27.0%	 22.4%	 22.7%	 26.6%
World Order	 8	 4	 12	 31	 48
___________	 7.3%	 2.8%	 6.6%	 8.9%	 7.6%
International	 14	 19	 25	 26	 26
Law	 12.7%	 13.4%	 13.7%	 7.4%	 4.1%
Peace	 11	 20	 14	 22	 59
___________	 10.0%	 14.2%	 7.7%	 6.3%	 9.4%
Women's	 10	 14	 16	 25	 61
Rights	 9.1%	 9.9%	 8.7%	 7.2%	 9.7%
Environment	 2	 5	 10	 26	 90
___________	 1.8%	 3.5%	 5.5%	 7.5%	 14.3%
Development	 3	 3	 7	 13	 34
____________	 2.7%	 2.1%	 3.8%	 3.7%	 5.4%
Ethnic unity!	 10	 12	 18	 37	 29
Group rights	 9.1%	 8.5%	 9.8%	 10.6%	 4.6%
Esperanto	 11	 18	 28	 41	 54
___________	 10.0%	 12.8%	 15.3%	 11.8%	 8.6%
The causal relationship some have discerned between processes of globalisation and the emergence of
evidence of a 'global civil society' was noted earlier. The notion that civil society forms alliances to
counter the negative impacts of phenomena associated with globalisation has wide credence, and yet, as
Scholte points out, although evidence of civil society at the global level is largely unprecedented, many
elements of what is understood as 'globalisation' have occurred in earlier periods of histoiy. He
suggests that 'intemationalisation' ('marked by intense interaction and interdependence between
countly units'); 'liberalisation' ('an 'open' world where resources can move anywhere');
'universalisation' ('found at all corners of the earth'); and 'westemisation' ('the imposition of modern
t*uwU1Irtru-	 LIJt N.
	 iJ**u1LsiuIt I r*ij fui his- ruiw,
67 Union of IntnationaI Associations Yearbook ofIn:enzationa! Oganimtions (1953, 1963, 1973, 1983, 1993) quoted in Keck, MargaM E. and Kathiyn
SikkinkAclivisLc Beyond Borde, op. ciL p.12 I.
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structures') all have clear parallels with previous circumstances. The only distinct trend is
'deterritorialisation', by which 'global relations are seen to occupy a social space that transcends
territorial geography'. Scholte suggests that the existence of global civil society derives in various ways
from 'supraterritorial civic activity'.68
In more general terms, three further factors support a focus on networks of global civil society in
addressing the central question posed earliec first, the role of civil society in what could be termed the
'globalisation of ideals'; second, the particular challenges and debates which arise from attempts to
realise forms of 'self-governance' in the functioning of global networks; and third the broader
questions of legitimacy and accountability which accompany the assumption of greater authority and
influence in the global polity.
The globailsation of ideals - The following chapter will explore the functions global civil society
networks exist to perform. By considering their rationale, their working methods, and the means by
which progress towards shared objectives is gauged, it is possible to assess the degree to which such
processes aim to contribute to shaping aspects of the global polity at a much broader level than has
been widely accepted in academic studies in this area. The elements which do not conform with more
conventional approaches can be described as attempts to develop shared concepts and principles which
are advanced in a wide range of situations and through various means to achieve change in the contexts
in which the much narrower, fonnal debates occur on policy formulation by governments or in inter-
governmental processes.
The International Baby Food Action Network, for example, has worked for over twenty years at
multiple levels to challenge the activities of major international infant food manufacturers. This has
entailed lobbying inter-governmental bodies and national governments; using consumer boycotts
against recalcitrant companies; providing alternative information which challenges the assertions of
parts of the industry and positive advice which assists health workers and parents to make more
informed choices. Without the presence of the network, or its involvement at each of these levels, the
cumulative impact of ideas at all levels would be diminished and fragmented. Its global character,
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allied with strong local and professional ties, has been a prerequisite to achieving change through
altering the societal context in which decisions are taken.
Self-governance - The scope for influence in the global polity suggested above necessitates
negotiation of acceptable means for management and operation of global civil society networks. There
is considerable scope in these deliberations for tensions between organisations to emerge, for
differences on issues of principle or tactics to cause difficulties, and for the viability of the network to
be considered of less importance than the needs of individual organisations. There is also the danger of
large, influential organisations dominating the process and imposing working methods and stnictures
without adequate attention to the needs of other members. Nevertheless, networks also offer the
potential for dialogue to establish new understandings and shared agendas for action, which are
necessaiy to realise the opportunities touched upon above.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Silddnk's work on transnational advocacy networks provides a useful
point of reference for consideration of these issues. They suggest that 'when network actors have
different medium- or long-term agendas, networks can become sites for negotiating over which goals,
strategies, and ethical understandings are compatible. Because transnational advocacy networks
normally involve people and organizations in structurally unequal positions, this negotiation is always
politically sensitive.'69 The ways in which networks attempt to conduct this negotiation constitute a key
element in establishing the impact of civil society at the global level.
1.8 Synopsis
This opening chapter began by considering the central question of the thesis as a whole: What is the
impact of civil society networks on the global politics of sustainable development? It introduced the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development as the principal point of reference for
the body of the thesis and went on to explore the elements necessary to address the main question,
considering how international relations writers, non-governmental commentators and inter-
governmental bodies have conceptualised and contextualised it. This entailed exploring ways in which
69 Keck, Margaret 5. and Kathr Sikkink Activists &ryond Borde' op. ciL p.121.
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origins, usage and limitations of 'sustainable development' as a concept. The distinct role played by
networks which link non-governmental actors was then put forward as a significant factor in
understanding the impact of civil society in global politics.
The main chapters of the thesis will develop the concepts introduced here and will:
. Consider the significance of pluralistic understandings of influence in global politics
• Consider the relevance of international deliberations on the environment and
sustainable development to the above
• Explore the capacity of non-governmental actors to influence the development of nonns
in particular issue areas (focusing on the UNCED process)
. Assess the importance of dialogue and decision-making within NGO networks to a
broader understanding of global politics
Chapter 2 reviews theoretical approaches which acknowledge the roles played by non-state actors in
inter-governmental process, and considers the criteiia used to gauge their effectiveness. Most
assessments which acknowledge the activity of such actors at all focus principally on their capacity to
affect decisions taken collectively by governments. If a broader understanding of influence is accepted,
this challenges us to consider the range of objectives non-governmental collaborations exist to achieve
at the international level. These entail attempting to shape the global polity through various means, and
lead in turn to a focus on the intrinsic significance of relations between non-governmental actors
conducted through global networks to a broader conception of global politics.
Chapter 3 presents a detailed account of the UNCED process, addressing both official perspectives on
the significance of engaging a wide range of societal actors and the conceptual struggles and conflicting
priorities evident in the work of the principal NGO networks active during preparations for the Rio
Summit and at the event itself. It explores tensions between the rationale of sustainable development
propagated by the UNCED Secretariat, based on the importance of dialogue and consensus between
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NGOs, who believed that systemic injustices resulting in social inequality and environmental
degradation should be identified and redressed.
Chapter 4 assesses attempts to translate the organisational principles established during the UNCED
process into new UN procedures and institutions. The establishment of a new body, the Commission
on Sustainable Development, and the negotiation of new rules governing NGO accreditation to the UN
derived directly from UNCED. In both instances, non-governmental actors believed they had played a
significant role in achieving change. However, the degree to which these developments subsequently
reflected the ethos of the Rio Summit is open to question. During the same period, notions of self-
governance and pluralistic understandings of legitimacy and responsibility within international NGO
networks deriving from the UNCED period appear to have been marginalised from the mainstream
discourse.
The final chapter considers the extent to which the contexts considered provide answers to the
questions posed in chapter 1. It explores the inherent strengths and weaknesses, and the internal
tensions evident in the functioning of international civil society networks, and reviews ways in which
these challenge state-centric, hierarchical understandings of international relations. The concluding
chapter also addresses the particular relevance of these issues to the study of global envirnnment and
sustainable development issues.
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Chapter 2: The Role of NGO Networks in Global
Politics
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced the principal themes ofthis thesis, and the contexts and questions to
be considered This chapter presents two elements in more detail:first, the ways in which academic
analysis has addressed the particq,ation ofnon-state actors in internationalpolitical processes; and
second, thefunctions global civil society networks exist to perform and the tensions and conflicts
evident in their activities. These provide necessary cont extualisation for the morefocused and
empirical material presented in thefollowing two chapters.
The chapter argues that most analyses focus primarily on inter-governmental decision-making and
regimes as the contextfor considering the impacts ofnon-governmental actors in global politics. But
success in influencing policyformulation in these contexts is only one achievement which global
networks may prioritise. A  number ofothers derive more from the interaction oforganisations
through thefunctioning ofglobal networks - notably in discourses on norms, but also the exchange of
information - and do not consider governments (individually or collectively) as the most likely agents
ofchange.
uccess'and ¶ejJ'ectiveness 'for individual organisations andfor networks are thus more fluid
concepts and are more contested than many analyses would suggest. They require a consideration of
'trade-offs' between d/J'ereizt goals and allow for a range of tensions and divisions within civil society
networks.
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development do not seem readily to conform to the classifications established by the United Nations
for its relations with non-governmental bodies, nor to the categonsations attempted by some of the
principal International Relations scholars in their considerations of these matters. The former has been
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characterised in large part by attempts to apply the template of the inter-governmental structure which
shapes the work of the UN as a whole to the involvement of NGOs. In his response to a set of
recommendations on changes to arrangements for NGO relations in 1975, the then UN Secretary
General, Kurt Waldheim, stated 'the consultative relationship does not imply the intervention of non-
governmental organizations in the decision-making process that is the proper domain of Governments,
but rather it provides a channel through which {thedecision-making process can be improved'.' The
latter have seen NGOs as significant primarily to the extent that they can be understood to have
influenced inter-governmental policy formulation or implementation. 2 Common to both is the
placement of NGOs as peripheral in a schema which establishes interaction between governments as
the crux of international relations, and (implicitly in the first case, explicitly in the second) measures
the significance of other actors through their impacts on the activities and decisions undertaken
collectively by governments.
In contrast to these well-established perspectives is an accumulation of commentaries which posit the
development of a 'global civil society' with the potential to act as a countervailing force to ongoing
processes of globalisation and attendant liberalisation of markets and the undermining of cultural
diversity.3 For example, Rajesh Tandon of the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA)
argues that networks, if they strengthen the links among civil societies, could become important to the
growth of an 'international civil society'. International civil society institutions will be needed to
respond to the increasingly globalised institutions of governance, finance and production.4
This juxtaposition is problematic - the imprecise use of the term 'civil society' was explored in
chapter 1. In this context it may serve to minimise the diversity and the tensions which exist among
and between its constituent parts and lead to unwarranted generalisations which cannot support the
conclusions resting upon them. Paul J Nelson's assessment of this body of literature is worth noting
here:
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3 See for example The Human Development Report 1999 produced by the United Nations Development Programme, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK
1999.
4 Tandon, Rajesh Civil Society. The State and Roles ofNGOs IDR Reports 8 (3) Boston Institute for Development Research, Boston USA 1991 p.11.
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One of the most important claims widely made for NGOs is their capacity to function within a
civil society as institutions of democratization or pluralism. Considering-the importance of the
claim, it is somewhat surprising that it is made so widely with such imprecision. Neither the
concept of civil society nor the actual performance of NGOs within civil societies is clearly
delineated or tested in much of the discussion ofNGOs.5
This should serve as a challenge to seek precision in dealing with ideas which lend themselves to
hyperbole, rather than deflecting our attention from a cluster of issues which warrant further
consideration.
A more useful delineation of the context within which we should consider the role of networks of
N00s 6 is provided by Martin Shaw, who emphasises difficulties in relating to the appropriate level of
decision-making as an important element in understanding the emergence of a global civil societ3r.
A particular problem in the definition of global civil society is to specify its relationship with
state forms. The emergence of global civil society can be seen both as a response to the
globalisation of state power and a source of pressure for it. There is no one, juridically defined
global state to which global civil society corresponds, even if a defacto complex of global state
institutions is coming into existence through the fusion of Western state power and the
legitimation framework of the United Nations. The fonns of global state power are often
inadequate from the point of view of civil society organisations e.g., power can be mobiised to
deal with what is seen as a problem for Western strategic interests (e.g., Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait) but not coherently to deal with genocide, environmental crises, or world poverty. Civil
society organisations often find themselves, at the end of the twentieth centuly, arguing for a
different kind of crystallisation of global state power from those favoured by state elites.7
'Civil society organisations' are'thus the means by which alternative articulations of 'global state
power' or other forms of resolution of international problems are achieved. Yet Shaw's focus here is
limited to addressing the significance of civil society as an agent in the globalisation of state power. In
what ways can this understanding of the role of non-governmental actors be challenged and
broadened? 8
5 Nelson, Paul J The World Bank and Non-Governmental Osganizalions: The limits ofApolisical Development Macmillan Press, Basingstoke UK 1995
p.45.
.6 Ihave used the teams 'network', 'coalition', 'allianc'and 'collaboration' inteathangeably in this section. pistinctions between these teams are imprecise
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7 Shaw, Martin 'Civil Society and Global Politics: l3nd a Social Movements Approach' Millennium vol.23 No.3 pp. 647- 667. London Winter 1994
p.650.
S As an aside, Shaw's inference that the United Nations provides legitimation for the creation of global state institutions which mask the dominant interest
of Westem states may be appropriate as an interpretation ofoerlain events but does not apply to the full spectrum of UN work - not least the UN General
Assembly and the functioning bodies of the UN Economic and Social Council, where the most influential bloc is the Gil group of developing countries.
Finding ways to confer greater influence on these more representative international institutions is a challenge to which many NGOs have committed
themselves.
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The purpose of this chapter is to assess efforts by NOOs to establish ways of working together which
do not derive their legitimacy exclusively from the resulting impact on inter-governmental
deliberations. In turn, if collaboration occurs for a variety of reasons and with a range of objectives,
the measures which could be used to gauge success are commensurately more numerous and more
complex. In questioning the primacy of influence over inter-governmental processes as the yardstick
with which to assess the impact of NGOs we have to acknowledge a multiplicity of overlapping, at
times conflicting means by which we could assess the effectiveness of individual organisations or
groups of NGOs. hi addition, members of an NGO network may have very different perceptions of the
benefits which should accnie to their organisation through their participation - success for some may
be understood as failure by others. This suggests a further element of complexity in considering the
functioning of an NGO network. Internal tensions deriving from differences in matters of policy and
principle on political strategies, or from more prosaic issues such as funding and the division of
organizational responsibilities may all have a bearing on the way it operates and on how it is perceived
by participants and observers.9 Although these elements are next to impossible to untangi; it should
be feasible to test a few basic premises which represent a distinct point of departure from many
considerations of this area
• Many NGOs prioritise collaboration with organisations from other regions and sectors
to an extent not necessazy if the sole reason is to increase influence on governmental or
inter-governmental decision-making. For a significant minority of NGOs, such
associations constitute the principal reason for participation in international processes.
What reasons do organisations which do not prioritize lobbying governments have for
taking part in international processes? How do they gauge their success?
• One way to approach these questions is to consider whether exchanges between
organisations from around the world offer the possibility for the development of
coherent responses from 'civil society' to global problems. These could conceivably be
formulated with some degree of equality across geographical regions and between
various groupings. If such responses can legitimatelybe attributed to a collaborative
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9 PadbuTy. Peter 'International Cooperation among NOO Netwoks: Expetiments, Rellections and a Survey on Next Stq,&. Statenent by Peter Padbury of
Alternative Futures Institute, Ottawa Canada at the World Economy and Ecology for Development Workshop Beyond Rio-Perrpecves ofintenwilona!
CMlSocie4y Five Y cws After Rio Bonn, 21-23 October1997. Padbury comments that 'NGOs are an independent and highly competitive group so
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effort this would constitute strong evidence for the functioning of a 'global civil
society' - or at least for transregional co-operation to tackle common1y perceived
challenges.
• If the above assertions are accepted, dialogue among different non-govermnental
groupings (the major groups of Agenda 21, for instance) can have ramifications which
are quite distinct from the inter-governmental process. The opportunities to engage
with private sector organisations or representatives from local government, for
example, can result in agreements to action or the ciystallisation of opposing positions
which could only be reached given the presence of the relevant organisations but which
do not occur through the prism of exchanges between governments.
The above points are not intended to downplay the significance of govermnents in international
decision-making, nor to suggest that collaborative structures along the lines of those discussed here do
not or could not occur with the participation of representatives of national governments. The puipose
is rather to shift the focus of attention to ways in which international dialogue takes place between
principally or exclusively non-governmental actors in ways which are of relevance to our
understanding of the conduct of international policy debates and policy formulation.
Common to these various fonns of interaction between non-governmental actors is the existence of a
mechanism to allow communication to occur. A network may be a loose, ad hoc group of
organisations which share an interest in a particular issue for a limited time and devise means to
exchange ideas or information when it is felt necessaly. Alternatively, it could be a highly structured
body with its own stafi established rules for its operations, and the capacity to act on behalf of its
members in a variety of contexts. These two extremes - and the gamut of types of networks in
between - exist to increase collaboration between their members.
Networks can also act as the conduit for relations between widely disparate organisations: between
NGOs operating at local and global levels; between NCIOs from different parts of the world; between
small and yeiy large organisations; and between organisations focusing on unrelated issue areas.
This linking role places networks in
legitimacy and effectiveness necessaiy to NGOs of all descriptions. The sharing of information and
strategies contributes to alliance-building and challenges divisions which might exist between
44
different contexts. The capacity to bring experience and expertise from one level (the local, for
example) to inform and shape decision-making at another (say at an inter-goveinmental meeting or a
conference of Northern international development NGOs) is a further instance of the potential that
NGO networks hold to broaden the range of perspectives given voice in processes of global
governance. Does this principally entail enriching inter-governmental dialogues or can we discern
more far-reaching implications for the functioning of governance systems at the global level in the
activities of international NGO networks?
2.2 Relevant theoretical constructs
Sociological studies have identified, with various typographies, the emergence of 'new social
movements' as actors in the political sphere.' 0 Alan Scott refers to social movements as collective
actors constituted by individuals who understand themselves to have common interests and, in
relevant contexts, a common identity He draws an explicit distinction between social movements and
other collective actors such as pressure groups and political parties in that 'they have mass
mobilization, or the threat of mass mobilization, as their prime source of social sanction, and hence of
power'. 11 The most significant point to recognise here for our purposes is the reappraisal of relations
between institutions of the state and civil society this approach necessitates. Thus Justin Rosenberg
suggests that states should be understood as part of 'the empire of civil society', 12 rejecting the
separation of institutions of the 'state' or of 'government' from the rest of society which is implicit or
explicit in much international relations theory. Krause and Knight's work on civil society and the UN
was considered in the previous chapter.' 3 As their analysis suggests, if social movements articulate
l0Apceocc!pation among sociologists with the distincuuns between 	 (ynncpa1ly class-based) and 'new' (concerned with issues which am not class-
II Scott, I1an Jdeologj and the New Social MovementcUnwin 1-!yoian. London UK 1990 p.6:Thecon1ation between social movements atmasS
mobilisation is modified by Mactin Shaw. who suggcsts that the more de*.'cntnliscd Ibmis of participation evident in the activities of the women's and gay
movements should also be acknowledged: 'pailicipation rather than mobilisation ... is the relevant cntenon here'. Shaw, Mamn 'Civil Society and Global
Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach' op. cit. p.653.
12 Rosenberg. iustin The Empire of Civil Society: A  Critique of the Realist Theomy ofInternational Rdazions Verso. London 1994.
13 Krause, Keith and W. Andy Knight eds. &ate Society, and the UN 5) ste,n: Changing pemcciives on multilazeralism United Nations University, Tokyo
1995.
45
the perspectives of sections of civil society, then their relations with the state will be interpreted very
differently if the traditional state/society dualism is not presumed.'4
What is the relevance of these approaches to the study of global politics? Social movements theorists
start from the assumption that civil society organisations operate principally at the national level,
reacting to and initiating change in social, cultural and political structures and interacting with
institution and processes. The existence of a global civil society, and consequently of global social
movements, is possible primarily through the agglomeration of these national efforts. Martin Shaw
distinguishes between global and interstate (international) politics: 'Global politics is the more
inclusive and fundamental, and international politics represents an important sub-category, concerned
with issues which aiise in interstate relations'.' 5 However, despite the global linkages of the
environment, human rights, and feminist movements in 'making a reality of global civil society',
Shaw concludes that civil society is still predominantly nationally frame&
'Think globally, act locally' could be seen as a rather neat rationalisation of the cunent structural
limitations of globally-oriented social movements, which are able to mobilise power at local and
national levels much more easily than at the global level.'6
How valid are these inferred structural and psychological limitations on the effectiveness of civil
society organisations at the international level? Social movements theory suggests that 'pressure
groups' function as adjuncts of civil society, translating general principles into a specific policy
context. This relationship becomes stretched at the international level given the plurality of civil
societies and of states. Yet if our criteria for gauging effectiveness include the capacity of such
organisations to promote dialogue and awareness as well as to achieve mass mobilisation, the
conclusions reached may differ considerably. Anne Thompson Feraru's survey of contemporazy
literature on the subject, written in 1976, is still trenchant
We are still wrestling with the problem of how to detect and measure the political influence of
INGOs [International NGOs] - how to establish connections between INGO inputs and 1(30 -
ía
of this area. Many UN documents, fot examplc aasumean ideologcal consistency m the positions ofNGOs which may serve to blur distinctions between
their stances and implies the existence of value systems shared by governments, NGOs and UN officials without valid corroboration. Patiick McCully
proposes a definition of NGOs as 'non .profit group(s) concerned with social justice and/or environmental protection' which suggests a similar pi'esumpion
• McCoy, Michael and Patnck McCully The Roadfrom Rio: An NGOAction Guide to Environment and Development International Books, Den Haag the
Netherlands 1993 p.66.
15 Shaw, Martin 'Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach' op. cii. p.655.
16 Ibid. p.655.
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governmental outputs (and possibly also the reverse influence-flow), and the connections
between INGO activities and international integration.17
The principal focus for most International Relations theorists who have analysed the roles played by
NGOs operating at the international level has been on co-operation with the intention of influencing
decisions taken or action initiated in inter-governmental contexts. Established theories of international
relations which adopt this perspective, including regime theory models for international decision-
making have been addressed in the previous chapter. Yet a similar bias is apparent in the work of
many authors for whom the effectiveness of NOOs is the principal subject. A number of detailed
studies have been made of the efficacy of NGOs in influencing specific inter-governmental processes.
Bas Arts attempts to establish a qualitative means by which to gauge the impact of NOOs collectively
on the inter-governmental processes set up to review implementation of the Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity. From the outset, he prioritises
'political influence' as a measure of success: 'political influence ... is defined as the achievement of
one's policy goals through one's own, intended, intervention in international politics'.' 8
 Stairs and
Taylor conclude that NGOs have been successful in influencing inter-governmental decisions on the
protection of the oceans. 19 Benedick considers the influence of NGOs on negotiation of the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and concludes that NGO participation
contributes to the likelihood of reaching strong agreements. 2° Holmber& Thomson and Timberlake
suggest that NGOs contributed significantly to the texts negotiated at UNCED, most notably sections
of Agenda 21 addressing empowerment, citizens' participation in decision-makin& and the role of
women.2'
Others conclude that such influence is rare. Jackie Smith et aL acknowledge that '[flew social
movements are successful if by "success" is meant that they achieved specific policy changes'; rather,
the authors suggest three less direct means by which to gauge the impact of non-governmental actors:
to focus the attention of global elites and the general public on important global concerns; to help
17 Faani, Anne Thompson Transnational Rdadoits: The S udy oflnteniationalNon.goventn,ental (ganizations (7NGOs) International Studies
Association, San Fransisco USA 1976 p.9.
18 Ails, Bas The Political influence of Global NGOs International Books, Uuecht the Ncthcslands 1998 p.30. Arts focuses on negotiation of and folkup
i**i	 JI*S-i
policy goal with regard to an outcome in ty fo,mation and implementation, which is (at least partly) caud by one's own and intentionalintervention in
the political arena and pmcess concerned' ( p.S81. which funhcremphasiscs the prc.cmincnce of intcs-govemmental decision.makingin his conception ol
NOOs' objectives.
19 Stairs, Kevin and Peter Taylor 'Non.govemmental organisations and the legal pretection of the oceans: a case study' in HUnCH, Andrew and Benedict
Kingsbuiyeds. The Intenatlonal Politics ofthe En Wronment pp.110-141, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992.
20 Benedick, Richard Ozone Dplomacy: new directions In safeguarding the planet Harvard Univasay Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1991.
21 Hohnberg. johan, Koy Thomson and Uoyd Timberlake Facing the Future. Bend the Earth Summit Eazthscan, London 1993.
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governments learn about a problem; and (through their presence) to enhance government
accountability in global political processes.22 The limitations this imposes are recognised by Elizabeth
Voorhees Perkins, who nevertheless restricts her analysis to 'one aspect of transnational relations - the
interaction of non-governmental organizations and an international organization, the United
Nations'.23 Perkins also raises (and challenges) assertions that many NGOs regard themselves as
'nonpolitical'; and that 'concerted NGO action is rare'.24
Don Hubert acknowledges that 'NGOs have many important influences on a wide range of different
actors and outcomes', but concludes that '[a] focus on NGO effectiveness vis-à-vis states is crucial
since global governance or social change, regardless of the specific definitions, will depend to some
extent on the agreement of states'. Hubert also concedes that a demonstration that 'NGOs are
influential in the emergence and consolidation of new norms [in international relations] would be a
vy strong case for their importance in world politics', but suggests that such reseaivh should
complement a focus on 'NGO effectiveness in influencing govermnents'.25
John McCormick's history of environmentalism demonstrates a similar supposition that the
emergence of inter-governmental institutions and decision-malcing is a prerequisite for international
NGO co-ordination. Writing of the creation in 1974 of the European Environment Bureau (an
instmment for co-ordination between NGOs with the European Community), McCormick concludes
that its origins can be traced directly to NGOs' experience at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human
Environment in Stockholm: 'The creation of the EEB suggested that after many false starts, when
international NGOs had lacked international authorities that they might lobby, the emergence of
political internationalism and the creation of international governmental organizations had given
international NOOs contextual relevance and permanence'.26
Philip Lowe and Jane Goyder extend this association to establish a general correlation between inter-
governmental collaboration and NGO activity
22 Smith, Jackie, Ron Pagnucco and Charles Chatfield 'Sncal Movements and World Politicar A Thcoittical Framewoik' in Smith, Jackie, Charles
Chatfie1dand Ron Pagnucco eds. Tra,ww dSocioiMove,ne.rus and Global Polüics: Solidarity Beyond the &ale pp.59-ll, Siacuse University Press,
23 Paidns, Elissbcth Voorhees Comparative Prssum Group Politics and Thmennttonal Relations - The Case of Won-Govenimental Oganfra1ions at th
United Nations University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor USA 1979 p.5.
24 Ibid. p.14.
25 Hubal, Don 'lnfcmng Influence: Gauging the Impact of NGOs' in Ku, Charlotte and Thomas G Weiss eds. Towwth Understanding Global
Governance. The International Law and International Relations Toolbox pp.27-51, Academic Council on the United Nations System Repoits arid Papers
No.2 Bruwii University, Rhode Island USA 1998 p.43.
26 McCo.mick. John The Global Environmental Movement: Reclaiming Paradise Beihaven Press, London UK 1989 pp. 10 1-2.
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In Western democracies, the pressure-group network forms a system complementary to
government institutions. Each tier of government has a corresponding phalanx of groups which
help to keep government informed, responsive and in check. Traditionally, the apex of both
governmental and pressure-group activity has been the nation state, but since the Second World
War new international institutions have emerged either for collaboration on specific issues, or
for economic and political coalescence within a geographic area (as is the case of the European
Economic Community). It is logical to assume that, as governments agree to form higher levels
of decision making, non-governmental organisations will similarly regroup to meet the new
level, and indeed international non-governmental organisations have multiplied over the past
thirty years.27
An alternative perspective is advanced in the 1995 Benchmark Survey ofNGOs. Drawing on the
statistical evidence presented, the report's authors identify two distinct models of international
democratic participation. The first they term 'national democratic strategies on the international stage'
- this entails the continuation of domestic lobbying efforts at the international level. The second is
described as 'global civil governance' which starts from the premise that states are 'unable to solve
key global problems'; consequently, 'the international NGO community sees itself— and is
increasingly seen by governments - as part of embryonic institutional structures that will define a
different form of global governance, a model in which citizen action occurs at a global level'. Akey
element within this emerging web of global governance is the establishment of norms of behaviour
and of principle among non-governmental actors: '[a]ware of this fledgling phenomenon of
democratic international decision-making NGOs often spend considerable amounts of time trying to
define the best way to govern themselves democratically at the international event, even rthis process
sacrifices their capacity to influence the formal process at that event' (my italics)8
The Benchmark Survey suggests that structures for interaction between NOOs are necessary if
they are to promote democracy in international decision-maldng of all forms. Leon Gordenker
and Thomas 0. Weiss suggest that networking is central to the functioning of many NGOs - 'the
process of creating bonds, sometimes formal but primarily informal, among like-minded
individuals and groups across state boundaries'. They argue that new communications
technologies allow 'scaling up' of certain types of transnational activities from local levels to the
global level and 'scaling down' to involve grassroots organisations. Now that these relations are
notlogisficimposèibilitie44hey mayoeqJd j1is
authors claim that where hierarchy is the natural organising principle of states, and markets
27 Lowe. Philip and Jane Goydor Environmental Gswps in Politics George Allcn and Unwin, London 1983 p.163.
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perform this function for business organisations, networking plays a defining role in interactions
between NGOs. It is this characteristic in NGOs which confers particular effectiveness to their
collaborative efforts at the international level: 'In the international arena, these possibilities are
enhanced because effective cooperation among states operating in an anarchic environment often
implies precisely the kind of informality and network-building that work well for NGOs'.29
Andrew Chetley quotes a report from the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN)
which constitutes an instructive example of differences between the networking capacity of
NGOs and of business organisations:
When it comes to IBFAN decisions which can affect our position on an international level, there
are about 10 of us involved and we all trust each other This is a fundamental asset which
industry does not have ... From a tactical point of view, there is a definite advantage in being a
loose network of several organizations from all over the world.30
The association Gordenker and Weiss draw between the international context and the organising
principles of various sets of actors seems questionable - the 'anarchic environment' characterises
relations between states on matters of territorial security just as much as on environmental or social
issues; yet NGO coalitions of necessity assume very different structures and relations with inter-
governmental bodies in different contexts. Formal access for NGOs to participate in and contribute to
policy formulation is anathema to bodies such as the UN Security Council, while it is accepted
practice for the UN Commission on the Statos of Women and is increasingly evident in the work of a
tange of economic and social institutions, including the World Bank and the UN Development
Programme. The point is not that NGOs do not carry influence in international policy formulation on
traditional security issues, but that influence is not acknowledged through direct interaction with
governments in the relevant inter-governmental forum. This in turn contributes significantly to the
form of collaboration and the working practices ofNGOs operating in such areas, which must
exercise influence by more circuitous means. We cannot minimise the significance of the inter-
28 Dernocralk Global Civil Governance Repo.i ofthe 1995 Bencluna,* Survey ofNGOs Nor%vegan Royal Ministiy of Foreign Affairs, Oslo Norway
1996 pp. 3-5.
29 Gordcnkur, icon and Thomas 0. Weiss 'Plurahz.ng Global Govcmancc Analytical Approaches and Dimensions' op. cii. p35. Keck and Sikkink refer
to the work of organisalional theorist WakerPowoll, who calls networks a third mode of onomic organisation distinct born markets and hierarchy (thern
intbn,,ation' and 'for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured'. [Powoll, WalterW. '?'ieithor Market nor Hierar* Network Forms
ofOrtjanization", Research in Organiia:ional Belwvioi-no.l2 pp.295-96, 303-4, 1990.] Keck and Sikkink conclude 'His insights about economic networks
are cxtraonlinarily suggestive for an understanding of political networks, which also form around issues where information pIa a key role, and around
issues where the value of the "commodityt' is not easily measured.' Keck, Margaret E, and Kathiyn Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks In International Politics Cornell University Press, Ithaca USA 1998 p.8.
30 'Report of a mecting of IBFAN' Geneva, 20 September1980, quoted in Chetley, Andrew The Politics ofBaby Foods: Succes.rful Challenges to an
international Marketing Strategy Frances Pinter, London UK 1986 p.11.
50
governmental interlocutor in shaping the objectives and the tactics employed by NOOs acting
individually or collectively.
Nevertheless, it is legitimate to suggest that the new communication technologies with which NGOs
are confronted create new imperatives (as Gordenker and Weiss suggest), and that the implications
these have for a reappraisal of notions of accountability and reciprocity in relations between
transnational NGO networks and their national or local partners may be considerable.
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) study States ofDisarray,
produced for the 1995 UN World Summit for Social Development concludes that citizenship rights
understood in the national context are under threat '[a] growing number of economic transactions
escape the control of any government, weakening the capacity of nations to tax and regulate, and
therefore to cany out coherent programmes of economic redistribution and social support. In this
sense, some of the basic elements in the "enabling environment" for citizenship are no longer national,
but global in scope'. At the same time, in parts of the world where the rights of citizens are not
adequately recognised the possibilities for new associations have been expanded considerably by
technological advances and social and economic change: 	 -
The new ease of iransnational communication creates bonds of co-operation and solidarity that
transcend territorial divisions. The defence of human rights in non-governmental forums, as
well as through recourse to international agencies, is one important example of this
development. Alliances among women across the world are another. Extensive networking on
environmental issues could be a third. People interact on a global scale in order to develop new
sets of rights and obligations that may or may not be enforced pthnarily within a national
political context3'
This dialectic between global economic liberalisation and global social solidarity suggests a role for
international networks as the fora within which dialogues on rights, standards and other issues of
principle are conducted between organisations which confront problems arising from processes of
globalisation. Michael Schechter states that 'globalization contains the seeds for counter-hegemonic
fozves, including social movements foimed by those seemingly most negatively affected by
globalization'.32 Rita Krut also articulates this perspective:
rfLaLuutJi 1LT - "uji -__i'ui *1Li1T1L øJUUUtj-
31 Research AcsMtIe.s 1995/6 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development repoil, Geneva Switzerland 1996. Available online at
hupi/unrsd.org/engind&publ/Iist/pogrep(rcs96lres96.htm . Visited on I Scpienibcr 2001.
32 Schechter, Michael G. 'Globalizition and Civil Society' p.61 in Schechtc Michael 0. ed. The Rev, wzI ofCM! Society: Global and Co.npamzñw
Perspectives pp.61 . 101, Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke UK 1999.
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there is a view that globalization has not been accompanied by democracy but quite the
opposite: globalization has put democracy at stake. In this view, the crpcial role of civil society
today is to advocate democracy against the rising anti-democratic tendencies of global capital
concentration and a new international economic institution [the World Trade Organisation] with
a singular commitment to "free trade" as the primary basis for international economic
relations.33
How can the proposal that NGO alliances are performing this function be tested? If they are, we might
expect to find evidence for some or all of the following:
• Significant increases in the levels of communication between NGOs working in the
issue area under consideration. This could occur for a wide range of reasons, but it is
legitimate to conclude that its absence would mean that the hypothesis is invalid.
The development of decision-making procedures to ensure that the network
functions effectively. These could include providing facilities and supervision for staff
agreeing ways in which to oversee electronic communications between network
members; editing and producing newsletters and other publications and so on.
Procedures may also be developed to allow for negotiation of common positions on
policy issues but this is by no means a widespread occurrence among NGO networks.
• The ceding of authority to the network by its members in certain areas of its
activities. At a minimum, we might expect to find evidence of commitments of money
or expertise by its members in order to make the network viable. In some instances the
positions taken by the network on policy issues may be considered authoritative
because they represent the negotiated conclusions of a range of organisations from
different geographical regions or sectors of society. On such issues individual NGOs
may agree to adhere to the consensus position in the belief that this confers greater
legitimacy and more leverage on the participants than would otherwise be the case.
• Debates on issues of principle. Even if the network does not oblige its members to
•	 negotiate and then be bound by a joint policy position, we can expect it to be the
*Nqj.LuimJ.. iJ.LfttII'tL.L*I L1II*LUI1L&.
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33 Krut, Rita Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in lnzenzational Decision4 faking United Nations Rcsrch Institute for Social Deve)oplflCfl
Discussion Paper No.83, Geneva Switzciiand 1997. Available online at hflpIIww.nnjasdatabank.org'toc83.htm. Visited on I Septanbor200l. For fiuth
articulations of this perspective see for esample Fox, i and U) Brown eds. The SiniggleforAccouniobility: The Wo4dBan& NGOs and Gmssruo2s
Movements MIT Press Cambridge MA, USA 1998; Edwards, Michael and D Huhiie eds. Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGOPe,fonnancewidAccowttabiliOP
in the Post.Cold War World Kumanan Press, West Hartford USA 1995; and Claiic, John Democtvtizing Development: The Role of Voluntaty
O,ganisa1ions Earthscan, thndon UK 1991.
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context within which participating NGOs explore elements of common ground and
establish norms and standards to be pursued in their core activities.
Links with other networks on issues of common concern. The work of NGO
networks focusing on different issues or contexts can overlap and make collaboration
between the networks advantageous. For this topp would indicate the ability to
establish ties of association between groupings of NGOs working in different issue
areas, which implies the existence (assumed or negotiated) of common ground on some -
issues of principle, and also of strategies for achieving common objectives.
• Targeting rogue actors and placing pressure on them to conform with widely
accepted norms and standards. This would entail using the international network to
heighten pressure on transnational companies which contravene internationally agreed
procedures, for example, or co-ordinated lobbying of governments which oppose
negotiation or implementation of international agreements in key areas.
2.3 Objectives of NGO networks
It is also useful to consider the various objectives international networks of NGOs exist to achieve.
Any one network may incorporate some combination of the elements outlined below; by identifying
the distinct reasons for collaboration it will be possible to explore the ways in which networks
function more fully than a consideration based exclusively on the &st two points listed. The aims of
NGO networks can be distinguished as follows:
To strengthen NGO influence over inter-governmental decision-making
. To facilitate dissemination of and access to information
• To promote dialogue between NOOs on issues of principle
• To change the behaviour of an economic actor (most commonly transnational
1t j	 .UL$iLJLtv1LIr-s1LULu1.. JJ_, - rmu.
• To change the behaviour of a social group
• To support or create individual members of the network
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2.3.1 Strengthening NGO influence over inter-governmental decision-making
Two distinct forms the relationship between NGO coalitions and inter-governmental bodies can take
should be identified at the outset: first, networks which prioritise influencing inter-governmental
decision-making; and second, those whose members seek to play a role as intermediaries in delivering
services, material or information to a target constituency. My focus is principally on the former, as the
role of networks as intermediaries is considered more fully under the second classification.
Nevertheless, there is clearly considerable crossover between these two functions which should be
borne in mind in considering the role of NGO networks in this context.34
Within the former category of networks, it is important to recognise the variety of structures which
exist Those considered below have been chosen to illustrate particular ways in which such networks
can function.
The Climate Action Network (CAN) has broad legitimacy among both governments and NOOs in its
role, but is not prominent in policy formulation on climate change issues as an entity distinct from its
members. CAN piioritises collaboration and communication between its members as an integral part
of its work. It could be categorised as an 'insider' network which aims to use its influence to broaden
the impact of NGOs on international decision-making.
The coalition of NGOs opposed to the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI Coalition) is
widely accepted byNGOs and includes among its participants many of the largest organisations
working on issues of environment and development generally (the World Wide Fund for Nature
[WWF] International; a large number of national Friends of the Earth organisations; the World
Development Movement and so on). However, this recognition has not extended to governments or
inter-governmental organisations, which have not welcomed attempts by NGOs to contribute to
deliberations on the MA! or the co-ordinating role played by the coalition. The coalition has been the
principal context within which both the principles and the strategies for action of NGOs opposed to
the MA! have been elaborated. It is an 'outsider' network which aims to articulate the rationale behind
opposition to the proposed agreement.
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34 Cyril Ritchie ellectively conflates the two functions I have distinguished in his analysis of links between the UN and NGO coalitions: 'Whether through
fomol contacts, standing agreements, or ad hoc anangements, UN organisations collaborate with and often rely on NGOs to deliver services. test new ideas,
and foster popular participation. By belongrng to an NGO coalition that has systematic relations with UN organs, an MOO has a ctain additional
legitimacy and also has the opportunity to join the collective exereise of responsibility and to influence the decision making of that UN body'. Ritchie, Cyril
'Coottlinate? Cooperate? Harmonise? NGO Policy and Operational Coalitions' in Weiss, Thomas G and Leon Gordenkereds. NGOs the UN and Global
Governance, pp.177-188, op. cli. p.18 I.
54
NGO
Network
Climate
Action
Network
MM
Coalition
EarthAction
Network
The EarthAction Network operates as an intermediary between its members (principally small,
national NGOs) and governments or inter-governmental organisations. It provides information and
strategies for its members which are intended to enhance their effectiveness. EarthAction could be
described as a 'vertical' network - it promotes links on a vertical axis from small-scale, local or
national NGOs to influential decision-makers rather than on a horizontal axis which would entail
promoting exchanges between comparable organisations.
sTable 2.1 Functioning of 3 NGO networks which prioritise influence over
Inter-governmental decision-making
Status in its area of
activities
The principal NGO
co-ordinating body on
dimate change
Issues
The focus for NGO
activity in opposition
to the MAI
Not the principal
network on any of the
key issues addressed
Level of acceptance by
Inter-governmental I
governmental actors
Accepted as legitimate
participants by most
Participation and perspective
contested by many
governments and others
Generally welcome; some
hostility when critical of
indMdual governments
Role In promoting
dialogue between
members
Hosts exchanges of
information; little role in
shaping policy
Significant role in
policy dialogue among
NGOs
Little interaction
between members
through EarthAction
2.3.1.1 Climate Action Network
The Climate Action Network links NGOs working on the range of issues addressed in the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change and by inter-governmental bodies established and
processes occurring as a result of the Convention. Its eight regional offices cover 243 member
organisations in 64 countries (November 1997). Members are 'non-governmental, citizen-based
organizations with a special interest in climate-related issues'.35 The objectives of the network are:
. to promote government and individual action to limit human-induced climate change
to ecologically sustainable levels;
to co-ordinate information exchange on international, regional, and national climate
policies and issues;
LJL.Ml.tJI*JU*fl *. *I	 LjJO%L	 ujlw- 1 - ii -
to formulate policy options and position papers on climate-related issues;
35 From the FridjofNanscn lnstitutcs Gtn Globe Ycaibook website: http//w w.ext.Wida.n&gg)l/ng&. Visited on I Septanb& 2001.
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to undertake further collaborative action to promote effective non-governmental
organizations' (NGOs) involvement in efforts to avert the threat of global warming36
CAN also plays an intermediary role in bringing local and national organisations to international
deliberations: 'The development of this network allowed the UN Secretariat to invite, as observers,
national NGOs which had no official international status, but had been identified as CAN contacts'.
The presence of these members of the network in turn had a beneficial impact on the negotiations on
climate change in general:
This promoted a democratic and decentralized NGO contribution to the process even though
several major developing countries, and to a lesser extent some industrialized countries, were at
first opposed to NGO participation. As a matter of fact this direct participation was important
because the governments did not feel that their public opinion was fairly represented b the
large international NGO groups from the North who bad previously attended UN meetings.7
Levy and Egan add a further rationale for NGO collaboration through CAN - the additional pressure
for action which can arise through international processes, and the particular advantages in this
context:
environmental NGOs advocate for international regulation of greenhouse gas emissions because
they recognise that many countries would not take strong action in the absence of an
international agreement due to corporate pressures and the high cost of unilateral action.
Moreover, they recognise the high status and influence of the international scientific community
within UN-based institutions and the relative weakness of corporate pressures?8
Many of the participating organisations in CAN (and particularly the larger, more influential ones)
have clear positions on the principal issues arising. As a result the Network has much less of a role in
shaping the lobbying activities of its members than the collaborative mechanisms constructed by
NGOs around the proposed negotiation of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MA1).
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36 CAN bsite- httpi/www.climatcnctrk.oegl. Visitcd on 1 September2001.
37 Ibid.
38 Levy, David Land Daniel Egan 'Ccwpoiitc political action in the global polity National and nanational teglcs in the climate change negotiations'
in Higgoti, Richard A., Gffiey RD. Undediill, and Andreas Bielereds. Non-SWieAcio oJsdAuthOiIzy in the Global System pp.138-I 53, Routicdge/
Warwick Studies in Globalisation London 2000 p.150.
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2.3.1.2 MAI Coalition
Various overlapping groupings of organisations, operating at local, national and international levels,
were established to highlight concerns about the threats posed by the Agreement in the form it has
been proposed. These came together in various contexts as the MAI Coalition. The positions of many
of the participating organisations have been significantly shaped by the interaction of their
representatives with members of other groups.39
The Multilateral Agreement on Investments (extracted from 'The MAI and the Clash of
Globalizations' by Stephen J Kobrin40)
For three years, the 29 wealthy nations comprising the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development have been negotiating the tenns of this treaty, in the modest hope that it
would facilitate international investment by ensuring that host governments treat foreign and
domestic finns similarly. Yet the MA! has sparked a global firestonn of opposition from a
coalition of 600 organizations in nearly 70 countries that includes Amnesty International, Sierra
Qub, the Malaysia-based Third World Network United Steelworkers of America, and Western
Governors' Association.
In large part due to a global grassroots campaign that has made use of World Wide Web sites,
newspaper ads, bumper stickers, letter-writing campaigns, and even street protests, the MM
negotiations screeched to a halt in late April. Negotiators called a time-out to allow for
consultation among the parties and "with interested parts of their societies" including
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business, and labor.
On one level, the MA! story is a cautionary tale about the impact of an electronically networked
global civil society on international negotiations: The days of negotiating treaties "behind closed
doors" are gone. The virulent opposition to the MM, however, is concerned with much more
than the provisions of one treaty. It reflects a widespread and deep-seated anxiety over the pace
and scope of globalization.
David Henderson, former chief economist for the OECD, suggests that attempts to negotiate the
Agreement were abandoned because of two inter-related sources of concern: fierce disagreements
within the negotiations and rising anxiety among a large number of NGOs. 4 ' He argues that it will be
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necessary in future to tackle the pressure coming from outside such negotiations in two ways: first, to
engage directly the arguments of those who believe economic liberalisation threatens democracy, the
poor and the environment; and second, to insist that the claims of NGOs to represent civil society as a
whole to an extent comparable with the role of democratic governments are spurious. Martin Wolf
makes this point robustly, in terms which echo the mainstream IR theories which were noted earlier:
Only elected governments can be properly responsible for the making of law, domestically and
internationally. This does not preclude full discussion with all private interests. But a civilised
society is one in which the state alone has a monopoly of coercive power, exercised, under law,
by a government responsible to the electorate as a whole. To grant any private interests a direct
voice in negotiations over how coercion is to be applied is fundamentally subversive of
constitutional democracy2
I characterised the Coalition as an 'outsider' network earlier. This term encompasses both the relation
with inter-governmental bodies and government departments (generally hostile) and the prevailing
ethos of the Coalition (opposition to the MM with little flexibility for compromise or negotiation).
Yet many of the individual organisations of the network are clearly 'insiders' in other contexts and
have developed constructive relations with governmental counterparts in which their effectiveness
derives in some measure from the flexibility to argue for incremental gains. Such organisations would
not object in principle to the establishment of an agreement setting out rules to standardise the
conditions under which lransnational investments occur - their concerns were rather that the
Agreement in its proposed form undermined existing legislation on environmental and social issues
and threatened local and national autonomy in safeguarding standards in these areas.
Others are unequivocally 'outsiders', for whom opposition to the MAI is consistent with a principled
stance on a wide range of issues which derives from rigorous adherence to a political ethos. For such
organisations, an agreement on rules for multilateral investment should be opposed in whatever form
it is presented. Many more fall somewhere between these two extremes. The uncompromising stance
taken by the Coalition in opposition to the proposed Agreement in any form can be understood to
derive at least in part from the diversity of its members. Thus although the network has promoted
detailed consideration of the effects of the MA! and the means by which opposition to it can be
engthened,1the joint
outright opposition.
42 Wolf, Martin 'Uncivil Society', The Financial lin,es, London I September 1999. This echoes Kurt Waldheim's assertion that the decision-making
process is the 'proper domain of Governments', noted at the beginning of this chapter.
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If governments were to begin negotiation of the details of an MAI in some revised form, the insiders
would almost certainly become involved in attempts to shape aspects of the Agreement through, at a
minimum, achieving specific changes to mitigate its detrimental impact. The outsiders could be
expected to maintain their rejection of the Agreement in its entirety, and as a result the Coalition
would be placed under severe strain. By marginalising all NGOs from discussions of the MAT at the
outset, governments could be understood to have precipitated the creation of an alliance which
encompassed a broad spectrum of organisations with little in common but shared or comparable
concerns about the implications of the Agreement. Through delays in detailed negotiation of the
Agreement, it was possible for the Coalition to coalesce around a stance of opposition to the MA! in
its entirety.
Following the rejection of the Agreement in its proposed form it was possible for this opposition to be
presented as the articulation of a coherent alternative - a 'different kind of ciystallisation of global
state power', to use Shaw's term. Thus one organisation involved in this process has concluded that
'[t]he failure of the [MA!] demonstrates broad public opposition to the deregulation of the global
economy, the increasing dominance of transnational corporations and escalating resource use and
environmental degradation',43 which suggests in turn that the activities of NGOs opposing the MA!
will be presented as articulating wider social antipathy towards prevailing economic patterns. Cyeical
commentators and opponents such as Martin Wolf might suggest that the principal lesson to be learnt
by those keen to sustain the neo-liberal economic model will be that engaging non-governmental
critics in dialogue is an effective way to lessen their effectiveness in articulating external oppositior
Others question the implication that the NGO coalition played a decisive role in undermining the
Agreement - Elizabeth Smythe cites disagreements between states over issues including the US
investment embargo contained in the Helms-Burton Act, the insistence of the EU on an exemption
from national treatment for Regional Economic Integration Organisations and the problems of binding
sub-national entities (such as US states and Canadian provinces) along with the cultural exemptions
demanded by France and Canada, and concludes: 'Can the changes in the positions of countries, the
-	 rrflr-iJjNf--t tJ$ 1 JL1 - U 1111 Ji ithuii
43 Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Dcvclopmcnt (ASEED) website - httpUantenna.nWasèed. Visited on 1 September 2001.
44 Sce Chauetjce, Ponap and Matthias Finger The liàrth llmkt'rs: Po. Politics and World Development Routledge, London UK 1994 and Patrick
McCully's chapters in McCoy, Michael and Patrick McCully The Roadfrom Rio: An NGO Guide to Environment and Development, op. cit. for
ecmparablc analyses of the co-option of NGOs in the UNCED process. WlO Director-General Renato Ruggiem's promise 'dedicate much of his time in
1999 to foimalizing a relationship between the W10 and civil society' (quoted on US National Wildlife Federation's wthsite-
hJ/www.nwforg(nwintemationalArad&taedcnf html. Visited on I September2001) could be interpreted as an example of this, although events ii
Seattle in December 1999 indicate the gulf between the institution and many NGOs.
59
defeat of the agreement itself and changes to the wording of the draft text be explained solely by the
activities and influence of NGOs? Clearly they cannot.'45
Nevertheless, Smythe and most other commentators concur that the MAI Coalition represented a
significant, and to a large extent a new, factor in determining the fate of the proposed Agreement. This
is of particular relevance given the MAI's clear purpose, to introduce global standardisation in
regulations governing external investment, and to accelerate capital flows through removing state-
centric obstacles. The prospect of a reduced role for the state, and the apparent scope of the draft
agreement can be understood to have exacerbated concerns among citizens in many countries over
potential costs in jobs and economic disniption. Smythe concludes that '[olpponents have been able to
use the context of inter-state negotiations to begin to redress the shifting imbalance of power between
citizens and capital either through shoring up national authority or through transferring it to the global
level via international regulation which reflects more than the interests of multinational capital'
As noted above, Henderson and Wolf also call into question the legitimacy of the Coalition's claims
to represent the interests of broader constituencies of civil society. One supposition in these positions
is that the coalition of NGOs and the civil society concerns they invoke are predominantly nationally
based. Their challenge is to the legitimacy of 'elected governments', and their influence can be
questioned in domestic political terms —Wolf comments that '[i]fNGOs were indeed representative
of the wishes and desires of the electorate, those who embrace their ideas would be in power. Self-
evidently, they are not'47 However, if it can be demonstrated that such organisations articulate the
views of groupings which span national boundaries, this equation breaks down. International financier
George Soros calls into question the presumption that the representation of citizens by their
governments constitutes a sufficient guarantee that their interests will be safeguarded: 'The interests of
states do not necessarily coincide with the interests of their own citizens, and states are even less likely
to be concerned with the citizens of other states. There are practically no safeguards built into the
present arrangements to protect the interests of the people.'48
45 Smythe, Elizabeth 'Slate authoiity and investment sccwity: Non-state acto and the negotiation of the Multilatcia) Agncment on lnvstmcnt at the
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A. second way in which this diminution of the role of NGOs could be challenged relates particularly to
environmental organisations. Concern over the loss of species, the destruction of natural habitats and
imbalance of ecosystems through pollution leads many organisations to argue that it is not viable to
limit consideration of interests to humans alone. As a result, they assume a defacto role as defenders
of the environment in its own right. Sustainable development places particular emphasis on the
interests of future generations and the actions necessary to safeguard their interests: again, many
NOOs invoke these perspectives as part of their overall legitimacy, again, this is not acknowledged in
Martin Wolf's narrow schema of representation and legitimacy.
Finally, Wolf and Henderson deflect attention from the range of influences over government's
position-forming. It is unsound to suggest that government depamnents act as conduits for the wishes
and needs of their populace in pursuing international negotiations. To do so is to ignore the
complexity of internal relations between government departments in establishing common policy, the
influence of other actors in formulating positions (investment banks, for example, in this instance);
and external pressure (from other states or inter-governmental institutions) to take a particular
position. Just as the role of international NGO networks in promoting the influence of their members
in decision-making processes cannot be assumed to comply with notions of democracy and good
governance, so governments cannot be presented as homogenous channels which do no more and no
less than to represent the interests of 'civil society'.
The contested status of the MA! Coalition indicates that an expanded role for non-govermnental actors
in international decision-maldn& as elaborated in Agenda 21 and elsewhere, has not established
principles which are universally acknowledged. It also suggests that clearly articulated and, where
appropriate, verifiable channels of accountability and claims of legitimacy are a necessary corollary to
effectiveness in influencing inter-governmental processes.
2.3.1.3 EarthAction Network
The third exemplar in this category is the EarthAction Network, which functions much as many
individual organisauons do but includes a netwQrk of NGOs around the world amon its members.11-• 
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EarthAction produces iegular 'Action Alerts', intended to focus attention on particular issues of
concern and present a coherent lobbying position and strategy which its members are invited to
pursue. Among the organisation's stated aims is to 'mobilise large numbers of citizen groups,
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individual activists, journalists and members of parliament around the world to communicate with
policy makers on key issues'. The areas where influence is sought are:
• International negotiations, such as those on climate change, biological diversity or
debt.
International institutions, such as the UN or the World Bank.
• A single national government, when the decision has profound global consequences.
• Multinational corporations, whose decisions can sometimes have equally important
consequences.49
Ths mirrors the structure of many individual organisations - decision-making is not deferred to the
members of the network. Information is disseminated from the central node, but there is little evidence
of exchanges between the individual organisations or of communications from members to Earth
Action itself being encouraged. 5° Nevertheless, EarthAction claims a membership of 'over 1,800
citizen groups in 143 countries. Roughly 1,100 groups are in the South and 500 in the North'. The
organisation's website is punctuated with tributes from these members which are clearly intended to
illustrate the range of countries and sectors represented and the enthusiasm with which they receive
and use EarthAction's material. Of particular significance is the quotation attributed to Greenpeace
International:
EarthAction has set a new standard for providing top quality, timely and focused campaign
materials to non-governmental organisations around the world, at the same time encouraging
more concerted and effective NGO action. In so doing, it has provided a potential model for the
next phase of NGO evolution.5'
Jackie Smith has considered the work of EarthAction as a case study in a wider exposition of the roles
played by 'Transnational Social Movement Organisations' (I'SMOs). She concludes that
'EarthAction's work helps articulate and focus shared interests of its partners, amplif,ing the needs
and demands of.local populations and empowering them to act on global issues. These functions of
EarthAction help shape the contexts in which national, multilateral, and transgovernmental decisions
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are made'.52 The inference is that the organisation acts as a conduit, bringing the views of key non-
governmental actors to bear in inter-governmental contexts. Smith does not address the dynamics of
power within the network - the means by which decisions are taken on the subjects for Action Alerts;
the rationale for allocating 'grants to local partners'; the legitimacy of its role in 'articulating shared
interests'. Her focus is on 'empowering', 'educating', and 'informing' local and national
organisations, and on creating 'transnational mobilizing frames' to make governments more aware of
the importance of environmental issues and place pressure on them to take national and multilateral
action.
The effect of this is to maiginalise consideration of uncertainty or disagreement within the network by
emphasising communication and homogeneity in place of dialogue and diversity. 53 There is also an
assumption that the flow of education and information should predominantly be from the international
network to its national and local affiliates, and that Northern-based international organisations are
benign and consinictive in their dealings with Southern associates, establishing mutually beneficial
relationships. Such suppositions have been challenged by many authors writing on this area, whose
critiques should be acknowledged in this context?'
The significance of relations between network members is evident in the first two examples
considered, and its apparent absence in the third case has been noted. CAN's stated objectives
establish a correlation between its effectiveness in 'promoting government and individual action' and
its capacity to effect a 'democratic and decentralized NGO contribution to the process'. The diversity
of organisations participating in the MAJ Coalition has contributed to a rich dialogue on the potential
impacts of the Agreement whilst limiting collaborative work on its proposed provisions. The apparent
lack of horizontal interactions within the EarthAction Network and its emphasis on dissemination of
information and education to its predominantly Southern membership suggest underlying tensions in
the network's self-governance.
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These issues are directly addressed by Paul Nelson in his analysis of the work of transnational
NGO networks lobbying the World Bank. 55 Nelson argues that NGOs have had 'a measure of
influence in policy and funding debates' 56 for the World Bank, raising issues of environmental
impact, economic and social justice, political participation and the rights of minorities. The
corollary of this success has been 'pressures that reveal tensions and contradictions in the
networks' representation, agenda-setting, self-governance and claims to legitimacy'. 57 Thus,
despite deeply embedded values of accountability, participation, sustainability and equity, Nelson
suggests that informal organisational structures and the broad range of policy issues these
networks address make these principles of self-governance elusive. 58 Three particular sources of
tension make NGO networks vulnerable to division over issues and strategy:
• The tension between entrepreneurial leadership and participatory, solidarity-driven
alliances;
• The need to balance and reconcile local objectives of Southern participants with
strategic, global objectives of international campaigners;59 and
• The diverse and sometimes contradictory claims to legitimacy in international
lobbying.6°
Nelson argues that NGO networks' influence is dependent on trust and at least the appearance of
solidarity. Disagreements threaten that trust and weaken the perception of a movement united around a
set of principles and values. All networks of non-state actors have to confront this challenge—
govern loosely tied global networks that are establishing themselves as political actors He concludes
that
[s]elf-governance may be as significant a challenge for NGO networks as is motivating and
monitoring change in official institutions such as the World Bank ... The networks' performance
as models of accountability, transparency and broad participation is at the center of their
theoretical significance as new political actors, and their impact on future policy and practice.6'
55 Nelson Paul 3 'Conflict Legitimacy and EfFectiveness: Who Speaks for Whom in Ttansnational NGO Netwuics Lobbying the World Bank?' Occasional
PaperNo. 7 Harrison Pmgrammcon the Futuiv Global Agenda Ocinher 1996. Located online at hnpJIww.bss.tmid.odu/hanison,apc&paperl7.htm.
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In identifying and delineating the activities of NGO networks which aim to influence inter-
governmental deliberations, three dichotomies have emerged:
• The insider / outsider distinction
• The vertical / horizontal distinction
• Status among NGOs I credibility with governments
None of these pairs should be understood as mutually exclusive - as noted earlier, organisations which
might be considered outsiders in their work on the MA! are clearly insiders in other contexts. An
appropriate balance in the second and third distinctions would be considered advantageous by many
NGOs. Yet the tensions and contradictions in networks' activities identified by Paul Nelson occur
along the fissures which these distinctions indicate.
An understanding of NGO networks as nascent political actors entails rejecting theoretical constructs
which suggest they function as 'honest brokers', or play an impartial role in channelling the views of
their constituencies to inter-governmental fora. If this is accepted, and the influence of non-
governmental actors in certain aspects of global governance is acknowledged, any consideration of the
roles played by NGOs in these contexts must give commensurate consideration to relations between
organisations and the structures for self-governance that support and validate their pailicipation.
2.3.2 Facilitating dissemination of and access to information, experience, and
training
A variety of networks play a service role for participants by providing them with information,
facilitating exchanges between organisations, or enhancing input from NGOs to inter-governmental
processes. This may entail strengthening access to information or the dissemination of information
developed by individual organisations; the provision of training in practical project work or in
lobbying governments and inter-governmental bodies; advice and support in obtaining funding or
other necessary backing; or linking similar organisations to allow dialogue on problems and solutions
for those m comparable circumstances. A distmction was made m the previous section between
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'horizonta' interaction' and 'vertical communication'. Networks which provide services to their
members can operate on both of these axes and will tend to employ some combination of the two.
65
Service networks have a primaiy focus on meeting the needs of their members. As a result, it is not
surprising to find that many demonstrate a considered understanding of the structures of accountability
which ensure that they adequately meet these needs. Potential for conflict arises when the network's
role in linking a wide range of organisations in a particular sector and its resultant knowledge of the
area lead it to be seen by others as a means by which to control and limit NGO access to inter-
governmental decision-making. If a small nwnber of NGO delegates are invited to participate in an
inter-governmental working group, for example, the network (or more precisely its central node) may
be invited to identi1' the most appropriate individuals. As a result, the network could be held to have
acted as a 'gatekeeper', limiting access to positions of influence and perhaps thereby taking decisions
which conflict with its mandate.
The examples considered below illustrate some of the functions of service networks, and explore ways
in which the potential for internal conflict described above has been avoided or accommodated.
Networks such as the International NGO Network on Desertification and Drought (Réseau
International d'ONG sur Ia Désertification - RIOD) aim to bring together organisations working at
local or national level to enable them to interact 'The establishment of the network is based on the
view that through exchange of information, experiences and ideas NGOs and CBOs [Community
Based Organisations] will be more effective in their efforts to fight against desertification' 2 Two
documents shape its activities - the General Framework ofOperation ofRIOD and the NGO Action.
Plan to Combat Desertification, both agreed at an International NGO Planning meeting that was held
in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in November 1994. RJOD functions through a system of focal points
at national, sub-regional, regional and global levels. The network's commitment to an open and
democratic process requires that each focal point establish the most appropriate means of
communication with the organisations it is to serve. Selecting focal points is described as a 'slow
process':
National focal points cannot be self-proclaimed nor appointed by (sub)-regional or global focal
points. National focal points need to be selected in consultation with other NGOs/CBOs in the
country. This can be done by organsing a meeting at the national level to which all
NGOs/CBOs that arective in diyland areas will partwipate. In countries where they exist.
1IL-T	 ..aii .-.LL-UUL _. r Tt EI	 1NGO i.ounct s or	 Feaeratlons can be very neiprui tn getting such meetings .organise
Once sufficient focal points have been established at the national level also the focal points at
62 RIOD-An Introduction ifom RIOD's website httpifriod.ulando.com. Visited on I September2001.
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the sub-reional, regional and global level will also be selected through the "bottom-up"
approach.6
This conscious attempt to build accountability and transparency into the operations of RIOD stands in
marked contrast to many other NGO networks which could be considered 'top-down', not structured
in ways which best suit grassroots members or equipped to provide them with the information or
services they require. However, it should also be noted that the R1OD model would be difficult to
emulate without significant levels of funding. The protracted decision-making process may also lead
to problems if quick responses to particular challenges are required.
Nevertheless, RJOD constitutes an example of the impact of new communications technologies in
transforming what were previously logistical impossibilities into institutional imperatives, as noted by
Gordenker and Weiss earlier. Just as it is misplaced to suggest that NGO networks are necessarily able
to act as honest brokers in promoting the influence of NGOs in inter-governmental contexts, it would
be wrong to imply that information-sharing networks constitute no more than conduits for knowledge
and ideas, or that changes in the means of communication do not present profound challenges to
prevailing structures of power. Jessica T. Mathews states that '[t]he most powerful engine of change
in the relative decline of states and the rise of non-state actors is the computer and telecommunications.
revolution, whose deep political and social consequences have been almost completely ignored':
Above all, the information technologies disrupt hieraithies, spreading power among more
people and groups. Jn drastically lowering the costs of communication, consultation, and
coordination, they favor decentralized networks over other modes of organization. !n a network,
individuals or groups link for joint action without building a physical or formal institutional
presence. Networks have no person at the top and no center. Instead, they have multiple nodes
where collections of individuals or groups interact for different purposes.64
Social Watch brings together reports by national or subnational members on implementation by their
governments of commitments made at the UN World Summit for Social Development and the UN
World Conference on Women (both 1995). Again the legitimacy of the network is closely associated
with its ability to access country-based (especially Southern) critiques of domestic activity and present
these as relevant additions to international consideration of follow-up to these global conferences.
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'Table 2.2 'The Boomerang Pattern'65
State A
Pressure	
State B
x00000000000cx
Blockage	
('	
Inter-
.±	
governmental
Organisation
State A blocks redress to organisations within it; they activate the network whose irembers pressure their own
states and (if necessary) a third party organisation, which in turn puts pressure on State A.
A further significant element in such instances has been described as the 'boomerang effect', whereby
NGOs use an international network to engage an inter-governmental audience in the hope of
influencing their own government Social Watch can thus be interpreted in some instances as an
attempt to use internationally established norms, focusing explicitly on those recognised at the Beijing
and Copenhagen Conferences, to strengthen domestic political influence.
This intermediary function was alluded to in a UN paper on modalities for the work of the UN
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD):
To enhance and facilitate the active and coordinated participation of the non-governmental
organizations in the work of the Commission, the Secretary-General believes that it might be
useful for the non-governmental organizations themselves to organize or continue organizing in
various constituencies and interest groups and to set up non-governmental networks, including
electronic networks, for exchange of information and documentation related to the work of the
Commission and the follow-up of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in genemi.
The Secretary General's suggestion should be placed in context it was proposed that access to annual
sessions of the CSD be extended to include organisations which had been accredited to UNCED
(some 1400 NGOs). Misgivings had been expressed by some governments and various more
established NGOs at the practical difficulties this influx might cause given the size of the rooms
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understood to imply that effective networks might alleviate these problems by allowing NGOs to
share information and agree upon spokespersons designated to represent the views of a broader
constituency.67 Thus networks purporting to extend NGO access and strengthen their involvement in
international processes are obliged to facilitate decisions on which organisations should be allowed
access and which should not.
The difficulty this can cause for NGO networks is particularly apparent when they are placed in the
invidious position of having to identify a small number of representatives to participate in the work of
an inter-governmental body. in their analysis of relations between NGOs and inter-governmental
organisations working on acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), Christer JOnsson and Peter
Söderhohn report on the establishment by a subsidiaiy body of the World Health Organisation of a
&obal inter-governmental task force to provide recommendations on global and countiy-level co-
ordination in tackling AIDS, to include strengthening the involvement of NGOs. This new body
consisted of three representatives each from recipient govermnents, donor governments, the UN
family and NOOs. The means by which the selection of these three representatives should be
conducted was deferred to 'appropriate NGO coordinating bodies'.69 Despite this, no commonly
accepted forum which could play this role existed. Jönsson and SOderholm state that an informal
consultation process was initiated which resulted in selection of 'trusted persons rather than
organisations as such'. Their conclusion suggests that the ad hoc mechanism devised to identify
participants in this task force has not obviated the need for means by which to ensure the
accountability of these representatives in future; conversely, the means by which three individuals
could adequately represent the views of a diverse range of NGOs remain problematic:
It is still unclear how a few organisations might represent the heterogeneous NGO community -
in the task force or in any other contemplated coordination body. Whereas the task force
symbolises official recognition of NGO access to decision-making and coordination, difficult
questions concerning constituency and representation remain.70
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2.3.3 Promoting dialogue between NGOs on issues of principle
Networks can enable NOOs to debate issues of principle and establish commonality, complementary
objectives, or areas of fundamental difference. This kind of dialogue is distinct from discussions on
common strategies and objectives in influencing governments or other actors, yet it can be a
significant precursor to changes in the outcomes NGOs seek to achieve through their lobbying and
campaigning work. Discussions on issues of principle can be particularly important when they occur
between different types of NGO or between NGOs from different parts of the world. For instance,
interaction between environment and development NGOs during the Rio process led many
organisations to reframe their overarching principles to take into account perspectives which may not
have been acknowledged previously. More stnictured interchanges between Northern and Southern
NGOs took place in many contexts which led to a questioning of the assumptions underlying positions
taken previously.71
The coalition of organisations campaigning against South African apartheid established associations
between widely divergent organisations, linking trade unions, NGOs, and politicians from around the
world with the South African resistance movement. Audie Klotz writes of the power of lransnational
social movements to challenge prevailing norms and initiate change through the general acceptance of
new governing principles for global decision-making. She asserts that the anti-apartheid movement
successfully replaced the norms of state sovereignty and the right to self-determination which
undeipinned the South African regime's claims toly in its international relations with the
principle of racial equality. This transition was most marked during the I98Os when the governments
of Britain and the US were ideologically opposed to an extension of sanctions against South Aflica
and preoccupied with the countly's strategic importance in the Cold War. Despite this resistance,
Klotz claims, the histozy of the anti-apartheid movement demonstrates the power of weak and
nonstate actors to transfonn both global norms and the distribution of social power in the international
system:
The international and transnational aspects of South African identity, which I have explored
here only in terms of race, illustrate fundamental tensions between statecentric and transnational
r* i*i
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as missionary societies in the colonial era and a continual flow of immigrants around the globe)
are all relevant to our theorizing about international and domestic transformations.72
A network of organisations united in opposition to the ideological basis of the South African state was
therefore able to change the policies of the most powerful international actors. It also politicised the
role of economic actors associated with South Africa and ensured that they were placed under
sustained pressure to acknowledge the prevailing importance of racial equality as a principle which
should be reflected in their operations, and thereby to withdraw their (implicit or overt) support for the
South African regime.
As noted earlier, the UNRISD analysis of the emergence of a global civil society focuses on
interaction between people at the global level to develop new sets of rights and obligations as the crux
of a shift from a national to a global conceptualisation of citizenship73 This echoes Martin Shaw's
reference to the role of civil society organisations in 'arguing for a different kind of crystallisation of
global state power from those favoured by state elites'.74 Shaw also suggests that the capacity of such
organisations to act in this manner is limited - civil society is still predominantly nationally framed
and, despite examples from the feminist; human rights and environment movements, is not effective at
mobilising power at the international level. The Anti-Apartheid Movement constitutes evidence of
these transformatozy processes occurring at the global level, and suggests that their capacity to
influence governments or inter-governmental bodies is not the only means by which to assess their
effectiveness.75
2.3.3.1 The Transatlantic Environment Dialogue
One example which can usefully be explored in this context is the transatlantic environment
dialogue (TAED) launched in May 1999 by the European Environment Bureau and its US
counterpart, the National Wildlife Federation and disbanded following the 2000 change in US
administration. The TAED has been chosen here because it brought together two sets of
environment NGOs which in most cases had not previously had close working relations. It also
created a new set of criteria for their interaction - contributing and reacting to a broader set of
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dialogues between organisations and governments. Thus although a particular focus for the
TAED was on the means by which to influence inter-governmental decisic5n-making, we might
also expect to find some debate on the establishment of procedures for taking decisions within
the network and some consideration of the means by which shared principles which should
underly all the network's activities could be agreed. Although the TAED existed for less than
two years, it is legitimate to assess the degree to which these aspects of network formation are
seen to have a priori significance, or whether they arise through the operations of the network as
a result of crises in realising the more tangible aspects of the network's agenda.76
The Transatlantic Environment Dialogue was one of a set of 'people-to-people' dialogues initiated
by officials from the US and European governments. During the June 1995 U.SJEU Summit in
Madiid the US and EU governments drafted the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) which was
formally launched in December 1995. The NTA created a series of dialogues between civil society
groups on both sides of the Atlantic. The dialogues were intended to provide government officials
with citizens' perspectives on the most important issues affected by this effort to strengthen U.SJEU
ties. The NTA had four major goals, and the Joint U.S.-EU Action Plan outlined priority action items:
• Promoting peace and stabilityj democracy and development around the world, with
a particular emphasis on the challenges to peace and democracy in Central Europe,
Russia, and the Middle East
• Responding to global challenges, including drug-trafficking, teirorism, environmental
protection, combating human disease and addressing the needs of refugees and
displaced persons. Included in the Action Plan is a commitment to coordinate U.S.IEU
negotiating positions on major global environmental issues
• Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations, with a
particular focus on full implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments,
76 Parallel fora for dialogue between busmess organisauons, chantable feations, C umeroçganisatons, and organised labour as well as a multi-
to facilitate exchange between NGOs on envirenment issues was not initiated until mid-1998. It appears that the respective government de$rtments
believed the credibility of this initiative vwld suffer if a related process for interaction between NGOs were not started.
64The National Wildlife Federation speculates that President Clinton's I99 speech to the World Trade Organisation sent clea onless thmugout the U.S
administration to include NGOs in trade policy development'. In addition, 'The 1997 and 1998 defeats of US "fast track" trade negotiating authority, and
the OECD governments' embarrassment caused by universal NGO rejection of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), have helped to create a
new political atmosphere sunwnding trade and investment negotiations.' NWF website: hu /ww.nwforg/nwintemationa1kiadekaedcnthtin1. Visited
on I September2001.
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strengthening the World Trade Organization, and negotiating greater U.SJEU
economic integration by creating a New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM).
• Building bridges across the Atlantic to bring together business people, scientists,
educators, and others to improve communication and to ensure that future generations
remain committed to developing a full and equal partnership. The Action Plan
specifically calls for supporting and encouraging the transatlantic business
relationship.77
Material produced by the secretariat of the TAED emphasised three points of relevance:
the dialogue is independent of governments and should not be understood as an
acceptance of the terms of reference for the NTA or alegitimising of its activities
. the initial focus on issues of trade, investment and related issues should be broadened
to incoiporate a much broader range of environmental issues
• given the potential significance of a transatlantic axis in these areas the involvement of
NOOs from all regions of the world should be sought
It may be useful to revisit the premise established earlier in this section that the dialectic between
global economic hl,eralisation and global social solidarIty suggests a rci'ie for io&(3f3
networks as the fora within which dialogues on rights, standards and other issues of principle are
conducted between organisations which confront problems arising from processes of globalisation.
The TAED bad as its remit to conduct dialogue between NGOs resulting in 'a united front when
campaigning on global issues such as free trade, climate change and agriculture'. 78 Its stated
objectives related principally to influencing governmental decisions and procedures, yet these are
framed by an overall aim to '[m]onitor transatlantic negotiations and policy making with a view
toward making sustainable development the overall objective in EU-US relations and assessing and
preventing the potential negative impact of governmental policies on the environment'. 79 This would
seem to support the assertion that it existed to promote a fundamentally different set of principles from
TU r1 JLF"UUJ
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A number of criteria were also established earlier by which the proposal that NGO alliances are
performing this function might be assessed. Again, it may be instructive to review some of these
briefly here:
The development of decision-making procedures - John Hontelez of EEB stated that the TAED would
offer the opportunity for co-ordination on lobbying inter-governmental bodies and negotiations: 'we
will use the dialogue to sort out exactly what our positions should be for the benefit of the
environment'.8° This implies consistency in the ideological positions and strategic approaches taken
by participants, and does not allow for dialogue on these more fundamental issues should consensus
prove elusive.
Linkc with other net vorks on issues ofcommon concern - The TAED undertook to 'build upon the
already existing co-operation and joint action among EU and U.S. non-governmental organisations
and promote further dialogue with NCJOs in other regions, including those devoted to consumer,
development and labour issues'.8'
Debates on issues ofprinciple - The lack of emphasis on any means by which participants could
negotiate and review common principles is slrildng in the documents available on the TAED.
Taigeting rogue actors and placing pressure on them to conform with widely accepted nonns and
standards - There is no evidence fiom the availsble documentation that El) }OOs pam)ed tt
channel to challenge the US on issues on which it is out of line with the rest of the world. This could
have occurred through attempts to make direct representations to US Government officials on matters
such as climate change or the regulation of biotechnology. EU organisations could also have tried to
persuade their US counterparts to act more as intermediaries for broader global concerns in their
domestic lobbying activities than had previously been the case. Both approaches would have required
prior agreement on the appropriate uses to which the network should be put - it seems likely that
official reports and press releases would not have included information of this kind. Nevertheless, the
degree to which this type of norm-setting leading to focused lobbying occurs through networlcs such
as the TAED could be significant in determining their success in achieving their overall objectives. Its
could provide support for Sha's claim that civil society organisations ate
nationally framed - in this instance, ideological and pragmatic tensions between European and US
80 EEB website http://www.eeb.be . Visited on I September2001 *
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NGOs could have been exposed which in turn could undermine achievement of the network's stated
policy objectives.
in sum, the TAED is presented by its principal participants as a channel by which the complementary
perspectives of European and US NGOs can be brought to bear more effectively than previously in
influencing the decisions and actions of other actors, notably governments. Issues of self-governance
are marginalised, at least in the material available for public perusal. Where these are acknowledged at
all, they are presented as logistical matters rather than of central importance in establishing the
credibility of the network82 or of value to the participants as elements in a broader elaboration of
'embryonic institutional structures that will define a different form of global governance'. 83 By
contrast, these issues were central to a meeting convened in Manila in 1995.
2.3.3.2 Manila Meeting of NGO Networks
A meeting of NGO networks which addressed the ways in which global norms could be developed
through co-operation was held in Manila in November 1995. Titled 'Meeting the Challenge of the
Emerging Global System', the event was organised by the International NGO Forum [see chapter 4],
whose members had been elected on a regional basis to promote awareness of the Alternative Treaties
negotiated at the Global Forum held during the Rio Summit in 1992. The focus was on forging
collaborative mechanisms which could constitute the starting point for coherent resistance to the
negative impacts of economic and social globalisation Given the cbaYienges poseôy t
global system, the need for more effective NGO networks at the world level was recognised'.TM
Representatives from 77 NGO networks from around the world tackled an ambitious agenda,
attempting to initiate a range of collaborative processes intended to counteract globalisation:
8lIbuL
825cc Ne1son Paul J 'Conflict Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Who Speaks for Whom in Trensnational NGO Netwoiks Lobbying the World Bank?' op.
at.
83 Democmilc Global civil Governance Repo,i oilthe 1995 Benchma,* &irieyofNGOs, cit. p.3.
84 Manila NGO Conference Meeting the Challenge of the Emeigtng Gobal S)stem tmpublished tepoit on the meeting cimulated topaiticipanis, Janualy
19% pars. 1.1. Unpublished report on the meeting circulated to participants, Januaty 1996. Participants endorsed a Statement on Globalisation as the basis
bxthrcoliabcration:	 .
.ua.
knowledge, to increased poverty, both in the South and the North, to environmental degraditio to homogenous wa of life and to destn,ction of cuKures.
11cre are also some positive aspects, but the negative impact is pnslominant. The undersigned NGOs committed themselves to support the positive aspects
(human rights, women's rigits, communication, minonty rigits) and to face the negative economic, political and environmental impacts of globalisatiori in
search fora sustainable development based on justice and equity from local to international levels.'
84Thid,para.1.3
84/bid., pare. 5.1
84 Ibid, para. 2.2
75
We have proposed an interim period of two years during which we can work towards stronger
co-operation and more comprehensive involvement of NGO networks around the world. During
this period we can work together in a number of ways, including the following:
• Enhancing the capacity of regional and national NGOs to work together;
• Identifying gaps where there is no strong international network dealing with a specific
issue. It would be very useful for organizations working on such issues to "buy-in" to
our process and build links and capacity quickly;
• Building alliances through creating a co-operative structure. We should be able to act
together in a more efficient and co-ordinated way than would otherwise be possible.
This is another way in which networks outside the arena in which we operate can be
brought in.85
A number of task groups were created to develop this proposed 'meta-network'. These included
groups focusing on capacity-building for networks; international exchanges of staff; comparisons
between national legislation for NGOs; advocacy training and lobbying; and a 'think tank' intended to
'define public interest in the context of globalisation'. 86 Participants were invited to sign up to
contribute to development of work in these areas. The networks were asked to take the proposal for
creation of these processes for interaction to their own decision-making bodies in order to build the
necessary commitments of time and money into their ongoing work programmes. Five focal points for
each geographical region agreed to promote awareness of the initiative and to liaise in developing the
ideas and proposals put forward at the Manila meeting.
This process is particularly significant in that it identifies globalisation as the spur for the development
of countervailing efforts. It characterises NGOs as limited in their capacity to make the associational
links between disparate issues with common root causes and it presents focused collaboration between
NGO networks as the means by which such conceptual and institutional limitations might be broken
down. Finally, the Manila documentation emphasises the significance of links between local and
global activities, recognising the need for 'decentralisation of power, resources and services' 87 In all
of these respects 'Meeting the Challenges of the Emerging Global System' conforms with the premise
6et
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principle are conducted between organisations which confront problems arising from globalisation, as
suggested earlier. As such, the analysis of the impacts of globalisation advancd and the initiatives
proposed for international NGO networks to challenge such developments are particularly relevant.
The limitations exposed by this initiative should also be considered. Despite attempts to establish
participation in the Manila process as an integral part of the work of international NGO networks, few
if any proved able to incorporate the follow-up into their subsequent work programmes. The principal
funder of the Manila meeting (the Canadian Council for International Co-operation) decided not to
continue to provide backing for work in this area. Even during the event itsell many delegates
expressed reservations about the difficulties in building working relations with a diverse range of
organisations from other regions, issue areas or sectors of society.
The above examples suggest that the development of norms byNGO networks to be promulgated
more widely in international affairs has occurred in particular instances, such as in the work of the
anti-apartheid movement However, to date attempts to establish more general means by which NGOs
can collaborate to translate norms (and strategies for their promotion) from one context to others have
had limited success. These limitations derive from practical difficulties (organisational culture;
problems with funding and staffing) and from conceptual obstacles. With these qualifications, the
output from the Manila meeting suggests that if the pervasive impacts of globalisation are increasingly
understood to present a consistent (but multi-faceted) threat to 'principles of sustainable development
based on justice and equity', the relevance of effective means by which to span existing bathers to
collaboration may become more widely appreciated by NGOs around the world.
2.3.4 Changing the behaviour of an economic actor
Many examples can be cited of networks which bring together individual NGOs with an interest in the
activities of a particular company or group of companies. A representative sample might include the
International Baby Milk Action Network; the Campaign Against the Arms Trade; co-ordination
between organisations opposed to the work of multinational companies such as Monsanto in
modified crops; and recent collaborauve campaigns drawing attention to
incidences of child lalour in production of consumer goods such as sports shoes and footbl1s. At the
international level, this is perhaps most interesting when the leverage the network has over the
companies' activities in one context derives in large measure from its ability to mobilise consumers in
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another. In addition to the range of government-sponsored sanctions which were supported, the anti-
apartheid movement initiated boycotts of South African produce (to reduce the flow of foreign
exchange to the countiy and reinforce its isolation from international society) and established
campaigns against international companies with overt links to South Africa (to put pressure on
companies such as Barclay's Bank to sever these associations and to provide individuals who shared
the network's principles with accessible targets for their own actions).
The UNR1SD report States ofDisairay asserts that '[s]ince governments often lack the capacity or
will, much of the impetus for fostering corporate responsibility has come from citizens' groups'.88
 The
report identifies three techniques employed by NGOs in recent years to put pressure on multinational
corporations: organising corporate boycotts; formulating codes of conduct; and offering alternative
investment sirategies. The first two tactics have been extensively pursued at the international level
over the past thirty years by NGOs collaborating through the International Baby Food Action Network
(IBFAN) to combat the promotion of artificial infant foods by multinational companies and their
subsidiaries.
Promotion of and opposition to artificial infant foods both have international origins. Nestlé was
operating as a multinational company before the start of the 20th Centui with substantial markets in
Europe, North and South America and South East Asia. The response from NGOs and statutozy
bodies was also initially international: concern expressed by a UN body (the UN Protein-Calorie
Advisory Group) in 1970 was followed by preparation of a draft code of practice on athe irgy t
International Organisation of Consumers Unions (IOCU) in 1972 and publication of The Baby Killer
by the development NGO War on Want in 1 974•89 It was only subsequently that national boycotts
were organised by members of IBFAN and others and that national-level legislation and monitoring
was initiated. These efforts continued, in most instances, to be closely associated with the international
network National boycotts also indicate awareness of the international context - with reference to the
US boycott of Nestlé products initiated in 1977 Chetley writes: 'Nestlé was genuinely surprised by the
boycott, not least because none of its infant formula products was sold in the United States.'9°
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The work of IBFAN also provides a number of examples of agenda setting byNGOs at the
international level. These encompass influence over inter-governmental fora (through publication of
regular Breaking the Rules reports on implementation of the marketing code initiated by IOCU and
agreed by WHO and UNICEF); national governments (witness the adoption of the code in national
legislation and the introduction of other national legal instruments deriving from it - also the volte
face by the USA, which was the only country to oppose the marketing code in 1981, but had changed
this position by 1994); national NGOs and consumers (through the succession of national boycotts
initiated throughout the period) and producers themselves (evident in the voluntary agreement to an
advertising ban entered into by US companies in the early 1990s). The inherently international nature
of the campaign was recognised by participants:
Dealing with the strategy developed by the TNCs demanded a broad base of support constantly
updated information, and a careful analysis which showed that the events were not isolated
incidents, but pait of an integrated world-wide pattern of marketing ... The TNCs, meanwhile,
were not slow to recognize that they too needed to organize internationally. Nestlé had carried
most of the criticism in the early years of the campaign, but an increasing amount was rubbing
off on the other companies. They recognized the dangers of being picked off one by one and
began building a buffer organization to deflect the growing crfficisim'
It is significant that the industry network established in 1975 (the International Council of Infant Food
Industries [ICIFI]) was unable to exert a comparable influence. Its opposition to the WHO/UNICEF
code for marketing in 1981 did not lead to the abandonment of the code. Although Nestlé created its
own guidelines and monitoring body (the Nestlé Infant Fotimila Pidt C
	
issoti üsboy was
disbanded after ten years in 1991 after releasing research which was critical of the company's
activities in Mexico.
This suggests that John McCormick's assertion that international NGO activity is dependent upon the
emergence of political internationalism and the creation of international governmental organisations to
give them 'contextual relevance and permanence' could be broadened to include the context provided
by the activities of multinational companies. The interaction and mutual reinforcement evident
between NGO networks and inter-governmental bodies in this instance also call into question
McCormick's rernise that the creation of international authorities to be lobbied constitutes a
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precondition for the emergence of international mechanisms for NGO co-oñiination - in this instance,
formation of IBFAN in 1979 predated agreement to the International Code of Marketing of Breast-
91 Ibid. pp.4-7.
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Milk Substitutes at the 34th World Health Assembly by two years. Instigation of national boycotts and
promotion of a code of practice, two of the key techniques for NGOs in attemting to change the
behaviour of multinational corporations identified in the UNRISD report, were already established
before inter-governmental activity became significant. The a priori significance McCormick ascribes
to inter-governmental institutions does not seem appropriate here.
Another model for interaction between NGOs and the private sector advances forms of constructive
engagement, founded on the principle that 'credibility is a cornerstone of trust':
NGOs should be supported in various ways to partake in meaningful dialogue and then
even negotiation. Companies cannot leave this process to civil society alone, as coalitions
of NGOs can marginalise certain issues. Instead, companies should take a leadership role in
helping to support systems of independent consultation, which may include efforts to build
the organising and negotiating capacity of affected groups. This is a major undertaking for
an individual corporation, and so partnership with other companies, major international
NOOs and intergovernmental agencies is advisable.92
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) was established in 1997 as a partnership between the World
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Unilever plc. Penny Fowler and John Heap present a cautiously
optimistic account of its early activities, deriving from 'the identification of a common objective, the
facilitation of intermediaries, the creativity of staff in both organisations and the pre-existence of the
FSC [Forestry Stewardship Council]', but qualify this by recognising further work needed 'to bring its
stakeholders, particularly fish-workers and development NGOs on board'. 93
 The MSC claims to have
been able to instigate best practice in various areas of commercial fishing, with much more significant
results than UN-sponsored efforts to achieve change in industry practice through international
negotiation and regulation. Nevertheless, the degree to which the collaboration is constructive has
been questioned by other NGOs, and its replicability in other contexts is unclear.
2.3.5 Changing the behaviour of a social group
Networks may exist to link organisations which share the desire to influence culturally or socially
prescribed patterns of behaviour. The benefits of participation in such processes to individual
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organisations are more diffuse than those which motivate organisations involved in networks designed
to increase the influence of NGOs in inter-governmental decision-making.
The campaign against female genital mutilation (FGM) is an example of an international alliance
involving a diverse range of organisations aiming to delegitimise a practice still considered socially
acceptable in certain places. It includes the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF),
Amnesty International (Al), the FGM Network, and Christian Solidarity International, as well as inter-
governmental organisations such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UNIFEM. The
constituent elements of this network include international women's organisations for whom the issue
is articulated as a manifestation of patriarchy and a rejection of female sexuality. For example,
Caroline Coon uses FGM as evidence of the continuing relevance of feminism, and by implication
rejects any suggestion of cultural relativism: 'I need to be a feminist because ... I can't bear to live on
earth knowing that at this moment millions of girls are having their citorises cut off Feminism has
grown out of a tradition of supporting other oppressed women across the world.' The rejection of
specificity may become problematic if it is thought to undermine local efforts to achieve change. The
example of Senegal is instructive in this respect. In January 1999 a decision was taken by the
Senegalese Parliament to outlaw FGM. This was applauded by a range of international NGOs and
inter-governmental bodies. Carole Bellamy, UNICEF Executive Director, said the action reflects
Aflican women's resolve to end 'a cruel and unacceptable practice which violates the right of all girls
to free, safe and healthy lives'.95
The UN Non-Government Liaison Service report on this decision goes on to emphasise the
complexity of the issue:
since the Parliament's decision there has been a backlash from many traditional leaders,
especially in northern Senegal. On 11 February InterPress Service (IPS) reported that the new
law has undennined local efforts to stop female circumcision; it says women from 31 villages
travelled to Dakar to explain why making FGM a crime at this time would not help abolish the
practice. The law, according to local activists, is viewed as having been dictated by "outside"
forces such as aid organizations and Northern governments, rather than having been presented
for local debate. Many opponents of the procedure decline to use the word "mutilation,"
preferring to look t it as simply a health problem and supiorting a strategy of education over
__	
-	
E
94 The Guardian Section 2 London UK August 9 1999 p.7.
95 UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service 'Senegal Bans Female Genital Mutilation' Go Between 74, UN NGLS Geneva Swittand Apn3May 1999.
96/bid.
81
There is clearly a difference between the operations of the international network in this context, and
the model for incorporation of local experience and perspectives established 6y MOD. Caroline Coon
implies that the practice is so abhorrent and repressive that total opposition to FGM should be an
intrinsic element of feminism, and indeed that it constitutes the strongest illustration of the continuing
relevance of feminism today. Yet if this uncompromising stance were found to be counterproductive
(as the JPS report suggests) how could an alternative approach to the issue be negotiated and
established? Although the principles underlying the positions taken on FGM by the organisations
mentioned are very similar, a concomitant principle of participatory democracy should be identified in
this instance as a corollary to achieving societal change.
It is perhaps significant that international human rights networks place a strong emphasis on the
practice of FGM as an extreme instance of violations of the rights of women which are evident in
many other contexts. Al states that FGM is 'an extreme example of efforts common to societies
around the world to manipulate women's sexuality, ensure their subjugation and control their
reproductive functions'. IPPF emphasises the need to ensure that international concern is consistent
with the priorities of local activists:
Historically, the issue of FGM has been avoided because of its sensitive nature, but currently
there is an international and national momentum tooy address the issue. There is also an
increasing recognition of the need to support local activists and share innovative grassroots
initiatives which have succeeded in maldng some impact in eradicating FGM.
Keck and Silddnk explore this tension in detail: they claim that the issue of FGM was particulañy
contentious around the time of the 1980 Copenhagen UN Conference on Women, but that
subsequently attempts to delegitimise the practice were 'resituated within a broader campaign against
violence against women', and that as a result 'it was defused and legitimized':
Critics sometimes argue that lransnational networks are vehicles for imposing concerns of
Western states, foundations, or NGOs upon social movements in the third world. The violence
frame helped women overcome this often sterile north-south debate by creating a new category:
when wife battering or rape in the United States, female genital mutilation in Africa, and dowry
death in India were all classified as forms of violence against women, women could interpret
these as common situations and seek similar root causes?9
1. 
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97 Al website: httpf/v w.amnesty.s&wvnic/289e.htm. Visited on I Septemb 2001.
98 IPPF website: htlp//www.ippf.oiglfgmf. Visited on I seplemba 2001.
99 Keck, Margaret 5, and Kathryn Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in international Politics op. cit. 1998 p.'97.
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The involvement of Al in work on this issue highlights another factor of relevance. The organisation's
work is primarily to identify, verify and publicise violations of human righth by governments, with a
particular focus on the incarceration or silencing of political opponents. However, as the following
quotation emphasises, the distinction this implies between public and private activities is arbitrary in
many contexts:
Numerous critiques have sought to demonstrate that traditional interpretations of international
standards have created an artificial, hierarchical distinction between violations by state forces in
the realm of public political activity and similar abuses in the "private" sphere. One of the
results has been that the international legal regime has offered scant protection to women from
systematic, grave and gender-based abuses inflicted on them by non-state actors. The
public/private distinction overlooks the fact that systematic abuse in the "private" sphere has a
public dimension, in so far as it arises from more or less officially sanctioned prejudices,
discrimination or intolerance. It precludes these abuses from being considered as a hwnan rights
issue.
If human rights violations can be located in the 'private sphere', and the international legal system
offers little protection to individuals abused by non-state actors, clearly Al's mandate necessitates its
involvement Yet by challenging the activities of such non-state actors, AL could be understood to
have exceeded its remit by taking a partisan position on a domestic political issue. This issue is
particularly problematic for Al, in that its reputation depends to a large extent on rigorous application
of a well-established set of procedures to maintain the credibility of its interventions. lithe
public/private distinction is blurred, does this necessitate some renegotiation of the organisation's
activities? Krause and Knight describe such cases using what they term 'the umbrella of a
"state/society perspective," signalling that the basic unit of analysis is not the state but the complex of
social relationships that coalesce within and across states and are projected into the international
dimension'.'°'
2.3.6 Supporting or creating individual members of the network
It could be considered self-evident that networks exist to support their members, but even so this
constitutes a distinct objective from those outlined above. The extent of this support maybe limited to
of useful information or contacts. In other instances, participation in an international
network confers c'onslderable legitimacy and influence on national affiliates - members
100 Al website op. cli.
101 Krause, Keith and W. Andy Knight eds. Slate, Society, and the UN System: Changing perspecth'es on nwl:ilaieroitsm United Nations Univsity
Tokyo, Japan 1995 p.261.
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Federation of United Nations Associations, for example, have recourse to an extensive list of
organisations in pursuing their work and can appeal for more direct supportif their own existence is
threatened by a hostile government.
Networks may also create (or promote the creation of) members at local or national levels. Peter Wahi
suggests that Oxfam International has taken this approach, supporting the creation of national affiliates
in Germany and Québec, while Greenpeace has established new national partners based in Moscow
and Beijing.' 02 This serves to demonstrate the relevance of the issue(s) addressed, and by inference the
relevance of the network itself; to a growing and diverse audience; it increases the capacity of the
network as a whole to claim to articulate the views of members from around the world, and it meets
the needs of participating organisations to have points of contact in an increasing number of countries.
2.3.7 Overlaps
The preceding section has outlined distinct objectives NGO networks exist to pursue, and sketched
out some of the principal issues of contention arising for practitioners and academics in achieving or
analysing collaborative mechanisms in these various contexts. Of particular significance in the
elaboration of these objectives is the difficulty one would have in establishing any coherent schema
for assessing the effectiveness of NGO networks. In place of the narrow formula for gauging political
influence advanced by Bas Arts, we ate confronted with a multiplicity of ways in which NGO
participants, inter-governmental bodies, grassroots organisations and any other prospective
beneficiaries of the networking process might measure its success. The examples cited also
substantiate Nelson's emphasis on the a priori significance of negotiations on self-governance within
NGO networks if any of the functions outlined are to be performed effectively.
It should also be acknowledged that considerable overlap is evident in practice between the different
archetypes identified above. All of the networks cited as examples perform activities which could
place them in at least one of the other categorisations. Again, this lends credence to the idea that
102 Wahi, Peter 'Globalisalion From Bevnd Elenients (era Fuiwe Sawegy of NGOs in the Post-Rio Age' Paper presented at the World Economyand
on the i,itemct at http '/www.comlink.apc.orWweedlcnv dc/bcyondI .htm - visited on I September2001 I See also the expansion of the network of national
hiendsofthc Earth organisations - in 1982, Tom Burke wrote: 'Rtxruiuuent of new national bodies is not thespecific responsibilityofanypart of FOEI
and it is a clear policy of the organization that initiatives must oiiginate flmi the counti, in question. In practice, FOE UK and FOE US have played the
largest part in developing initial inquincs through to the point of fomial application. FOE UK has recently played an Important part in helping groups of
people in Cyprus, Sn Lanka and Papua New Guinea acquire the necessaiy confidence and expertise to found new organutions.' Burke, Tom 'Fnends of
the Earth and the Conservation of Resouro& in Willetis, Petered. Pressure Groups ur the Global Sya1em. The TransnatlonalRdatiorssoflssue-Oden&zied
Non.Governnte,ual Organizations pp.15-30, Frences PinterLondon 1982 p.20.
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measures of success for NGO networks resemble a complex web rather than a linear scale gauging
external influence. If this revision to more prevalent models for assessing NGO effectiveness is
conceded, one dimension which merits further consideration is when organisational limitations
preclude pursuing multiple strategies simultaneously. The 1995 Benchmark Survey of NGOs suggests
that time constraints for organisations participating in international meetings oblige them to strike a
balance between lobbying governments and negotiating adequate systems for self-governance.'03
Similar choices may arise through decisions on the allocation of funding or staff expertise. Pursuit of
one objective over another may arise as a result of deliberate strategising to determine the most
promising means to an end (the work of RIOD, for example) or it may be determined by the wider
context in which the network's activities take place (the MAI Coalition). It is unclear how these types
of trade-offs are calculated, in that they require comparison between vely different organisations and
contexts. It is relevant to note here that precedence is by no means always given to influence over
inter-governmental decision-maldng
The anti-apartheid movement provides an illustration of overlaps between attempts to influence
economic actors and activities intended to challenge social norms. Achievement of each of these two
objectives may necessitate quite distinct strategies. For example, members of the Climate Action
Network share the overarching objective of achieving a reduction in emissions of substances which
disrupt the global climate to the point where long-term climatic destabilisation has been avoided. To
this end, they may focus on the roles of different actors who contrIbute In some way to ne piolthen.
This may entail putting pressure on governments, individually or collectively, to enact legislation to
ban particularly harmful activity or place a prohibitive cost on it It may mean initiating public
awareness campaigns, designed to educate the public and persuade them to alter their behaviour
accordingly. NGOs may attempt to persuade companies to provide more environmentally friendly
alternatives through pushing for more widespread availability and standardisation (the introduction of
alternatives to chorofluorocarbons in aerosols, for example) or even through demonstrating that
products which companies are reluctant to take up are economically viable (Greenpeace's 'Green
Fudge', or various prototype electronic cars, for example).
change through public education may conceivably be undermined by the suggestion that alternative
103 Nonan Royal MinisnyofFoieignAffaiisDemomatic Global CMI Goventance Repoil ofthe 1995 Benclunas*SunreyofNGOs, . cit p.5.
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products or services could become available which would require no alteration in behaviour by
consumers. Similarly, proscriptive legislation by governments may exacerbate hostility towards the
environmental movement from the general public and from decision-makers in industiy, and thereby
adversely affect attempts to achieve societal change. In attempting to find the right mix, NGOs are
confronted with conflicting pressures: on the one hand to co-ordinate in order to ensure that there is
some coherence in their work in these different contexts; on the other to establish a clear profile for
their own work by distancing the organisation from collaborative structures. 104 This can in turn result
in an excessive emphasis on one particular aspect of achieving change to the detriment of others
because this bolsters the individual organisation's standing.
2.4 Conflicts within International NGO Networks
The development of a broader conception of NGO influence in processes of global governance and
the significance of networks in realising these diverse objectives have been the subjects of this chapter.
We should now recognise that a diversity of aims, strategies and principles pursued or held by
members of an NGO network also entails scope for divisions. The instances cited below ifiustrate
tensions which can arise within NGO alliances:
2.4.1 Tension between Northern and Southern NGOs
The Norwegian ForUM (Forum for Environment and Development) held a seminar in 1995 on
NGOs' Role in Civil Society - Comnwn or Opposing Interests? Rita Knit summarises the conclusions
from the event by emphasising structural tensions within the international NGO community:
The view from the South presented at this seminar was cleai that Northern attitudes to the
South and to Southern development issues and Southern civil society organizations are
characterized by a mixture of sensationalism and romanticism designed to provoke feelings of
guilt and charity. Neither the image nor the reaction are based on any understanding of the
conditions of the South, and Northern interventions therefore simply perpetuate structural
Southern underdevelopment and dependency)°5
It shoul4 also be noted that in various contexts Southern NGOs play the leading role in determining
positions taken by a larger body of organisations. Paul Nelson suggests that in
104 Greenpeace International provides an example of the latter stance- see for example Krut, Rita Globalization and CMI Society: NGO Influence in
International Decislon-Maltingop. cIL 'Historically ... Gmcnpcacc has not favored coalitions and networks with other NGOs, is highly campaign driven,
and highly effective at different times and at all points along the decision-making spectrum'.
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replenishment of IDA 11 (the World Bank's International Development Association), Northern
NGOs, particularly US-based organisations, which had been hostile towaids the World Bank as a
whole and had opposed the previous IDA round, deferred to their Southern colleagues' strong views
on the need for support in replenishment)° 6
 Despite this, Southern NGOs have had to confront
difficulties in gaining access to information; lack of access to their own government officials, and to
those from donor countries; and preconceptions that their principal input relates to their domestic
circumstances rather than deriving from their legitimacy as participants in international policy
dialogues)07
Michael Edwards et aL suggest that, in certain contexts, this tension derives in some measure from the
underlying competition between NOOs over limited funding available in the form of foreign aid from
donor countries. The projected decline in official aid may be beneficial in creating the conditions for
more constnictive relations: 'The gradual replacement of foreign aid by a wider agenda of
international co-operation makes it easier for NGOs and other civil society organisalions to work
together, without the distorting effects of coniracts, conditions and unequal access to funding')°8
Others have pointed to ideological distinctions which may prove more resilient, citing the charitable
perspective of some Northern development organisations as inimical to the evolution of collaborative
relations intended to empower the Southern partners to play an effective role in international policy
deliberations.
2.4.2 Tension between local and global organisations
Tensions arise between organisations operating at different levels in two principal ways: first, if the
'macro' goal pursued by those focusing on 'global' issues is thought have adverse consequences at the
local level by those working there; and second, if 'global' NGOs claim legitimacy through their role in
representing broader groupings of NOOs but do not adequately communicate with this constituency.
As noted earlier, changes in communications technology have rapidly altered notions of what is
acceptable. It is now possible for geographically disparate organisations to consult extensively and
exchange information and views almost simultaneously with their partners As Gordenker and Weiss
suggestthis niakepossibIe a 'scaling upfvtain tes of tians
	 alaotivitieth'omiocaUevelaipn .
105 Ibid.
106 Nelson, Paul 'Conflict Legitimacy and EfTectiveness Who Speaks for Whom in Tivisnational NGO N6'wuks Lobbying the World Bank?', op. cia
107 Ibid.
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to the global level and 'scaling down' to involve grassroots organisations.'° 9 This may lead to the
emergence of new institutional imperatives, changing the balance of influehce within some
international NGO networks to mirror the growing capacity of local or grassroots members to bring
their perspectives to bear in international processes.
2.4.3 Tension over issues of principle
Increasing influence in inter-governmental deliberations may exacerbate differences on issues of
principle not previously brought to the fore in relations between NGOs. US 'pro-life' organisations
circulated leaflets during the 1996 Habitat II Conference in Istanbul which attempted to establish links
between general statements of principle made during international conferences (notably the
International Conference on Population and Development [1994] and the Fourth World Conference
on Women [1995]) and specific legislation by US States and elsewhere on access to abortion
services."0 The inference was that the 'pro-choice' lobby bad exerted undue influence over these
international fora and that this had contributed to introduction of legislation which the authors
ed." In effect, a domestic ideological dispute bad been translated to the international level
through the perceived influence of the UN in setting national agendas.
A similar process is evident in the leading role played by the US National Rifle Association (NRA) in
the establishment in 1997 of an international umbrella organisation, the World Forum on the Future of
the Sports Shooting Activities. A spokesperson for the NRA stated 'The hope of this organisation is
that it will have the united voice of the shooting community, the gun-owning community. We're
hopeful we can have influence at the UN and some influence with our own government and preclude
some kind of treaty that might clamp down on firearms." 12 NRA has gained UN ECOSOC
consultative status, and NRA delegates have been active in meetings of the UN Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice. This has in turn led to discussions on the role of the Conference of
Non-Governmental Organisations in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations (CONGO).
108 Edwards, Michael, David Hulme and Tina Wallace 'NGOs bi A Global Future Manying Local DelivayTo Worldwide Leverage' Confce Paper.
Birmingham UK 1999. Available online at httpilwww.soc.titcch.ac.jp/ngo'g-futurthtml . Visited on I September2001.
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Although CONGO is ostensibly a non-partisan alliance," the fundamental differences which exist
between the NRA and many of CONGO's members have led to discussions on the purpose of
CONGO itself and whether it is possible to act impartially in dealings with such disparate
organisations."4
2.4.4 Tension over strategies to achieve common ends
NGOs may take diametrically opposed positions despite having broadly compatible objectives. In
1997 a number of governments, most notably from the EU countries, supported negotiation of a global
convention on forests. Some NGOs supported this objective, arguing that the process of negotiation
would allow NGOs to have substantial influence over the commitments to be entered into. The
Environmental Investigation Agency committed itself to 'ensure the rapid negotiation of a Global
Forests Convention that will strictly regulate timber companies and protect forests'." 5 The majority of
NGOs lobbying on these issues opposed negotiation of a Convention, which they feared would
'enshrine weak standards, favour commercial interests over conservation, and distract attention from
the real action needed'."6 Attempts to agree a common position on the proposed Convention during
preparatory meetings for the UN General Assembly review of outcomes from the Rio Summit met
with little success, and as a result there was no coherent lobbying position taken by NGOs as a whole.
2.4.5 Tension over relations with other actors
Although in some instances difficulties have occurred in relations between NGOs and trade unions or
the scientific community, by far the most contentious interaction is with the private sector, and
transnational corporations (I'NCs) in particular. In a global survey of 133 NGOs conducted between
October 1997 and January 1998, the nature of this relationship was clear:
113 'CONGO was set up in 1948 ass co-adinathig body, as a watchdog of NGO interests in the consuhative system and as a framewedc for NGO Co.
opetation in a nirniber of fiekis of oonancm interest' - Rice, Anr.bew E. and CviiI Ritchie 'Relationships between intenialional non-governmental
organizations and the United Nations A Researdi and Policy Paper' pp.254-265, TrOIZDIOJiOMOJASSOCIGilO.*S l. 47 No.5 1995.
114k is worth nnting in passing that both the NRA and its pnncipal opponents sock to po.lray the other as 'undernociatic', filling to comply with principles
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• 41% thought that the current relationship between TNCs and NGOs was antagonistic.
47% did not even think a relationship exists. 64% of participatin NGOs felt powerless in
their dealings with TNCs.
• 62% believed that global companies do not care about ethical standards of corporate
conduct.
• 64% thought that global companies do not play by the rules of fair competition under
existing legal and social constraints.7
This level of concern is evident in the work of international environmental NGOs. The Environment
Liaison Centre International drafted a document entitled 'How to Develop a Code of Conduct for
Voluntary Organizations' following the Rio Summit in 1992 which was constructed around
distinctions between NGOs and other actors:
A VO Code of Conduct will raise awareness on the function and responsibilities of Voluntary
Organizations in society which diverge from those of business, industry and governments.
Industry is driven by the principle of profit and sees people as consumers whose purchasing
power is to be tapped for the remuneration of invested capital. The modem state is driven by
governmental control and people are perceived as citizens with democratic rights whose votes
are needed to legitimize the exercise of state power."8
Debates within the UN Commission on Sustainable Development NGO Steering Committee on
the role of industry are addressed in Chapter 4. Follow-up to the Rio Summit poses a particular
definitional problem in that the private sector is designated as one of nine 'major groups' of civil
society, which places industry as equivalent to NGOs, trade unions, local government and other
sectors. The inference that all these groups share broad objectives in attempts to achieve
sustainable development have been challenged in various instances. The Women's Environment
and Development Organization reports that women's health organisations participating in a
preparatory meeting for the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women adopted a resolution
banning the participation of transnational corporations from their caucus meetings and asked that
those organisations representing the infant formula, pharmaceutical, tobacco, pesticides and other
cifries	 h	 fifd	 afibliG1Io
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meet, reach consensus, set policy, plan and strategize without the presence and influence of
organisations formed to protect the financial and business interests of their members. One NGO
stated 'it is unconscionable that people-centered groups should have to share their one channel to
policy makers with profit-making concerns'.119
NGOs may also stigmatise development of working relations with governments, which is sometimes
characterised as 'co-option'. Tatsuro Kunugi contrasts the lack of consultation by governments in the
fonnulation of Programmes of Action at international conferences and elsewhere with subsequent
attempts to engage NGOs:
When it comes to the implementation of the programmes of aclion ... governments tend to rely
on the cooperation of NGOs whether directly or through the UN or other intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs). This tendency often entails the risks of co-optation and the loss of NGOs'
special characteristics, comparative advantages and autonomy.'2°
Because of their role as intermediaries between inter-governmental bodies and NGOs, networks have
frequently been the context in which debates on the form and extent of relations with other actors have
taken place. Differences between members of international networks on these issues may reflect their
distinct origins or understanding of their role in opposing or working with representatives of industry
or government. National affiliates to Friends of the Earth International have divergent views on such
questions, and increasing disquiet has been expressed by Southern organisations at the more
collaborative stance taken by their Northern partners.12'
2.4.6 Tension over organisationa! issues
Divisions may also occur over pragmatic aspects of the network's activities. This might include the
siting of headquarters, responsibilities and Supervision of staff; the production of newsletters or other
publications by the network, and matters of internal accountability and representation.
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'Table 2.3 Problems which limit co-operation among NGO networks
Problems which Limit Co-operation Among NGO Networks
(From Peter Padbury 'International Cooperation among NGO Networks'1)
There [are] a number of problems that limit the capacity of NGOs and their networks to work
together.
Competition: NGQs are an independent and highly competitive group so cooperation does not come
naturally. The fact that media attention and fundraising dollars go to the groups that get the spotlight
can make cooperation harder.
Limited Capacity: Most NGOs are over-committed and over-worked. They have limited capacity for
cooperation.
Funding: Umited financial resources are a fact of life for most NGO work and a factor in many of the
problems outlined here.
Unprepared: NGOs are unprepared and ineffective players in the policy dialogue. Often, we do not
do the research, analysis, or policy proposals or built the constituency - to take advantage of
opportunities in an effective and timely fashion.
Accountability: Weak accountability and other 'networking diseases' are problems that can cascade
through many networks. Many networks are not as strong as they could be because the member
NGOs do not put time and resources to make the network work effectively. When the capacity or the
commitment of the members is low, the capacity of the network to collaborate with other networks is
low. Networks with low accountability are a liability for everyone who works with them.
Identity: Numerous differences (language, culture, history, values, issues, budget, and access to
technology, etc.) make cooperation difficult at the best of times. Often all that unites NGOs is we are
reacting to different aspects of the same global forces. When we are unclear about our analysis and
our own Identity, it is hard to work together.
No constituency: In many countries, particularly in the North, NGOs and their networks have lost (or
not built?) the public and political constituency to validate and support their work.
Limits on human rights: in some countries these limit network possibilities to cooperate nationally
and internationally.
In his analysis of relations between NGOs and the World Bank, Manuel Chiriboga emphasises the
differences between community-based groups, NGO networks, transnational alliances or coalitions,
and liaison and support organisations.' 23
 Having established the distinct roles played by each of these
which should boessessed'when considering thetri,mt,,
work of international NGO alliances:
122 Padbwy, Peter 'International Cooperation among NGO Networks', op.cit.
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an adequate balance among the different arenas in which global campaigns are held:
local, national and international, with adequate information flow among the said arenas
and with shared guidance.
an adequate balance between action from the masses and specialised influence by
specialised NGO groups. Not giving adequate attention to this can lead to a dependence
solely on NGOs' technical capacities, normally those from the North.
a balance between confrontation and negotiation perspectives with the Multilateral
Development Banks, in which both perspectives help achieve the desired reform
objectives. Experience shows that negotiation tends to be more successful when there
are more radical campaigns with more inclusive agendas.
• balance is also required between the short medium and long term objectives, where
special attention should be given to the need for creating more stable alliances; to
develop the capacity of groups at other levels so that they can understand and undertake
this type of action; and, above all, to build a base of social support to achieve a more
democratic and inclusive vision of development.
2.5 Conclusions
The functioning of NGO networks has considerable significance to existing and emerging systems of
global governance. This extends well beyond their role as channels by which information and
lobbying positions are channeled from constituent groups to inter-governmental institutions, or as the
means by which the decisions and prioiities established in these contexts are disseminated to a broader
audience for whom they are of some relevance. These two broad functions could be understood as the
'lowest conmon denominator' which are accepted in assessments of this subject. This more restrictive
interpretation of the impact of NGO networks is apparent in analysis by a number of international
relstions theorists, and is evident also in UN documents which establish the terms for NCIO
ppaipa1Ionin1JN pmcessesucha the
demonstrated in the earlier consideration of the objectives NGO networks exist to achieve: even those
23 Chinboga, Manuel 'NGOs and the Wodd Bank: Lessons and Challenges' paper psepared for the Montresi International Fonim, Montreal Canada
September 1999.
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networks which could reasonably be characterised as established to perform one or both of these
accepted functions also confront questions of self-governance. I have suggested that success in
tackling these challenges is a critical determinant of their capacity to function as networks in any of
the ways essayed earlier.
A further modification to the prevalent model of networking therefore opens the internal operations of
the network as a relevant area for analysis. Tensions that exist between different 'nodes' of the
network can only be resolved through an effective system of self-governance, which in turn can be the
impetus for a re-evaluation of shared principles, and of the sirategies and objectives which participants
in the network agree to pursue. This capacity to respond to the collective concerns of its members is
also the network's principal claim to legitimacy. To the extent that NGOs are recognised as credible
representatives of civil society as a whole, networks such as the MAJ Coalition can be understood as a
forum for dialogue between a wide range of perspectives which results in the articulation of the
common concerns of a much broader swathe of society in international deliberations.
To what extent do international NGO networks depend upon the existence of formal systems of
governance for their contextual relevance? A number of the examples cited earlier indicate that
external determinants of relevance maybe found in the activities of private companies (the
International Baby Food Action Network) or of sectors of society (the campaign against female genital
mutilation). In these instances the absence of a fixed inter-governmental context did not hamper
development of effective international NGO alliances. Yet it is also valid to identify limits to the
capacity for networks to function without a clear external focus. The 1995 Manila meeting of
networks attempted to elaborate principles for collaboration and develop a 'mela-network' which
could link work underway in a range of areas, providing practical advantages to participants (access to
information and expertise; ability to reach a large number of diverse organisations) and the capacity to
extend debate on issues of principle by linking the contexts in which such dialogue was occurring.
Peter Padbuzy's analysis of 'Problems which Limit Cooperation Among NGO Networks' [see Table
2.3] derives in large measure from difficulties in establishing an effective network after the Manila
meeting.
1 1JLJ.LJIJ1U .111 I
Exposing the internal workings of international NGO networks to scrutiny also reveals conflicts which
cannot readily be resolved through negotiation. Divisions on issues of principle or on relations with
governments or the private sector may constitute an unbridgeable schism which could undermine the
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integrity of the network. For example, a procedure for establishing a code of conduct for voluntary
organisations was developed by the Environment Liaison Centre lnternatic5nal (ELCI) in part as a
result of a disagreement with the International Facilitating Committee (IFC) which was established to
guide non-governmental preparations for the Rio Summit.' 24
 ELCI rejected the organising principles
of the IFC, that voluntary organisations and industry could be considered as elements of the
'independent sector'. This led to a split within the network which had a significant impact on the role
played collectively by NGOs in the Rio Summit. This dispute will be explore more fully in the next
chapter, but it is relevant to note in this context that ELCI's production of principles for a Code of
Conduct suggests that the IFC had violated widely understood ethical or procedural givens, and that a
formalisation of these shared principles would lessen the likelihood of similar conflicts arising in
future.
Conflicts within NGO networks are also evident between organisations operating in different contexts,
or at different levels. This is most apparent in divisions between Northern and Southern NGOs, and
between local, grassroots and global NGOs. Whilst inequality within the networlç favouring global
and Northern organisations, may be readily acknowledged, this does not necessarily result in action to
remedy the problem. Edwards, Hulme and Wallace present this as a threat to the wider credibility of
networks, and as a pertinent test of their legitimacy
Channels of communication and networking are far more open to those in the North, and to
well-resourced NOOs in the South. Few are prepared, it seems, to back their support for broader
participation with the financial resources required to promote the voices of smaller organisations
and marginalised groups. Unless this changes, public questioning of NGO legitimacy and
accountability will continue to mount fatally undermining the credibility that NGOs will need if
they are to play a part in global debates.'25
Again, this constitutes a shift in the means by which to assess the validity of a network According to
Edwards et al. credibility is dependent upon evidence of efforts to achieve greater equality in
communication and interaction between NGOs and thereby ensuring a voice for marginalised groups
in international fora. Notions of equity in relations between NGOs operating at the international level
must be understood to constitute a counterpoint to prevailing inequalities. As such, actions which
____	 new norms% with much wider aDDlir
*'
The obverse is also true - by promoting the removal of inequalities in theory, but neglecting topursue
124 Envimnment Liaison Centie International 'How to Develop a Code of Conduct for Voluntaiy Organizations' op. cit.
125 Edwanls, Michael, David Hulme and Tina Wallace 'NGOs in a Global Future: Mariying Local Deliveiy to Worldwide Leveige' op. cit.
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these objectives where it is possible, NGO networks undermine their capacity to achieve change in the
norms governing international affairs.
It was suggested earlier that international NGO networks might act as the fora within which dialogues
on rights, standards and other issues of principle are conducted between organisations which confront
problems arising from processes of globalisation. The following were among the means proposed by
which to gauge the extent to which NGO networks were playing this role:
The development of decision-making procedures
The ceding of authority to the network by its members
. Debates on issues of principle
. Links with other networks on issues of common concern
Each of these elements is evident to some extent in the examples considered. By demonstrating the
range of associational structures established by NOOs, and the benefits and conflicts which derive
from or arise within these, it should now be apparent that NGO networks often play a countervailing
role to the negative impacts of globalisation. However, it should also be noted that in most instances,
NGOs have not invested international networks with extensive authority to pursue the above activities
beyond a naiow application in a particular policy context. As the aftermath of the Manila meeting
demonstrates, organisational and conceptual limitations impede more comprehensive collaboration,
even when the benefits of strengthening and formalising mutual comrnitrnenis 't1i'J
acknowledged.
rt*m	 iwi*	 **I	 i•	 ti-
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Chapter 3:
NGO Networks and the Rio Summit
I think that my visceral reaction against the name 'Earth Summit' comes from the series of
images that the phrase recalls. ... The shape that 'summit' brings to mind for me is a triangle or
pyramid: the few at the top and the masses at the bottom. In the case of the 'Earth Summit', my
mind's eye displays a picture of several dozen heads of state all gathered on the last several
metres of a mountain peak. The slopes are littered by exhausted diplomatic 'bearers' canying
boxes full of conference documents and briefing papers. Further down the slopes you have the
gathered representatives of the civil society, waiting for the decisions to be made and revealed to
us below.'
3.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the relevance ofthe issues presented in the previous chapter to the activities of
civil society organisations in the Rio Summit process. It presents an extensive range ofempirical
materials and considers thefunctions, the effectiveness and the limitations ofthe principal NGO
networks active in the preparationsfor UNCED.
As a detailed 'case study' exploring the principal themes of the thesis as a whole, this chapter and the
next address official perspectives on the sign ifcance ofengaging a wide range ofsocietal actors and
the conceptual struggles and conflicting priorities evident in the work oftheprincialNGO networks
active during preparations for the Rio Summit and subsequently. They explore tensions between the
rationale ofsustainable development propagated by the UNCED Secretariat, based on the
importance of dialogue and consensus between dj'ferent actors, and the oppositional politics
prevalent among many environment and development NGOs, who believed that systemic injustices
resulting in social inequality and environmental degradation should be identified and redressed
NIl J ijirr iiift$	 a1iu
In the current chapter, I argue that all ofthe principal N&() networks began byprioritising influence
over inter-governmental decision-making, and came to place an increasing importance on dialogue
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and interaction between civil society actors. This is particularly evident in the negotiation of
'Alternative Treaties 'at the Rio Summit, which are presented not as a crItique of the official UNCED
agreements, but rather as a set ofcommitments to actions which could be achieved by NGOs acting in
collaboration. There is also evidence of the limitations of these activities, which suggest that there are
inherent pro blems for international NGO networks attempting to facilitate agreement on ideological
issues.
Opinion on the value and the legacy of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED)2 is sharply divided. The Ecologist's scathing critique of UNCED
characterises it as a manifestation of 'free market environmentalism', evident in efforts to place
economic value on the environment and in the use of development policies as the means by which to
achieve further enclosure of previously common resources.3 By contrast, fonner Dutch Prime Minister
Ruud Lubbers claims that 'Rio and Brazil have become milestones on the path of men to one world',4
while Lawrence Arturo of the Baha'i International Community Office of the Environment goes even
furthec
The Earth Summit and the Global Fonim represented a discernible shift in conceptualizing the
interrelated problems of environment and development. A new global vision can be seen
emerging from this process. The need for the unity of the peoples and nations of the world has
begun to be discussed by governments, NGOs and others. Many now see this as the foundation
for the creation of a sustainable future. Ultimately, this will prove to be Rio's most significant
contribution to world civilization.5
Statements by some of the principal arcbitects of the Summit inàicate rusttañon n%at% ol
progress in certain key areas which is tempered by the sense that significant change has been achieved.
Thus Gro Harlem Brundtland writes 'We owe it to the world to be frank about what we have achieved
here: Progress in many fields, too little progress in most fields, and no progress at all in some fields
But the direction of where we are heading will have been set'.6
Goree VI, Langston James (ICimo") 'Swrrniteers, Shapas - and the Rest' Crossaureiitr PtCom2: No. 02 26-28 Mareh, 1991. Available on Earth
Summit: The NGOArchives CD ROM produced by The Thud World Institute, Montevideo 1995.
.21 have used the tem UNCED, the Earth Summit and the Rio Summit intachangeablythmughouL
Earth Spoken: Power. Politics end World Develop#nentRoutledge, 1.ondon 1994: 'the outronielofUNCEDi is a new push fhrmnvironrnaitally
destructive industrial developmcnt' p.10.
4 Quoted in One Country. newrleuer ofthe Baha 'I !ntenioiionoJ Community vol.2 issue 41992. Available on Earth Siuwsüt. The NGOA,t/uve.r CD
ROM. op. cit.
5 Ibid.
6 Quoted in E1-Ashry, Mohammed 'Reflections on UNCED' in Centre for Our Common Future Rio RevIews 1992 COCF, Geneva 1992. Available on
Earth Summit: The NGO Archives CD ROM, op. cIL
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The Rio Summit has also provoked strong differences of opinion on the value of attempts byNGOs to
create or strengthen collaborative mechanisms at the global level. Tony Gross of the Brazilian NGO
Forum presents these alliances as 'fundamental' to the achievement of progress:
The search for sustainable development in any one country cannot be made in isolation. What
happens at a global level affects and conditions the opportunities for the resolution of each
country's individual situation. For this reason citizens' alliances at a global level are
fundamental. The building of equitable, transparent and mutually supportive relations between
different networks in the run-up to 1992 will not only maximize input in the UNCED process,
but will be the foundation for a new era of cooperation.7
This perspective is supported by Chip Lindner of the Centre for Our Common Future:
we have to find a way to move from confrontation through dialogue to cooperation; and we
havetogetalltheplayersatthetable.hisnolongergoodenoughtobecritical.Eachofushas
to accept a share of the responsibility to do something. And we all have to have the humility to
recognize that our solutions are not necessarily the only ones or ultimately the right ones. The
world works inter-relatedly and we have to work inter-relatedly.8
By contrast, Chatteijee and Finger consider that the imposition of a working structure which obliged
NGOs to form alliances lessened their impact and made it easier for their concerns to be marginalise±
NGO coalitions ... organized NGOs to speak with one voice, applying the rationale that since
we are all in the same boat, everybody should make his or her contiibution to global
management. And in order to achieve this, money was willingly provided by business and
foundations. As a result of this 'facilitating' process, business and industry, which do share a
common culture and working methods, came out strengthened, while the culturally diverse
environment and development movement diluted its inherent strength stemming from its very
diversity and unique approach to local situations.9
Four principal areas of contention emerge from these assessments which are of relevance to a
consideration of collaboration between NOOs at the global level:
• First, whether UNCED should be understood as a justification for 'business as usual',
a radical reappraisal of established practice by governments and others, or something in
11 ossJy monbçpf the Expdive Swetariat of the Preparatoy Fonam of Brazilian NGOS for UCED Guest ditoda1' in Centre br Our Common
FRffi"92 ODC ,iea Deth9d'XvaIIable on Ear9i iv Th OAvd,hFetCD ROMtftUWW. .- L J111
8 Interviewed in Lemer, Steve Earth Sun,niit: Conversations wit/i Architects ofan Ecologically Sustainable Future Common Knowledge Press. Bolinas
USA 1991 p.242.
9 Chattcrjee and Finger, op. cii. p.170. UNCED Secretary General Maurice Strong provided a clear example of this perspective at the UNCED PrepCom's
organisational session in Mareh 1990: fli broad challenge of the Conference is to promote acceptance and fu1fihent by all countries -by their
governments, their citizens, by business and industry - of their respective responsibilities to work fbra sustainable future and to modit, accordingly their
patterns of production and consumption in the interests of present and future generations.' Quoted in Centre for Our Common Future Brundtland Bulletin
No.7, COCF Geneva March 1990 p.1.
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between, lithe former is accepted, then NGOs with transformative agendas and
progressive norms could be construed to have had insuffidient impact on the process;
• Second, whether the work of international NGO coalitions and networks (which
undoubtedly increased in number and profile at the time) is central to future efforts to
solve some of the problems addressed at the Summit or whether these should be
considered at best irrelevant, at worst a further barrier for others with more radical
agendas to scale;
• Third, whether NGO networks in this context have functioned as 'horizontal' equitable
structures or as hierarchical systems of management;
• Finally, whether alliances between NGOs strengthen or weaken their individual and
cumulative ability to transform systems of global governance.
One striking example of these distinct perspectives is in a book jointly authored by Michael McCoy
and Patrick McCulIy entitled The Roadfrom Rio: An NGO Action Guide to Environment and
Development. The two wrote separate sections of the book and reach fundamentally different
conclusions about UNCED: McCoy states that the Summit's remit 'was to prove to be the most
comprehensive social and economic agenda ever set before the UN in its 47 year histozy', tm while
McCully concludes that '[t]he success of the corporate lobbyists in blocking any attempt within the
Summit to criticize their role in environmental destruction, or to subject them to international
regulation, provides a vivid illustration of where power lies in the New World Order'.' 'Their
assessment of the significance of NGO involvement is equally divergent. McCoy writes '[The]
development of an embiyonic, independent, international "movement for sustainability" was in
evidence throughout the Earth Summit in Rio'.' 2 McCully has a rather different interpretation:
most environment and development groups got involved in the Summit in the hope that it
would give them a part in future decision making. But they failed to think about whose interests
the process would serve. The lack of analysis over the relative power and interests of the
different players - governments, international agencies, corporations and NGOs - led to many
I.- I sLal$ JUL • fl1 1ij1L *hlr J -*JJUfl JLLIS1T ILJ11T 1LIL*1JL1OJJUIJIL
10 McCoy, Michael and Patnck McCulIy The Rcadfron, Rio:An NGO4ction Guide to &nwvnment and Devdopmenz p.I0, International Books, Den
Haag the Netherlands 1993.
Il/bid. p.89.
12 Ibid. p.17.
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holding naive hopes that as all shared a supposed "common future" all would be equal in the
decision-making process.' 3	-
The schism indicated by these differences is broadly between sceptics and enthusiasts - those who
question both the ideological underpinning and the transformative capacity of the Rio Summit and its
outcomes, and those who accept these as valid and effective. In considering the events and ideas
developed in the UNCED process it will be necessary to refer to both analyses. It is therefore useful to
develop these two perspectives further at the outset.
3.1.1 Sceptics
In his 1981 assessment of the 'identity, role and function' of NGOs at the United Nations, Chiang Pei-
heng identifies an NGO elite which played a restrictive role in relations between NGOs and the UN:
The tendency of many among the [NGO] leadership to distort, ignore, or suppress minority
opinions perhaps underscores an unarticulated view that democratic processes are too time
consuming, inefficient, incoherent, and even an obstacle to the perfonnance of the "real" work
of NGOs (and the UN). This tendency, moreover, assumes that NGO (or other) leadership
elites, like governments, do not themselves need what, in the earliest and still a major school of
thought within the democratic tradition, has been considered necessary for the health of the
body politic: the provision and protection of legitimate means for dissent, opposition, alternative
views, and minority opinions, in recognition that the majority, though it must prevail, may not
be necessarily right'4
Chiang also emphasises that a functional approach to international affairs was pushing NGOs to
consider their role as non-political:
There seems to be a real danger that NOOs will be pressured into assimilation into the gigantic,
monolithic, and technocratic world administration run by a coalition of technocrats and experts
consisting of members of IGOs and NGOs, from Western, socialist, and developing countries,
who claim to be the collective repository of the truth (nonpolitical and nonideological) and
keepers of a new universal morality based on technological imperatives.'5
Some of these concerns are also evident in analyses of the interaction of NGOs and the United
Nations in work on sustainable development issues in the period preceding, during and following the
Rio Summit in 1992. Chiang suggests that broad consensus existed between officials (from both the
Recognition of opposing perspectives or of ideological challenges to the prevailing apolitical ethos
13 Ibid. p.95.
14 Chiang Pei4ieng Non.gowiiunensal Organizations at the United Nations: Identity. Role and Function Praegor PubIishers New York USA 1981 p.246.
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governing the operations of the UN became increasingly tokenistic. Comparable criticisms have been
made of relations between NOOs and the UN in the UNCED process. Juan Jose Consejo's analysis
provides a clear echo of Chiang's concerns:
The voices that were most clearly heard were those of reformers, from both North and South. In
the speeches of these global technicians and administrators, the Earth was turned into a
spaceship, living beings into natural resources, areas of wilderness into parks and reservations
and rural communities into marginal populations. Thanks to them, development was
rejuvenated by the mask of sustainability, and was even joined in holy matrimony with
environmentalism)6
Peter Doran adds that the 'ascendant ideology of global environmental management' is not value-free,
but reproduces 'the values and interests of existing international institutions and their most powerful
members'. 11 This has the further effect of marginalising and disenfranchising 'diverse and competent
communities of knowledge which embrace numerous ways of understanding, perceiving,
experiencing and defining reality, including relations between people and their environment'.'8
The Ecologist's assertion that UNCED should be understood as 'free market environmentalism' was
noted earlier. The principal resistance identified in this analysis comes from local communities
reclaiming and defending the 'commons' which are theirs by right and which are undermined by new
global models of environmental management and economic development.' 9 'Environmental groups'
operating at the global level, by contrast were generally positive about UNCED: 'credibility has been
achieved (some even having seats on government delegations) and their concerns are no longer
marginalizeti They are now recognized as major players themselves.' 20 As in Chiang's analysis, this
constitutes assimilation. International NGOs were satisfied that their own credibility had been
enhanced and did not challenge the fundamental precepts of UNCED. Patrick McCully differs in that
he concludes that 'most environmental activists left Rio with a strong sense that the Summit had
15 lbid,p.284.
16 Consejn, Juan Jose 'The Twilight of the Envimnma'itahst Ei lnstituto de Ia Naturalcsa y Ia Sociedad, Oaxaca Mexico. Postal on electronic conference
ngonet July 1992. This and subsequent references to electronic conferences can be found on Ea,ih Summit: The NGOATC* EveS CD ROM pixxlucul by The
Third World Institute, Montevideo 1995.
17 Doran, Peter 'Earth, power, knowkdge towards a critical enviroflmcntal politics' in Macmillan, John and Andrew Linklatereds. Boundaries in
Question: new directions in International Relations pp.I93-2ll, Pinter Publishers, London 1995 p.193.
ll-
	 .
should be discussing the roots of what is leading us to these problems. But they arc not. All they ate talking about is monitoring and managing. This notion
of global management is based on a mistaken understanding of how the world functions. It is based on a mechanical model where you can foresee the results
of ever)lhing you do. This model expects that if you have a good monitoring system you can compensate lbr problems by turning a little wtieel here and
pushing a lever there. But nature and human societies do not function like that. So over the last 50 ysars we have been able to see that these managing and
monitoring systems have not been able to foresee the results of what they are doing.' Gunnar Album, interviewed in Lemer. Steve Earth SummiL
Conversations with Architects of an Ecologically Sustainable Future Common Knowledge Press Bolinas USA 1991 p.79.
20 Ibid. p.1.
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failed'.2 ' However, the straws of comfort they are able to take away are found in 'the fact that they
were granted the right to participate in official global environmentalism'.
3.1.2 Enthusiasts
Significant differences between the period considered by Chiang and the early 1990s should also be
recognised. Michael McCoy suggests that the dominance of Northern NGOs in international
conferences and in the regular work of the UN had been challenged by involvement of Southern
organisations in two Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly to address the UN Programme of
Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) over four years from 1986
to 1990.23 The links and expertise developed by Southern NGOs through this work were subsequently
channelled into the preparations for UNCED.24 McCoy presents this as an example of significant
change in the relative influence of Northern and Southern NGOs, which in turn bad a beneficial
impact in the UNCED process:
At UNPAAERD African NGOs spent four years monitoring their own governments and the UN
development bureaucracies. This helped them develop an extremely active contingent of Pan-
African representatives, which then went on to play an important leadership role among
international NGO activists in the two-year Summit process ... During UNPAAERD African
NGO travel funds and other costs for NGO participation were raised from UNDP, the Canadian
and European governments and administered by the UN Non-Government Liaison Service
(NGLS). This pattern foreshadowed similar arrangements made among Southern NGOs,
NGLS, UNDP, and Northern government finders during the Summit preparatIon process and at
the Earth Summit itseIL25
Thus the Rio process brought new types of organisations to a working relationship with the UN
system, and further developed the expertise and the influence of those which bad previously been
peripheral. Although previous summits and conferences had established rules of procedure which
allowed the accreditation of NGOs not in consultative status with the UN Economic and Social
21 McCoy, Michael and Patrick McCulIy The ROadfrOnI Rio, op. cii. p.95.
22 Ibid. p.95.
23 The 13th UN General Assembly Special Session, May -June1986, generated the UNPAAERD.
24 hi the aftemiath of UNPAAERD, the UN Economic Commission for Mica organised the International Conlèrence on Popular Participation in the
Recovcnj and Development Process in Aflica, in Anisha, Tan,'ania from 12 to 16 Febniary 1990. Writing thmears after the event, Salime Lone
emphasised its significance fora broader undaianding of relations between the UN and NGOs. snd between Northern and Southem organisations
ajkülodN.tiumng*s
INGO) community, and indeed dominated in large part by the latter, who sat under the banner of 'The People" fri the central part of the conferenceliall. Thia
provided the first clear indication of how lr indigenous African NGOs have come in asserting their presence as a force for change and progress. For
decades, when people talked of NGOs in Africa, the names that automatically came to mind weie Oxläm, Save the Childien, CARE, etc. But with the help
of Nonlic and Canadian NGO partners in particular. African grassroots groups have been able to become mote active players at both the national and
international level.' Lone, Salime 'New Directions in Africa' People Fuse vol.2 no.1 UN Economic Commission for Mica Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Januaxy
1993 p.1.
25 Op. ciL, p.19.
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Council (ECOSOC), those organisations accredited to participate in preparations for UNCED were
subsequently granted the right to ECOSOC recognition. This constituted a significant break with
previous practice. The consequences of these changes are considered in the next chapter.
The contemporary analyses cited above recognise changes which had occurred in the years preceding
UNCED but differ in attributing significance to these. Examples of developments which may be
construed to have affected the work of NGOs in the international context during this period include
the following:
• The overall number and the proportion ofNGOs from Southern countries in
consultative status with ECOSOC was significantly higher by 1993 than itbadbeen a
decade earlier. Did this reduce the likelihood of a small clique of developed country
NGOs dominating stnictures for interaction with the UN?
• Rapidly improving means of communication became widely available during the
period in question. Did these make organisations with representatives in New York or
Geneva more accountable to their broader constituencies, or are other factors more
significant in these relationships?
• An influx of environmental NGOs and local and national organisations onto the
ECOSOC NGO roster occurred as a result of the opportunity offered to them after the
Rio Summit What impact did this have on global environmental governance?
• New associational structures were created and existing ones revised to meet the
particular requirements generated by the official Summit and by parallel NGO
activities. How should the work of these coalitions be assessed, and what lessons can
be drawn which are more generally applicable to the work of NGO networks operating
internationally?
These questions are addressed more fully in the next chapter, which considers events after the Rio
nreiarationsfor UNCED..
L
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3.2 The Rio Summit in brief
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
from 3-14 June 1992. It has been estimated that the Rio Summit was attended by 103 Heads of
Government and State;26 official Government delegates from 178 countries;27 761 officially
accredited non-governmental organisations (516 from developed countries and 230 from developing
countries);28
 and 8749 from the mass media (roughly half from Brazil). 9 Approximately 15000
NGO representatives were present in Rio during the Conference, most participating in the parallel
Global Forum.3° At the conclusion of the two weeks of the Summit the assembled dignitaries were
invited to sign the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and to acknowledge the agreed text of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, and Agenda 21 (forty chapters intended to serve as a
blueprint for the achievement of sustainable development). Behind the scenes, last-minute
negotiations were still underway to finalise text in certain particularly contentious areas while horse
trading over institutional arrangements for follow-up to UNCED and over other issues to be tackled in
the aftermath of the Summit took place in the margins of the official events. NGO participants were
present (some as members of official delegations, others in their own right), although their capacity to
follow the more contentious negotiations were strictly limited.
Meanwhile, elsewhere in Rio a parallel series of events was taking place. The NCIO Global
Forum was separated from the official negotiations in the Rio Centro conference centre by 40
kilometers and by Brazilian traffic which meant that the journey typically took over two hours.
Thus although there was some interaction between the inter-governmental process and the NGC)
events in Flamengo Park, there was significantly less cross-over than the Forum organisers had
envisaged. The organisations present at the Forum ranged from the World Bank to the
International Baby Food Action Network, from the Brazilian Centre for the Defence of
Children's and Adolescents' Rights to the Global Heart Project. The majority of delegates and
visitors to the Global Forum were Brazilian. Yet despite this diversity and the confusion it
at Riode J'.UNbPe14t 1992. snsi
27 Chasek, Pam NGO Strategies on the Road fmm Rio' in Network 2 No.1 Sop. cit. June! July1992. Available on Earth Summit: The NGO Archives
CD ROM, op. cii.
28 Figures from Alvam Santos, Co-ordinator of Works and Transpoilation of the Brazilian National Work Gmup, quoted in 'Facts and Figuis on
UNCED', IJNCED/ DPI Press Release, 12 June 1992.
29 Ibid
30 UN Non.Govemmental Liaison Service 'Briefing fbr NOOs on LJNCED' E & 1) File No.30, NGLS Geneva July 1992. Available on Earth Summit: The
NGOArchives CD ROM op. cit.
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inevitably caused, there was a focus for organisations willing to discuss shared concerns and
negotiate common positions on these issues. The International NGO forum (INGOF) was
established in the preparations for the Summit to provide the space within which dialogue
between NGOs could take place. Thirty-two Alternative Treaties were negotiated under the
auspices of INGOF.3 ' These were intended to provide an analysis of problems and some concrete
ideas of actions NGOs could take to remedy these. Discussions also took place on ways in which
dialogue and collaboration between NGOs could be strengthened following UNCED, using the
Alternative Treaties as the focus for attempts to build trust and solidarity between organisations.
It is useful to outline the framework of events leading up to and including UNCED at the outset
in order to contextualise the issues addressed subsequently.
3.3 Official Preparations for UNCED
Both of these showpiece events should be understood as the culmination of a formal preparatory
process lasting two years and of a sequence of meetings and less formal discussions and
exchanges of ideas stretching back further still. The World Commission on Environment and
Development, more commonly referred to as the Brundtland Commission, was convened by the
UN General Assembly in 1983 and produced its report Our Common Future in 1987. This
included recommendations to hold regional follow-up conferences within an appropriate period
after presentation of the report to the UN General Assembly. These would be followed, some•
time before the end of the century, by an international conference to review progres and to 'act
benchmarks and to maintain progress within the guidelines of human needs'. 32 In 1989 UN
General Assembly Resolution 44/228 initiated preparations for UNCED. Four Preparatory
Committee sessions (or PrepComs) were held:
• PrepCom I - Nairobi, August 1990
• PrepComll—Geneva,March 1991
• PrepCom ifi - Geneva, August 1991
•	 • PrepCom IV - New York, March 1992
**IL.	 1IJ1t	 Lt*	 tIu,_lI
31 Centre for Our Common Future Dnindi/and Bulletin No.16 op. ciL July 1992 p.7.
32 World Commission on Envimnment and Development Our Common Futu,e Oxford University Press. Oxford 1987.
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PrepCom I set the terms of reference for UNCED. At PrepCom II the extensive documentation
provided by the Secretariat was designed to assist governments to 	 key issues and to prioritise
the areas where action was needed. The first indications of the shape of the official UNCED
agreements came at the second PrepCom. At PrepCom ifi governments debated the best ways to
approach the problems and commenced negotiations, for the first time, on Agenda 21. Finally, at the
fourth PrepCom delegates met to negotiate and finalise the technical portions of Agenda 21 and the
other political instruments that were expected to be signed in Rio de Janeiro.33
Substantial disagreements between governments emerged during these preparatory meetings. These
included a number of divisions between groupings of Northern and Southern countries on the relative
importance given in preparations for UNCED to environmental protection and economic
deve1opmen which was evident in fractious discussions on the need for increased financial flows and
transfer of technology from North to South and in repeated assertions of the principle of national
sovereignty to counter what was perceived as 'environmental imperialism'. Southern governments
maintained, with some justification, that attention to the symptoms of environmental degradation was
inadequate if prior consideration were not given to the causes of that degradation. Foremost among
these was the unequal international system which resulted in over-consumption of resources in the
North and poverty through the lack of basic requirements in the South. The most notable casualty of
this friction was the proposed convention on forests, which was interpreted as an attempt to impose
environmental standards on Southern countries without providing additional financial support to
compensate fOr the loss of earnings and additional costs these new commitments would impose.
Divisions were also apparent between the USA and other developed countries (particularly in the
European Community) on the substance and the scope of the Rio agreements, most notably on the
proposed conventions on biological diversity and climate change.
By the end of PrepCom IV, 85 per cent of Agenda 21 had been successfully negotiated. Major issues
to be resolved were finance (including all of the 'Means of implementation' paragraphs in each
chapter of Agenda 21); technology transfer; atmosphere; and forests, among others. Thus government
officials and ministers in Rio had to conclude in two weeks what hundreds of diplomats had not
*TtW PJP1ItPlJr1LiJI....L	 4
	resolved over the previous two years What n 	 'exptfoë
quickly evolved into the most critical negotiating session.
33 See The Earth Summit Bulletins from PrepCom IV and UNCED for a more detailed account of this sumce of events
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In Rio, the Conference itself was divided into two main bodies: the Plenary and its subsidiary body,
the Main Committee. The Plenary was the forum for the 'General Debate';which consisted of country
statements delivered at the Ministerial level. By contrast, the Main Committee was site of the actual
political negotiations, in essence a 'PrepCom V'. The mandate of the Main Committee was to finalise
the products of UNCED: Agenda 21, the Statement of Forest Principles and the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development. When the Main Committee ran out of its allotted time at 6:00 am on
Thursday, 11 June, three issues still had not been resolved: forests, finance and atmosphere. These
issues were forwarded for further negotiations at the ministerial level where, at the eleventh hour,
agreement was finally reached.
3.3.1 The Role of NGOs in the UNCED process
The role of non-govermnental organisations in the official UNCED process was also contentious. The
initial UNGA Resolution 44/228 had not made clear the extent of NGO involvement envisaged. In
particular, it did not establish whether organisations not in consultative status with ECOSOC would
be able to participate in PrepComs and the Summit itself. In May1990 the UN Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE) held a regional conference to review the Bnindtland Report in Bergen,
Norway. Similar events were held in other UN regions as part of the formal process of considering
and acting upon the conclusions of the Bmndtland Commission. These regional meetings also served
as the first opportunities for countries to discuss priorities for the Rio Summit. The Bergen Conference
was significant in that NGOs organisel themselves for the first time to vontribute to the UNCED
process. The conference was at ministerial level, but included a structured attempt to promote
interaction between non-governmental organisations and government delegations. In official
conference documents the term 'independent sector' was used, and defined for this context as
industry, trade unions, the scientific community, youth, and environmental NGOs. A number of
commentators have asserted that a new model of NGO involvement in international negotiations was
tested during the Bergen process. The Brundtland Bulletin, produced by the Centre for Our Common
Future (of which more below), stated that:
about Bergenwas.at it
international level of a new and unique participatory process in which bodies representing the
'independent sector' (i.e. industry, trade unions, the scientific community, youth, and Non-
Governmental Organizations concerned with environmental issues) not only conducted their
own parallel conferences, but participated with the ministerial delegations in the quest for the
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broadest possible consensus. The 'Bergen Process' of consensus-seeking between independent
and official channels had been evolving over the two years in which Bergen was in preparation,
and seems set to become the model for 'the 1992 process', as we now move towards the all-
important UN Conference on Environment and Development in Brazil.34
At Bergen the various non-governmental groupings were required to organise themselves into
coalitions to negotiate common positions which would then be presented to the other sectors,
including governments. Two significant organisational principles were therefore established, which
would be evident throughout the UNCED process: first, that the involvement of a wide range of actors
would help to legitimise the decisions reached by governments; and second, that non-governmental
organisations should be involved as a set of distinct interest groups and encouraged to reach
compromises within and between these groups in order to maximise their cumulative effectiveness.
The correlation implicit in the Brundtland Bulletin report quoted above between broad participation
and broad consensus should also be noted. The report goes on to note dissent from one NGO grouping
in distinctly pejorative terms: 'Alongside the Ministerial Conference and the conferences of the
independents, the clamorous Popular Forum of the SEED (Solidarity for Equality, Ecology and
Development) exercised their democratic rights by hectoring mainstream participants, complaining of
inaction'.35 While complaints and attacks on the 'mainstream' may have their place in a democratic
process, these are clearly not viewed as constructive contributions, likely to lead to greater consensus
among participants.
The model for non-governmental participation advanced in Bergen drew on precedents fivm previous
UN processes, most notably the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment and the rationale
established in the Brundtland Report for the involvement of civil society in efforts to realise
sustainable developmenL UNCED Secretary General Maurice Strong had played the same role at
the 1972 Stockholm Conference and had been a prominent member of the Brundiland Commission.
hi the former context in pailicular he had supported involvement of a wide range of NGOs, including
organisations without UNECOSOC accreditation. 37 The extent of Strong's role in planning the
Bergen Conference is not clear, but the arrangements for NOOs undoubtedly fit within the broader
.. —s -i	 &r uss	 i: ur s - UUj *.L--
34 Ccntic rOurCcn.non Fidute Bnsnddandflulkths No$ cit. June1990 ,l.
35 !bt p2.
36 SceChapier 1.
37 See Wilkes, Peter 'Fn,m Stockholm to Rio and bcyund: the impaofthc envitonmadal nionent on the UnitoiNationsocns*z1ietiveaI..b
NOOs' Reiwvoflniemationalstwliesno22 ppS7-S0, UK 1996.
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pattern for extending access and extending the understanding of the role played by non-governmental
actors which Strong had previously advanced and would subsequently develop further.38
Strong met with representatives from the 'independent sector' following the Bergen Conference and
'stressed his support for the principle of broad representation and participation'. Strong had prepared
'guidelines for NGO participation that he will present to the PrepCom in Nairobi [which] recommend
that NOOs, as well as groups from a broad spectrum of society, be brought into the official process.
He also urges governments, when drafting their national reports, to generate dialogues with and
encourage input from all sectors of society.' 39 The organisations meeting with Strong put forward
further proposals on the involvement of NOOs in the UNCED process: 'These range from creating 30
seats for independent sector representatives at the PrepCom to granting observer status to various
NGOs at ECO '92 (UNCED] to placing representatives of the independent sector on all national
delegations to ECO '92 as full and equal members'.4°
By the time the first PrepCom in Nairobi started, Strong's position on incorporation of the procedures
established in Bergen had shifted. In his opening address, he stated that the Bergen arrangements for
NGOs would not be 'realistic or applicable' given that numbers of government and non-governmental
delegates would be much greater in Brazil. However, he did advocate that the Bergen principles
should be applied, suggesting that NGOs could have their 'principal impact' at the national leveL4'
Compromise was subsequently reached on these issues in Nairobi, establishing the arrangements
which would apply to formal NGO involvement throughout the UNCED process. Reporting on the
first PrepCorn, Stephen Collett of the Quaker United Nations Office outhned the shift in stance which
led to the acceptance of participation by such organisations:
That NGOs have an important contribution to make is now generally accepted; the question
under debate is how to channel contributions into the intergovernmental process, and
particularly how the invitations to and statements of non-consultative NGOs will be handled.
While a majority of statements in this debate were rosy on the role of NGOs - the USA, for
example, read a list of important US national organizations which would not have consultative
38 Scc also UN duc A/CONF.I 51/PC/102 'Report on Institutional Proposals preparorl by the Secretary General bfUNCED' for an account of
recommandations put forward bygevormncnls on these issues - moat notably pass. 177 in which tie Canadian rqxesentauve advocates 'arcowagnent to
negotiating fbIar%d
broadening of CONGO membership and changes in ciitrsia for membership; use of hybrid govemment/ non-government fixa ... and the use of permanent
or ad hoc advisory bodies of eminent environmental scientists'. Also pam. 181. in which the Norwegian position is set out' mechanisms and procedures
should be established which would facilitate and strengthen the participation of constituencies outside government .,. in the work of the UN in general and in
the folkw-up and implementation from the 1992 Conforence in paiticular.
39 Centre forOurCommon FuWmNetwo* 2No.1, op. clt, July 1990. • Availableon Earth Summit: TheNGOAmhivecCD ROM, op cit
40 Ibid
41 Ibi€L
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status but have useful expertise - the greatest shift is in the G-77. From having been somewhat
discomfited by the whole idea, the mainline G-77 statements now called for formulas to bring
'broad-based and balanced' NGO participation to the Conference and its preparatory process,
laying weight on the need for equal representation of groups from their regions with those of the
North. This marks something like a 170 degree shift from their strict stand of earlier discussions,
aimed at limiting participation to those they couldn't keep out - those in consultative status.42
Debate on the issue continued for almost four days before an acceptable compromise was found.
Despite protracted opposition from a small number of G77 countries, most notably Mauritania and
Tunisia, after four days of negotiation agreement was reached for the purposes of the first PrepCom
that NCiOs with Consultative Status and those without such status could attend working group
sessions and ask for permission to speak but would have no negotiating role. Additional resources
would be sought to guarantee the participation of NOOs from the developing world. The principle of
'broad-based involvement by relevant non-government organizations' was accepted, as was the
principle of balance both between developing countly and developed countly NGOs and between
environmental and development This compromise was referred to the forty-fifth UN General
Assembly session and became the basis for subsequent arrangements for NGO participation. At the
second PrepCom the UNCED Secretary General presented guidelines for determining NGOs'
competence and relevance to the work of PrepCom, which were adopted with no significant changes.
l'hmughout the UNCED process, almost all organisations which applied for accreditation were
accepted.43
Is there any correlation between large numbers of NGOs and increased influence over the decision-
making process? Princen and Finger conclude that the opposite may be true in this instance: 'Large
numbers served the organizers' purposes well but may have actually hindered the NGO community,
especially that segment of the community which tried to address underlying causes and to propose
meaningful solutions'. Contemporary accounts from the second PrepCom suggest that these
misgivings were widely felt. Langston James Goree VI (Kimo) reports unease at the gulf between the
rhetoric on NGO involvement and the lack of access to contentious negotiations:
There is a growing sense of frustration from many NGOs who ielieve that the process wants
our nominal participation so that they can cJairn legitimacy but that a commitment to real
dat'
42 Coll Stephen 'Memo to the NGO Development Comniittee' posted on the e1ecnic conference en.unced.geneial. August 1990.
43 Pnncen and Finger claim that only fbor applications fbr accreditation 	 denied. P,incen, Thomas and Matthias Finger Envüvnmenial NGOs in World
Po1i//cr.IJzAmgtheLoca/ and the Global RoutIcdge London 1994 p.199.
44 Ibid. p.190.
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everything regarding NGO involvement has happened too late in the process to allow anyone to
claim that NGOs have been involved throughout the PrepCom process.45
These concerns were echoed byNGOs barred access to key meetings of the UN Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE), despite the principles established for the Bergen Conference:
At the ongoing Annual Session of the ECE (46th session) in Geneva, several ECE countries -
notably the USA, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands - have shut the doors on NGC)
participation. At that meeting the ECE decided to exclude NGOs from participating in the
forthcoming ad hoc meeting on the document of environmental rights and obligations to be held
in the Hague in July 1991. This document is to address, among other things, the rights of groups
and individuals to participate in decision-making processes which do, or which could have a
significant impact on the environment Having followed the cumbersome process on including
NGOs in the UNCED process, the recent decision taken by the ECE annual session can be seen
as a serious setback. We just can't help asking ourselves, 'Are we to be left out when
substantive matters are discussed?'
One interpretation of tbis contradiction is that different government officials were present at the two
meetings, and reached different decisions on the presence and significance ofNGOs. Whether this sort
of organisational discontinuity led to this situation, or a more coherent strategy to exclude NGOs from
sensitive meetings, there are clear grounds for cynicism from NGOs. This in turn affected other
relations between officials and NGO representatives in the UNCED process.
In addition to the above, relations between governments and NGOs assumed particular importance.
during preparations for UNCED in two further ways:
NGOs on delegations A number of countries included NGOs on their official delegations. At the first
PrepConi, Norway, Canada and the UK were among the few to do so; at UNCED the number was
considerably higher. A shift also occurred during this period in the nature of the organisations
represented. Initially, non-governmental members of government delegations were principally from
established NGOs with a broad remit Subsequently, governments also included scientific experts,
representatives from industry, youth organisations, local authorities and other sectors. 47 The
responsibilities of these delegates were often unclear and contentious. Should they, for example,
divulge sensitive but useful information to their NGO colleagues? Were they used as go-betweens by
nit jfl_
45 Langston James Gorec 'E-mail Briefing Note on PrepCom II of LJNCED' Geneva,' 25 March 1991.
46 linge. Elm 'ECE excludes NGOs' in Centre for Our Common Future NCA* '92 No.6. op. cit.. April 199%. Available on Earth Swnmü: ThcNGO
4rehiws CD ROM, op. cIL
47 The UK, ftc instance, gave obseiw status to fourteen non-governmental delegates at UNCED: 2 fiorn environmental oups, 2 from development
grou 2 from local authoiitics, 2 from indushy, I from unions. 1 from the scientific community, 1 from youth, plus iqitatives from UNEP-UX,
United Nations Association and the Labour Party.' Hill, lube 'Green Alliance Report on UNCED'. Green Alliance, London July1992. Reproduced in
Appendix 3.
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their governments, or were they able to contribute to the work of the delegation? What responsibilities
did they have to NGOs in their country? In many instances NGO representatives on the official
delegation were required to sign formal undertakings not to pass on any privileged information, or to
take a public stance which contravened the position of the delegation. For others, to have an NGO as a
government delegate was seen as 'politically correct', given increasing pressure from the UNCED
Secretariat to do so, but of little wider relevance.
Despite these general criticisms, inclusion of NGOs was considered beneficial by many organisations
which were able to cement relations with government delegates and enhance the credibility of their
own preparations for UNCED. Opportunities to present the priorities of broader NGO networks in this
context were also significant developments for many.
National Reports: Guidelines for production of National Reports to UNCED were agreed at the
Nairobi PrepCom, with a deadline for completion of July 1991. While the guidelines suggested broad
public participation in drafling, the method of production was to be determined by individual
governments. Countries were requested to provide a sophisticated assessment of the state of natural
resources as well as information on enviromnent and development policies, their effects on the natural
resource base, and a listing of the country's most pressing needs in terms of environment and
development issues. More importantly, however, the guidelines asked that each countiy analyse the
effect of the international situation on its environment and on its development as well as the effects of
its local situation on the international environment and on international development.
The scope of these requirements placed considerable strain, particularly on developing countrIes.
While limited assistance was provided by the UN Development Programme in certain cases, the huge
variation in detail, quality and focus evident in the reports eventually submitted suggests that many
countries were not able to deliver the material outlined and were not clear on the purpose of the
reporting process. The UK was widely criticised by NGOs for submitting an existing Government
White Paper on the environment, 'This Common Inheritance', as the UK Report to UNCED Without
further consultation on its contents, although the UNCED Secretary General was said to be 'delighted1
with Koy Thomson of IIED,writing in Fthn ry914Uggested thspOdu
about the overall focus of UNCED:
48 Centre for Our Comon Future Nezvrk 92 No.4 cit. Fcbniasy 1991 Available on Eøth Swaa flw NGOA hn CDROMi ct
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Is it designed to promote specific and detailed improvements in national, domestic
environmental policy around the world, or is it about global ecological interdependence,
cooperation, and the development of the environment as a key international policy determinant?
If it is the latter (green diplomacy or green foreign policy) this casts a completely different light
on how we judge National Reports. ... Strong must provide rapid and convincing guidance on
these questions if he wants constructive and effective preparations for the conference and not an
early collapse of national dialogues. If no such guidance emerges, environmental NGOs might
be tempted to use the Earth Summit as yet another high-profile media event at which to push
their own domestic policy agenda or expose the dirty hands of their governments.
If Strong wants all sectors of society to come together to rigorously examine what they can offer
in terms of expertise, experience, training and resources to protect the world environment and
secure a sustainable livelihood for all, he must make it very clear now. To persuade all sectors of
society to do this he must inspire an unprecedented sense of shared responsibility, accountability
and confidence in the conference itself.49
The questions raised here are relevant to a critique of UNCED as a whole and will be returned to later.
3.3.2 The Earth Council
One final initiative should be considered at this point, although its significance in preparations for
UNCED is unclear and its status (as NGO or government body) is questionable. The Earth Council
was first formally proposed in the Costa Rican National Report to UNCED. The format outlined
would comprise '12 to 18 persons from different countries known for their scientific reputation and
international prestige in global ssessments'.50 Costa Rica advocated that the members of the 'Planet
Earth Council' would be elected at UNCEI) and would meet two or three times per year. Its main
responsibility would be 'to assess, as objectively as possible, the state of the Earth, concerning the
conservation of the environment in the light of present uses of planetary resources as well as the
aspirations of developing countries in reaching a fair and dignified standard of living in the socio-
economic context'.5 ' The Council would function outside the UN 'to enhance its objectivity and
transparency',52 but would draw on the expertise of UN agencies, NGOs with a global approach, and
other institutions. Ways in which the deliberations of this body would be disseminated were not
clarified, but it 'should receive the widest publicity and should hopefully become a powerful
instrument to strengthen or otherwise actions of UN agencies as well as multilateral, bilateral
IUflLWiIi1IfltI*
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governmental as well as non-governmental organizations involved in scientific aspects and field
work'.53
Maurice Strong's close association with this initiative was soon evident. Discussions on reform of the
UN Trusteeship Council to focus on UNCED follow-up during PrepCom W were caustically linked
with the Earth Council initiative by one observer: 'An NGO pundit wondered if [Strong] was planning
to re-name it the Earth Chamber where the Earth Team, that make up the members of the Earth
Council, would meet to take the Earth Pledge after the Earth Summit'.54
Further references to the Earth Council suggest that it would be 'like Amnesty International, only
concerned with issues of the environment', 55 and that it should be located in San José, Costa Rica:
'just as it made significant progress towards peace, Central America is willing to confront the
challenge of achieving peace with nature', as Jorge Cabrera, Executive Secretary of the Central
American Commission on Environment and Development put it. The concluding paragraph of the
Agenda 21 chapter on 'International Institutional Arrangements' also refers to 'the proposal to
establish a non-governmental Earth Council', 57 remarkable recognition for an organisation which, in
Strong's own words, did not hold the first meeting of its organising committee until September
1992.58
The close association between Maurice Strong and the Earth Council will be considered in subsequent
chapters. In the build-up to UNCED, it is significant to note that discussIons on the creatIon of a new
body with the potential to play an influential role in the implementation of the Rio agreements took
place with little or no consultation or discussion. The inclusion of the Agenda 21 reference seems
principally to be at the instigation of the UNCED Secretariat. It is also worth noting the shift in
emphasis from a body comprising scientists from around the world to the more general 'non-
governmental Earth Council' anticipated in Agenda 21.
.'..	 _____	 ____________________ ____
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55 Centre for Our Common Future Network '92 No.18, op. cii. June - July 1992.
56 InterPress Service 'Central America Sndcs Creation of Earth Council' 23 March 1992.
57 Agenda 2/The Regency Press London 1992 para.38.45.
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3.4 Non-Governmental Preparations 	 -
Great numbers of NGOs were involved in preparations for UNCED and in the event itself. Some
participated in local meetings or campaigns; others were actively following the international inter-
governmental negotiations. Organisations representing a diverse range of constituencies and from all
parts of the world engaged in a multiplicity of activities intended to influence the formal decisions
reached or to use the widespread interest in UNCED to project their more general concerns and
priorities. Numerous reports, position papers, critiques and analyses were produced, reflecting a rich
diversity of views and proposals. While acknowledging the importance of these initiatives in
providing the substance for the transformative influence of NGOs in the Rio process, my principal
concern is with the structures created to promote dialogue and collaboration. Even this leaves a
considerable number to be considered - issue networks such as the Climate Action Network the
Rainforest Action Network and EarthAction International; national and regional networks, including
the Asian NGO Coalition (ANGOC), the Alliance of Northern Peoples for Environment and
Development (ANPED), the US Citizens' Network and the Brazilian NGO Forum; and global co-
ordinating bodies such as the International Facilitating Committee and the International Steering
Committee.
The previous chapter explored the influence of such networks in global politics, considering the
proposition that networking constitutes an 'organising principle' of NGOs and exploring the range of
functions NGO networks exist to achieve. Some tentative conclusions were also reached on the
obstacles to the effective functioning of such networks and the conflicts which can arise in their work.
Finally, consideration was given to norm-setting by international NGO networks in global politics and
to the significance of effective systems for self-governance within such networks. To develop these
points further, the principal focus here will be on the NGO networks which played a particularly
significant role in promoting interaction and dialogue between organisations in the UNCED process.
Only a handful of NGOs were present at the first PrepCom in Nairobi; their number had grown to
almost 1 000 by the time the final PrepCom took place in New York. During this period a complex
eiibfdIa1s1,èt*een1sTGOs took place'a&iressing iffbffinciple (establimnoTrøw
ground among participants); tactics (how to influence the inter-governmental process; how to interact
more effectively with each other); and communication (sharing information and ideas). While these
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discussions were unavoidably fragmented, in that different individuals attended the various meetings,
it is possible to present a sequence of events and extract from this some of the principal issues of
relevance for the chapter as a whole.
3.4.1 The Centre for Our Common Future
One of the key organisations was the Centre for Our Common Future (COCF). The Centre had been
established in October 1987 as a charitable foundation to promote awareness and debate about the
findings of the Brundtland Commission, as set out in its final report Our Common Future. Its founder
and Executive Director Chip Lindner described its mission as broadening the understanding, debate,
dialogue and analysis around the concept of sustainable development, involving as many sectors of
society and as many countries as possible:
The Centre for Our Common Future also established a network of working partners around the
world. Originally we targeted 100 key global networking groups such as the International
Chamber of Commerce, the Global Tomorrow Coalition etc. We got them to associate with the.
Centre for Our Common Future publicly as working partners by way of making a public
commitment to further the concept of sustainable development.59
A significant, though little publicised meeting of NGOs took place in March 1990 in Vancouver. This
had been intended as a review by COCF of its preparations for IJNCED. However, after a meeting
between Lindner and Maurice Strong, newly appointed as Secretaiy General for UNCED, it was.
agreed that the structure of the meeting should be altered. Lindner later recalled 'I went to him and
said we would be happy to provide our assistance and support to mobilize in the broader
constituencies, but we could not work solely from an NGO point of view'.60
 The Centre brought
together 152 of its working partners from 60 countries, representing the broader constituencies they
had endeavoured to involve in dialogue on the Brundtland Report. These included industry, trade
unions, women, youth, media, and NOOs. Half of those present were from developing countries, half
from developed.
This Vancouver meeting endorsed the COCF call for broad participation by all sectors of society in
the UNCED process_and gave the Centre a mandate to extend its work in this area. It is worth noting
the close correlation between Lindner's account o the conclusions reached and the positions
subsequently taken on these issues by Maurice Strong and the UNCED Secretariat:
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At the time the whole question of who could participate in the UNCED process had not been
established. First, out of the meeting came a vely strong call for l5road participation. There was
also a recognition that we had to find new mechanisms for resolving problems. Second,
participants in the Vancouver conference called for at least 50 percent participation from
developing countries and women in all strategizing and planning for the UNCED conference at
all levels - national, regional, and international. Third, it was recognized that the development
side of the environment / development nexus was extremely weak in the proposed agenda for
1992; and that the inter-sectorial or cross-cutting issues, as they are now called, were elementary
issues that had to be seriously addressed. And fourth, it was decided that the Centre for Our
Common Future should call a meeting of heads of institutions to get a mandate to play some
kind of focal pointrole in 1992.61
Lindner's account suggests that the Vancouver event merely endorsed the role for COCF which bad
already been defined by him and Maurice Strong. The second meeting called for in Vaheouver was
held inNyon, Switzerland in June 1990. Again, all sectors and geographical regions were represented
- in total, 100 people were present Lindner asserts that COCF did not take 'a directive role' in this
meetin&62 yet the conclusions again correlate closely with the original blueprint An International
Facilitating Committee (IFC) was established to 'serve as a focal point for independent sector efforts
for ECO '92 (UNCEDI'. Its remit was to 'facilitate and-or organize:
• communications within the independent sector in the run up to ECO '92;
• access to the UNCED process for the independent sector,
selected meetings and interactions among the various components of the independent
sector;
a parallel forum at ECO '92;
• facilities for the independent sector in all official preparatory committees for UNCED
and atECO '92 itself; and
a donor education campaign to encourage the availability of funds for independent
sector preparatory activities for IJNCED' .
The Secretariat for this new body would be separate from the Centre, but located in the same office
________	 rt r)rovided by COCF. The thstincti.ons between the two were not made any
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3 'International Committee Forms to Push Independent Sector lssues Agenda' Centre for Our Common Future Netrk '92 NoJ, op. ciL July1990.
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clearer by the production of a bi-monthly newsletter, Network '92, published by COCF 'in
collaboration with' the IFC. Since the IFC had no staff or secretariat supp6rt other than those provided
by COCF, its role resembled that of an advisory group rather than an independent entityP
Thus by the time the first PrepCom for UNCED took place in August 1990 the Centre for Our
Common Future had already instigated the creation of a cross-sectoral body whose self-defined role
would make it a key channel for non-governmental organisations to communicate and interact with
governments, the UNCED Secretaiiat and other NOOs. The IFC had also discussed the terminology
available to denote its constituent groups. Although 'NOOs' in the UN context would include all the
types of organisation to be involved, this was deemed inadequate. This was in part because, outside
the UN, 'NGO' is widely understood to denote a campaign or advocacy organisation and its use to
refer to the range of those involved with the IFC would cause confusion. In its place, the term 'the
independent sector' was adopted. The COCF report on the Nyon meeting makes clear that infighting
between members of the independent sector would be detrimental - a resolution passed by those
present stated that 'the independent sector should strive for some degree of unity to increase its
political leverage'.65
Although the UNCED Secretariat was restricted to use of 'NGOs' in official documents, the COCF
newsletter highlights the close correlation between the concept it has advanced and the position
adopted by the UNCED Secretary General in the 'NGO Guidelines' ('Suggested Arrangements for
Involving Non-Governmental Organizations in the Preparatory Process' A/CONF/15 1IPCI9) prepared
for the first PrepCom: 'In referring to NGOs, the Secretary General points out that the term 'non-
governmental organization" includes groups from indusiry, science, trade unions, enviromnent and
development, youth and women, as well as those NGOs with and without consultative status with
ECOSOC'.66 The Secretary General's paper also notes the positive recommendations from the
Vancouver and Nyon strategy meetings on the need for the broad participation of the independent
sector in UNCED preparations. The Network '92 report omits the distinction made in the 'NGO
Guidelines' between the 'broad based preparatory process' advocated at national and regional levels67
and the much more restrictive formula proposed for the global level: 'At the global level, non-
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governmental organizations may contribute to the preparatory process by providing information and
counsel on matters of special relevance to the non-govermuental commüfiity'.68
3.4.2 Creation of the Business Council for Sustainable Development
Following the Nairobi PrepCom, Maurice Strong took it upon himself to initiate a more coherent
preparatory process among private sector organisations for UNCED. He appointed Stephan
Schmidheiny, a Swiss industrialist, as his Principal Adviser for Business and Industry. Among
Schmidheiny's responsibilities was to challenge global business leaders to take a personal interest in
the UNCED process. This led to the establishment of the Business Council for Sustainable
Development (BCSD) in late 1991. Executive Director of the BCSD J Hugh Faulkner spelt out the
UNCED Secretary General's intentions: 'Mr. Strong requested that the mandate be carried out well in
advance of the Earth Summit so that the input of the Business Council's members could be taken into
consideration during the consultative process that the TJNCED Secretary-General is canying out prior
to Rio'.69 There is no evidence of Strong taking a similar interest in fostering direct input from other
sectors, nor of his willingness to accept it when proffered. 7° Faulkner's outline of the BCSD's
mandate emphasises increased efficiency in the use of resources and increased economic growth to.
combat poverty as the constructive contribution of the business sector to UNCED to help 'solve the
single most urgent problem that faces the human race today—that of preserving the environment for
ourselves and for the generations to come'Y1
Strong also provided support to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which held the
Second World Industry Conference on Environmental Management (WICEM II) in Rotterdam in
April 1991. The ICC produced a Business Charter for Sustainable Development which was endorsed
at the Conference. Signatories to the Business Charter were under no obligation to enact any of the
commitments it set out, nor were the objectives quantified with any independently verifiable measures
or targets. A further criticism of the Charter was that it did not focus sufficiently on social issues and
was in essence a set of general environmental principles. Nevertheless, despite these apparent
rw -sri liii r* uTt.aI1urwjr1u1rn..J.i
69 Faulkner, I Hugh 'Business' Mandate for the EaxTh Stmmit' Centre for Our Common Futuie Nefwo,* '92 No.6 op. bit, April 1991 Available on Earth
Sumn,ii: The NGOAnthives CD ROM. op. cit.
70 See for example, the official responsetoAgendaya Wananchi, the NGO document agreed at the 'ROOkS Ibr Our Future' conference organised by ELCI
in December1991. h accepting the ccnfance documents, Mautice Strong undatook to 'integrte than into the real world' (Centre for Our Common
Future Network '92 No.13 op. cit., Januaiy 1992). No reference is made toAgendaya Wananchi in Agenda 21. in stoic contiist to acknowledgement of
BCSD and ICC initiatives.
71 Faulkner, I Hugh 'Business' Mandate for the Eazih Summit' op. cit.
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shortcomings and the dearth of other significant undertakings by the private sector, the Business
Charter for Sustainable Development was cited in Agenda 2! as a valuable code of conduct,
'promoting best environmental practice'.72
Thus from an early stage in UNCED preparations there was a common perception among NGOs that,
although all independent sectors were considered equal, some were more equal than others. Given
deep-rooted misgivings over the efficacy of treating the private sector as a constructive contributor to
environmental protection shared by many NGOs, the appearance of preferential treatment served to
heighten antipathy towards industry representatives and concern at the ideological perspective of the
UNCED Secretary General. As we shall see, these misgivings were voiced increasingly in the period
preceding the Summit.73
3.4.3 Problems in Nairobi
Some of the NOOs attending the first PrepCom were not happy with the activities of the COCF or
with the underlying ideological stance. The Environment Liaison Centre International (ELC1) was
established after the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment to promote NGO awareness
and involvement in the work of the UN Environment Programme, based in Nairobi. ELCI bad devised
a programme of work in preparation for UNCED which assumed that its role as the principal co-
onlinating body for NGOs working on environmental issues in the UN context was still valicL Its.
response to the activities of the COCF was to launch a vituperative attack.74 A paper titled 'Green
Pollution' was given to all delegates on the third day of the Nairobi PrepCom:
The world knows many forms of environmental pollution. A new, more insidious form is
developing green pollution. Based on false propaganda consumers are sometimes asked to buy
certain products falsely claimed to be environment friendly. But for ELCI the strategy
developed, now known as the 'independent sector strategy', is yet another form of this green
pollution.
This strategy implies two objectives, both denounced by ELCI:
to promote the idea that everyone is working for the protection of the environment - implying
there are no more polluters;
bSi*11-r*-ifll*L
72 Agenda 2/op. cii. para.30. 10(b).
73 For an analysis of this tension in negotiations for the Framework Convention on Climate Change see Levy, David Land Daniel Egan 'Corporate
political action in the global polity National and tmnsnational strategies in the climate change negotiations' in Higgolt, Richard A, Geoffrey R.D. Underhill,
and Andreas Bielereds. Non-SialeAcsors andAuthori(y in the Global System pp. 138-153, Routledgcl Warwick Studies in Globalisation Lendon 2000.
74 Friends of the Eai*i International and a consoilium of Scandinavian organisations, the Nordic Societies for the Conservation of Nature, had also released
statements criticising the 'independent sector' approach, although these were not cireulated as widely as ELCI's.
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to effectively disempower the environmental movement by forcing NGOs to bargain directly
with the polluters and arrive at common viewpoint before being heard by public authorities, in
this case governments.
For ELCI, NGOs are non-profit, non-party political organizations including groupings such as
environment and development, youth, indigenous people, consumer and religious.
Organizations of industry, trade unions, parliamentarians, academics and local authorities are
not NGOs.75
Many Government delegates must have been bemused by this first introduction to internecine
struggles between civil society organisations. For the NGOs present its target was clear. However
although the paper sets out clear concerns over the implications of the IFC's work, the principal
reaction among non-partisan NGOs seems to have been embarrassment at so public a display of
disunity. Thus Elizabeth May of the Canadian Environmental Network suggests that the appearance of
conflict - 'washing our dirty linen in public' - compromised the ability of NGOs to present a united
front in the critical debate on terms for the involvement of NGOs in the preparatoly meetings: 'The
appearance of a public indictment of the Centre for Our Common Future the day before the debate on
involvement of NOOs struck all the non-ELCI NGOs as particularly badly timed - a criticism the
ELCI board members failed to understand'.76 According to May's account, an open meeting was
organised by the IFC at which the concerns of ELCI were resolved by a decision to refer to
'independent sectors' in future. In his account of the same meetin& Stephen Collett suggests that the
steps taken by the IFC to counter the accusations levelled at it were rather more substantial:
Most significant was the agreement reached on a clear set of guiding principles and objectives
(mandates) for the IFC, and a formula for its composition. Regarding the puipose of the IFC it is
most important to note that the body will serve a facilitating ulinction rather than one of
representation for the gjobal NGO community. To this end it will develop a communications
strategy to support the flow of infbrmation between the UN and the independent sectors, it will
facilitate the submission of oral and written statements to the official UNCED process and, if
requested, will assist organizations and networks to define their roles vis a vis the UNCED.77
This assessment indicates a more limited role for the IFC as a facilitator, acting to enhance the
involvement of all NGOs in the Summit. There is no mention of the Committee's previous
• 75 'Given PoIIuiio&, unpublished ELCI paper circulated at the ixt PmpCom for UNCED. Nairobi August 1990. The flifl text is in Appendix 1. While the
inction diawobdwein O.5iJtiCab 1ded eNO	 ni1iyhasbeenl ithr,od, und	 _______
prunimably catcgoriscd as elements of government, it is less clear tiy trade unions and academies should beexciuded in this context
76 May. EIibcth 'News from Nairobi' posted byon en.unced.gcncral. 25 August 1990.
77 Coflctt, Stephen 'Memo to the NGO Development Committee', op. cit. The communiqué released by the IFC Ibliowing this meeting states that 'There
was general agreement that the independent sectors .cited differing and at times opposing constituencies. The purpose of the IFC was not to attempt to
facilitate the emergence of consensual positions iegauling UNCED amongst these different constituencies, but rather to promote dialogue amongst them
with a view to determining what common grotind might exist, whilst recognizing that these would be positions on which consensus would be unlikely to be
found.' Minutes of the first meeting of the IFC, Nairobi 10 August 1990.
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undertaldngs to organise a parallel NGO forum at UNCED or to conduct a 'donor education
campaign' to solicit financial support for independent sector activities. ITevertheless, such activities
continued. The principal lesson learnt by the IFC and COCF would appear to have been the need for
more tact and circumspection in their dealings with other organisations.
ELCI had also established its own International Steering Committee, which met for the first time on 4
August 1990. This new body had committed the organisation to hold regional consultations in
preparation for UNCED, and to prepare an NGO report; 'The Brazil Document', in collaboration with
a number of otherNGOs. The overlap between this co-ordinating role and the functions of the IFC
clearly fuelled tensions between the two. A further area of contention was the IFC's stated intention to
hold a meeting involving all sectors six months before UNCED. 78 An internal COCF memo from this
period states that 'the ELCI board members felt that the ELCI, and not the IFC, should organize such a
pre-Brazil meeting and that the IFC should play only a facilitating role'.79 By late 1990, it was evident
that the French Government was willing to host and fund a global NGO preparatory event.80 The
event itself (held in Paris from 17 to 20 December 1991) will be considered later in this chapter. At
this point, it is useful to note that rancour between ELCIIISC and COCFIIFC was evident in both
ideological divisions over objectives and methods of working and in more prosaic differences over•
which group could claim to be the focus for NGO co-ordination in preparation for UNCED.
A contemporary account from the second PrepCom in Geneva the following April by Langston James
Goree VI (Kimo) suggests that the evident ill-feeling between the IFC and ELCI reflected more deep-
seated divisions between NGOs on some of the key elements of their collaboration.8 ' A meeting held
by the IFC to clarify its mandate 'to facilitate those who wish to be facilitated' highlighted a number of
particularly contentious issues:
Holding an alternative event in Rio: Kimo's record states that 'there was no consensus on the value of
the proposed parallel NGO conference'. The IFC proposed to play a leading role in organising this
event, suggesting that it would offer the opportunity for consensus-building within and between
different constituencies. This was supported by a number of organisations which held that the
flL*i.L-	 i ..uii : - iL U._J1LIf i1 airuiiiei.
78 Sce Centre for OurCommon FutureNetr* '92 No.1, op. cit. July1990.
79 Undated memo, quoted in Chattejee Pratap and Matihias Finger The Earth Brokm op. cit. p.87.
80 The December1990 issue of Neflw,,* '92 includes a repot from the IFC proposing to hold an independent sectors meing in early 1992 with French
suppolt; the same issue contalos an update from ELCI confirming that an offer from the French Government had been accepted and that the event would be
organised by ELCI for December1991. Centre for Our Common Future Netrk '92 No3 op. cia December1990. Available on Ewth Summit: The NGO
Archives CD ROM, op. cia
81 Goree VI, Langslon James (Kimo) 'PrepCom II Chronicles' posted on en.unced.general, Apiil 1991.
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opportunities for co-ordination and interaction would be valuable. Others opposed the initiative,
arguing that it would deflect attention from involvement with the core bu'siness of UNCED itself and
lessen the overall impact of NGOs on the Summit.
Relations with host organisations: Kimo quotes the IFC chairman saying 'there would have to be a
certain amount of work with the Brazilian NGOs'. However, most of the groups present rejected this
approach and insisted that the IFC must give support to the Brazilian NGO Forum in their
organization of the alternative events. The assumption by the IFC that it should play the leading role in
these preparations appears to have been challenged. Kimo also reports that 'ten developing countly
NGOs decided to boycott the meeting because of its domination by northern groups'. Such concerns
would not have been eased by the apparent disagreement over the centrality of the host NGO coalition
in the organisation of a parallel event
Legitimacy and accountability of the IFC: There was open criticism of the accountability of the IFC
representatives to the sectors that they represented and the legitimacy of their positions as
representatives, due to a lack of democratic processes within the sectors in their selection. If the
internal operations of the IFC did not stand up to scrutiny, the positions it was taking in attempting to
shape NGO structures for collaboration were also open to question..
These are three key areas which challenge the assertion that the IFC could play an apolitical,
facilitating role 'for those who wish to be facilitated'. In each instance, the a priori significance of
effective structures for self-governance by which to address divisions between NOOs and to resolve
conflict is evident82 It may be useful here to invoke some of the general points raised in the previous
chapter on the work of NGO networks and consider their validity in this context.
3.4.4 Elusive Principles of Self-Governance
In the previous chapter Paul Nelson's analysis of transnational NGO networks lobbying the World
Bank was considered. Nelson suggests that a measure of influence in policy and funding debates leads
I 111fl!LtJu1uI :t iiur
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here:
to problems within networks. Three sources of particular tension were noted, and merit repetition
. the tension between entrepreneurial leadership and participatory, solidarity-driven
alliances;
. the need to balance and reconcile local objectives of Southern participants with
strategic, global objectives of international campaigners; and
. the diverse and sometimes contradictory claims to legitimacy in international
lobbying.83
These constitute a useful fiBmework for consideration of tensions and divisions apparent in the
collaborative mechanisms established by NGOs prior to UNCED.
3.4.4.1 The tension between entrepreneurial leadership and participatory, solidarity-driven
alliances
'Green Pollution', ELCI's attack on the IFC, represented an attempt to reclaim the principal role in co-
ordinating NGO preparations for UNCED. As we have seen, this focused on the ideological
distinctions embedded in two different oranisationa1 models: privileging non-governmental
organisations or adopting a broader conception of 'independent sector(s)'.
ELCI's understanding of its own role clarifies these divisions still furthec
The organization's objectives include helping empower grassroots environment and
development organizations; influencing policy that impacts on the environment through a strong
NGO involvement in the planning and policy-making processes; promoting and facilitating
South-South and North-South dialogue.TM
'Green Pollution' makes clear that ELCI is prepared to enter into dialogue with organisations from
other sectors if they are recognised as the representatives of their constituencies, but without ariyprior
commitment to negotiate common positions unless it is clear that there is enough common ground to
'aWaiTanUheir development.This constitutes a clearcothmilment
83 NeIson Paul I. 'Conflict, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Who Speaks for Whom in Transnaticnal NGO Netwcdcs Lobbying the World Bank?
Occasional Paper No.7 Hanison Pmgramnie on the Futwe Global Agenda, October 1996. Located online at
httpi/ww.bsos.umd.eduThanisonapersfpaperI7.htm. Accessed on 3 January 2002.
84 Pmfile of ELCI, 'Organisations Participating at the Global Fonim', Proutists International, USA 1992.
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alliances' which is also evident in the stance taken by the International Steering Committee (ISC)
established by ELCI and others to oversee preparations for Rio. Princen and Finger state that
The main focus of the International Steering Committee was to identify local solutions to global
problems that can contribute, in particular, to changes in lifestyle and consumption patterns
The focus was on grass-roots and people-oriented initiatives, much of which would be in
opposition to governments. The approach was, therefore, also much more confrontational than
the International Facilitiating Committee's.85
The IFC was created after due consultation but as we have seen, with a strong steer from the Centre
for our Common Future and the UNCED Secretary General. While its publications state the
importance of 'the broadest, most representative possible involvement of... the independent sector
and individuals at all levels' in the 'ideal of a sustainable future',86 its actions suggest considerable
pragmatism in the interpretation of this dictum. 87 A mandate was secured prior to the first UNCED
PrepCom for the IFC to 'mastermind arrangements for the independent sector's participation in the
run-up to UNCED and the conference itself. 88 Attempts to persuade NGOs involved in the
preparatory committee meetings that this role was legithnate and useful proved contentious, as
considered earlier. Accusations of 'heavy-handedness' and 'neo-colonialism' 89 illustrate the concerns
of many mainstream NGO activists over the role played by the IFC.
Yet the IFC, in collaboration with the Centre for Our Common Future, did exhibit some of the more
positive attributes of 'entrepreneurial leadership'. It was able to anticipate the debate onNGO access
at PrepCom I and hold a meeting with the IJNCED Secretary General in advance to discuss these
issues. As a result, many of the IFC's concerns were reflected in the initial guidelines drafted by
Maurice Strong. This demonstrated the 1FC's ability to act on behalf ofits broader constituencies and
its capacity to influence the official UNCED deliberations. Because it had no strong critique of
specific issues in the negotiations, or coherent ideological positions to defend (other than promoting
the involvement of the independent sectors in UNCED), the IFC was able to function as an
intermediary between different organisations and sectors, culminating in its role in the organisation of
the parallel NGO Global Forum in Rio in 1992. It also organised an extensive series of information
4 t5ia1NGOsi, WJ PoW b4	 thVGkbd2O5IaL
86 Ccntre for Our Common Future 8n,ndiland Bulktin No. Sop. cit. June 1990. p.1.
87 For example the conclusions of its inaugural meeting in Nyon in June 1990 included the assertion that	 ives of the various components of the
sector should be granted observer status to the entire UNCED preparatory process; and that iqitatives of the independent sector should be included in
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88 Ibid. p.5
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briefings for NGOs before and after PrepCom meetings and held dialogue sessions involving key
figures in the official UNCED proceedings.	 *
Despite these successes, which increased the JFC's profile and (superficially at least) demonstrated its
usefulness to all sides, its inability to present strong and coherent positions can also be construed as a
weakness. Princen and Finger's analysis illustrates this:
the IFC was a coalition or, maybe better, a patchwork, or various independent sectors,
themselves represented by particular organizations, such as ItJCN, EEB, ICC, CNN, ICSU, the
Asian NGO Coalition (ANGOC) and so forth. Consequently, it was very difficult for the IFC to
agree on anything substantive except, perhaps, the call for sustainable development and the
active participation of independent sectors in the UNCED process. It is, therefore, not surprising
that some NGOs - in particular, the more social movement oriented ones - were unhappy with
the IFC and created their own alternative [the International Steering Committee].9°
This analysis seems somewhat unbalanced. If the IFC's difficulty in formulating substantive positions
constitutes a weakness, so surely does the inability of ELCI and the ISC to assume an impartial
position from which they could support the greater involvement of all NGOs (using the IJN's broader
definition) in the UNCED process. While the participatory approach taken by ELCI may have served
to build legitimacy at the local level and among Southern environment and development NGOs, the
IFC was able to initiate dialogue between sectors and gain the ears of the most influential individuals,
including the UNCED Secretary General. The two could be considered complementary, except that
they clearly provoked mutual antipathy.9' Nevertheless, for many NGOs they constituted two separate
networks which each offered distinct benefits and were used in this way throughout the UNCED
process.
A further NGO grouping which does not figure prominently in the literature of the Centre for Our
Common Future, the Environment Liaison Committee International, nor of the UNCED Secretariat is
the steadily expanding group of organisations which followed PrepCom negotiations closely and
shared information and ideas. This self-styled 'NGO Strategy Group' was constituted initially by the
90 Puincen, Thomas and Matthias Finger Envbvnnwntal NGOs in World Politics: linking the Local and the Global op. cit. p.204. Chatterjee and Finger go
inher still: 'Oveiail, the IFC s calainly not a soccesstoly impoilant environmental and developnental NGOS •rCfUSCd to play along with the tenns
management' Chattetjce Prata and Matthias Finger The Earth Bmkerr: Power, Politics and World Development . ciL p.87.
91 To pick one example from many, Chip Lindner's cntique of NGOs participating in the thinl PrepCom for UNCED illustiates this: 'the traditional
environment / development constituencies.. are vay vocal, anti-govemment and critical of industry. They don't want to be co-opted under any
cireumstances by governments or industries. There is also a new breed of organization, which is open to input from a variety of sectots be it from industry,
the tiade unions, professional associations, NGOs or whomever ... The IFC is very much in that group that sees the need for every sector to be represented at
the negotiating table. And if you cannot deal with each other at the table in a cooperative, contributory, objective way, then you are going to be out of the
ball game.' Interviewed in Lamer, Steve Earth Summit: Conversations th Architects ofan &ologicaiiv Sustainable Future op. cit. p.244.
127
small number of organisations represented in the Nairobi PrepCom and drafted the final NGO
statement there. By the second PrepCom this informal group had reconstituted itself and held daily
NGO Strategy Sessions
briefing each other on the events from the day before, sharing collected bits of information
gleaned from the corridors and sharing ideas on the substantive discussions. This group was
open to all NGOs and we had more than one hundred and fifty different NGO representatives
circulating in and out of the meetings over the three weeks. Although the majority of the NCIOs
were from the environment and development sectors we also had youth, religious, business and
others in attendance. The group never pretended to speak as a single NGO voice but it was a
forum where many coalitions were formed and subsequently wrote collective interventions.92
The NGO Strategy Group established task groups to follow issues on the UNCED agenda and used
the newsletters and other means of communication created by other more structured networks. At the
third and fourth PrepComs its significance as the locus for sirategising among NGOs had been
established, and the production of information reports, analysis, and position papers as well as the
continuation of task groups which communicated between sessions and the daily NGO strategy
sessions cemented the position of the NGO Strategy Group in the UNCED procedures. At UNCED
itself; funding was secured for production of a dailyEarth Summit Bulletin which provided detailed
information and analysis of the negotiations for an extensive audience. The Group proved adept at
using new electronic means of communication to continue regular exchanges between PrepComs, and
provided a framework within which organisations with common perspectives or concerns could
collaborate effectively. Thus issue groups addressing forests, climate change, biological diversity and
others were able to meet, and caucuses for women's organisations, indigenous peoples and other
sectoral groupings could also function effectively.
This loose coalition shared some of the characteristics of the two high profile NGO networks focusing
on UNCED preparations: it shared some of the ELCI / ISC's ability to identify issues not on the
official agenda, though not its more radical critique of the proceedings; it was able to bring together a
wide range of organisations, though its capacity to disseminate information was more limited than the
COCF I IFC; it provided a stnicture for NGOs to interact with each other and with the official
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proceedings, which was widely used and appreciated by NGOs and by governments and UN officials.
Despite this, the relationship between the NGO Strategy Group and the wo more established NGO
networks appears to have been rather fraught. Despite its evident usefulness during the second
PrepCom, Kimo comments:
It remains unclear the exact role of the International Facilitating Committee in relation to the
NGOs that were here at this PrepCom and participated in the NCiO Strategy Sessions. In my
very personal opinion, I don't think that the IFC yet recognizes the NOOs who came to this
PrepCom and met in the NGO Strategy Sessions as an important part of their constituency.93
These tensions, and the ideological and pragmatic divisions they suggest, will be considered more
fully in the conclusion to this chapter.
•Table 3.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of UNCED International NGO
Networks
Network	 Strengths	 Weaknesses
Environment	 Miculating the shared concerns of 	 Taking extreme positions which have
Liaison Centre environment and development NGOs,	 lithe bearing on the official debate
International I	 grassroots and Southern organisations
International	 Difficulty in relating effectively with other
Steeilng	 Challenging The unsustainable practices of 	 sectors, particularly indusliy
Committee	 key actors
Participatory work methods hampered
Presenting viable alternative policies and 	 ability to take decisions quickly or
ys of living	 anticipate opportunities
Introducing issues otherwise exduded from
the official agenda
Centre for our	 Promoting dialogue between all sectors 	 Lack of credibility with many NGOs -
Common
Future I	 Providing information and advice to increase 	 Inability to reach strong, coherent policy
International	 the extent and the effectiveness of NGO input posilions
Facilitating	 to UNCED
Committee
	
	
Weak articulation of principles beyond
Close relations with the Secretariat and other what is already in the Brundtland Report
key actors
Difficulty in holding together the various
Working methods allow it to act quickly and 	 coalitions involved
take advantage of opportunities
Perceived as part of the UNCED
'establishment'
'	 "'"' ---	
•-	
- +.—'.-	
—NGO Strategy	 Promoting dialogue between sectors 	 Limited capacity to inform wider debate
Group
	
	
on sustainable development issues
Providing information and advice to NGOs
______________ interested in official proceedings	 Unclear relations with more established
93 Goree VI, Langston James (Kimo) 'PrepCom II Chmnicles', op. ciL
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interested in official proceedings 	 NGO networks and international NGOs
Introducing issues not addressed by others in 	 Insufficient 'institutional memory' to build
official proceedings	 consistently on previous successes
Formulating joint positions and statements 	 Perceived as predominantly made up of
among like-minded organisations 	 Northern NGOs
Informal structure allows quick responses and
ad hoc joint activities
Regular presence in PrepComs allows good
relations to develop with governments and the
UNCED secretariat
3.4.4.2 The need to balance and reconcile local objectives of grass-roots organisations with
strategic, global objectives of international campaigners
In the context of UNCED, this issue raises both general ideological tensions and particular
organisational difficulties. The fonner have been touched upon earlier and form the basis of the
Ecologist's critique of the UNCED process as a whole - that global NGOs are at best an irrelevance
and at worst impede the efforts of community groups to reclaim control over their own enviromnents
from the destructive processes of industrial development. The latter is most evident in relations
between global NGOs and networks and Brazilian organisations, themselves collaborating in an
uneasy alliance named the Brazilian NGO Forum.
Ideological tensions between global (principally Northern-based) organisations and local (often
Southern) groups can be cited in many aspects of NGO collaboration in the IJNCED process. The
emphasis placed in Our Common Future and the draft text of Agenda 2! and the other Rio agreements
on devolving decision-making and involving communities in policy processes was understood by
many critics to be at odds with the system for global management of the environment being
developedY' From this perspectiv; references to the important roles to be played by NCiOs and other
'major social groups' in achieving sustainable development would have vely different implications if
they referred to the direct involvement of local communities in these processes. However, the greatest
beneficiaries are the influential but tiny international NGO elite, whose accountability to grass-roots
organisations is often negligible, but who claim to represent the poor an 4 marginalised, and gain
1r.rrr r - i pisj juui p- —.ii .p r .	 u
funding and prestige through this association.
94 For ecanip1e, see Consejo, Juan Jose 'The Twilight of the Environmentalist Era', . cii.
955cc for example Roy, Bunker 'Open Discussion on an NGO Code of Conduct' posted on en.unced.dialoguc, Apil 1992.
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The Brazilian NGO Forum (BNGOF) was created by three Sao Paulo-based NGOs, in response to
issues raised at the Vancouver and Nyon meetings held by the Centre forOur Common Future.
Following the example of the newly established International Facilitating Committee, it was decided
that the Brazilian Forum should be a:
broad-based, representative grouping of Brazilian NGOs around the issue of TJNCED, in order
to
a) meet the need felt by those outside Brazil (NGO networks, the UNCED Secretariat, other UN
bodies, sympathetic member-country governments and others) for a representative and
legitimate NGO reference point in Brazil for liaison on both practical and substantive questions
involving UNCED (understood as including the official preparatory process and Conference, as
well as parallel processes and events in 1992); and
b) stimulate and coordinate NGO activities within Brazil around the Conference, including the
fonnulation of positions on the substantive issues under discussion as well as pressing for the
adoption by the Brazilian government of the UN recommendations in respect of NGO
participation in the official processes and the elaboration of national reports?6
BNGOF was thus created in large measure as a result of external pressure; the focus for its activities
was split between providing services and a 'reference point' for those outside Brazil and co-ordinating
domestic NGO preparations for the Conference. Its relationship with the IFC is also significant - one
of the Forum's first acts was to elect a representative to participate in IFC meetings. Further
ambivalence is evident in the frame of reference the BNGOF adopted in establishing its activities. Its
inaugural report presents a critique of the issues on the agenda for UNCED, proposing revisions and
additions; however, no position is taken on the 'independent sector' debate which was ongoing at the
time. Strong emphasis was placed on finding out what other national and international networks were
doing in preparation for UNCED:
We see the conference not in terms of the event itself; but as a stimulus to dialogue and
networking. The establishment of the conference has provided us with the requirement to act
and a deadline to meet, but other than this it should not be seen as other than a point on a
continuum. This continuum stretches long beyond June 1992, and involves the strengthening of
the ability of citizen's groups internationally to establish networks and identify priorities and
strategies for preserving and enhancing life on the planet, with all that this implies for the
establishment of new, equitable and sustainable development paradigms.97
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However, the Forum also stresses the need for 'a grassroots perspective on environment and
development issues'.98
	
a-
In all of this, the BNGOF would seem rather uneasily to straddle the divide between the IFC and ELCI
explored above. Internal divisions between environmental groups and organisations focusing on social
issues occurred repeatedly in the work of the Brazilian Forum. In part, this can be attributed to the
domestic context within which these organisations had been created. Bill Hinchberger's analysis of
the increasing influence of third world NGOs in global enviromnental politics emphasises these
elements:
[A]s the discussions advanced, Brazilian NGOs began to discover that their heterogeneous
make-up, often a source of enlightening debate, could also prove a hindrance to the pragmatic
goals of preparing logistics for the parallel gathering and lobbying the official one.
Conflicts in Brazil often mirrored those stirring up in other parts of the world. Despite moves
towards sometimes similar agendas during the late 1980s, the classic duel between 'social
developmentalists' and traditional environmentalists loomed again. The growing role of mass-
based social and labour organizations in preparations for the Earth Summit became increasingly
polemical. Ecologists complained that NGOs with strictly environmental concerns gradually
lost their early majority in the NGO Forum. Those sympathetic to 'popular' NOOs predictably
believed that 'Ecological issues - and organizations - are overrepresented'Y9
A militant labour federation, the Unified Workers' Central (CUT), had a seat on the BNGOF seven-
person directorate and was involved in a number of disputes with enviromnentalists over the policy
direction the Forum should take. Tensions were also evident within the Forum between large,
influential organisations and grass-roots groups - Hinchberger quotes Green Party member of the
Brazilian Congress, Sidney de Miguel:
In Brazil there are two types of NGOs. The salon groups, that are good at raising funds, and the
small, local, thematic groups. The rich groups, those connected to the CUT and the church,
controlled the NGO Forum. ... Our position is that the most representative groups are the small,
self-sustaining ones. The five-star NGOs are linked to the ecological programme of the rich
98/bid. •
99 Hincherg Bill 'Non-Govi menial Organic cns.The Third Fo. •in the Thud World' in Bes .Helge Ole and Gerag Parmann ads. Green
Globe Yetv'book 1993 p.45-54;O dtMIvaftyPr Oxlbid 1993. Available on
Ricardo Ambuja 'The Inside Out, The Outside In: Pros and Cons of Foreign Influence on Brazilian Environmentalism in Bergesen. Helge Ole, Magnar
Nordehaug and Oeorg Parmann ads. Green Globe Y earbook /992 pp.15-23, Oxford University Press. Oxford 1992. Ant suggests that international
prcssuI and cnvironmental campaigning on multilateral finding agencies have coninbuted to changrng the development model adapted by Brazil.
However loreign influence has little chance of success if separate from the dynamics of Brazilian civil society and local organizations which een and
root out external influence and create culture. When foreign campaigning surpassed national efforts it lacked society's suppor1 gennating distortions,
cosmetic changes, and opportunism' (p.15). This represents an important consideration in assessing relations between international and Brazilian NGOs in
the UNCED process.
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countries, sustainable development. They ignore potential solutions that would reduce
production but guarantee life.'00
Difficulties also arose through Conflicts between the different responsibilities placed upon the Forum.
In its relations with the Brazilian authorities, it articulated the views of national and international
NGOs on arrangements for NGO participation; it also acted as the forum for efforts by NGOs to
influence positions taken by the Brazilian Government. In both contexts relations were further
complicated by the fact that government and NGOs were also attempting to use an international
audience to establish their credibility, sometimes by denigrating the other. 10 ' The BNGOF was
obliged to negotiate with the Rio State authorities and national government officials to make
arrangements for the promised parallel NGO Conference. The location for the event proved
contentious - although the Jacarepagua racetrack was considered, as it would give delegates relatively
easy access to the official meetings in the Rio Ceniro conference centre, the venue was eventually
fixed as Flamengo Paik in central Rio, which would effectively separate the NGO events from the
inter-governmental proceedings. These discussions corncided with attempts by the BNGOF to have its
input adequately reflected in the Brazilian National Report to UNCED. The problems inherent in
conducting these related but separate negotiations are clear, and demonstrate the invidious position in
which the Forum was placed in attempting to meet (or reconcile) the needs of Brazilian and
international NGOs.
A further challenge for the BNGOF in its role as host was to find financial backers and in-kind
support for the NGO Global Forum. This was resolved to some extent by entering into partnership
with the IFC in organising the Global Forum. While the Brazilian Forum undertook to organise a
'Social Movements event' within the Forum, the IFC would co-ordinate other aspects of the
preparations, including negotiations with potential funders from countries other than Brazil. Kimo's
comments from PrepCom II, noted earlier, suggest that the Forum's stated intention to act as the
'principal host of all parallel events that will take place in Rio in 1992b02 was not always respected by
the IFC.
Tensions within the host NGO network can thus be attributed to four principal causes:
mx-sE1,-ar--I..--#.* -* "—$'.4t
100 Ibid.
101 Network '92 published an article titled 'Bil: A model of Public Participation' in July 1991 which described govanmentled consultation on the
report as a model fbr othes countries participating in UNCED - Centre for Our Common Future Network '92 No.8 op. ciL, July 1991. The following month
it was obliged to print a retraction, and the Brazilian NGO Forum's detailed criticisms of the consultation process (Network '92 No.9 op. cia, August 1991.
Available on EaMh Summit: The NGO Archives CD ROM, op. ciL)
102 Quoted in Centre for OurCommon FutumNelwo,* '92 No. Sop. cia, Match 1991.
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• domestic political divisions, exacerbated by the previous repressive regime which
continued to polarise Brazilian political perspectives.
• just as the IFC was formed before other interested organisations had prepared coherent
positions and strategies, so the Brazilian NGO Forum was created at the instigation of
external actors and struggled to gain wider acceptance in Brazil for the 'independent
sectors' model it had adopted.
the BNGOF had difficulty reconciling the interests and principles of its two principal
constituencies - Brazilian NGOs on the one hand and foreign organisations on the
other.
. the Forum attempted to combine a facilitating role (information dissemination, making
arrangements for meeting venues and so on) with an advocacy role (both in the
domestic context and in international processes).
Tensions between the local objectives of Brazilian organisations and the global objectives of the
principal international NGO networks are evident in the above analysis. The BNGOF attempted to
combine the inclusiv; essentially organisational role of the IFC with the more radical critique adopted
by the ISC and ELCL Other national and regional networks were obliged to align themselves with one
or other perspective or to endeavour to reach an uneasy compromise similar to that of the BNGOF. In
each instance, the position taken would have been shaped in large measure by the domestic context in
which these coalitions operated. Despite this, there is little evidence that these particular concerns
were acknowledged by the IFC or the ISC, or that attempts were made to balance them with the global
strategies they pursued. All of these factors are significant in the structure and the substance of the
Global Forum, considered more fully below.
3.4.4.3 The diverse and sometimes contradictory daims to legitimacy in international
lobbying
mover the legitimacy of posiUons taken by NGOs in the UNCED process have been touched
1	
i
upon eailier. Among theprincipal international non-governmental netviorks, two broad perspectives
are apparent:
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• legitimacy is derived principally from close relations with and accountability to local,
Southern and grass-roots organisations, which ensures th'at positions taken by the
network reflect their experience and priorities.
• legitimacy is derived from other regional and international networks representing a
diversity of perspectives. The network plays a necessary role in bringing together these
groupings and can help them to interact effectively with the official proceedings and
with each other.
We have already considered how the latter understanding of legitimacy was challenged and redefined
by critics of the International Facilitating Committee. At the Paris NGO Conference organised by
ELC1 the efficacy of the first definition was also called into question.
The ELCI NGO Conference titled 'Roots for the Future', took place in Paris from 17 to 20 December
1991 .103
 Representatives from 862 organisations, three-quarters from Southern-based NGOs,
considered two principal documents: 'Justice Between Peoples - Justice Between Generations', a
'synthesis of citizens movements' responses to environment and development challenges' and Agenda
ya Wananchi (Swahili for 'Sons and Daughters of the Earth'), a 'draft action plan for the 1990s',
produced as an NGO response to the official Agenda 21. Agenda ya Wananchi inc1uded
• descriptions of what were considered to be the most pressing problems facing the
Earth, including 'systems of governance that subjugate the individual', 'a world
market system that largely brings benefits to a small minority.., and discounts the future
or passes the costs on to the world's poor', and 'a global culture in which the world's
cultural diversity is getting subjugated and destroyed by the dominant economic and
technological processes'.
• a set of requests made to governments: a request for participatory democracy; a request
to develop a powerful and effective UN; a request to reduce military spending by at
least a half; a request to Northern governments to reform the world's trading system;
and a request to Not henfoyernments to increase nancia1 flows to the South and '
East.
103 Information from NGO Conference held in Paris', Centre for Our Common Future Network '92 No.13 op. ciL, January 1992 (available on Earth
Summit: The NGOArchiws CD ROM, op. cit.), and from FOE Link Friends of the Earth International Issue 47, Antenlam Jan/Feb 1992.
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. a set of commitments made by participating NGOs: a commitment to build up global
NGO alliances for working together in the 'struggle for global justice and
sustainability'; a commitment to 'campaign against all those national and international
organisations and interests who disregard the imperatives ofjustice and sustainability';
a commitment to 'the development of equitable and sustainable natural resource
management systems and technologies'; a commitment to educate the public; a
commitment to 'a struggle for the empowerment of the socially and ecologically
marginalised people'; and a commitment to 'a struggle for women's empowerment and
equal status in society'.'°4
Despite the vague but worthy tone of much of the documentation, dissatisfaction was expressed by a
number of delegates with the conference as a whole. This was reflected in a declaration that was
prepared and endorsed by regional workshops from Africa, Latin America and the Carilbean, Asia
and the Pacific, as well as representatives of indigenous peoples. The statement criticised the
conference for being too 'rigid and inflexible'. The structure of the meeting and logistical problems
did not allow for discussion and production ofjoint statements on important structural issues such as
'the international economic order, the dominant models of development, the homogenisation of
cultures and identities', among others. 'Having let this opportunity pass us by,' the declaration
concluded, 'we have failed to achieve one of its objectives, to influence the iJ4()
Friends of the Earth International's newsletter described the Roots for the Future Conference s 'a
disaster','°6 although the final text ofAgendaya Wananchi was 'paradoxically, quite good'. Such
criticisms must have been chastening for ELCI and its International Steering Committee, which had
undertaken to 'strengthen the NGO movement by helping groups to combine their efforts, rather than
simply to produce another new declaration'.'01 Tension between the objectives of the global coalition
and the priorities of its Southern partners is evident in these statements. As noted earlier, ELCI's self-
proclaimed role included: 'helping empower grassroots environment and development organizations;
influencing policy that impacts on the environment through a strong NGO involvement in the
planning and policy-making processes; promoting and facilitating South-South and North-South
". ''rJrui	 -4umefrw iT .j..ir*m	 cèu
104 Envimnment Liaison Centie International Agenda ye Wananchi, agreed at the 'Roots fix Our Futur& osnfence organised by ELCI in Palis in
Deeomber 1991, ELCI Naimbi, 1992.
105 Quotes from Centrefor Our Common FntweNeti* '92 No. 13, op. c. Available on Ea,ih Sununii: The NGO Archives CD ROM, op cit
106 FOE Link Issue 47,op. cit
107 'Global NGO Document for 1992' ELCI Paris, posted on en.unced.geneial, 25 Septombor 1991.
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dialogue'.' 05 Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of those attending the Paris Conference would
appear to have concluded that ELCI had failed to perform these functions-to their satisfaction.
To some extent, it seems reasonable to conclude that ELCI and its International Steering Committee
had been 'hoist by their own petard'. By attempting to build consensus and partnerships among
participants, the organisers had limited the likelihood that any radical critique(s) of the UNCED
process would be formulated. By involving a broad range of organisations and ideological
perspectives they bad exacerbated the problem. And by establishing an agenda which prioritised the
development of common positions they bad drawn attention to these structural difficulties. In all of
this the parallels with earlier criticisms of the International Facilitating Committee are clear. In this
instance, reaching global consensus in order to present coherent NGO positions at UNCED seems to
have taken precedence over the negotiation and articulation of a more complex and contradictory web
of regional and issue-specific concerns. It is less clear whether, with bindsight the organisers could
have avoided any of these problems.
Despite these organisational and conceptual flaws, the Roots for the Future Conference did initiate
collaboration among a group of NGOs which was subsequently termed the 'International NGO
Forum' (INGOF). In the six months leading up to UNCED, INGOF developed some of the issues
raised in Agenda ya Wananchi into the initial drafts of a set of Alternative Treaties to be negotiated
further in the Global Forum. Although these NGO Treaties addressed the responsibilities of
governments, their primary pwpose was to arlicu)ate common princip	 t	 ieits
agreed by a group of like-minded organisations. In this respect Agendaya Wananchi can be
understood as the final attempt to present an overarching critique of the UNCED process. Its failure to
deliver this to the satisfaction of many of the participants, and the failure of the Paris Conference to
ciystallise an effective NGO agenda for the official UNCED proceedings may have led to more
deliberate analysis of the ideological and practical factors necessary for more effective collaboration in
future. Alternatively, the lack of a coherent overview may have led to development of numerous
partial analyses and proposals for action which had a negligible impact on the inter-governmental
	
decisions.	 .
	
--	
.:	 .	 •	 •
108 Profile of ELCI, tnisations Pankipating al the Global Forum', op. cit.
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3.4.5 Fragmentation in the Run-up to Rio
Attempts by the JFC and ELCI to create effective NGO coalitions led to considerable ideological and
practical difficulties, as we have seen. Nevertheless, other collaborative activities gained momentum.
In the months preceding UNCED a large number of other initiatives assumed increasing importance
as appreciation of the significance of the Rio Summit grew more widespread. International
conferences were held by women's organisations, scientists, youth NGOs, indigenous peoples'
organisations and many others. National and regional preparatoxy events took place amund the world
as media attention and public awareness increased.
sTable 3.2 Preparatory Conferences organised by various sectors
April	 Rotterdam Second World Industry Conference on Environmental Management
(WICEM II). A non-binding Business Charter for Sustainable Development was
1991	 launched, signed by over 200 business associations and corporations.
November Miami World Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet induded draffing of
1991	 Women's Action Agenda 21; organised by the international Policy Action
Committee formed for the purpose by the Women's Environment and
Development Organisation.
November Vienna International Conference on an Agenda of Science for Environment
1991	 and Development into the 21st Century (ASCEND 21) organised by the
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) together with the Third World
Academy of Sciences.
December Paris 'Roots for the Future' NGO Conference organised by the ISC / ELCI.
1991
February	 Berlin 'Promotion of Environmental Protection at Municipal Level - Strategies
1992	 and Approaches for Action' two-day meeting of 115 experts from cities,
national governments, international and interlocal organizations, NGOs and the
scientific community.
March	 Caracas, Venezuela World Congress of the International Confederation of
1992	 FreeTrade Unions
May 1992 Kari-Oca, Brazil International Conference of Indigenous Peoples on
Environment, Development and Territories organised by the International
Indigenous Commission and the lntertiibal Committee in BraziLj.ru .*
May 1992 Rio de Janeiro International Chamber of Commerce Industry Forum (27-29
May) followed by Council meeting of the Business Council for Sustainable
Development (29-31 May).
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May 1992 Curitiba, Brazil World Urban Forum in preparation for UNCED, organised jointly
by UNDP and Curitiba City Hall.	 -
As drafts of the Rio texts took shape, NGO networks also became increasingly focused on influencing
negotiations of particular relevance to them. For example meetings of the international negotiating
committees established to prepare the conventions on climate change and biological diversity were
obviously of interest to members of the Climate Action Network and the Rainforest Action Network,
respectively. Similarly, deliberations on specific sections of Agenda 21 (addressing issues such as
oceans, agriculture, human settlements and health) became of increasing interest to individual
organisations and alliances focusing on these areas. This more detailed work frequently required
considerable knowledge and expertise. In many instances, close collaboration between government
officials, IJNCED secretariat staff and NGOs was cemented through these negotiations° 9 By the
same token, issues on which there were fundamental differences were exposed and exacerbated
tensions between the various sectors.
One factor which had united NGOs attending the first three PrepComs and negotiations on the draft
conventions was the desire to secure access to informal negotiations."° Although this bad been
possible in a number of the working groups functioning during the first three PrepComs, this bad been
at the discretion of the Working Group chair and could be vetoed by any government At the third
PrepCom, NGO representatives had been removed from Working Group 1 at the request of a number
of governments. Thus by March 1992 questions of access to PrepCom N, and the precedent these
would set for NGO access during UNCED itself; remained contentious issues. The NGO Strategy
Group assumed a central role in efforts to challenge these restrictions and discuss ways in which
access could be made more secure.
109 See for example the International Institute for Sustainable Development Earth Swnmit Bulletin fim PrcpCom IV vol.1 no. 27, IISD Manitoba Canada
April 1992: 'After two years of working closely together, it became increasingly clear that close interactions and the exchange of ideas created a very
productive and positive work environmeat for both ontities. NGOs realized that many government delegates were deqly ccanmitteçl but were limited by
their ne&fathg btructions. On the othbmtd, gpvmi1mts ewtoieebeutdTheconviona1 e eoflOOs.' 	 •
110 UN jargon distinguishes between 'formal' sessions, where officials generally make statements 'for the f 	 these areopen tdNGOs'); 'infomial
sessions (sometimes termed 'fonnal-infomials'), in which detailed negotiations on proposed text take place with translation facilities but without
transcription; and 'informal-informal?, where the most sensitive discussions between governments occur -these range from open-ended meetings without
translation but otherwise similar to informal sessions to meetings of a amall number of country delegates in the chair's office. This typogeaphy is adapted
from Bernstein, iohannah, Pamela Chasek, langston James Goree VI, and Richard Jordan 'PrepCom ffiWeek2 Report UNCEDNGO Strategy Group,
August 1991. The distinctions drawn aie necessarily imprecise, since an informal session by definition can be conducted according to the wishes of the
Chair and government participants.
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Whilst interactions of these kinds became increasingly elaborate and involved, a growing number of
organisations with little or no prior experience of UN procedures were granted accreditation to attend
UNCED preparatory ee" Many brought considerable expertise and were able to articulate the
concerns of under-represented groups and perspectives. Nevertheless, there were clearly discrepancies
between the needs and expectations of those who had participated from the outset and those who had
become involved much later in the process."2
Given its focus on the official UNCED preparations, the NGO Strategy Group assumed a particular
significance in this complex scenario. Morning strategy sessions took place daily during PrepCom N
and were complemented by a growing number of NGO caucuses and working groups. In addition, the
Strategy Group liaised with the UNCED Secretariat and others to organise discussions with key
officials fim the UNCED Secretariat and governments. It was also the focus for debate on issues of
access to meetings during the PrepCom and to official sessions at IJNCED itself Funding bad been
obtained from three US charitable foundations to produce Earth Summit Bulletin daily during the
session. Although not formally linked to the Strategy Group, the publication was written by
individuals closely associated with it at previous PrepComs and articulated the perspectives ofNGOs
closely involved in the negotiations while providing an authoritative and influential account of the
proceedings. As we have seen, these are all activities which the IFC and ELCI had previously
identified as key elements in a broader programme of collaboration between NOOs. Both had also
endeavoured to provide these services in their attempts to act as the central node in NGO preparations
for UNCED; yet both appeared to have retreated from these efforts prior to the Summit.
It is strildng that, in accounts of the final PrepCom for UNCED, activities of the ]FC/COCF and
ISC/ELCI do not feature prominently, even in their own newsletters. While the IFC organised some
briefings for NGO representatives new to the process and dialogue sessions with officials, it had little
involvement with the substance of the session. The subsequent issue of Network '92 reproduced in its
entirety the PrepCom N summary report from the Earth Summit Bulletin, which suggests that the
latter should now be viewed as the most authoritative source of information on official negotiations."3
ELI's post-PrepCom N newsletter suggests a similar retreat from attempts directly to influence the
1 MWZ*	 •	 ,.ø' -'	
.* '
111 In April 1991 193 NGOs had gained accreditation (lctter from Yolanda Kakabadse NGO Liaison Ofliccr, UNCED Seeretaijat to NGOs seeking
accreditation', 11 April 1991). By the stail, of PrepCom IV ovri 1000 organisaLions had been accredited (kiternalional Institute for Sustainable
Development Earth Swnmit Bulletin fim PrepCom IV, vol.1 no., op. cit, 2 March 1992); by the end that number had risen to 1420.
112 See the Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations' Issues and Non-Govnmental OrganizatIons Pmgran,ne Repoil on the Pailic(vation
ofNon.Govenunenwi Ogantaations in the Preparaio,y Pmcess of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development CAS1N, Geneva
1992 fora more detailed account of these issues. Available on Earth Summit: The NGOArchives CD ROM op. cit.
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inter-governmental process: 'It comes as no surprise that NGOs who were intensely involved in the
UNCED process will have to look for alternatives themselves, rather than relying on governments to
solve the deepening environmental crisis'."4
This is not to suggest that either network had withdrawn from preparations for the Rio Summit.
Rather, their focus had shifted to contexts in which they might be able to operate more effectively.
ELCI and the ISC placed greater significance on inter-NGO dialogue as the basis for progress,
contrasting the closed and uninspiring negotiations between governments with the potential benefits to
be derived from collaboration between NGOs:
If there ever was a time that citizens groups laboured under the illusion that they could greatly
influence decisions made inside the compact and closed-door world of government
negotiations, that has been all but dashed in this fourth and final meeting of diplomats before the
Earth Summit"5
As a result of this shift in emphasis, ELCI became an active participant in preparations for the parallel
events to take place in Rio, in the process representing Agenda ya Wananchi as 'a vehicle for creating
cohesion in the NGO world'.."6	-
The IFC was also more closely associated with the Global Forum than with UNCED itself during the
events. This entailed joint responsibility, with the Brazilian NGO Forum, for organisation of the
Global Forum and the hosting of a cross-sectoral dialogue on issues to be addressed in UNCED, 'The
Intersectoral Dialogue'. The post-UNCED edition of Network '92 considers the activities and
successes of COCF and the IFC at length and speculates on the organisations' future mles but does
not identify influencing inter-governmental decision-making in either context"7 In contrast to ELCI's
cynicism about the nature of inter-governmental decision-making, the UNCEI) edition of Network '92
considers participation by NGOs in inter-governmental processes as desirable in itself; rather than
assessing its value as dependent on the more substantive achievements it enables:
Never before in history have so many different people, from so many different walks of life and
with so many different interests, gathered together in one place to discuss one common interest;
to try and solve one common problem ... This has been an exercise in public participation and
partnership on a global scale. Without a doubt, one of the most.successful outcomes of the
•	 •
113 Centre for Our Common Future Netwo,* '92 No.16 op. cii., April 1992. Available on Earth Summit: The NGOAn*iverCD ROM, . cit.
114 Envirenment Liaison Centre International Ecoforwn voL 16:1 ELCI Nairobi Maith /Ap.iI 1992 p.3.
115 Ibi4 p.8.
I l6lbidp.8.
117 Centre forOurCommon FutureNeivoi* '92No.19, op. cii. August -September1992.
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UNCED process has already taken place, without the events themselves having even begun. In
searching for solutions to the problems we face, we have deveipped a process that is, in itself;
part of the solution."8
This conclusion was not endorsed by many organisations involved in UNCED.
3.4.5.1 NGOs versus transnational corporations
Hostility towards this analysis is most apparent in the assertion by a number of NGOs that the private
sector, and multi-national companies in particular, were responsible for many of the problems
identified in the UNCED documentation and should be made to alter their activities through concerted
global regulation and legislation. The draft texts of Agenda 21 and the other Rio agreements provided
vely little to support this analysis, which fuelled assertions that the private sector had exerted undue
influence in ensuring that 'responsible entrepreneurship' and increased industrial development were
presented as solutions."9
Suggestions that there was a covert agenda to avoid such initiatives gained credence through the
dismantling of the UN Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCrC) by the new UN Secretary
General, Boutros Boutros-Ohali, in Februaiy 1992, as part of a broader reform of the social and
economic activities of the UN deemed 'pm-Western' by The Times.'20 The UNCFC bad prepared a
Code of Conduct for TNCs and recommendations for the text of Agenda 21 on 'Transnational
Corporations and Sustainable Development'. These v'ere iot o!malj	 tt
PrepCom N - Martin Khor's contemporary report outlines the divisions underlying this volteface:
The UNCFC was asked by ECOSOC to prepare action recommendations on TNCs and
sustainable development as possible inputs into the Earth Charter and Agenda 21 of UNCED. A
comprehensive set of recommendations was prepared on five major areas: global/corporate
environmental management; risk and hazard minimization; environmentally sounder
consumption patterns; full-cost environmental accounting and enviromnental conventions,
standards and guidelines. However, at a meeting of the UN Commission on TNCs (which
oversees the UNCTC), industry together with the US, EC and Japan made clear their opposition
to the recommendations. To date, the UNCED secretariat has also not included the UNCFC
118 ibiS
119 See for example Bnrno kenny The G eaceBookofGrwswtzsh p ntennational, Amiteslam May 1992: 'D ethe urgent need for
binding agreements controlling the impact of TNCs on the environment and their role in development, the fonmal UNCED process has all but ignored the
issue. Instead, the corporations themselves and their political organizations such as the BCSD and ICC have set the teims of the debate. As a result UNCED
itself now risks becoming greenwash on a grand scale by giving the fuse impression that important, positive change has occurred and by filling to alert the
worid to the root causes of environment and development problems. In the end, the ThCs, in collaboration with some govemments, could hijack the Earth
Summit and destroy an historic opportunity to make progress towanlecologicallysound, sociaHy equitable development.'
120 Quoted in Khor Kok Pang. Martin 'Regulating Transnational Corporations: the biggest gap in UNCED's agenda' Briefing Papers for UNCED No20,
Third World Network Penang MaIaia Maroh 1992.
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recommendations into its Agenda 21 drafts; neither has it circulated the recommendations
(contained in E/C.1O/1992/2) to UNCED delegates although the document had been referred to
Prepcom 4 for discussion.'2'
The final text of Agenda 21 instead proposes 'strengthening the role of business and industiy',
emphasising industrial development and increased efficiency in the use of resources as critical
contributions in reducing poverty and the unsustainable use of natural resources. Both correlate closely
with the vision of the Business Council for Sustainable Development (considered earlier). Neither can
be readily corroborated. The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) report
on !JNCED concludes 'there is no evidence at all to suggest that market forces by themselves protect
the environment There is, on the other hand, plenty of evidence that unfettered market forces can
quickly degrade the environment'
The evidence appears to support conspiracy theorists who decried an unholy alliance between Western
governments supporting global market liberalisation, the UNCED Secretariat and transnational
corporations. Such assertions were made forcibly and repeatedly prior to and during the Rio Summit
One document in particular gained widespread supporl At the end of PrepCom W four organisations
(Greenpeace International, Friends of the Earth International, the Brazilian NGO Forum and Third.
World Network) issued 'A ten point plan to save the Earth Summit', which was endorsed by a further
27 NGOs. 1 This was presented as an ultimatum to governments if the support of the signatories was
to be regained. The text expressed concern at the lack of progress towards UNCED's stated objectives
and addressed ten issues in particular (including climate chang; transnational coporaüois,aiztths
wastes, forests, nuclear weapons, and trade). Common to the majority is a call for states to become
more proactive in establishing regulations and legislation to limit socially and environmentally
damaging activities. The plan concludes that such action is unlikely, given the influence of opposing
perspectives: 'the gravity of the situation deepens as UNCED entrusts care for environment and
development with the veiy institutions that are causing many of the problems in the first place'.' 24 For
four of the most influential NGO groupings involved in the UNCED process, this constituted a final
attempt to alter the outcome of UNCED, although its presentation as a public statement without more
detailed substantiating documentation suggests its target audience may have been the media and the
general public rathei'than government officials.
121 Ibid
122 Holmbcrg. Johan, Koy Thomson and Uoyd Timberlake Facing the Future: Beyond the Earth Summit arthscan London 1993 p.14.
123 Reproduced in Third World Reswence No.21, Third World Network Malaysia May 1992.
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By contrast, the objectives of business and industry organisations appeared to have been
overwhelmingly achieved from UNCED. A UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) report
records a statement submitted by industry representatives to Ambassador Mazairac (UNCED co-
ordinator for Major Groups discussions). This urged that:
we must ensure that our actions and responses to environment and development issues
motivates and enhances the creative and dynamic process in the private sector. The capacity of
industry to adjust to sustainable development and to continue to create wealth and employment
in all countries must be seen as the key to achieving sustainable development.'25
The NGLS report notes the extent to which these principles are reflected in the final text of Agenda 21
and concludes, 'The objectives of the business and indusiry representatives were, in the main,
achieved'.'26
3.514 Days in Rio de Janeiro
It was suggested above that the International Facilitating Committee (IFC) and the Environment
Liaison Committee International (ELCI) had withdrawn from the central roles as conduits and
promoters of non-governmental involvement initially envisaged for themselves in the official UNCED
proceedings. A similar shift in priorities was also evident in BNGOF. The Forum had initially
undertaken to act as 'a representative and legitimate NGO reference point in Brazil for liaison on both
practical and substantive questions involving UNCED',' 27
 endorsing the 'independent sectors'
approacit However, it bad subsequently supported the 'Ten point plan to save the Earth Summit',
which was critical of government priorities and hostile towards the activities of transnational
corporations, as noted above. BNGOF, the IFC and ELCI were all more actively involved with the
parallel NGO Global Forum than with the official UNCED negotiations.
Thus comparable tensions and difficulties are apparent in each of the three NGO networks which bad
been most influential in preparations for UNCED. Early strategy documents demonstrate their
intention to produce position papers endorsed by their constituents which would have a significant
impact on the inter-governmental negotiations. The presumption is evident in each that this process
would be relatively straightfoiward, and would provide the network with a strong set of'
125 UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service E& D File No.29 'Major Group& UN Non-Government Liaison Service, Geneva July 1992 p.2.
126 lbkL
127 Btzi1ian NGO Fonim 'Prepaito.y Fonim of Brazilian NGOs' Bulletin I. BNGOF Sao Paulo Brazil October 1990.
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recommendations and objectives, and the legitimacy to pursue these on behalf of the broader
constituency. In each instance, it became increasingly clear that a coherent set of priorities would not
be forthcoming and that the scope for channelling the views of a diverse range of non-governmental
actors into the official deliberations was very limited.
Yet a separate trend should also be noted. in each instance, the benefits of increased interaction appear
to have been redefined. Analysis of the necessity for collaboration during the earlier stages of
preparation for UNCED privileged influence over official proceedings and placed the onus on
governments and the UNCED Secretariat to motivate the broader constituencies. Koy Thomson's
identification of flaws in the national reporting structure charges Maurice Strong with a particular
responsibility 'To persuade all sectors of society to [come together] he must inspire an unprecedented
sense of shared responsibility, accountability and confidence in the conference itself'.' 28 As the
Summit approached, both enthusiasts and cynics found intrinsic value for NGOs in the formation and
maintenance of alliances. They placed the responsibility for initiating collaboration with the
organisations concerned and considered broader societal change as the most relevant measure of
success, rather than impact on the UNCED process.
This transition is evident in the shifting priorities of the principal networks identified earlier. Whereas
initially the IFC's remit was to facilitate independent sectors' interactions with IJNCED proceedings,
by mid-1992 its main focus was on a three day conference 'Decisions for Change: the Intersectoral
Dialogue', described as 'the only opportunity within the entire '92 Global Forum for the various
sectors of society to come together, share their individual agendas, engage one another in a substantive
debate over their positions, and work towards achieving higher orders of inter-sectoral dialogue'.'29
The 'Alternative Treaties' finalised at the Global Forum have a similar rationale:
The long-term objective of the treaties is to build the foundations of a worldwide movement,
comprised of NGOs, social movements and grassroot organisations, to establish new patterns of
equity, participation and ecologically sustainable development. Each treaty contains practical
solutions that NGO can implement in their future actions.'3°
The fourth NGO network considered in detail previously was the NGO Strategy Group, established as
an informal alliáncë by organisations closely involved in following negotiations during the four
128 Thomson, Koy 'The Two Faces of the UK National Report', Centre for Our Common Futuxe Netwo.* 2 No.4 op. cit, Februaxy 1991. Available on
Earth Summit The NGO Archite CD ROM, qo. cit
129 Centre for Our Common Future BSWIdIIOJ,d Bulletin No. 15 op. cit Special Feature March 1992 p.7.
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PrepComs for UNCED. Here also, considerable changes were apparent by June 1992. By PrepCom
N, the growth in the number of organisations accredited to attend the pre5aratoiy meetings required
greater formalisation in the procedures followed by the Strategy Group. Pressure was placed on key
individuals to provide a widening range of services as the needs of participating organisations became
more diverse. Tensions over access to the negotiations for NGOs and the merit of the Summit texts
also placed considerable strain on collaborating NGOs. During UNCED, negotiations on remaining
text were predominantly conducted behind closed doors. A demonstration by youth organisations on
11 June was aggressively broken up by security staff and led to even tighter restrictions onNGOs
during the high-level conclusion of the Summit. There was little opportunity for the type of co-
ordination offered by the Strategy Group at the PrepComs and less likelihood of influencing the
negotiations on the contentious issues remaining to be agreed. While large numbers of NGOs attended
UNCED sessions at Rio Centro, for a significant proportion of those eligible to do so the limited
opportunities to influence proceedings proved unappealing. By contrast events at the NGO Global
Forum, most notably the Forum of International NGOs and Social Movements (generally referred to
as INGOF), provided a more constructive context for NGO activists.
3.6 Agreements reached in Rio by Governments
The main agreements reached at UNCED were noted earlier. Opinion is sharply divided over the
extent to which NOOs could viably claim to have influenced the final texts, or more importantly the
conceptual framework which the Rio agreements articulate. Malaysian diplomat Fauziah Mohd Taib's
account suggests that their impact was peripheral: 'The NGOs and other pressure groups may have in
one way or another helped shape the agenda, but the agreements that were eventually arrived at were
negotiated by the practitioners who were representing their governments and thus defending their
national interests'.' 3 ' Others identify significant themes attributable to NGOs and credit them with
important roles in debates on institutional issues:
Whole chunks of Agenda 21 can be traced to NGO drafting groups and coalitions. One example
is the section in the poverty chapter on 'empowerment', which completely changed the
orientation of the text. Women's organizations were the trail-blazers of a theme which runs
throughout Agenda 21: citizens' participation in decision making, with a particular emphasis on
130 Centi for Applied Studies in International Negotiations' Issues and Non-Govnrnantal Oinizations Progran,ne Repotlon the Pwticipatio., qwon-
Governmental Organizations In the? wnto.yPucess of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Dewlopmenl ep. dt.
131 Fauziah Mohd Taib Malaysia and UNCEDAn analysLs ofa diplomatIc process: 1989-1992 Kluwer Law Intanaticmal, London 1997 p.160.
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the role of women. Another theme, that of taking actions and making decisions as close as
possible to the people, was pushed by NGOs. The Commission °r' Sustainable Development
was given a significant boost by NGO lobbying. Many other examples can be found, and we
should not forget that the fact that the Earth Summit was happening at all was due, in some
measure, to the persuasive skills of environment and development organizations.'32
Princen and Finger assert that the architects of UNCED envisaged a limited service role for NGO
participants, publicising and promoting the Summit among their constituencies and perhaps providing
some input to governments in areas where their expertise is recognised as complementary to the
resources already available. Those organisations which were able to perform these functions were
acknowledged and rewarded accordingly, while those which did not conform to the official
delineation of the roles to be played by NGOs were marginalised from the official process.' 33 Princen
and Finger associate this process of marginalisation closely with the UNCED Secretary General:
Strong had already been the Secretary-General of the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment held in 1972 and was a member of the World Commission on Environment and
Development Traumatised as he had been by heavy social movement protest in Stockholm in
1972, Strong was determined from the very beginning to pre-empt any opposition to UNCED.
This experience explains, at least in part Strong's interest in NGOs.''
fliese three positions are rather overstated. There is little to suggest that NGOs exerted sufficient
ifluence over negotiations to change the positions of key governments and plenty of testimony from
100 representatives disillusioned with the narrow self-interest exhibited by many government
aelegates. On the other hand, the influence of industry groups on sections of Agenda 21 has been
documented and challenges the exclusive role Fauziah Mohd Taib ascribes to government& Princen
and Finger's analysis invests so much power and influence in Maurice Strong that it requires them to
turn a blind eye to instances when his intentions were thwarted (the negligible success of the Earth
Council, for example).
Attributing responsibility and distinguishing influence in these circumstances is difficult and perhaps
contentious. Nevertheless, the overall course the negotiations took was not determined by any one
government. In the ideological and pragmatic dialogues which took place in preparation for UNCED
the contribution of constructive and innovati'e ideas was of key importance, whatever their origin.
NGOs were able to'take part in this process and can legitimately claim, to have helpd in elaborating
many elements of the agreements reached. The concurrent development of networks promoting
132 Holmberg. Johan, Koy Thomson and Uoyd Timbndake Facing the Futw Beyond the Earth Summit op. cit. p27.
133 Nncen, Thomas and Matthias Fing EnvironmentaiNGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global Routledge. London 1994 pp22O-l.
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interaction between NGOs at the global level further suppoits the notion of a 'melting pot' of ideas
from which the Summit agreements were drawn. This image also allows for the frustration and
cynicism evident in a number of commentaries at the absence of a clear and radical critique of existing
practices and ways of living. Difficult issues could be avoided because of the need to achieve a broad
consensus, and in most cases no one would be held responsible for their exclusion.
3.6.1 Major Groups
One area in which consideration of the influence of NGOs is particularly pertinent is the Agenda 21
text on 'major groups'. In Agenda 21, non-governmental actors are acknowledged as nine distinct
'major groups of civil society"35 with particular roles to play in achieving sustainable development,'36
a concept which would appear to be closely related to the 'independent sectors' of society identified
by the Centre for Our Common Future. This constitutes a major conceptual shift for the UN, with
implications for the ways in which governments, inter-governmental bodies and other actors relate to
these diverse groups. It should also be noted that inclusion of the nine major groups chapters was
agreed by governments near the end of the final PrepCom. No discussion appears to have taken place
to establish the rationale behind the inclusion of some groups and the exclusion of others. Veiy little,
consultation on these issues appears to have taken place with the groups to be included. There is some
evidence that attempts were made to include other sectors. One report states that 'proposals at
PrepCom 1V to include religious groups, peasants and people of Aflican descent as separate major'
groups did not meet with success'.137 Yet the criteria on which these decisions were based are not
clear.
While women's groups, trade unions, the private sector, local authorities and NGOs all contributed
significant proportions of the material eventually included in their respective chapters, they were not
invited to provide a coherent perspective on the section as a whole, or on relations between different
major groups. The overall sense of a concept introduced into Agenda 21 as an afterthought is
134 Ibid. p.195.
135 The nine chapters of Agenda 21 on major groups are: Global action for wcanen towaids sustainable and equitable developmei* Children and uth in
sustainable development; Recognizing and strengthening the role of indigenous people and their communities; Strengthening the role of non-govenunental
ganization: pa1m for sustainable development; Local authorities' initiatives in support of Agenda 21; Strengthening the role of works and their trade
unions; Strengthening the role of business and industiy Scientific and technological oommunity Strengthening the role of irrneis. Agenda 21 chapters 24-
32, op. cit.
136 Agenda 21 Chapter 27: Strengthening the role of Nongovernmental Organizations pars. 27.2: 'One of the major challenges thamg the world community
as it seeks to replace unsustainable development patterns with environmentally sound and sustainable development is the need to activate a sense of
common purpose on behalf of all sectors of society. The chances of fo.ing such a sense of pwpose will depend on the willingness of all sectors to
participate in genuine social partnership and dialogue, while recognizing the independent roles, responsibilities and special capacities of each.' Agenda 21,
op. cit.
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substantiated by the fact that the term 'major groups' was not used in any official documents, nor in
any of the myriad unofficial papers, prior to the final stages ofPrepComlV Even so, there had been a
great deal of attention to the broader roles played by organisations of civil society in achieving
sustainable development during preparations for UNCED.
Five sectors had been acknowledged at the Bergen Conference: 'industry, trade unions, the scientific
community, youth, and Non-Governmental Organizations concerned with environmental issues'.'38
The first issue of the International Facilitating Committee's newsletter defines the independent sectors
of society as 'development and environment NGOs, grassroots movements, women's organizations,
youth groups, the media, indigenous peoples, scientific unions, irade unions, industry, religious and
interfaith communities, etc'. 139 Thus the non-governmental organisation closest to the UNCED
Secretary General bad provided both the general rationale for expanding the understanding of the roles
played by a range of 'independent sectors' and identified seven of the nine major groups eventually
cited in Agenda 21 before the first PrepCom had even begun. Development of the concept is evident
throughout the preparatory meetings.' 4°	 -
A further basis for inclusion would seem to be the emphasis on devolving decision-making to the
appropriate level implicit in many expositions on sustainable development, including the Brundtland
Report Reporting on PrepCom ll Kimo notes the significance of a procedural paper tabled by the
Canadian Government
[L38] calls on the Secretariat to take into consideration the 'traditional knowledge and practices
of indigenous people and other local communities for the sustainable use, conservation,
management and development of natural resources and their special relationship to the
environment'; This document requires the Secretariat to listen to indigenous peoples, rubber
tappers, colonists and other local communities that are sustainably using their environment and
use their 'traditional practices' as the basis for recommendations by the Secretariat and thus the
PrepCom)4'
While records to substantiate Kimo's conclusions are not available, it appears that this document
provided impetus for the involvement of both indigenous peoples and local communities in the
official process. Although the reference here is to local communities, Agenda 21 recognises local
137 UN Non-Govomment Liaison Savice E& D File No.29, 'Major Groups' op. cit July 1992.
138 Centre forOur Common Future Bnsndtland BufithA No.8 op. cit June 1990 p.1.
139 Centre for Our Common FutuieNi* 2No. 1 op. cit, July 1990.
140 Maunce Strong was responsible for the UNCED Secretariat paper A/CONF.151/PC/9 in 1990. h para.8 under 'groups in society' are listed six of the
nine groups covered in Agenda 21 Section ifi.
141 Gorse VI, Langston James 'Kimo' 'PrepCom 11 Chronicles: Notes fium Geneva' posted on eswnceLgenersl, April 1991.
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authorities as one of the major groups of civil society. This may be because communities do not
constitute a distinct entity, while staff and elected representatives are mor demonstrably accountable.
It may be that there is no direct correlation between the issue as raised at PrepCom II and Agenda 21
chapter 28. Nevertheless, L.38 is an early acknowledgement of the significance of effective local
governance, which is elaborated throughout Agenda 21 and particularly in the chapters on local
authorities and indigenous peoples.
For both groupings, participation in UNCED was problematic. Indigenous peoples' representatives
frequently asserted their sovereignty over their territories and rejected both the claim that they
constituted one of nine major groups of society and the inference that they had anything to learn from
other sectors on living sustainably. Local authorities also bridled at being tenned 'NGOs' for puiposes
of accreditation to the UN and the implication that local democracy was less legitimate than national
government.
Pressure for the incoiporation of local government as a Major Group can be attributed in large
measure to the work of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives formed in 1990.
A further significant impetus was provided by the 30th World Congress of the International Union of,
Local Authorities (JULA) in Oslo in June 1991. The Congress produced a declaration emphasising the
central role to be played by local government in establishing partnerships with other sectors 'to make
environmental protection measures work'.' 42 IcLErs most significant contribution to Agenda 21 was
the 'Local Agenda 21 project', an attempt to assist municipalities in implementing TJNCED
commitments. 143 Reference to 'Local Agenda 21' passed almost unnoticed into the text of Agenda 21
chapter 28, but has since had a major impact in many parts of the world.
As with Local Agenda 21, it appears that the broader significance of these nine chapters of Agenda 21
was not readily apparent to non-governmental participants and that no coherent rationale determined
the inclusion of some sectors and the rejection of others. Even so, identification of distinct sectors of
civil society as contributors to sustainable development has had wider resonance in two areas of
particular relevance: discussions on procedures for accreditation ofNGOs to the UN; and the
142 Rcported in Centre for Our Common FuiureNetww* 2 No.9 op. cii, August 1991. Available on Earth Summit: The NGOArcitives CD ROM, op.
cit.
143 Centre for Our Common Future Bninddand Bulleiin No.14 op. cit. December 1991 p.39. ICLEI also initiated an Urban CO 2 Reduction Project
intended to help ch municipal govemment develop its own comprehensive CO2 reduction progremme.
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formation of national-level bodies to monitor and promote UNCED follow-up (often termed national
councils for sustainable development).
3.7 Agreements reached in Rio by NGOs
For many NGOs in Rio de Janeiro for the Earth Summit, the opportunity to initiate and strengthen
networks with other organisations was of paramount importance. The number of people present was
unprecedented. The issues under discussion had never been presented in this way. The chance to
establish common principles and joint programmes of work might not present itself again. Thus
regional and national linkages were strengthened: 'Before this meeting, we had a lot of trouble trying
to link up with groups in some Asian countries. But here we found 20 Koreans, 15 Taiwanese and so
on. We now know who to talk with.W Numerous formal and informal associations were cemented
during the Summit, and new collaborative alliances such as EarthAction International were created.
Negotiation of 32 Alternative Treaties under the auspices of the Forum for International NGOs and
Social Movements (INGOF) provided an intellectual focus for this activity.
3.7.1 The Alternative Treaties
The Alternative Treaties were first proposed at PrepCom IlL Their purpose was redefined at PrepCom
IV, taking into account the fall-out from the Paris NCiO Conference. Drafts and outlines were
developed by interested organisations in the months preceding the Global Forum. Each Treaty was co-
ordinated by a Northern and a Southern NGO. INGOF received fimding for this work from the
Canadian International Development Agency, the Norwegian and Japanese governments, the US
National Wildlife Federation, and WWF among others. The Treaties were divided into four groups:
NGO co-operation and institution building; alternative economic issues; major environmental issues;
and cross-sectoral issues. Two thousand delegates undertook to contribute to the Alternative Treaty
process, which continued throughout the two weeks of UNCED.
The Treaties were carefully presented not as a critique of the official UNCED agreements, but rather
as a set of commitments to actions which could be achieved by NGOs acting in collaboration:
44 Chee Yoke Ling. Third World Network, quoted in lsbclo Ramon EaiTh Summit: ForNOOs, %mity means staying slightly apait' Inter Press Service,
Uune 1992.
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The treaty process was conceived of through the build-up to the Rio conference, as successive
PrepComs indicated that the government negotiating process, whilst far from closed to NGO
participation, was nonetheless unlikely to deliver an agenda reflecting the serious need for
immediate action to change our understanding of economic, material and ethical relations in the
world. NGOs are increasingly gaining confidence in their legitimate claim to a voice in the
global policy dialogue. They are asserting with growing conviction the need for an empowered
civil society.'45
A core steering group oversaw negotiations during the Global Forum, providing a basic infrastructure
(translation facilities, venues, access to computers) and hosting discussions on the rationale behind the
process. In addition to large numbers of organisations new to UNCED, many of the NOOs and
individuals who had followed the preparations closely contributed to the formulation of the Treaties.
Peter Padbuiy identifies two assumptions that shaped the NGO treaty process:
A. international co-operation is required to build consensus among NGOs to replace
cunent institutions, policies and processes and to envision new ones that are more
equitable, just and sustainable, and
B. NOOs are key catalysts in the change process; they are moving from being critics of
govenunents to being inventors and builders of the sustainable society.'
The Treaties provide an illuminating example of the elaboration of NGO systems for self-governance.
The role of lransnational networks in establishing and popularising constitutive norms and thereby.
challenging prevailing regulative concepts of legitimacy were explored more filly in the previous
chapter.' 47 The relevance of collaboration among NGOs to negotiate the means for achieving
common objectives has been considered by a number of authors. Less attention has been given to the
significance of interaction in exploring contested or conflicting norms, or in conceptualising new
principles. The role of INGOF in overseeing negotiation of the Alternative Treaties provides a striking
example of an NGO network which promoted dialogue on norms, given unprecedented prominence
by the convergence of some 50000 NGO representatives in Rio for UNCED. One commentaiy states
that '[tjhe long-term objective of the treaties is to build the foundations of a worldwide movement,
145 Padbury. Peter 'NOOs Sign Alternative Treaties at the '92 Global Forum' Centre for Our Common FutweNesui* 2 No.18, op. cit., June-July
1992. Available on Earth Suntmis. The NGOArchiyes CD ROM, op. ciL
146 'International NGO Forum: International Steering Committee(1992-1993)' The Ne,* No.29 August 1993. flom a paper drafted by Peter Padbuzy
and circulated at the first session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Dew3opmont June 1993.
147 The distinction between the 'conatitutive" definition of group identities and interests and the "regulative" definition of legitimate behaviour and policy
has been elaborated by Kratochwil, Frederich V Nonn Ruler, and Decisions: CM the Conditions ofPractical and Legal Reasoning us International
Relations and Dome.cticAffaur CUP, Cambridge 1989.
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comprised of NGOs, social movements and grassroot organisations, to establish new patterns of
equity participation and ecologically sustainable development'.'48
It is also relevant to note the considerable difficulties experienced in bringing widely divergent
organisations together to negotiate common statements of belief and the means by which these might
be furthered. A contemporaiy internal report by staff of Friends of the Earth describes the
'disagreeable mix of movements present at the Global Forum', including multilateral banks,
multinationals, and companies. 'This was an indication of what was awaiting us: continued tension
between those of us who want social, economic and ecological justice and those who profit from the
present situation'. The authors suggest that Friends of the Earth's positions on many of the issues
covered by the Alternative Treaties are 'more detailed and more radical', and they question the
motives of some of the other participants: 'It is, moreover, possible that some of the treaties [will] be
used against us, posing as the voice of NGOs, but in fact representing the interests of infiltrating
companies or government representatives'.'49
What role (if any) should the private sector have in negotiating in this context? Is industry necessarily
hostile to NGO work (and vice versa), or are its representatives necessaly participants if viable,
pragmatic solutions are to be elaborated? Should the private sector be considered in these
homogenous terms, or does it include a diversity of actors who have very different positions on the
issues at hand? These questions proved highly controversial for NOOs during the Rio process and
have led to tensions and divisions in many other contexts.
Gnjbb et aL emphasise the problems which were apparent in the negotiation of the Alternative
Treaties and suggest that the principal reason divisions were less pronounced than in the official
conference is because the participants were not negotiating 'real' agreements or engaging with all the
relevant actors:
These negotiations between the NGOs at Rio were certainly not as difficult as the official
negotiations, but they were hardly easy, and it requires little imagination to foresee the depth of
148 Cantze for Applied Studies in hflamational Negotiations' Issues and Non-Governmental Organizations Pmgiamme Reponon the Pailicoalion ofNon-.
Govenunenial Oanizatlons in the P-epanztaiyhvcess ofthe Unued Nations Conference on Environment and Development, op. cit.
149 Friends of the Earth International	 Earth Summit: Myths, Verdicts, Actions, Iandmines' Section on the 1ieaty Pmcess FOE Link No.50, FOEI
Amsterdam June - August 1992.
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disputes had they been negotiating real policy and tiying to take account of the full range of
viewpoints and affected parties (for example including NGOs from industry or trade unions).'5°
Princen and Finger suggest that environmental NGOs' activities in world politics can be understood as
'the construction of linkages on two dimensions: one dimension connects the biophysical to the
political, and the other connects the local to the global'.' 5 ' Insofar as they are able to bring the
extremes of these two dimensions together, the authors suggest NGOs play a distinct role which in
turn is a key element in the elaboration of new ways to articulate and tackle the 'global ecological
crisis'.' 52 Conversely, NGOs which do not bridge these gaps are neglecting their principal
responsibility at the international level, which is to set the conditions under which states will act (or
react). This distinction is explored in a consideration of the roles played by NGOs at the Rio Summit:
many NOOs invested in strengthening the !JNCED process, but neglected the positions of
NGOs operating at the grass-roots level. Those NOOs that accepted their assigned role of
information disseminator and promoter [i.e., a role prescribed by the IJNCED secretariat] got
visibility and some degree of access. But they also alienated many NGOs, especially the
grassroots and social change NGOs, who were largely excluded and whose views did not get
translated to the international leveL By contrast at Rio itself many NGOs directed their efforts
toward strengthening the global NGO community, as opposed to strengthening the state system
through the UNCED process. One mechanism was the so-called alternative treaty writing
process, a complex and trying effort to write statements of NGO self-commitment To do this,
both vertical and horizontal connections had to be made, connections that, in the
implementation phase of the UNCED process, may prove criticaL Thus, it appears that those
NGO activities in UNCED that conformed to the states' conception of appropriate activity -
traditional, essentially national politics yet in an international forum - were most visible but
probably least effective in translating local and biophysical needs to the global leveL The real
translational linkages began to take shape apait from the official process, the concrete effects of
whichwillonlybeseenoverthelongterm.
Princen and Finger claim that the distinct role of environmental NOOs in world politics is to make
links between biophysical realities and political processes and between local circumstances and global
decision-maldng. In so doing, NGOs constitute the principal spur for action. They articulate the
problems to be confronted, generate pressure on governments to respond to these challenges, and
provide viable alternative models where possible. The central assertion the authors make is that the
150 Gnibb, Michael, Matthias Koch, Abby Munson, Francis Sullivan and Koy Thomson The Earth SwnmitAgreeinenzc:A Guide andAssessmeni
Eaiihscan Publications London 1993 p.44. Peter Sand provides a more considered appraisal of the relevance of the Alternative Treaties in any broader
assessment of the UNCED outcomes: 'The 'altanative treaties' were net intended as legally binding instruments, nor as a substitute fbr the important 	 -
simultaneous input of NGOs to the official UNCED process and other ongoing efforts at international environmental law-making. They served mainly as a
focus of civic interaction between NGOs in the joint articulation of goals and action plans.' Sand, Peter 'Intanational Environmental Law Alter Rio'
Ewvpam Journal of1nWrallonal Law pp.377-389. vol.4 no.3,1993.
151 Princen, Thomas and Matthias Finger EnvbvnmentalNGOs In World PolWcz: LinkIng the Local and the Global Routledge London 1994 pp.22O-1.
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architects of UNCED envisaged a limited service role for NGO participants, publicising and
promoting the Summit among their constituencies and perhaps providingsome input to governments
in areas where their expertise is recognised as complementary to the resources already available.
Those organisations which were able to perform these functions were acknowledged and rewarded
accordingly, while those which did not conform to the official delineation of the roles to be played by
NGOs were marginalised from the official process.
Yet the focus of activity for these marginalised organisations was not just on criticising the official
event, or on attempting to use other means to force their perspectives onto the official agenda (though
these clearly did occur). The most coherent output from NGOs attempting to articulate an alternative
to the official agreements was a series of 'statements of NGO self-commitment' (my italics).
It is rather frustrating that; having established a dichotomy between NGOs which played a passive role
in information dissemination and publicising UNCED and those which attempted to shape a coherent
alternative conceptualisation of issues, priorities and responsibilities, in their conclusions Princen and
Finger revert to a much narrower notion of measures of effectiveness which can be applied to NGO
networks:
The effectiveness test for these coalitions is not, as noted, the apparent clout according to budget
or membership nor the quantity of information exchanged. Rather, it is the extent to which, rst,
biophysical realities are translated effectively into political action and, second, local needs are
transferred to international decision-making (and then to national decision-making).t54
The implication is that the Alternative Treaties process was some form of displacement activity, valid
in that participants were bringing their tmderstanding of biophysical and local realities to a
consideration of mechanisms which could deliver change, but of limited significance because this
discourse took place outside the magic circle of states. If political action and state (or inter-state)
decision-making are the measures by which to assess the effectiveness of NGO coalitions, the
articulation of commitments to be entered into primarily by NGOs themselves must be held to be of
circumscribed value. Any broader relevance can only be measured subsequently if negotiation of the
Alternative Treaties can be understood to have influenced NGOs' effectiveness in achieving these
principal objectives.
153 IbkL p222.
154 Ibid. p.229.
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These claims seem contradictory. If environmental NGOs transform politics by placing new issues
and perspectives on the agenda, the processes by which norms are tested, established and disseminated
among NGOs must have a significance which has not been adequately acknowledged. Princen and
Finger imbue national governments and inter-governmental bodies with a centrality in achieving
change not borne out by many considerations of this area; yet even on these terms, the elaboration of
collaborative working relationships between widely divergent NGOs and the expression of shared
values (and means by which these can be realised) must constitute a strengthening of the capacity of
NGOs to achieve the desired political transformation. Consequently this dialogue between NGOs
could be considered a better use of the opportunity offered by the Rio Summit than any which might
have been possible through the adoption of a more flexible and inclusive attitude to agenda setting and
NGO involvement by the official UNCED organisers.
3.7.2 North - South relations between NGOs
One area in which many of the participants in the Alternative Treaties process have claimed that NGO
interaction was more productive than its governmental counterpart was in constructive dialogue
between Northern and Southern organisations. Vandana Shiva of Third World Netwoik concluded
that '[t]hose of us deeply involved have found our partners are crossing the North-South divide much
more effectively than governments.'. 155 Nevertheless, significant tensions were apparent between
Northern and Southern NGOs throughout the UNCED process. Particularly contentious issues
included: matters of fimding and resultant (implicit or explicit) influence over Southern partners by
Northern NGOs; the disproportionate influence of Northern organisations in the official conference
through the numbers with accreditation and also those participating as members of their national
delegations; and differences in ideological perspectives, most pronounced in perceived divisions
between Southern organisations concerned with economic and social issues and their Northern
(particularly US) counterparts preoccupied with environmental conservation.'56
Emphasis has been placed in a number of commentaries on the leading role played by Southern NOOs
in the UNCED process. Bill Hinchberger reports that
155 UN Non- Govmcnta1 Liaison SeiviceE&D File No.25, op. ciL July 199L,
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Third World non-governmental organizations as a whole were credited with encouraging some
of their more traditional northern counterparts to take a harder Iook.at the social ramifications of
the environment-development dichotomy. Even before the conference some European
environmentalists had singled out Brazilian, along with Malaysian, groups for providing
intellectual leadership for the international NGO movement.'57
A prominent member of the Third World Network, Martin Khor concluded:
Northern officials and especially northern NGOs have become much more sensitized to the
development needs and perspectives of the South ... Many environmental groups which in the
past focused only on saving plant and animal life have come to a new understanding that
resolving environmental problems requires tackling North-South and rich-poor inequities at the
same time.'58
It should also be acknowledged that the structure put in place to promote adoption and implementation
of the Alternative Treaties foundered due to a lack of financial support and the uneven ability or
willingness of designated regional focal points to commit time and resources to their role. One of its
principal architects writes of '[t]he failure of INGOF to produce lasting results', citing a litany of
factors which limit the capacity of NGOs to collaborate effectively.'59
Despite such reservations, NGO activity at the Global Forum during the Rio Summit constitutes an
ambitious attempt to define a common agenda and to broaden the scope for collaboration from
attempts to influence the inter-governmental negotiations to desired forms of societal chang; and the
role of NGOs in realising these. As a dialogue between coisttuentpt1s o&m2 ttt
'global civil society' the Forum addressed much that is of interest, whether analysis entails picking
over the bones of a 'failure' or discerning the germ of ideas developed more fully subsequently.
3.8 Conclusions
Analyses of the roles played by NGOs acting collaboratively in the Rio process fall broadly into three
groups:
• first, those which interpret the outcomes of the Summit as a significant advance on
previous international understanding and commitments on issues of environment and
development, and attribute this in some measure to the work of NGOs in establishing
157 Hinchberger Mailin 'Non-Govnmenta1 	 nhzticmai The Third Force in the Third World' op. cit.
158 Khor, Maitin 'Third World Nwodc's Analysis of the Eaith Summit Disappointmont and Hope' Temz Vni 9 June 1992 p.8.
159 Padbury, Peter 'Expeiiments, Reflections and a Survey on Next Steps' op. cit.
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pressure for agreements to be reached and in providing expertise on specific issues and
legitimacy in their roles as representatives of broader constituencies;16°
• second, those which attribute liberal, 'progressive' ideals to the spectnim of
participants in both the official Conference and the parallel Forum, but argue that the
agreements reached are wholly inadequate in confronting the systemic factors which
cause and perpetuate environmental degradation and social inequality t6 ' and
• third, analyses which assert that one of the main effects of UNCED has been to
legitimise the roles played by imnsnational companies in the various processes of
globalisation, and that participating NOOs have been coerced into playing a
promotional role for this process to the detriment of their responsibilities to those not
otherwise represented (future generations; local, grass-roots organisations; the
environment).'62
None of these interpretations acknowledges the shift in emphasis evident in the work of all the
principal NGO networks, as documented here. Although they demonstrated divergent strategies and
ideologies, the two central international networks (the ISC and the IFC) and the most significant
national network (the Brazilian NGO Forum) all revised their emphasis on the significance of
networking during the course of preparations for UNCED. In each instance, this entailed attaching
increased importance to interaction between NOOs and less weight to influencing the inter-
governmental negotiations. This liansition obliged the networks to redefine their reasons for existence
and presented them with new priorities and conflicts. In part this transition was forced upon the
networks by their members. While initial objectives presumed a degree of homogeneity among NGOs
and equated common objectives with greater influence on policy fonnulation by governments, in
practice strengthening relations between organisations became the main priority of each network. The
need for various forms of arbitration and conciliation was not widely anticipated but assumed a central
importance in each instance. It is also evident that the networks considered here developed an
160 See for cample Haas, PeterM, MamA Levy and Edward A Parson 'Appndsing the Earth Summit: How Should we Judge UNCED's Succs?'
Envbvnmenl Vol.34 No.8 pp. 6-11,26-33, Washington D.0 October1992; and Hohnbei. 3ohan KoyThontson and Lloyd Timberiake Facing the
Futwi. Beyond the Earth Summit op. dL
161 'UNCED and the Global Forum t inevitably trapped by the structures they were aiticising, for thetis was an intensely liberal view in a world which
had left liberalism behind ... The Global Forum was right in its recognition that countervailing forces are all that can compel the institutions of the global
'flee market' to operate within the bounds that will allow most people to live deoently it may just have bi a little optimistic in supposing that the NGOs
could be a focus for their organisation.' Middleton, Neil Phil O'Keefe and Sam Moyo The Tonir ofthe Cmcudile. From Rio to iealiy in the developing
HdPluto Press Chipping Norton UK 1993 p.107.
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appreciation of the potential benefits in facilitating the creation of new alliances and the negotiation of
shared principles and norms at the international and national levels. Paradoxically, each example also
provides evidence of dissatisfaction from member organisations with the role played by the network in
delivering this type of service. This suggests that there are inherent problems for international NGO
networks attempting to facilitate agreement on ideological issues.
The ELCI Paris Conference and negotiation of the Alternative Treaties suggest that a number of
factors mitigate against networks functioning effectively in nonn-setting:
Building trust and elements of a programme of collaboration between participants is
most feasible among a relatively homogeneous group; however, the establishment of
norms by transnational movements necessitates the participation of as broad a range of
organisations (by region, sector and ideological perspective) as possible.
Negotiation among organisations will of necessity be perceived by some contributors
as 'watering down' their own principles and expertise. The value of working with
partners perceived as less effective or of compromising on weak positions may result in
the collaborative process itself being called into question.
• Legitimising a process whereby the collective voice of an alliance of organisations
assumes central importance in relations with other bodies may come to marginalise
individual organisations when their stance on a particular issue differs from the
consensus. This may in turn make NGOs as a whole easier to contain, allowing th&
interlocutors to exclude awkward participants from the discourse by asserting the pre-
eminence of the majority. The Friends of the Earth report on the Alternative Treaties
process quoted earlier suggests that legitimation of some form of collective decision-
making may increase the ease of access for hostile 'infiltrators', aiming to dilute or
discredit the effectiveness of NGOs)63
Despite these impediments, the agreements reached by NGOs at the Global Forum provide a
nelling a
	
tion'öftheedcdr	 br1c'pbrate asihe conduits for intemational dialogue
on norms and principles. The institutional challenges presented to organisations collaborating at the
163 Friends of the Earth International 'The Earth Summit Mhs Verdicts, Actions, Landmines' Section on the Treaty Process FOE Link No.50, op. CIL
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international level on environment and development issues present a comprehensive articulation of the
shift in perspective identified above. The limitations in the scope of the Tieaties, the contradictions
and inconsistencies within and between different Treaties, and the failure of attempts to realise
effective follow-up bear out the intrinsic problems for networks in placing relations between NGOs at
the heart of their operations and making progress towards the broader societal change this could
presage.
As for the broader themes of this thesis, an extended consideration of international non-governmental
networks during preparations for the Rio Summit provides us with strong empirical evidence of the
significance of interaction between organisations at the global level in realising a range of different, at
times incompatible objectives. In the deliberations of participants over the terms by which they would
co-operate, and their efforts to articulate and agree common principles and goals, we can also identify
conscious attempts to tackle many of the conceptual issues raised in chapter one.
1a -wtj t'*Uj	 ,	 .
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Chapter 4:
Institutionalising the Earth Summit - attempts to
incorporate the UNCED models for NGO
networking into the regular work of the UN
4.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses attempts to translate the organisational principles establithed during the
UNCEL) process into new (JNprocedures and institutions. The establishment ofa new body, the
Commission on Sustainable Development, and the negotiation ofnew rules governing NGO
accreditation to the UN derived directlyfrom UNCED. In both instances, non-governmental actors
believed they had played a sign ificant role in achieving change. However, the degree to which these•
developments subsequently reflected the ethos ofthe Rio Summit is open to question. During the same
perio4 notions ofself-governance andpluralistic understandings oflegitfrnacy and responsibiTh)F
within international NGO networks derivingfrom the UNCED period appear to have been
marginalisedfrom the mainstream discourse.
The role played by NGO networks before and during the Rio Summit was addressed in the previous
chapter. It was argued that all of the principal networks engaged in the UNCED process increasingly
prioritised interaction between NGOs and gave proportionately less attention to attempts to influence
the inter-governmental proceedings. This shift is evident across the range of functions performed by
each of the networks considered, to a greater or lesser extent. Thus each increased its endeavours to
link member organisations and initiate dialogue with other networks. They also placed greater
emphasis n the elaboration of common positions and negotiation of future working relations between
'-s--'rnaiwr't 	 ru
NGOs.
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As considered earlier, the reasons for this shift in emphasis are not wholly clear and may have resulted
as much from the limitations and weaknesses inherent in the operations ofNGO networks as from an
emergent appreciation of the intrinsic value of collaboration between organisations at the international
level. One factor which is emphasised repeatedly in documentation from the period in question is the
unprecedented opportunity presented to NGOs by UNCED (and the attendant global interest) to
establish collaborative mechanisms and agreed norms. These would have considerable legitimacy,
given the large number of organisations from all parts of the world which participated. Negotiation of
the Alternative Treaties can be understood as the most coherent attempt to realise these possibilities,
but all the networks considered in the previous chapter appear to have accepted this rationale and
adapted their activities and priorities as a result
If this assessment is valid, then the period following the Rio Summit should allow us to consider how
durable these agreements were and their broader impact (if any) on the inter-governmental processes
addressing issues of sustainable development Chief among these is the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD), established after IJNCED to monitor implementation of the
agreements reached and to promote follow-up to the Summit Creation in 1994 of the CSD NGO
Steering Committee (set up by NGO representatives attending the second annual CSD session) and
the work of a succession of NGO caucuses at annual CSD sessions provide useful instances of NGO
collaboration intended to influence CSD decisions and to strengthen links between organisations.
This chapter will also consider how the practices for NGO involvement established through the
preparatory meetings and at the Summit itself led to a reappraisal of arrangements for NGO
accreditation and participation in the regular work of the UN Economic and Social Council.
Given the enduring levels of interest in the implications of UNCED from a wide range of perspectives
it is remarkable how little academic attention has been given to the UN body charged with principal
responsibility for following up recommendations and promoting action to implement the objectives
outlined in the Rio agreements. Where reference to the CSD is made at all in analyses of international
institutional issues or of the activities of civil society at the global level, these have predominantly
rkfoçuing
other contexts.
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Yet the CSD's mandate is extensive, and its responsibilities suggest a central, catalytic role in
stimulating action at local, national, regional and global levels. The Comthission has completed one
full review of Agenda 21 at its annual sessions and has since carried out a more focused programme of
work addressing issues not adequately covered elsewhere in the international system. This is therefore
an established institution, with an extensive track record in an area of international relations attracting
steadily increasing academic and general attention. Why has it not merited far greater interest? In order
to address this question it is useful first to consider a range of analyses and commentaries by
academics, NGOs and government representatives relating to UNCED follow-up. These are broadly
from two periods: the months following the Rio Summit when the institutional role of the CSD was
not clear but its broad remit bad been set out; and from the time of the UN General Assembly five-
year review of progress and difficulties experienced in realising the objectives established at UNCED.
These appraisals provide a broad contextualisation for the more detailed assessment of the role of
NGO networks in the yeara following 1992 which constitutes the bulk of this chapter.
4.1.1 Post-UNCED Assessments
Writing shortly after UNCED, Haas et a!. present an assessment of the CSD's potential which typifies
many contemporary analyses:
The [CSD]'s mandate gives it great potential to raise governmental and public concern for the
environment and development agenda by hoJding regular high-level meetings to monitor
progress on Agenda 21. Meetings of the commission, particularly if they include a ministerial
session, could focus the attention of the press, public, and activists on global environment and
development issues, much as the 0-7 summits do for global economic issues or the European
environmental summits for environmental issues within Europe.'
Haas and his colleagues identify ways in which the CSD could assume a central role in international
affairs, most notably through facilitating bargaining between governments to reshape international
politics in ways which better reflect the new priorities of sustainable development. In order to do this
Haas, Peter M., MamA. Levy and Edward A. Parson 'Appraising the Earth Summit: How Should Judge UNCED's Success?' Envirrinnient volume
34, numberS pp. 6-lI. 26-33. Washington DC October 1992. Located online at httpi/w w.ciesin.org/docs'008-57Gt)08-S7Oien1 . Accessed on 3 January
2002. Fcc similar analyses see also Fnnch, llilaiy 'After the Earth Summit. the Future of Environmental Governance' Woridwatch Institute Paper 107,
Washington DC USA99Cqica, Ken 'Enviivnmenzal Organisatioçs and the UN' in Wnss,.Thomas 0. and LeotGo,daker eds NGOS the UN and
19, 1
Vogler, John and Maik Imber cds. The Environnien: and International Relations pp.138-155, Routledge London 1996; Susskind, Lawrence E 'What Will
it Take to Ensure EtTcctive Global Environmental Management? A Reassessment of Regime-building Accomplishments' in Spector, Betijam L Gunnar
SjOstcdt and I. William Zaztman eds. Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learnedfrnm the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) pp221 -233, Graham and Trotman, London 1994.
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the CSD should have a very high level chief official with the capacity to bring other international
institutions into line, and it needs a highly competent, well-staffed secretaiiat able to engage a range f
other actors and organisations. These requirements can be understood as the organisational elements
necessary to maximise the new body's effectiveness: otherwise, its importance is largely taken for
granted.
In a similar vein, the authors suggest a number of factors which may limit the capacity of the new
body to play the role they outline. Many important specifics (membership, location, frequency of
meetings, budget and so on) had yet to be decided and could prove disadvantageous. The CSD bad
been given a vague mandate and its ability to call for reports and information from governments was
unclear. The Commission might be 'held hostage to [unspecified] petty bureaucratic squabbles or
become a venue for patronage and cronyism' which would lessen its effectiveness. Despite these
misgivings, the future viability of the CSD is presented as synonymous with the likelihood ot
significant international action to realise the objectives identified at IJNCED. In other words, if
progress of any importance is to be made at the international level the Commission on Sustainable
Development would certainly be a key player. By contrast, the Convention processes focusing on
biological diversity and climate change 'have less potential to foster dramatic change'.2
Similar assumptions regarding the intrinsic significance of the CSD are evident in public
pronouncements by various politicians. US Vice-President Al Gore, speaking at the inaugural session
of the Commission, set out an expansive vision of the new institution's role. It is useful to consider an
extended excerpt from this speech, as it gives an indication of the degree to which eminent politicians
were prepared to pay lip service to the transformative imperative in sustainability and to place the
CSD centrally in an assessment of how progress could be achieved. It also captures the close
associations implicit in many contemporary analyses between national activity, inter-governmental
collaboration, and the role of organisations of civil society, while skirting around the tensions and
contradictions inherent in pursuing sustainable development in these three arenas simultaneously:
2 HM	 A	 ailnjthEmTh
that 'To assure UNCED's long.tctm prespects for success, the Sustainable Development Commission will have to balance participation at high levels,
whcre political embarrassment can be both generated and experienced, and at lower levels, where expertise and creativity can bctter flowish. And new
mechanisms must be developed for transferring financial and technological resowees to developing countries—mechanisms that satisfq both industrial
countries' legitimate needs for accountability and respect for propetty rights and developing coimtnes' legitimate demands for domocratic decisionmaking.'
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Two principles must guide us as we set about the pursuit of sustainable development. First, the
principle of national responsibility. After all, the role of this Commission is primarily catalytic.
It can focus attention on issues of common interest. It can serve as a forum for raising ideas and
plans. It can help resolve issues that arise as nations proceed in their sustainable development
agendas. It can monitor progress. It can help shift the multilateral financial institutions and
bilateral assistance efforts towards a sustainable development agenda. It can help revitalize the
United Nations system to ensure that sustainable development is a central theme in each
organization. Indeed, this Commission, through its focus on sustainable development, can
enhance United Nations' efforts to maintain peace, stability and prosperity in this post-Cold-
War world. But it can do none of these things unless each country makes a strong commilment
to change. This Commission will simply be a meeting about meetings if the members fail to
bring to the table a strong sense of national responsibility.
Will the United States show that sense of commitment? We can. We will ... But just as each
nation must assume national responsibility, so must we all act together. If sustainable
development is to become a reality, the second principle we must follow is that of partnership.
There are still those who think the wealthy countries on this planet have a monopoly on
technology and insight. That's nonsense. We can all learn from each other. That's why this
Commission must encourage partnership among countries - especially between North and
South. Over the last 20 years we have made some progress in creating the basis for a global
partnership. UNCED was a landmark in unifying 'environment' and 'development' in the term
'sustainable development'. Now this insight must be given life within the policies of every
government. Trade, commerce, agriculture - all interests need to be part of the effort, and that's
why this Commission as well must help create partnerships within countries. There are those
who expect us to rely on a single financial mechanism such as the GEF for Agenda 21
implementation. But Agenda 21 addresses much too broad a range of issues for the GEF. That's
why this Commission must create partnerships between it and all multilateral development
banks. All of them have to be involved. Finally, there are those who believe that only
government can marshal the resources for this task. Not true. Public policy that gets input from
everyone is better public policy. The fact is the pti' ettot i. ttrtd iC
this Commission is to succeed it must help create partnerships between government and non-
governmental oiganizations.3
Gore's vision suggests fundamental shifts in world affairs and indicates that the US would be fully
engaged in realising these changes. Moreover, the CSD can play a pivotal role: 'Archimedes said if he
had the right lever and a firm place to stand, he could move the world. This Commission should seek
to exert leverage on other institutions which can help us accomplish our task'.4 He draws analogies
between the rapidity of change in the former Soviet bloc and South Africa and the potential for similar
transfonnations in global collaboration on sustainable development issues.
UflLII IL 1J !u4tl Prt •
3 US Vice-President Al Gore 'KeynOte Address to The Commission on Sustainable Development' United Nations New York. June 14 1993. Available
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4Ibid
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Another notable appraisal of the CSD's potential from 1992 comes from the influential 'think-tank'
the South Centre, whose Working Group on Post-UNCED Strategies for the South concluded:
'Building on the experience of the South in relation to Rio and the gains made, the establishment of
CSD could provide developing countries with a significant new base for promoting integrated
development policy initiatives'. 5
 While cautioning that, in the work of the CSD, Northern countries
may wish to privilege environmental concerns above the systemic causes of ecological degradation
(the detrimental effects of capitalism, aggressively promoted through various forms of economic and
social globalisation), the South Centre report advocates closer relations with Northern NGOs as a key
element in challenging prevailing Northern policies and practice:
The proceedings of the Commission are likely to be followed closely now by more interested
and vocal public opinion in the North. The Commission and its work could therefore provide an
important platform for the South in advocating significant policy changes within the North
relating to lifestyles, and equitable national and global development which is sustainable. If
approached skilfully, cooperation with NGOs in the North could provide an additional element
of pressure for new departures in policy.6
Thus in the period immediately following its creation, commentaries from veiy different perspectives
ascribed to the CSD a pivotal role in subsequent international politics. While some doubts remain
about the adequacy of the agreements reached to halt detrimental trends and the capacity of the UN to
deliver the desired outcomes, these are usually tempered with acknowledgement that much bad been
accomplished and that decision-maldng by consensus dictates that progress will be ahIeved at the
pace of the slowest7 In a similar vein to Al Gore's speech the rapidity of change is likened to recent
events in South Africa and the former Soviet bloc, and taken as evidence of a major conceptual shift
which will inexorably transform international and domestic affairs.
4.1.2 The CSD five years on
The contrast between the above and informed assessments written five or more years after UNCED is
striking. One seasoned NGO leader, Richard Sandbrook, writing shortly after the five-year review of
outcomes from UNCED, provides a trenchant critique of the Rio Summit's inherent failings:
the South in fomiulating post.UNCED policy and action' pam. 22, South Centre Report Geneva, October 1992.
6Ibid.,para.26.
7 See for example Porter, Gareth and Inji Islam The Roadfmn. Rio: An Agenda for US Follow-up to the Earth Summit Environmental and Energy Study
bstitute, Washmgton D.C. USA, August 1992.
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it was as if the international set had all put themselves (myself included) into a sort of wash
mode where words replaced the soap. There was any amount of froth and foam. Everything and
everyone was jumbled together into the lather, but then we all became spun dry. And, by and
large, we are all still spun dry. When all was over there seemed to be little else other than words
and yet more international agreements that went far ahead of countries' abilities to apply them.8
Sandbrook highlights failings in three principal areas, which continue to hamper the likelihood of -
progress: first, the dearth of targets and commitments agreed at UNCED for the local and national
levels; second, the failure to agree a method or methods to redistribute wealth on an international
scale, thereby starting to tackle poverty and third, the absence of effective means to look after market
failures and address environmental and social issues now that an international free trade system is in
place. In lieu of progress in these critical areas, Sandbrook asserts, many of those involved in
international processes are indulging in 'displacement activities', producing strategies that remain on
the shel indicators that are not used, flamework agreements that are not acted upon, charters,
conference reports and so on - 'but words do not replace deeds, I am afraid'.9
Shortly before the 1997 five year review the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer,
sketched out a more conventional understanding of shortcomings since UNCED:
Since Rio we have made some progress in fulfilling the commitments which Heads of State and
Government accepted in the name of their citizens. However, despite the Rio Commitments, the
basic concept of sustainable development is still not well understood. The policies and
sinictures required to implement the Earth Summit agreements are still not in place ... Some of
the expectations which were raised at Rio have not been fulfilled, particularly in relation to
speed of implementation, finance and transfer of technology. Expectations were raised which
were always going to be difficult to meet. At UNGASS, we should be realistic and focus on a
limited number of priorities. We can then look at where we can make a difference and ensure
concrete action rapidly)°
Santer makes no mention of the CSD at all, despite the importance of its future programme of work in
taking forward the agreements from the five-year review. His call for realism in place of unfulfilled
8 Sandbrook, Richard 'Twenty Years on and Five Yeais hi' Beigesen, Helge Ole, Georg Paimann and øtem B. Thommesen eds. Yearbook of
InteniationaI Co-operaiion on Envirannieni and Development l99& pp19.22,The FridtjofNansen institute! EaitKqcan London 1998 p.20. The Tnaonty
of references from academic works to the CSD from 1997 and latersuggest little orno awareness of its activities Forexample, Mische and Ribeiro, wTlting
in l998, still refer in passing to the mandate of the 'new Conanission on Sustainable Development'. Misc1e. Patiicia M. and Mauricio Mdres Ril,eiro
ogicas tThy and the United Nilot Steaf
Censwy pp.315.356, United Nations University Press, Tokyo Japan 1998 p.332.
9 Sandhrook, Richard 'Twenty Years on and Five Yeats In', p.21. op. cit.
10 Santer, Jacques 'The Environment and Sustainable Development' spcech at the inaugutation of the new European Consultative Forum, Brussels 5 June
1997. Available online at: httpi/europ .int!comm/santetll997/js050697.htmL Accessed on I September2001.
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expectations indicates a far more confined and prosaic reading of the significance of sustainable
development than had been widespread five years earlier.
4.1.3 NGO Networks and the CSD
Analogous shifts are evident in analyses of the significance of NGO networks during this period. As
we have seen previously, greatly enhanced NGO influence over inter-governmental deliberations on
issues of sustainable development was widely discerned in the UNCED process. Antonio Donini, for
example, describes the 'Rio example' as 'a clear demonstration of the crucial role that NGOs have to
play as policy shapers in an intergovernmental setting. So far, this is the closest approximation to
direct popular participation that the UN as been able to accommodate'." Caroline Thomas concludes
that '[t]he sudden high diplomatic profile of environmental issues in the run up to Rio derived largely
from the activities of NOOs who took advantage of the political space provided by the fortuitous
ending of the cold war'. 12 Hilary French anticipates that '[a]s environmentalists from around the world
learn to work together for shared goals, the non-governmental movement stands to become as
influential at the international level as it is within nations'.' 3 French considers openness to public
participation in international governing processes as a prerequisite for this transfonnation to occur and
suggests that provisions for public review and comment and mechanisms for bringing 'citizen suits'
at the international level will be necessary. Haas et al. draw correlations between the institutional
developments in the UN system and growing associational links between NGOs:
If NGO alliances persist beyond UNCED with the same degree of institutionalisation, the effect
on future global politics could be significant Institutional links would make it easier for NGOs
to share infonnation and expertise, to exchange and co-ordinate political strategies, and to teach
each other about the most pressing problems in their home countries.'4
As noted in the previous chapter, there was also an influential body of NGOs who interpreted
UNCED as the triumph of 'free market environmentalism'.' 5 After the event Greenpeace and others
expressed concern at the appointment of Edouard Saouma, head of the UN Food and Agriculture
II Donini, Antonio 'The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits: Stagnation and Innovation in the Relationship Between the UN and NGOs' in Weiss, Thomas
G. and Leon GCrdCrIkCrC&JGOI. the (IN, and Global Goveniance pp.83-i01, L	 Rienner, BouIda USA 1996 p. 84.
12 11as,
1994 6
13 French, Ililary F. 'A fter the Earth Summh: The Future of Envimnmental Governance' opL ciL p.48.
14 Haas, Peter M., Mare A. Levy and Edward A. Parson 'Appraising the Eailh Summit: How Should we Judge UNCED's Success?' op. cit. p.161.
15 The Ecologist Whose Common Future? Reclauning the Commons Earthscan, London 1993 p.1.
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Organisation, to lead a task group advising the UN General Assembly on formation of the CSD and
other aspects of UNCED follow-up - a decision described by Fiona Reynolds of the Council for the
Protection of Rural England as 'like putting King Herod in charge of a maternity hospital'.' 6 Despite
this, and similar criticisms on specific issues, many organisations which had expressed concern at the
ethos of UNCED appeared to view the creation of the CSD as a positive development. A number of
commentaries describe it as an institution which NGOs had advocated during Rio PrepComs against
opposition from the UK, the USA, India, China and others, and which (in part as a result of this
auspicious beginning) merited cautious support. Clif Curtis of Greenpeace International, for example,
wrote to 175 governments before the 47th UN General Assembly session considered the remit of the
CSD and suggested a direct correlation between the influence vested in the new body and broader
perceptions of governments' commitment to sustainable development: 'While other important
UNCED-related actions are needed, in our view the General Assembly's actions on the CSD ... will be
interpreted internationally as a key indicator of governments' commitment to UNCED
implementation'.'7
By 1997 this association between commitment to making the CSD an effective body and commitment
to sustainable development as a whole would have seemed inappropriate. The gulf between Al Gore's
optimism in 1993 and Jacques Santer's more modest ambitions in 1997 is also evident in the shift in
many NGOs' assessments of the potential of the CSD over this period. This contrast between
expectations at its inception and widespread cynicism and lack of interest after the CSD had been in
existence for five or more years demands further consideration. Haas and his colleagues anticipated
some of the bureaucratic and institutional barriers which subsequent commentators have also
identified. Concerns over the small secretariat assigned to the Commission and the effectiveness of the
means devised to ensure the 'injection of the idea of sustainable development into the normal UN
programme of work"8 were raised by many when the relevant decisions were taken, but nowhere
were these considered as major impediments to the CSD functioning effectively.
16 McCully, Paznck 'UN Appoints FAOOiie(tofcsm Sustainable Dcvçlopment Commission' mEwih bland Joiinsal vol.?, no.3 Summ 1992.
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The contrasts in the above examples are illuminating. At its inception the CSD was widely envisaged
by government officials, NGO activists, UN staff and academic commentators as a body which could
play a leading role in shifting the locus for international relations towards a common articulation of the
principles of sustainable development as the basis for future collaboration. By 1997 these aspirations
had largely disappeared. Even the strongest apologists for the CSD had much more prosaic
expectations. While institutional limitations are highlighted by some, far more fundamental difficulties
in tackling the problematic elements of sustainable development are frequently cited.
To this decline in the perceived significance of the CSD must be added differences over the relative
importance of environmental protection, social improvement and economic factors in various
understandings of 'sustainable development'. Contradictions between these various policy areas are
evident in some of the post-UNCED assessments noted earlier and have been explored in previous
chapters. It is also clear that resolution of these conflicts had largely been deferred from UNCED. This
presented two sets of problems for the CSD and other related international institutions: first, to
translate the rhetoric of UNCED into action, entailing difficult commitments and a programme to
engage other inter-governmental issue regimes (notably those dealing with trade and finance); and
second, to create a viable role for itself which spanned the breadth of functions anticipated but
demonstrated some coherence and commonality between them. An overarching problem here would
be to find ways to contribute to activity at the national level without provoking states which objected
to perceived attempts to question or undermine national sovereignty. A related process required the
CSD to translate the ethos and the practicalities which had characterised the involvement of NGOs in
the UNCED process into its regular work and to champion greater flexibility and openness towards
non-governmental actors in other parts of the UN system. Many of the difficulties and coniradictions
identified above are also evident in this context.
This is not to suggest that the CSD has not conducted valuable work or that it has not provided the
context within which significant agreements could be brokered between governments. The
Commission's record in developing a forum for the exchange of practical information on
implementation of Agenda 21 is solid, and its role as a catalyst, highlighting inconsistencies or gaps ir
nc1ed
Further, the CSD has developed innovative practices for the involvement of non-governmental actors,
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which have served as a challenge to other parts of the international system. It has also refined its
system for receiving and analysing national reports from governments, to 'the point where this is seen
as a useful exercise which is beneficial for those who participate. Yet in comparison with the
ambitions expressed immediately after the Rio Summit, this constitutes damning with faint praise.'9
What happened in the intervening years to nullify the hopes placed in the CSD after UNCED? Were
there specific organisational problems which limited its effectiveness, or can its lack of impact be
attributed to a more general failure to adopt sustainable development as an overarching set of
imperatives to govern international affairs?
These questions assume particular importance for our consideration of the role and functions of
international NGO networks focusing on sustainable development In chapter 2 it was suggested that
these networks do not necessarily depend upon inter-governmental bodies and processes to provide
them with contextual relevance and permanence. Here, the relationship is rather different - in charting
the decline in the perceived importance of the CSD, can we also identify a retreat from the
expectations widely expressed in 1992 for international NGO networks? If this is the case, how much
is it dependent upon the inter-governmental context, and what steps have been taken by NGOs to
sustain the ethos of collaboration to achieve broader societal change identified in the last chapter? Has
this been shaped by the broader inter-governmental context or can we discern evidence of autonomous
initiatives fostered by NGO networks? Have collaborations been instigated to push for action in the
areas of most glaring failure identified by Richard Sandbrook or does his charge of 'displacement
activity' apply equally to NGOs and governments? If the answer to thIs last question is yes' ,'bave üe
CSD and the UNCED legacy had any significance for their activities?
4.2 Background: The legacy from UNCED
As far as NOOs are concerned, UNCED's major achievement may be its contribution to the
internationalization of the NGOs. The networking, education and pressure to be active and
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19 For example, Paul de iongh, a Dutch civil servant who was vicc.chair of the tonission in 1996, has a hard job finding anything positive to say of the
five-year review:	 Rio Plus Five mecung. as it wascalled, svxl the cause of continuity by aflinning that the UNCED ageonts still hold and by keeping
the preasuleon national govemmalts to take than seriously'. De Jongh, Paul and Sean Captain Our Common Joumey:A PioneeAngApprcach to
Cooperative En vironmenial Management Zed Books, London 1999 p.256.
171
effective at the multilateral level in todiy's world will affect the work of NGOs and the inter-
governmental and United Nations processes in the future.2°
The national and international opportunities for real NGO participation laid down in Agenda 21
must be defended, or first won, through appropriate political pressure. The self-organization and
a minimum of national and international cooperation between the various NGOs and social
groups are an important prerequisite for effective pressure.2'
Previous chapters have challenged the assumptions underlying the conclusions of various writers on
international relations regarding the role and influence of non-governmental actors. One such is the
premise that quantifying influence in specific inter-governmental processes is an adequate measure of
NOOs' effeciveness? Another is the fixed hierarchy implicit in much of the literature on regime
theory, which also presumes a core of governmental (and perhaps also commercial) actors with the
capacity to agree upon 'principles, norms, rules, procedures and programmes that govern the
interactions of actors in specific issue-areas'. The evidence from a plethora of NGO networks
operating globally or transnationally suggests that these fixed, often hierarchical models do not
adequately encompass the priorities or the objectives of NGO collaboration. Working together to
influence inter-governmental decisions and sharing information among members constitute types of.
activity which broadly comply with these models. We should also recognise that attempts by
international NGO networks to influence economic actors or social groups can occur quite separately
from the prism of inter-governmental activity. The same is true of efforts to establish shared norms
which derive their legitimacy in large measure from their transnational origins. Yet these latter
activities also have the capacity to have an impact on inter-governmental processes or to provoke
broader transnational societal change which obliges international relations theorists to recognise them
as significant.
The distinctions this implies are particularly evident in the work of NGO alliances functioning before
and during the Rio Summit, as we have seen. The Alternative Treaties formulated during the Global
20 Adams, Bathara 'Increased NGO involvement challenges United Nations' Dewiopment Forum vol.20 No.3 UNDP New York May-June 1992 p.8
21 Unmussig. Barbara 'New Environment and Nouih-Souih Policy afi UNCED - Problems and Prospects' inGetikant, Andreas ed. In the Afteanath of
BGnany 1993 p.1 mi.
22 Arts, Bas The Political Influence of Global NGO International Books, Utrecht the Netherlands 1998.
23 Levy. Marc A. Oran Young & Michael Thm 'The Study of International Regimes' European Journal ofInternational Relations vol.1 No.3 pp.267-330.
Uppsala Sweden September1995 p.274; the authors go on to stress that states constitute an exchisive club in this context 'regimes are properly undostood
as social practices created to guide interactions among the members of international society (that is, states) in identifiable issue areas.'
172
Forum at Rio were carefully articulated, not as a representation of what governments should have
committed themselves to do, but rather as a collective exercise in defining shared principles and
objectives among participating organisations and establishing common undertakings for action by
NGOs themselves.
Concurrently, the work of the International Facilitating Committee and the UNCED NGO Strategy
Group introduced greater coherence into efforts by NGOs to influence the decisions being negotiated
by governments. By encouraging or facilitating informal alliances between organisations to present
joint positions to governments, these processes often privileged a particular viewpoint or perspective,
which could be understood as coming from the main body of NCIOs and would have widespread
credence as a result While comparable alliances had functioned in previous UN Conference
processes, and in numerous other international contexts, these were qualitatively different in two
respects: first, the UNCED agenda, which combined environmental concerns with development
priorities; and second, the new electronic means for communication and information sharing which
were becoming available and were widely used by UNCED NGOs.24
The presumption that networks should attempt to achieve consensus among their members conforms
closely to the understanding of the functions performed by NGOs and their relations with each other
presented in Agenda 21 (particularly in chapter 27, which focuses specifically on the role of NGOs):
To ensure that the full potential contribution of non-governmental organizations is realized, the
fullest possible communication and cooperation between international organizations, national
and local governments and non-governmental organizations should be promoted in institutions
mandated, and programmes designed to carry out Agenda 21. Non-governmental organizations
will also need to foster cooperation and communication among themselves to reinforce their
effectiveness as actors in the implementation of sustainable development.25
This notion of social partnership, initiated at the international level but pertaining to decision-making
processes in national and local contexts, constitutes a significant departure from established UN
attitudes towards NGOs. As we shall see, attempts to translate the Agenda 21 perspective into the
24 Shelly Preston notes the iniliative of II3ASE (the Braesiian Institute for Social and Economic Analyses) and the Association for Progressive
Qanmunicaticas in devising nd nagtngtl UNCED Infgnnatign Suttcgy Pmject in 1992, which enabled NGOs atound the wgrki to strategse and
exccje i	 tidnThe Earthuninit B	 biethUNEbThpComo)thydLa,efflna1eiffn ubP,stC*LIN
Shelley Ekruonic Global Networking and the NGO Movement: the 1992 Rio Summit and Beyond in Swonis and Ploughshares: A Chronideof
internationaL4ffairs vol.3. no.2, Washington D.C. Spring 1994. Available online at hnpi/stile.lbom.ac.uk/-gyedb/STILE/Emai10002089/m12.html . Visited
O 1 September2001.
25 Agenda 2! para. 27.4, op. ciL
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regulations governing access and relations with NGOs proved to be problematic and ultimately
unsuccessful. The perspective adopted in Agenda 21 also provoked negatfve reactions from those
whose interpretation of international NGO networking was informed by different understandings of
the nature of NGOs, and the purpose of networking. In her analysis of Agenda 21, Theodora Carroll-
Foster outlines these criticisms:
It treats NOOs in a monolithic way. It thereby makes the mistake of assuming that the
variegated NGOs will have common cause or agenda and will be amenable to being treated in
the same way by international organisations or governments. It fails to incorporate any analysis
about NOOs, whether Northern or Southern, and therefore does not appear to understand how
NGOs work; how they relate to communities and societies; how they network locally and
internationally and develop momentum, action, and change6
The grounds for elaboration of a broader understanding of the functions and influence of international
NGO networks were presented in chapter 2 and will be returned to in the following chapter. At this
point it should be noted that UNCED witnessed a new level of NGO networks' significance in two
related though not necessarily complementary contexts:
in advancing appreciation of the intrinsic importance of networks and networking (both
among NGOs and for a broader audience of governments, UN officials and others)
• in providing some evidence that networks could bring greater coherence to NGOs'
interactions with inter-governmental processes
The tension between the two types of 'networking' suggested here points to a fundamental divergence
in understandings of the purpose and the functions of international NGO networks. In order to
elaborate the implicit distinctions between what I have termed 'mainstream' and 'alternative'
perspectives, I have had to render as black and white differences which are often more subtle or
imprecise. Nevertheless, the underlying ambivalence over the relevance and purpose of networks
which the table below illustrates provides a valuable starting point for consideration of the role of
networks after UNCED:
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26 Carroll-Foster, Theodora 'Commentaiy on Agenda 21 Chapter 27' in Canoll-Foster, Theodoos ed Action 2!. Abstmcf Revwws and Commentaries
IDRC Books, Ottawa Canada 1993 p.191.
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•Table 4.1 Two understandings of the significance of international NGO
networks
Mainstream	 Alternative
Academic	 State-centric regime theory	 Civil society access to global governance
perspective
Participation at UN Lobbying governments 	 Dialogue and agreements between NGOs
Conferences
Structure	 Fixed, hierarchical structure 	 Loose, informal association dependent upon
reliant upon a competent 	 support from and use by its members
secretariat
Key relations with Defined by its relations with inter- Defined by its capacity to create and improve
other	 governmental bodies 	 interaction between NGOs
organisatlons
Beneficiaries	 Most useful to small, local and	 Useful to large, Northern organisations which
Southern NGOs which need	 can learn from the expenence of, and gain
information and expertise	 legitimacy from collaborating with small and
Southern NGOs.
Also useful to small organisations which can
exchange ideas and information
transnatiorially
Purpose	 To strengthen NGO influence	 To facilitate dialogue on issues of principle
over governmental decision-	 and norm-setting
making
Measure of
	
Lead to emergence of a
	
Allow articulation of a wider divergence of
success	 composite NGO position	 views
While the distinctions indicated above are much in evidence in contemporary and retrospective
literature on UNCED, within a short period after the event the 'mainstream' understanding appears to
have gained the upper hand in the work of the CSD. The Alternative Treaties process, which had
engaged so many organisations, is conspicuous by its absence from most of the documents available
on the establishment and early work of the CSD. I have only been able to find a single NGO document
addressing the mandate, functions and working practices of the Commission on Sustainable
Development which suggests that the Treaties constitute an agreed starting point for NGOs attempting
to articulate alternative approaches and objectives at the international level. Yet this is precisely what
* JIUUI1I .IrI*JrLi tri -• .- -. UL	 mS	 - IJL IIIML	 tiIàti
was envisaged in the Treaties themselves. A proposal br a second phase of activities arising from the
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Alternative Treaties process was circulated among NGOs between the first and second sessions of the
CSD. This spelt out their purpose and continuing relevance:
The Treaties were intended to be agreements on principles and commitments for NGO action on
environment and development issues regardless of what governments decided at Rio. A number
of the NGO Treaties have been used successfully in many countries in a variety of ways since
they were developed in Rio. However underlying many of the Treaties is a common thread
illustrating the lack of substantive credible alternative models.27
The document goes on to suggest that ongoing inter-governmental work, and the agreements reached
in Rio, would be insufficient to achieve necessaiy changes. Future collaboration between NGOs
should focus on 'several key pieces of the new paradigm that are missing'. Chief among these were:
1. Accountable, democratic decision-maldng institutions, for both governments and NGOs,
including financial institutions.
2. Alternative economic models that promote socially and ecologically sustainable
development.
3. Visions and values of sustainable communities in sustainable societies.28
In this paper the International NGO Forum (INGOF - the network which oversaw the Alternative
Treaties process) advocated that NGOs needed to 'step back from the busy crises of immediate
lobbying and public education' and participate in 'a dialogue among South / North / East I West
NGOs on new fundamental alternatives'. The results of this dialogue could then be influential in inter-
governmental contexts such as the CSD and the 1995 Social Summit 29 This proposal eventually led
to the 1995 Manila meeting of international NGO networks, considered in Chapter 2.
By contrast, the Centre for Our Common Future's quarterly update The Brundtland Bulletin sets out
the priorities for subsequent editions in December 1992, and does not mention the Treaties at all in its
litany of important processes it will follow in future. Significantly, those hihIighted are almost all
inter-governmental - the CSD, the Global Environment Facility, and UNDP's Capacity 21
•	 r	 -----.	 * -
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27 'lntemationalNGO Forum (INGOF) NGO Ttèaty Process - a proposal for phase 2' endorsed by,nembds ofthelNGOF Steeting Commfttee December
1993. Reproduced in Appendix 8.
28Thid.
29 Ibki
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Programme. The one exception is the Earth Càuncil, which as we have seen was closely associated
with UNCED Secretary General Maurice Strong. Reference to the Alternative Treaties occurs only in
information on meetings publicised by other organisations. The International Alliance for Sustainable
Agriculture, for instance, announced an event to be held in June 1993 which focused on action to
implement the agriculture-related Treaties and to strengthen the network formed at the Global Forum.
The US Citizens' Network provided information on a Treaty Working Group, formed to disseminate
and promote awareness of the Treaties in America. 30 Just six months after their inception, the clear
impression is that such examples are marginal to the emerging focus for international NGO activity;
Residual pockets of enthusiasm exist in particular locations and around specific issue areas, but the
coherence envisaged during the Global Forum has vanished.
As we shall see later in this chapter, the CSD NGO Steering Committee, created in 1994, was
established to enhance NGO access to UN work on sustainable development Its remit and the scope
of issues addressed by NGOs collaborating under the auspices of the Steering Committee coincided
closely with the work progranune of the CSD itself: The co-ordinating role played by the Steering
Committee was also understood as necessary by the CSD Secretaiia with a clear emphasis on the
'mainstream' interpretation of the functions of NGO networks, as presented above. Development of
various forms of dialogue with Major Groups, and the advancement of 'partnership' with civil society
would become key elements in the work of the CSD, and the NGO Steering Committee played an
enthusiastic role in advancing these.
Thus in a number of significant contexts the development of fundamental alternatives byNGOs was
marginalised, while incorporation of non-governmental actors into the regular work of the UN and
other official bodies responsible for implementation of Agenda 21 became of intrinsic importance.
The implications of this shift in emphasis will be explored later.
4.2.1 Evidence of discontinuity
In the aftermath of UNCED a large proportion of NOOs which had been involved in the Summit
- probably thc .majority - did not play an active role in follow-up to the event at the global
LI_u
level. Many shifted their focus to national or regional promotion of sustainable deveInpment,
30 Ibid.
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others were discontinued or fell into decline without UNCED as the principal context for their
activities. A number of prominent individuals within influential organisations moved to other roles on
concluding their work on the Summit. On the other hand, at national and international levels, new
organisations were created before and after UNCED to focus particularly on implementation of the
Rio agreements and promote awareness of their relevance. Broad-based networks were established to
play this role in many countries and regi ns 3 ' and to focus on particular issues or constituencies such
as the Women's Environment and Development Organization; the Climate Action Network; and the
Business Council for Sustainable Development [later renamed the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development]..
Further evidence of discontinuity is apparent among the organisations which continued to play an
active role internationally. Where some coherence had existed previously between groups and
networks focusing on different aspects of the UNCED agenda, now distinct processes bad been
established to address climate change, biological diversity and desertification, with separate
secretariats and far less co-ordination than had been necessary during preparations for the Summit As
will be considered later, it was decided that annual sessions of the CSD would each address a third of
the issues covered in Agenda 21, in order to allow more detailed consideration of each. Many
anticipated that this would also undennine the holistic approach to sustainable development advocated
through IJNCED, not least through weakening possibilities for NGOs working on different issues to
maintain their associations.
A marked break in personnel and organisational structure should also be noted in the IJNCED
Secretariat and in many governments. UNCED staff bad mostly been seconded from other parts of the
UN system and from governments. After June 1992 the majority returned to their previous roles,
although a handful of high-level officials were given new posts within the Convention Secretaiiats and
in the newly-created UN Department for Policy Co-ordination and Sustainable Development, a
division of the UN Secretariat headed by the Deputy Secretary General of UNCED, Nitin Desai. A
comparable dispersal occurred in many governments, where specially established units were
disbanded and officials returned to their previous posts, while in other instances new institutions were
— *l_ Ptfl	 SI$1rt	 rIL -
set up to address domestic	 - " -
31 For example, the United Nations Environment and Development UK Committee; the Geman Fonmi for Environment and Development; the Norwegjan
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Despite this upheaval affecting institutions and personnel, a core ofNGOs maintained their efforts to
build upon the advances achieved over the previous two or three years. F6r some, the links forged
with other organisations were seen as necessary elements for further sharing of information and
resources. A number prioritised the development of sustained joint critiques of ongoing processes,
such as global economic liberalisation, which they considered inimical to sustainability but which had
been legitimised by UNCED. Most others welcomed gains in access to and recognition from the UN
and sought to make these permanent in the ongoing work of the UN Economic and Social Council
and other parts of the UN system. A final group attempted to make connections between these areas,
emphasising the complementarity of attempts to influence inter-governmental processes and efforts to
achieve more effective collaboration between NGOs. There are four principal contexts in which the
role of NGOs and NGO networks before and during UNCED presented ongoing questions about
prevailing orthodoxies:
• The role of non-governmental actors in the work of the United Nations, most notably its
activities relating to sustainable development while existing arrangements limited access to
international NGOs, Agenda 21 stressed the significance of local and national activity, and
the need to strengthen links between these and international decision-making. How could
this evident contradiction be tackled?
• Established practice at the UN governing the accreditation of NGOs, and the access NGOs
were granted to attend and address key sessions during regular UN meetings and at special
conferences was widely perceived to have been amended in the UNCED context Had new
precedents been established and, if so, could these be introduced into new arrangements for
NGO participation in the ongoing work of the UN?
• The significance of NCIO self-organisation at the global level was widely acknowledged as a
significant factor in the UNCED process. This included co-ordinating input to the inter-
governmental process and elaborating and promoting broader global norms. Could this
range of activities be reflected in organisational arrangements and conceptual approaches
-u-â.established after
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ForUM; and the Alliance of Noithen'i Peoples for Environment and Development (ANPED - later renamed the No1hem Alliance for Sustainability).
• Mainstream international relations theories have had to accommodate the end of the cold
war and emergent tensions between Northern and Southern countries which undermine
assumptions of fixed hierarchies. Does a growing acknowledgement of the significance of
organisations of civil society in international affairs constitutes a further challenge to state-
centric models?
The Rio Summit also presented a number of broader theoretical challenges to established practice and
underlying ideological constmcts relating to the role of civil society. Thus a close association between
sustainable development and notions of accountability and democracy is evident in many of the
documents agreed at iJNCED. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, for example, states that
'[ejnvimnmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens',32 suggesting
that this involvement is not just desirable on moral grounds, but that it leads to better decisions and
legislation. The broader ramifications of this approach for the UN itself and for member governments
are substantial - the degree to which these have been confronted in the organisational and substantive
work of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development has been of particular concern to NGO
networks operating in this area.
A further shift is apparent in the identification in Agenda 21 of nine Major Groups - distinct sectors of
civil society with complementazy roles to play in the achievement of sustainable development This
conflicted with existing UN terms for the involvement of non-governmental actors in its work, which
made no distinctions among this range of organisations.
UNCED thus advanced an inter-related set of principles which presented considerable challenges for
the UN and for theories of international relations. The two principal elements to this were:
sustainable development as a body of norms and activities which should become of central
importance in all areas of international interaction
• involvement of non-state actors, and action at national and sub-national levels, as of central
importance
1	
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32 A/CONF.1 51(26 'Report of the United Nations Conference on Envimnmcnt and Development' chapter 1, resolution 1, anna I, Principle 10, Rio de
Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992.
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The challenge for advocates of Agenda 21 and the policies it advanced was therefore to infuse these
organising principles into the regular work of the UN, and also regional, national and local decision-
making structures.
On a separate front, the emphasis on what I have termed the 'mainstream' approach to international
NGO networking (as expressed in Agenda 21) assumed a homogeneity among NGOs which was
overly simplistic, and failed to explore ways in which NGO networks collaborate to elaborate and
advance shared norms and achieve broader societal change.
In the following sections I will consider the organisational arrangements intended to institutionalise
the Rio Summit in detail, and then assess how these had fared by 1997.
4.3 NGOs and the creation of the Commission on Sustainable
Development
Agenda 21 called for the formation of a new body to oversee implementation and monitoring of its
provisions:
In order to ensure the effective follow-up of the Conference, as well as to enhance international
cooperation and rationalize the inteiovemmental decision-making capacity for the integration
of environment and development issues and to examine the progress of the implementation of
Agenda 21 at the national, regional and international levels, a high-level Commission on
Sustainable Development should be established.33
It also established that the CSD should report to the UN Economic and Social Council; that a highly
skilled Secretariat should service the Commission; and that NGOs and other Major Groups shoukibe
granted access to information and encouraged to provide reports and other material according to their
expertise.34 The CSD's principal responsibilities are to monitor progress towards sustainable
development in the UN system, to receive and 'consider' national reports and other communications
from national governments, and to 'enhance dialogue ... with NGOs and the independent sector'.35
UIslu*F lrN11 ILIUTIUHW ist'tuJsrp - I	 UL1TjU iifim
33 Agenda 2iop cii. para. 38.11.
34/bid. para.38.13.
35/bid
181
Responsibility for determining the detail in these generalities was deferred to the 47th UN General
Assembly Session in autumn 1992. The GA 'should determine specific organizational modalities for
the work of this Commission, such as its membership, its relationship with other intergovernmental
United Nations bodies dealing with matters related to environment and development, and the
frequency, duration and venue of its meetings' •36 Thus although creation of the new Commission was
considered one of the 'quiet victories' of UNCED, 37 much remained to be determined regarding the
CSD's working methods, its remit, its accessibility for NGOs, and so on.
As noted in the previous chapter, during the four Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) for
UNCED, governments had disagreed over the appropriate institutional arrangements to put in place:
'countries initially opposed to the Commission included: the UK, China, Austria, India, Sweden,
Brazil, Japan, Argentina, Australia, Kenya and Norway. In the face of this opposition stood countries
like the Netherlands and France, supported by a coalition of non-governmental organisations.' 38 The
reasons behind opposition to creation of a new UN Commission were varied and complex. The
possible imposition of some system of national reporting has been cited as a particular concern of
some of the larger G77 countries such as Brazil and India. American and British priorities were
governed by the need for financial constraints on the UN, which had led to a common position that no
new UN institutions should be created in any context.39
Once general acceptance of the need for a new Commission to be created bad been ieac'ne4 t%trew
still considerable disagreement over its location (physical and organisational); over its remit and over
its working methods. Debate on these institutional arrangements during PrepCom lv for UNCED was
protracted, and many of the more detailed questions were left to be resolved after conclusion of the
Summit. One NGO observer summarised the positions taken and the compromise reached:
African countries wanted a powerful Commission, over which small Southern countries would
have much more control. Northern preferences ... for a weak Commission coupled with Indian,
36 Ibid. paza.38. 12.
37 Bill Pace, quoted in Centre for Our Common Future Netr* '92 No.19 COCF Geneva August-September 1992 p.1.
38 Ibid. p.1.
39 Mazk bnber has suggested that anticipation of the opportunity for insUtutioni streamlining may have led the UK and the USA to accept the creanon of
bWiath rkiplicetheict*vldeè &thSUN E intPw*ssne(UN5P) id UNDey*pmiPanindae
(UNDP), it may well be that the SDC [sic] will largely supplant the central purpose of ECOSOC itself. Thein may lie the exlanation of the late-
conversion of the westem powers to the creation of an SDC, something nitx1 throughout the prepaiatoiy phases of the UNCED since 1990. by the UK
and USA in particular until after the Maidi 1992 sessions in New York.' Jmber, Mark 	 reflections on the Sustainable Development Commission',
unpublished paper, University of St Andrews September 1992.
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Chinese and Brazilian determination to restrict its powers to require national reports, led to the
final Rio compromise, which puts the Commission firmly under ECOSOC, subject to a periodic
review by all ECOSOC's national members. 40
A further element of Agenda 21 of particular interest to NGOs in this context was its call for 'an
expanded role for non-governmental organisations, including those related to major groups, with
accreditation based on the procedures used in UNCED'.4 ' This was understood by many as a call for
revisions to the arrangements for NGC) participation in the regular work of the UN. This would thus
entail the translation of the principles underlying the formal involvement of NOOs in IJNCED into the
regulations governing NGO access to the UN system as a whole. One problem with this was that it
would call into question the rights and privileges ofNGOs whose associations with the'U1 'wer&iong-
standing. One contemporaiy report states that
some of the organisations that belong to the Conference of NGOs with Consultative Status to
the UN (CONGO) and the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA), both
of which have been working with the UN for some time, feel that processes for NGO
participation in the UN already exist and need not be changed. They see the accreditation
procedure used in UNCED as needlessly bypassing an existing system that works and of which
they are a part.42
NGOs which had been active in lobbying for creation of the CSD continued to push for the strongest
possible mandate and role. Proposals were formulated advocating that the CSD should function as a
global aii,iter on sustainable development issues.43 The UN Commission for Human Rights and the
International Labour Organisation were also cited as precedents for UN bodies which recognised non-
governmental actors as key participants and initiators of work. 44 Advocates of these quasi-legalistic
roles for the Commission found one ally in the Dutch Govemment which suggested that some form
of 'ombudsman' role should be performed by the CSD, which could be petitioned on violations of
40 Roddick, Jackie 'fl Sustainable Development Conumssion: Half Way Down the Road' United Nations Association UKpamphlét London Septomber
1992.
4l Agenda 21 op. cit. pam. 38.44.
42 Ornlre for.OurConaoon FutuieNes* 92 L NoJ9op & August-September 1992 p.6.
'43 R	 dthbrSmida, nlippe Rq'o'( ifs Ciltatlodoñ	 bleD ptthe(isflageIo Llona1L1byV.esmdatioa*W
for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) London 1993 p.9.
44 For example. Kathr 0. Sessions of the United Nations Association USA wrote in September 1992: 'Another example with considerable relevance to
the CSD is the U.N. Commission on Humaji Rights, which, in conjunction with nongovemmental groups, has gradually built international acceptanoc of
the need for global reviews of national progress in meeting human rights standards.' Sessions, Kathiyn 0. 'Institutionalizing the Earth Summit'. op. cit.
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international environmental agreements. A letter signed by representatives of 13 NGOs,45 principally
US-based, and dated 23 October 1992, refers to 'the ombudsbureau proposed by the Netherlands'. It
calls for pressure byNGOs to avoid a return to 'business as usual'. The 'Comments on the
Commission on Sustainable Development' sent with this letter set out some general objectives for an
effective body. These include:
• The [CSD] mandate should not be limited to reviewing agreements reached at TJNCED,
but should be forward-looking, including new agreements based on evolving political,
economic and social concerns and emerging scientific understanding.
• The Secretariat of the Commission should have the resources and staff it needs, and
independence and stature within the UN system to allow it to review the work of other UN
bodies.
• The CSD should adopt its own niles of procedure (which would give it the jight to establish
its own NGO participation procedures, set up subsidiary bodies or initiate consultative
processes involving other international organizations and NGOs and other independent
groups, and make studies and recommendations on its own initiative).
• The CSD should, as agreed in Chapter 38 of Agenda 21, employ the NGO accreditation
procedures used at UNCED. This will ensure that NGOs that participated in UNCED will
be able to participate in the work of the CSD. Additionally, the UNCED accreditation
procedures should be used to accept other 'relevant and competent' NGOs for the CSD
meetings and the working groups it may set up ... Additional procedures will need to be
developed for receiving meaningful input from NGOs such as the working-party model used
in the UNCED preparatory process, and the 'Ombudsbureau' proposed by the Netherlands.
45 The letter was sent to NGOs itieh had been active in the Rio process, urging them to lobby their governments in advance of the General Assembly
general debate on UNCED Ibilow-up. Si o.pnisations are Env mental Defense Fimd. Friends of the Ea&th USA, National Audubon Society,
'Nafi.MadWideFNgRDImatd,,
Council ofVoluntaTy Agencies, Panos Institute, Center for Development of Intemationil law, Union of Concerned Scientists, and United Nations
Association USA. Reproduced in Appendix 5. Attached to this letter was a paper entitled 'Comments on the Commission on Sustainable Development',
dated October28 1992; this was attnluted to Cape 2000, a conso.1itm made up of the first six of the organisations listed in the previous sentence (all tJS
NGOs).
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These objectives give some idea of the extentof what was considered possible immediately following
UNCED by some of those most closely involved. They also indicate the extent to which some NGOs
saw themselves as playing a key role in giving the CSD a strong institutional place and a clearly
defined and authoritative role in relation to other inter-governmental bodies. 46 It is therefore important
to note the close association drawn between these objectives and the emphasis placed on ease of
access and input for NGOs in the Commission's future work. All of these were presented in the letter
as essential if NGOs are to help like-minded governments prevent a reversion to 'business as usual':
It is vital that the voices and perspective of the independent sector be heard, by both
governments and the UN Secretary General, expressing support for the establishment of an
effective CSD and for the active participation of NGOs and major groups in *he work of the
new Commission. We urge you to communicate with your governments before November 2 to
discuss their positions regarding the CSD. We hope that you will voice your support for
provisions which allow for full participation of international, national, and local NGOs and
major groups in the works of the Commission (as was agreed at UNCED).47
A contemporary position paper produced by NGOs meeting in Europe as members of the 'Working
Group on Institutional Change' (established during the PrepComs for UNCED) set out a more general
rationale:
NGOs can actively contribute to the general improvement of international decision-making and
the achievement of sustainable development. They can bring a substantial amount of expertise
and practical experience and can play a very important role as guardians in the implementation
of international policies. They raise public awareness and stimulate action at local and national
levels. For that reason, they must be enabled to participate as observers in governmental and
inter-governmental meetings and submit statements
This position paper was signed by 25 people from 16 countries in an individual capacity.
As noted in the previous chapter, this association between NGO involvement and the strength of the
institution was also drawn by many NGO activists during preparations for the Rio Summit.49 This
constitutes one of the areas in which opinion on the validity of the event as a whole has been most
46 See also Hajost, scott and Liz Bazsstt-Bmwi 'Dndted amendments to the ECOSOC functional commission roles for the CSD rules of procedure', by
two US NGO representatives, which proposes line-by-line alterations to ECOSOC Doe. E15975 'Rules of Procedure f the Functional Commissions of
ECOSOC' New Y ork, January 1993.
47 Ibid Note the use of the term 'the mdependent seetor' hem to denote all non-governmental actors, despite the acrimony surrounding its promotion by the
l99Ot**1r"LT T1jj tfl1.f$WI 1 •*Jp I4i*	 . s-*T1r--
48 'Reconimendation of the Working Group on bistitufional Change on the UN Commission on SustainabloDevelopment' p.15 from a meeting at the -
Peace Palace, the Hague 4 to 6 November 1992.
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sharply divided between those who believe that civil society organisations were co-opted to lend
credibility to a process which they should be decrying and those who advocate collaboration and
partnership with governments and other actors as the most constructive course for NGOs to take.
Nevertheless, what is absent from this document is any acknowledgement of ideological differences
which could be anticipated between NOOs and governments, between NGOs and other major groups
organisations (most notably the private sector), and between NGOs pursuing different objectives. The
marginalisation of such ideological questions and the privileging of apolitical objectives such as
'effectiveness' and 'management' echo the concerns of Chiang Pei-heng and Juan Jose Consejo, noted
in the previous chapter, that NGOs could be assimilated into a 'technocratic world administration run
by a coalition of technocrats and experts'.5° The disappearance of the more radical critiques which
were considered earlier suggests that some were prepared to take a pragmatic stance on UNCED
follow-up (Greenpeace International) while others had ceased to play an active role in these
deliberations (ELCI).
There was therefore a core of NGOs closely involved with UN follow-up to UNCED. They bad
become familiar with the issues to be addressed through participation in the UNCED PrepComs and
had developed working relationships with the UN Secretariat and officials in government delegations
They had broadly accepted Agenda 21, including its representation of the role and composition of civ
society, as a legitimate set of objectives to be pursued subsequently. They had also put considerable
time and effort into broadening awareness and interest in the creation of the CSD, and had a clear
interest in maximising NCiOs' roles in the new body.
At the same time, a more diffuse group of NGO activists and commentators found sufficient evidence
in the post-UNCED debate for increasing cynicism and hostility towards the whole process. For
example, Chaueijee and Finger assert that 'the UNCED process has divided, co-opted, and weakened
the green movement'.5 ' They conclude that NGOs have lent legitimacy to a programme designed to
allow the continuation of destructive industrial development. Others were dubious about the proposed
institutional anangements, claiming that ECOSOC was a moribund organisation, and that placing the
'49 Use'fthe1m NGO' in this psrs.gi.b tthe&inctlánàiwii lajostaml ittThown b it NODs
and most notably in considcrstion ofanngernents for participation in the work of ECOSOC, the term 'NGO' is used in accordance with established UN
practice to denote all non-governmental actors.
50 Chiang Pei-hcng Non-governmental Osranizas'ions at the United Nations: 7denti Role and Function Praeger Publishers New York USA 1981 p.246.
SI Chattetjee, Pratap and Matthias Finger, Crosscun'ents vol.2 No.2 May 1992. Available on Earth Swumil: The NGOArc/siyes, op. cit.
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CSD as a subsidiary to ECOSOC would leave it with little power or influence. 52 And, as noted above,
a third group of NOOs saw the potential for a shift in the balance of NGOs in a formal relationship
with ECOSOC as problematic, given that this might undemiine their own position and privileges. As
the CSD's programme of work would not allow a detailed consideration of issues of sustainable
development until its 1994 session, these divisions over questions of process assumed greater
importance than might otherwise have been the case and may have suggested to a wider audience that
a strengthened role for NGOs in UNCED follow-up would prove more problematic than anticipated.
4.3.1 UNCED arrangements for NGO accreditation
The terms for NGO accreditation to UNCED have particular significance given that they are cited in
Agenda 21 as the starting point for involvement of new organisations in the work of the CSD. In his
role as Secretary General of the Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972,
Maurice Strong had secured agreement that not only the ECOSOC NGOs, but also 'other NGOs of
genuinely international character' should be able to participate, so long as they were 'directly
concerned with the subject matter of the Conference'. Twenty years later, as Secretary General for
UNCED, Strong was able to steer the Conference decisions towards a forceful statement that the
principles of supporting NGO involvement developed in the Rio process should be incorporated into
the working arrangements for the UN as a whole. In his final speech at UNCED, he stated:
We must also expand the participatory process that has meant so much to us here - participation
of people through non-governmental organisations in the implementation of Agenda 21, and
indeed in the United Nations itself: I believe we need to review entirely the system of
arrangements within the United Nations for greater participation of these organisations.TM
The clearest example in Agenda 21 of this expansion is the call for the General Assembly to 'examine
ways of enhancing the involvement of non-governmental organizations within the United Nations
system in relation to the follow-up process of the Conference'. 55 There is a close correlation between
this and the UN Secretary General's subsequent recommendation that ECOSOC review arrangements
for NGO accreditation which had remained unchanged since 1968: 'It now seems time to update these
*-1S.JtJ -JL W1*JIPIIfl*triuj.
53 A/CONF.481PC.I 1,30 July 1971. Quoted in Willetts, Peter 'Consultaiive Status for NGOs it the United Nation? in Willetts. Petered. "The Conscience
a/the World": The Influence oJNon-Gowi'nmental Otga,sisalions ha the UN System pp. 31-62, Hurst & Co. London 1996 p.54.
54 AICONF.1 51126 'Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development' voUV, para.74, 28 September1992.
55 Agenda 2138.44, The Regency Press London 1992.
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arrangements in the light of relevant experience gained within the United Nations in the course of last
25 years, in particular through the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and
its preparatory process'.56 It should also be noted that, where Strong implies and Agenda 21 states57
that this move to greater participation should apply to the UN as a whole, Boutros Ghali's
recommendation limits considerations strictly to the UN Economic and Social Council.
Attempts to extend the number and range of NOOs in a formal relation with ECOSOC in this way
were not universally welcomed. The Gil position at the outset of the UN General Assembly's
consideration of UNCED follow-up was that ECOSOC procedures should be applied to the work of
the CSD. Wrangles over the pre-eminence of one precedent over the other continued throughout the
meetings dealing with organisational arrangements for the CSD and on into the review of ECOSOC
accreditation procedures which eventually concluded its work in 1996. This discontent with the
application of UNCED precedents to the regular work of ECOSOC was also expressed by a number
ofNGOs, particularly those which had an established relationship with the UN which could be
destabilised or undermined by such change.
4.3.2 Organisational Sessions
4.3.2.1 47th UN General Assembly
hi November and December 1992 the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly considered
institutional arrangements for follow-up to the Rio Summit As noted previously, despite opposition
from the UK and others during PrepComs for the Summit, it had been agreed at the Fourth and final
PrepCom the previous April that a new UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) would
be created and that the new body should be a functional commission of the UN Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). At its 47th Session, the General Assembly decided that the CSD's secretariat
services should be provided by the newly created Department for Policy Co-ordination and
Sustainable Development.58 The GA also addressed many of the practical modalities for the
56 E/1993/12 'Rui of procedwe of the Conanission on Sustainable Development, Report of the UN Seczetaty-Genaal' para.22, ianuaiy29, 1993.
iTh	 eeldc	 u*ndafl i1pwtdi
fonims' to engage NGOs and maj Groups organisalions in the review of Agenda 21 and to take into account the results of the proposed reviews of NGO
participation in their future odc. Agenda 2!
	 cat pam. 38.43.
58 A/RES/47/191 	 Amngements to follow up the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development' pam 2,29 Januanj 1993
(based on the report of the second Committee (A/471719)J.
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operations of the CSD and its relations with other parts of the UN system which had not been
specified in the UNCED process.
The General Assembly confirmed that the Commission would function as a subsidiary body of
ECOSOC, and as with other similar bodies, recommendations to the General Assembly would be
submitted initially to ECOSOC. Finally, the General Assembly endorsed the Secretary General's
creation of a High-Level Advisory Board on Sustainable Development, made up of2l experts from
around the world, and the UN Administrative Committee on Co-ordination's decision to put in place a
subsidiary Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD).59
NGO access to the GA during its deliberations was more extensive than usually possible. An inter-
governmental Ad Hoc Working Group on UNCED Follow-up was established to address institutional
arrangements for the UN after the Rio Summit A UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service briefing
states that 'NGOs were able to attend not only its formal but also its informal, off-the-record
negotiating sessions. Such "informals", within which negotiations on resolutions are carried out, are
usually closeL Inside the Working Group on UNCED, however, the "spirit of UNCED" with regard
to NGO access to the process was maintained.' 60 A group of NGOs based in New York created an
'Interim Networking Group of NGOs to Monitor Establishment of the Commission on Sustainable
Development', which was co-ordinated by the Women's Environment and Development
Organization.6 ' This was an early attempt at seif-organisation and raised many of the issues
subsequently addressed by the CSD NGO Steering Committee, which was created during the 1994
CSD Session.
4.3.2.2 NGO activity in UN follow-up to UNCED
Much that was agreed by governments at the 47th GA on UNCED follow-up was seen as overly
cautious by NGO commentators. Put in general terms, the position of many such observers was that if
the Rio Summit had succeeded in involving organisations of civil society in UN work oii issues of
59 Nine agencies and ptugrammesofthe UN aze axe manbas of the L&CSI) (UNP, UN!)?. FAQ, the World Ban1 ILO, IAEA, WMO. UNESCO and
HO))thiiclea and UNbodl eabeIoaaid Iqv.i1&tiv	 Dmoiige I'.aabh.hod mOcSthai992byihsAi!zsIpU4t
Committee on Coordination (ACC) as a resuh of the recommendation of UNCED and meets twice a
60 UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service 'NGOs at the 47th United Nations General Asscmbly' E& I) File vol.11 No.2. NGLS Geneva February 1993 p.3.
61 Women's Environment and Development Organintion 'Creation of an Interim Networking Group of NGOs to Monitor Establishment of the
Commission on Sustainable Development' WEDO New York 1992. Reproduced in Appendix 6.
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sustainable development and creating the context in which broad commitment to action could be
fostered, this had been possible to a large extent because the conference jiad taken shape outside the
restrictive bureaucracy which oversees the regular work of the UN. Writing shortly after the Summit,
Kathryn G Sessions contrasted the accreditation procedures for UNCED with those for ECOSOC and
concluded that the former were more conducive to the involvement of a broad range of organisations:
ECOSOC's procedures are more rigorous and tend to favor the largest and most established
international NGOs, whereas UNCED procedures tended to be more liberally applied and were
more inclusive of national and smaller NGOs.62
Many NGO commentators also emphasised that the overarching claims laid by Agenda 21 to issue
areas which were the principal responsibility of existing agencies and programmes of the UN could be
expected to lead to turf wars, if serious efforts were made to translate the rhetoric into institutional
change. The body charged with promoting these new priorities would be much less effective if it were
merely a cog in the machine it was supposed to be altering particularly given ECOSOC's reputation
as an ineffective body. Still other concerns were expressed at the proposed location of the Secretariat
in the DPCSD, which was seen as offering insufficient independence and access to the Secretary
General, heads of programmes and agencies, and other influential figures in the UN system.
Underlying these viewpoints was a common assumption that the CSD represented a significant
opportunity for furthering international consensus and action on the UNCED agreements and that the
institutional arrangements for the Commission would have a critical impact on its effectiveness and,
by extension, on the chances for progress on the Rio agenda as a whole. The procedural matters under
consideration would test the commitment of governments to the overarching importance of
sustainable development in the work of all international institutions in future.63
A further supposition shared by many non-governmental analysts was that the involvement of non-
governmental organisations had been a vital element in securing whatever progress could be attributed
to UNCED and that continued flexibility and openness for participation of the major groups of civil
62 Sessions, Kathryn 0. 'Institutionalizing the Earth Summit', op.cPt. Whether this is borne out by the actual tcnns of the ECOSOC Resolution 1296
(XUV) of23 May1948 and Decisions 1/1 and 2/1 of thç Prq,arac.y Conimittee fçr the UNCED is open to question. The very resbictive provisions of
Wthablingdóeofleaioolrofthohbe,1l 	 loupoeddUNCu*uIflLIJruiurl1jaJE
63 ClifCurtis of Gróenpeace ?ntematona1 wrc*e an open letter to 175 governments' Permanent Representaiives in New York, (October1992). op. cit. He
advocated that the Secretariat should be in an independent unit reporting directly to the SecretatyGerieral, and not in the Department of Economic and
Social Development (DESD) [suggested home for the CSD secretariat prior to creation of the Department for Policy Co-onilnation and Sustainable
Development], as 'such placement would hinder the Commission's review and monitoring functions of that Department'. Reprinted in Appendix 4.
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society, as defined in Agenda 21, would be equally necessary if the CSD were to play a constructive
role in future." A number of those most closely involved in the negotiations at PrepCom N leading to
agreement that the Commission should be established claim that the role of NGOs in cementing
consensus on creation of the CSD was highly significant. For those who believed they had helped in
its creation, the desire to influence these arrangements and to play a continuing role in its work was
particularly strong.65 The expansion of access for NGOs to decision-making processes within the UN
can be understood as a key element in legitimising the role such non-governmental actors played in
initiating the Commission. If it were seen as a strong advocate for non-governmental participation and
influence, its creation would subsequently be understood as one of the most significant outcomes from
the Rio Sununit. Thus Bill Pace of the Center for the Development of International Law, who had
been a leading NGO proponent of the CSD four months earlier, wrote in August 1992:
For many NGOs and govermnents, one of the main reasons they supported the creation of a new
functional commission is because of the participation Tights and roles of NGOs and their
effectiveness in other UN commissions, such as the Commission on Human Rights. Perhaps no
other issue is more important than whether governments and the UN honor the commitments
and mandates in Agenda 21, especially in Chapter 38, that call for an enhanced role for NGOs
in the UN system and in future international decision-making fora.
However, a distinct current of concern had been raised throughout preparations for the Rio Summit
and afterwards by NGO activists who believed that environmental NGOs and others had effectively
been hoodwinked by a collaboration between business and governments and had lent credibility to.the
agenda agreed by these two groupings. Caroline Thomas, writing in the post-UNCED edition of
Environmental Politics, concludes that the Summit was 'unequivocally an interstate event which
reached agreements principally in the interests of states':
Furthermore, other actors with entrenched interests and enormous power failed even to engage
in a constructive debate about the fundamental causes of the crisis and possible solutions. The
hierarchy of the Catholic Church would not entertain the demographic debate, and the Pope bad
a huge influence on limiting the agenda. Transnational corporations argued successfully for self-
64 F camplc, one obse,ver wrote in Sq1anb 1992 that 'At least one delegation at UNCED cited NGO effoils as a major factor in gaining the suppoit
of their government for the CSD. The extent and chazacterofNGO involvanent at national and international levels is likely to be a aitical element in
building the political .vll and public dcmand needed for an effective Commission on Sustainable Development.' Sessions, Kathl)'n G 'histitutionalizing the
66 Pace, Bill 'Commission on Sustainable Development' infonnation note. Center for the Development of International Iaw. August 1992. ki the same
piece, Bifl Pace wmte that '[project-wodc lelating to the establishment of the CSD undetiaken by his organisation) is inextricably linked to questions about
the enhanced role ofcitis and NGOs in the post-Cold War, post-Eaiih Summit United Nations, and to veorganization of the Secitariat and proposed
substantial tefoons of the United Nations systent'
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regulation, and had powerful allies in the richest states. Even the NGO community has, to an
important extent, been co-opted into the mainstream debate. While this may make for more
comfortable relations with the JMF, World Bank, and rich governments, and hence lend
respectability and the appearance of being taken seriously, it is questionable whether it will
achieve much for the disempowered or the environment. The total failure of UNCED to address
fundamental causes of the crisis removed any possibility of meaningful effort to address the
sustainability problem.67
Another growing division among NGOs working on institutional follow-up to UNCED was over the
ramifications of the undertaking in chapter 38 of Agenda 21 to allow all NGOs accredited to the Rio
Summit to have the right to attend annual meetings of the Commission on Sustainable
Development.68 The debate on how this should be interpreted can broadly be characterised as follows.
Some 1400 NGOs had been given UNCED accreditation, a total which exceeded the number with
participatoiy rights at ECOSOC sessions in 1992. The debate initiated by the GA and carried on in
ECOSOC meetings increasingly focused on the logistical problems which a large increase in NGO
numbers would cause. As a result, proposals which would restrict the rights of NGOs participating in
CSD sessions in comparison with other functional ECOSOC Commissions were put forward. The
circulation of any document prepared by an NGO to delegations, which in other ECOSOC contexts
would be carried out by the UN (and such written statements registered as official UN documents)
would be the responsibility of that NGO. In addition, the CSD would have the right to require NGOs
to address the CSD through designated spokespersons. In other sessions, NGOs in consultative status
with ECOSOC had a right to spealc69
These proposals provoked a strong response from a number of organisations which felt that their
established tights, as set out in the ECOSOC Rules of Procedure7° were being undermined. Existing
antipathy between some members of the Conference of Non-Governmental Organisations in
Relationship with the United Nations (CONGO) and the so-called 'UNCED NGOs' was further
exacerbated. For the former, a large influx of organisations onto the ECOSOC roster threatened to
weaken their position as the focus for interaction between governments and non-governmental actors.
67 Thomas, Caroline 'Beymd UNCE!>. An Intiiductj(m' in Thomss, Caroline ad. Rio: Unravelling the Consequences ppJ-27, FtankCass, flfonl UK. .
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68 Agenda 21 para.38.44, op. oil.
695cc Willetts, Peter From 'Consuhative Anangements" to 'Panncrship': The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN' Global GoirMzance
no.6 pp.191-212. 2000 fora mote detailed analysis ofthesc issucs.
70 E/5715/Revl 'Ruics of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council' July 1992.
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For the latter, the potential for a major expansion in the number of NGOs accredited to ECOSOC was
being jeopardised because of the self-serving attitude of established organisations.
The possibility that wider relations between the UN and NGOs might be affected by UNCED was
given greater credence by the association drawn between non-governmental involvement in the
preparations and at Rio and the call for a review of existing ECOSOC arrangements for involving
NOOs in its work.7 ' The World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA), an active
member of CONGO, made the following statement to the initial meeting of the UN Committee on
NGOs, convened to address wider changes to accreditation procedures in ECOSOC:
Changes to rule 76 [of the ECOSOC Rules of Procedure] have the effect of removing
participatoiy rights and privileges acquired by categozy I and category II non-governmental
organizations. This too does not appear to WFUNA to be necessary in the circumstances. It is
perhaps true that adding all the non-governmental organizations that participated in the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development to the Roster would create pressures on
available space and services that are not easily accommodated. However, the answer of treating
the representatives of all non-governmental organizations equally and thus lowering the rights
and privileges already acquired does not seem to accord with established concepts of fairness.72
In other words, the introduction of a large number of NGOs to the ECOSOC Roster should not be
used to justify diminution of the rights of established organisations. WFUNA's proposed compromise
would have accorded the new organisations an insecure position —when space permitted, their role
would be equivalent to that of existing Category land II NGOs; when greater demands were placed on
the Secretariat (and therefore when the event in question was ofparticular interest to a large number of
NOOs), priority would be given to those with previous accreditation.
Many UNCED NGOs were aware of this potential for conflict and sought to defuse it through calls for
the rights of Category I and II organisations to be applied to the CSD as well. A group of 25 NGO
representatives from around the world who had collaborated as the Working Group for Institutional
Change during UNCED PrepComs met in The Hague in November 1992 to prepare recommendations
on the CSD. Among these was that
•	 1lbc Scaetazy Genail ilso bieves that it vuld be açcçriate fir the Council to wxlatake apnal review of the qvaall anangements for
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There should be an open and inclusive policy regarding NGO participation in the new
Commission by fully applying the existing ECOSOC rules for the participation of NGOs in
consultative status with the ECOSOC and arranging for the equal participation of NGOs
accredited at UNCED and that the procedure used to accredit the UNCED NGOs should be
used to accredit NGOs who apply to participate in the CSD in the future.73
Even so, divisions between different groupings are clear and would continue to surface in the
deliberations of the ECOSOC Open-Ended Working Group on NGO Accreditation, the work of
which is considered later in this chapter.
4.3.2.3 ECOSOC Organisational Session
The ECOSOC organisational session had been scheduled to last from 2-5 February 1993 but in the
event took a full two weeks (2-13 Febniaiy). The principal reason for this extension was that the
European Commission was keen to see arrangements for participation of the European Community
(EC) which bad been introduced at UNCED applied to the work of the CSD. This was resisted by
most other countries, as it would give an inter-governmental body rights similar to those of states and
a permanent place on the CSD. Lengthy negotiations and informal consultations took place before a
temporaiy compromise was reached which would allow other regional organisations to be granted an
equivalent status to the extent that they had 'attained a similar level of competence' to the EC. This
was still not acceptable to aU countries, and a final decision was deferred to a resumed ECOSOC
session in late April.
Despite the difficulties caused by negotiations on the status of the EC in the CSD, decisions were
taken on the establishment and organisation of the Commission, and an undertaking was made to
conduct a review of current arrangements for consultations with NGOs. The decisions included
agreement on rules of procedure for the CSD as a functional commission of ECOSOC, including
supplementary arrangements regarding the participation of specialised agencies, inter-governmental
organisations and NGOsY4 The principal agreements regarding these issues were concluded on 12
Febmary ECOSOC Decisions E11993t207 on 'Establishment of the Commission on Sustainable
72 E.2/l9931NGO/l 'Statanient submitted by the World Federation of United Nations Associations to the mocling of the Conu-nittee on NGOs' para6,
lOM49Q3.*-,u--iiuju -----j_ ir ij - 11. I	 "WT	 1 ss. -sit %* u73 'Recommendations of the Wotiting Group on Institutional Change on the UN Comission on Sustainable Development', ep. dt p.24.it is perhaps an
example of poor drafting that this recommendation advocates separate procedures for NOOs apping to participate in CSD sessions li-urn those used in the
ist of ECOSOC, but the purpose would snan to have been to identif common ground with Categosy land II NGOs.
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Development' and E/1993/215 on 'Participation of and consultation with specialized agencies and
participation of other inter-governmental organizations' drew largely on the Secretaty General's report
on 'Rules of Procedure for the CSD' (E11993/14), which was itself based on the General Assembly
resolution on 'Institutional Arrangements to follow up the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development' (A/47/191).
Decision E11993/215 was to cause considerable problems. Under its terms, NGOs which had been
accredited to the Preparatory Committee for UNCED (some 1 400 organisations) would be able to
apply for and be granted ECOSOC accreditation. These provisions conflicted with the existing
ECOSOC rules of procedure in removing rights to circulate documents and address Commission
sessions, so the decision states that, solely for the purposes of the CSD, the new provisions it sets out
should 'supplement' rules 75 and 76 of the ECOSOC rules of procedure. Thus ECOSOC bad
instigated arrangements solely for the CSD by which the accreditation Tights for NGOs were
extensive, but the participation rights, including those for NGOs with Category I and II status, were
actually more restrictive than in any other ECOSOC body. It should be pointed out first that the
Decision did little more than to accept the recommendations put forward by the Secretary General and
the General Assembly. It would seem reasonable to assume that during an organisational session
unexpectedly prolonged to two weeks, from the three days originally envisaged, delegates may have
been hard pressed to resolve outstanding matters quickly. The provisions for this decision had been
considered in some detail by the General Assembly a few months earlier (as noted above), and the UN
Secretariat had put forward further options with a strong steer towards the key elements found in
Ff19931215.
A further factor which may have persuaded government delegates to rely on prior decisions and
proposals was that the views of NGOs following this ECOSOC session were contradictory and often
conflicting. A number of delegations with a particular commitment to strengthening NGO
involvement would have been aware that the number of NGOs and the extent of geographical
distribution had been much higher during the deliberations of the General Assembly and may have
given greater credence to the outcomes from that session as a result. In addition, countries of the
• Jt jt- u-	-
European Community may very.well have been too preoccT ' th the complonegoang
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the role of the European Commission in the work of the CSD to focus on the procedures for NGO
involvement.
Some NGO lobbyists present during the Session suggested darkly that an unholy trade off might have
been mooted, whereby the EC countries would agree to refrain from pushing for the application of
UNCED procedures to the accreditation of new NGOs or for newly accredited organisations to have
access to all working sessions of ECOSOC and thereby strengthen support for recognition of the
European Commission's status.75 There is little evidence to support such conspiracies. Even so, it
does seem plausible that the highly charged debate over the status of the EC may have entrenched
positions on other organisational matters and made constructive debate unlikely. The uneasy
compromise that the EC's negotiating status should apply only to the work of the CSD may have
made it difficult subsequently to revert to establishing procedural arrangements for NGO participation
to apply to ECOSOC as a whole.
Whatever the factors affecting the context in which the resolution was considered clearly ECOSOC
had agreed an 'ambiguous, poorly-drafted Decision'. 76 Where Agenda 21 had called for 'an expanded
role for non-governmental organisations, including those related to major groups, with accreditation
based on the procedures used in the Conference', and the General Assembly advocated the
'mteglBton of environment and development issues' in 'the United Nations institutional system
arrangements', ECOSOC bad made this expansion and integration less likely by putting in place
arrangements which applied solely to the CSD.
A number of other significant factors should be acknowledged in assessing the arrangements made by
ECOCOC for NGO involvement in the work of the CSD:
Sustainable Development', I Mareb 1993.
75 See firccarnple 'A repast of the mtgtwassnental negotiations concerning the niles ofpcocedwes of the [CSDJ during thea anisational session of
[ECOSOC]', Netherlands National Conanittee for JUCN, 24 Febniay 1993. This states that the G77 issued an infoumal discussion paperon NGO
accreditation the day before the scheduled close of the session. This paper preposed removal of a number of points put forward by the Secretary General:
'[n)ot only were UNCED NGOs deprived of a special status, but there was also no reference to the rules of pn,cedure of UNCED, although this was
explicitly required by the General Assembly iolution.' The repast outhnes NGO conon that countries of the EC might be willing to compromise 'The
position of Denmark [then holding the Presidency of the E and the EC was focused on the special status for involvement and participation of the EC. In
the corndors lipservice was paid to the importance of NGO participation. The feeling among NGO observers was. however, that ifa choice were to be made,
theEC delegations vould opt for EC status to the detjiment of NGO involvement'. This issue was also thought to affect the position of the US (concerned
th ijqpeg_______
option for them). 'Only the Canadian delegation was strdightforwanlly and openly in favour ofNGO participation m the &bates'.
76 Willcus, Peter Consultativc Status for NGOs at the United Nations' op. cit. p.56.
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• Agenda 21 language on the 'major groups of civil society' posed considerable problems in
attempts to draw up procedures for NGO participation which complied with the broad
framework of ECOSOC procedures. The Secretary General called on the CSD to 'provide
for non-governmental organizations, including those related to major groups, as well as
industry and the scientific and business communities, to participate effectively in its work
and contribute within their areas of competence to its deliberations'. 79 No reference is made
to major groups, or to any broader conception of organisations of civil society in the agreed
procedural arrangements for the CSD.
• Decision E11993/215 requests the CSD to encourage an 'equitable representation' of NGOs
from developed and developing countries, in line with text agreed in many other contexts.
The same paragraph also calls for 'a fair balance between non-governmental organizations
with an environment focus and those with a development focus'. The suggestion that these
two analogous areas exist in which an equilibrium of sorts among NGOs is desirable derives
from political battles about the agenda for UNCED.8° It is interesting to note that the point
has been added to suggestions in the texts agreed by the General Assembly and put forward
by the Secretaiy General.
• The ECOSOC Decision develops the Secretaiy General's points regarding the desirability of
seif-organisation among NGOs, to include creation of constituencies and interest groups, as
well as networks for the exchange of information and documentation. 8 ' it is unclear what
significance this exhortation has in a text dealing otherwise with procedural arrangements
for inter-governmental meetings. The origin of these suggestions lay in concern that the
influx of a large number of NGOs might place severe strain on the resources at the disposal
of the UN, and in their original context could be read as suggestions for ways in which
77 Agenda 21 pars, 38.44, op. cii. The conclusion to the paragraph states that 'The General Assembly, at an early stage, should examine ways of enhancing
the involvement of non-governmental o
	
ations within the United Nations system in telation to the follow-Op ptoss of the nfctuce' a
reconuiiendation wtiich presaged the Review of ECOSOC Accreditation Procedures subsequently initiated by the Secretary GeneraL
78 Preambleto Res. A/47/191, op. cit.
79 E/I 993/12 'Rules of proccdw'e of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Repoit of the SecMaty-GenerI' para.2, op. cit
80 Ff19931215 (I,), op. cii. This language is taken from Decision 1/1 (pam 3) of the UNCED Preparatory Committee First Session. UN dcc. A/45/46, 25
-.fiji	 *uJ1irit r	 ii
SI ECOSOC 'Invites non-governmental organiiations, with a view to enhancing their effective and coonlinated contribution to the work of the Commission
and to the follow-up of the United Nations Confaence on Environment and Development in general, to oonsidor or to continue organizing thcmselvcs in
various constituencies and interest groups as well as setting up non-governmental networks, including electronic networks, for exchange of relevant
information and documentation' Ff19931215 (4 ibid.
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particular difficulties might be resolved. However, when read as part of a more rigorous set
of decisions on procedure the text implies that restrictions on 1400 access may be necessaiy
if these recommendations are not acted upon.
As noted earlier, existing rights for established NGOs in categories I and II are curtailed in the context
of the CSD. The right to circulate documents as official texts and for the UN to meet the costs for this
distribution will not apply.
4.3.2.4 CSD Organisalional Session
The CSD organisational session took place from 24-26 February 1993. The 53 members of the
Commission82 elected Ambassador Razali Ismail of Malaysia as Chair of the CSD. A four-person
Bureau was chosen to serve with the Chair. The organisational session also agreed a provisional
agenda for the first session of the CSD, which was to deal principally with the organisation of future
annual meetings. The principle of grouping chapters of Agenda 21 into clusters of issues as the basis
for the yearly programme of work of the CSD was also accepted.
hi addition, a number of decisions on future work of the Commission were agreed. 83
 These covered
issues such as the right of the Commission to establish informal negotiating groups and ways in which
it would consider contributions from entities outside the UN system, including NGOs. Further
informal consultations on the work of the CSD were called for— these took place in late March and
were chaired by CSD Vice-Chair Hamadi Khouini of Tunisia.
4.3.2.5 Subsequent steps taken by the ECOSOC Secretariat
A letter dated 3 March 1993 was sent by the NGO Unit in the ECOSOC Secretariat to all the NGOs
accredited to UNCED which did not hold ECOSOC accreditation. 84 They were given until iS April to
respond to this invitation. The letter departed from Decision E11993/215 in inviting applications for
accreditation from NOOs which had not been involved with UNCED at all. They were required to
submit information to establish the status and credibility of the organisation (accounts, annual reports,
..L1WPlPI LJ4I*I NLU_
	 S * à4	
-U.$w	 *iJpj1% VUWt
82 Election of 53 countries to save on the Commission f* penods of one to thiu years took place on 16 February 1993.
83 The focus f these discussions was Secraty General paper Ff1993/14. op. cit.
84 A copy of this letter is ipcoducul in P WiIIetts ad. "The Conscience ofthe World" op. cit p.308.
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constitution and so on) for consideration at a resumed session of ECOSOC to be held before the
inaugural session of the Commission on Sustainable Development.
Of particular significance here is that the Secretariat took the initiative in rectifying a practical
shortcoming in the original decision. As noted earlier, a number of non-governmental organisations
had been created in the period immediately preceding and following the Rio Summit. Many of these
had taken as their remit to promote awareness and action in specific countries or regions, or within
particular sectors, on the issues brought to global attention through the UNCED process. 85 For
advocates of strengthened NGO involvement in the UN institutions dealing with follow-up to Rio it
would be regrettable if these new enthies were not given the chance to participate in the work of
ECOSOC on an equal footing with more long-standing organisations. The evidence suggests that the
Secretariat took the opportunity to create an opening for a short period through which these newly
created organisations would be able to enter a formal relationship with ECOSOC, and thereby sidestep
the much more protracted process for accreditation which they would otherwise have bad to go
througiL	 -
The letter from the ECOSOC NGO Unit was sent to all NGOs which had held accreditation for the
Preparatozy Committee for UNCED. Its contents were clearly of wider relevance, and a number of
NGOs and other bodies took it upon themselves to disseminate this information to those who might be
interested in applying for ECOSOC Roster Status to attend CSD meetings. 'Action alerts' were sent
out which stressed the importance of the issue, and the need for a quick response. The Netherlands
Committee for IUCN, for instance, disseminated the information in a circular letter to 'participants of
the ANPED [Alliance of Northern Peoples for Environment and Development] Working Group on
follow-up to UNCED'. They wrote:
Please realize that if you fail to reach their deadline you will lose your accreditation, and you
might have to go through a long and bureaucratic procedure if you ever want to attend a CSD
meeting at a later stage. Moreover, if the great majority of NOOs accredited for UNCED applies
for reaccreditation, governments will have to make a rapid decision about a long list and they
will have less opportunity to veto the reaccreditation of their national NGOs. So even if you are
not planning to attend the coming meeting of the CSD we urge you to fill out the enclosed form,
*JtUN IUU Ii I!SI	 *11	 r**r-IJ-- ITULt)
85 That IJNCED Secretary General Maurice Stnmg was head of the newly-created la,th Council (refed to in Agenda 2! para38.45. op. ciL) which
cleaily met this description may pethaps be of some relevance.
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both out of solidarity with NGOs which might face a political veto from their own govermnents,
arid to avoid long bureaucratic procedures for your own organization later on.86
The following is a breakdown of organisations which took up the invitation of the ECOSOC
Secretariat.
•Table 4.2 Non-governmental oranisations applying for Roster Status for
meetings of the CSD by region:
Region or	 NGOs with	 NGOs with no	 Total
Country	 previous UNCED	 previous
	
accreditation	 UNCED accreditation
USA	 115	 27	 142
Western Europe	 76	 16	 92
LatinAmerica	 75	 7	 82
SouthAsia	 73	 3	 76
Africa	 57	 5	 62
EastAsia	 33	 5	 38
Canada	 23	 3	 26
PacifIc	 15	 1	 16
Caribbean	 4	 2	 6
Eastern Europe	 4	 2	 6
Middle East	 4	 0	 4
Total	 479	 71	 550
The geographical distribution among these organisations is still vely uneven. Only six organisations
fixm the former communist countries of East and Central Europe and four from the countries of the
Middle East applied for ECOSOC status - extremely low figures given the populations in these
regions. Conversely, there are a disproportionately high number applying from the industrialised
regions, particularly the United States. Even so, given the increase in the overall number of
organisatioris in a formal relationship with ECOSOC that these newcomers represented, their impact
on the geographical range of all the NGOs accredited to ECOSOC is significant.
It should also be noted that the proportion of organisations with no previous UN accreditation from
the US, Canada, Western Europe and Australia is extremely high (66 per cent of the total). This
'..4JJn lT*..1Sj.jp
 __ S1LLW jJiiij.pj.r
86 Letter to participants of the ANPED Working Group on followup to UNCED, Nethalands Committee RwIUCN Amstcniam, 17 March 1993.
87 Information from E/I 993/65 'Repmsenlalion of and consultation with non..govemmental organizations in the Commission on Sustainable
Development'. 26 May 1993. [The total number of organisations applying for roster status wbich had previously been accredited to UNCED is wrongly
given as 481 in FJ1993165J.
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suggests that sharing of information among these NCiOs was more effective than in other regions and
that more Northern organisations acted in the opportunistic fashion suggested by the Netherlands
Committee for IUCN above. If the intention of ECOSOC had been to draw in organisations from
around the world which had been unable to attend the Rio Summit but which wished to play a role in
the follow-up the results must have been somewhat disappointing, at least in comparison to the figures
for organisations which had UNCED accreditation.
The table below is a breakdown of broad categories of organisations applying for accreditation. The
information derives principally from their names and from the brief description attached to those
seeldng accreditation for the first time. In some cases organisations have been entered under two
categories, when their area of interest clearly applies to both; 88 organisations whose name did not
reveal enough information on which to reach a conclusion are listed under 'not clear'.
U%PS1S1L	 nt. J p'uji	 .
..	 ø*-
88 17 organisations have been listed under tvo categofles: for instance, the Arab Office ol Youth and Eny ,nmeifl and the Uganda Women I r Planung
Movement.
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Total
42
132
35
27
13
31
20
20
8
14
8
19
25
16
7
14
15
16
32
14
25
11
23
567
sTable 4.3 Breakdown of NGOs by category and country of headquarters:89
Academic
Environment
Development
Sustainable development
Media /Information
Rural Issues
Youth & students
Industry
Professional associations
Regional development
Education
Religious organisatlons
International co-operation
Women
Indigenous peoples
Peace groups
Legal Issues
Local campaigns
Social Justice
Foundations
Energy! technology
Marine Issues
Not clear
Total
Industrialised
countries90
20
58
13
12
10
6
6
16
6
2
6
15
25
7
5
12
13
3
12
8
18
10
4
287
Developing
countries9'
22
72.
21
13
3
25
13
4
2
12
2
4
0
9
2
2
2
13
20
6
7
I
19
274
Economies in
transition92
0
2
I
2
0
0
I
0
0
•0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
These figures give an inexact representation of the nature of organisations applying for accreditation.
By relying on the name of the organisation alone in most cases it has been necessaiy to make
assumptions about the work each undertakes which may not be accurate. By using the headquarters of
the organisation as the determinant of the location of its work there may be an inadequate
89 The 23 categories listed below are intended to cover the pnncipal grnupings oforganisations applying lbr ECOSOC accreditation. Some overlap between
these is inc itable. but each was considen.d to npnsent a distinct Pe x'cti.e. This categoiisation conflates identification by the issues the NGOs
concerned thcus on with identification by the constituency they represent. This leads to some pcobleins of detinition, tiut is perhaps consistent with the ways
Tii whlct( s deth* ,xd1&	 frdvs.11e ,o.cafled 'UNCfl)NGOs' and ne*lpplicinta p1#Jd togeth an	 qOrIIl:
placed in the same catcgoty on The newly.crestcd CSD Roster.
90 Western Eumpe, North America, Australia and New Zealand.
91 Allies. Asia, Iatin America and the Caribbean.
92 Countries of the fotmer Soviet bloc.
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representation of those with operations in mare than one region. 93 Even so, credence must be placed
on the names given as an indication of organisations' areas of interest and expertise as these are their
single most accessible manifestation to others around the world interested in issues of sustainable
development. The location of organisations' headquarters also has significance - for most bodies, this
will be the base for the most senior staff and the place where key organisational and policy decisions
are taken.
Despite possible reservations over the accuracy of this breakdown, it serves a number of useful
purposes. First, it shows clearly that the influx of NGOs onto the ECOSOC Roster was not
exclusively, or even principally, made up of bodies working on issues of environmental protection, as
some have suggested. Second, it demonstrates that the Rio Summit and its aftermath were
significant to very different groups in different parts of the world, which in turn suggests that the
broader societal concerns organisations from one region may be understood to represent or reflect are
not necessarily mirrored in other areas. Organisations addressing rural issues, regional development
and social justice are predominantly from Southern countries, while industry associations, religious
groups and bodies prkrifising international co-operation come mainly from the North. Finally, it
points up issues and groupings which were addressed in the UNCED process which are poorly
represented among those applying for accreditation. These conclusions should be explored further, as
they have a wider relevance to the role of NGOs in UN follow-up to Rio.
Notjust environment. There is a widely-held assumption among commentators, particularly in Europe
and North America, that UNCED was principally an environmental event The commonly used term
'the Earth Summit' perhaps helps to perpetuate this. Environmental organisations may be understood
to have used their influence to shape general perceptions of the scope and focus of the Rio Summit
Environment departments in many Northern governments played the lead role in co-ordinating and
presenting national positions in preparation for Rio, and in negotiating the agreements reached. Again,
this may have contributed to the ways in which the whole process has been understood. The statistics
for South Asia in particular indicate that this interpretation is not reflected by the interests of the
3	 ThofNc1iThan People CEnvItimi* and
headquarters in the Nchcrtand. Many similar examples èould be cited.
94 l'nneen and Finger. fur example titled their book on the UN('Et) process and its alemiath EmfromHe,ual NGOs in H'orldPolis'ks. They do note that
cultural diflbienccs distinguish NOOs' 11cm dillèrent pails of the wodd. and identify the colonial legacy and distinct 'organational cultuns' assignilicant
determinants of NGOs' psiorities and w of working.' Piinccn, Thomas and Matthias Finger En vimnnienial Politics Routledge. London 1994.
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NOOs wishing to continue their involvement with the UN after UNCED. Of 76 organisations seeking
ECOSOC accreditation, only 5 have a clear environmental focus (6.6 pef cent). This is half the
number addressing either social justice or rural development (13.2 per cent and 14.5 per cent
respectively). By contrast, 34 of the 82 South American organisations work predominantly on
environmental issues (41.5 per cent) while only a handful work on matters of social justice and rural
development (2.4 per cent and 3.7 per cent).
DjfJerent concerns in d9erent regions - In two of the groupings, over half the organisations are based
in the USA. US NGOs constitute 25.8 per cent of all those listed, but 11 of the 20 representing
industiy (55.0 per cent), and 14 of the 19 organisations with a clear religious affiliation (73.7 per cent).
South Asia has not one organisation in any of these two categories. The only other instance in which
over half the organisations are from one region is 'local campaigns', under which 9 of 16
organisations are from Latin America (56.2 per cent), which may perhaps reflect regional awareness
of; and ease of access to, the Summit.
Missing perspectives. Of the major groups identified in Agenda 21, it is striking that there are no trade
unions or other organised labour bodies. It may be that international organisations such as the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions or the process established in the work of the
International Labour Organisation are considered to be sufficient channels for the representation of
these perspectives by many. These formal means for presentation of distinct perspectives are also
evident among local government bodies, which are also unrepresented among those applying for
accreditation. Again, international associations such as the International Union of Local Authorities
(which has a long-standing formal relation with the UN system) and the International Council for
Local Environmental Initiatives may be seen to play this role effectively for the broader local
government community.
Of the other major groups identified in Agenda 21, women's groups and youth organisations are
present in reasonable numbers and with a fair geographical distribution. Farmers may have a voice in
some contexts through organisations focusing on rural development. Even so, these two perspectives
areot•necessarily iiflercbangeable
listed as addressing rural issues has a clear role in representing or articulating the views of farmers.
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It is also worth noting that there are no organisations from among some of the principal sectors not
included in the major groups categorisation: the disabled and older peopic are absent from the list.
In a brief statement issued at the end of May 1993, ECOSOC reported that:
At its 11Lh meeting, on 26 May 1993, the Council decided to accredit to the Commission on
Sustainable Development those non-governmental organizations listed in the note by the
Secretariat on the representation of and consultations with non-governmental organizations.95
4.3.3 First session of the Commission on Sustainable Development
By June 1993 a full year of debate over organisational issues had passed, during which time
protracted, if necessary, discussions had taken place over the institutional location of the CSD, its
remit, and its relations with other actors. Yet still more procedural issues were to be determined at the
inaugural CSD session, at which the new institution's work programme would be decided and the
requirements for reporting by governments and other key actors would be agreed.
Despite some frustration at the lack of substantive progress since UNCED (most notably the lack of
financial support from developed countries), the governmental participants at the CSD established a
number of important precedents. These fall into two general areas: domestic - international linkages;
and the advancement of notions of social partnership as the basis for achieving sustainable
development.
Domestic - international linkages. Unlike other functional commissions of ECOSOC, from the outset
the CSD attracted significant ministerial participation. At the first session 46 Government Ministers
attended, the majority from environmental departments.96 The CSD also established an optional
reporting procedure for countries, under which information on implementation of sections of Agenda
21 would be requested annually. The incorporation of the views and activities of 'major groups'
organisations in this process was encouraged. A number of states also initiated partnerships to further
co-operation on particular issues (for example, the UK and India agreed to collaborate on forest issues,
while the USA and Colombia pledged to work together on technology co-operation). All of these
ments can be understood as attempts to bring domestic policy and activity into the purview of
-.f	 pJ.lp.U.,t* *S* d
95 E/I 993fINI/2JAdd. I NonGove,nrnentaI Ot-,ntcatttns \ccn.'dtted to the ('ommission on Sustainable I)evdopmcifl'. 26 May 1993.
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the new global body and to explore formal and informal means by which collaboration could be
fostered.
Social partnership. In addition to the possibility of input to national reports to the CSD, 'major
groups' organisations were also encouraged to submit information directly to the CSD Secretariat. The
Commission also negotiated text on the Major Groups concept at its 1993 and 1994 sessions. 97
 NGOs
were not slow to take advantage of this openness - the majority of formal sessions were addressed by
one or two NGO delegates, and access to informal drafting groups was not called into question.
This also constituted the first opportunity for a large-scale meeting ofNGOs after UNCED, and thus
the first significant chance for the organisational principles advanced in the Alternative Treaties and
elsewhere to be addressed. In practice, little attention was devoted to appraisal of these agreements -
efforts at co-ordination focused principally on maximising access to the inter-governmental
negotiations.
In the period immediately following IJNCED extensive negotiations were necessary between
governments to clariir the arrangements for international follow-up to the Summit. This included
detailed consideration of access for non-governmental actors to the future work of the UN in this area,
and opened a more fir-reaching debate on the implications of sustainable development in international
diplomacy which has considerable significance for the study of international relations.
It is also important to note the genesis of a number of powerful myths emanating from NGOs'
participation in UNCED and from broader perceptions of the relevance of the process as a whole. The
terms under which NOOs participated in UNCED preparations were actually more restrictive than
those pertaining in regular sessions of ECOSOC, although this was seldom recognised by
commentators. A number, such as Kathryn Sessions, conflated the procedural arrangements with
practice which arose during the PrepComs, and propagated the idea that the terms agreed by
governments at PrepCom 1 for NGO involvement constituted an advance on previous textsY 8 In
addition, widespread impressions of the Summit as predominantly concerned with environmental
96 Sessions, KaUyn jpfl 	 IJ4 jjç	 1)gp	 UNA-USA. Wsthiiglm D.C. July1993. RqxuducaI it
Appddix'7	 *N	 ua)MXII 1F * fJf Ti $. J**4
97 Documents FJ1993/25/AddJ Rcp, f thcC mmksion on Sustainshtc Dcvekipnianón its First Session' 30 June 1993 aid E1VNJ719944J I
GeneniI Discussion on Pmss en the Imph,ncnbuun o(Adj 2). Iucu.sang on the Ca s-ssid Cumponcsiso(Agraids 2) aid the CWI EkmaiSs
ofSuslainability'. 25 May 1994.
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issues is not borne out by the documents agreed by governments or by NGOs and is not reflected in
the priorities of NGOs coming into a formal relationship with the UN as result of UNCED.
A final development to note is that, although NGO contributions to the ongoing debate on institutional
issues was extensive, this was not matched by attempts to sustain the international networks noted in
the previous chapter, which were intended to foster debate on issues of principle and programmes for
co-ordinated activity by NGOs. The initiatives started in the Rio context were not promoted or
developed by NGOs involved in UNCED follow-up and were quickly marginalised and forgotten. By
contrast, NGO collaboration in the CSD context came to deal principally with attempts to co-ordinate
input to the inter-governmental negotiations.
4.4 The Open-Ended Working Group and the Review of Rules
for NGO Participation in ECOSOC
In the event, a compromise between existing arrangements and the particular priorities emerging after
UNCED could not be satisfactorily realised before the first CSD session. ECOSOC took a decision in
February 1993 to establish a Review to consider revisions to existing arrangements for NGO
participation. Although Agenda 21 had envisaged revisions to strengthen 'the role of non-
governmental organisations as social partners' which would address the whole UN system
'including international finance and development agencies','°° the mandating resolution for the
proposed Review took a narrower focus:
a general review of current arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations,
as determined by the Council in its Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968, with a view to
updating them, if necessary, in particular in the light of recent experience, including that gained
during the process of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development'0'
The deliberations and conclusions of the Open-Ended Working Group established to conduct the
Review are too wide-reaching and convoluted to explore in detail here'° 2 The Review addressed three
98 Scssions Kathim institutionakóng the lanh Summn	 cit
994ge,uia21paa.27.6,p.cf.
coud.27. -.r	 !IP- s t	 JU	 iT- s P irt Li. .i	 ft s	 ,*
I 01 £1199Y21 4 Rcvicw of thcanngenxnts Ii inihaik with rxn-gnnnenta1 ntg	 12 Fcbhrary I9. Ddiae i.n1,iihdw4w
did beyond this rnntL and address swnc o(themae general tsaasraiand in Aala 2L.
102 See Willetis, Peter Social Parmership SuccessfW Sidelining? The United Na1iI Keaiewo(ib keburm*i 	 w*tvretei
paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshopa Bair Switr1and 2-4 Mardi 1997 a mars dc_ifnj alsMtI*%t*ss&
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areas: the fora in which NGOs should be allowed to participate; the issues on which NGOs should be
able to express their views; and the types of NGOs which are legitimateparticipants in the UN system.
Resolution 1996/31, agreed in July 1996, provided the following conclusions:
The new resolution would only apply to ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies. Attempts to
open negotiation on terms for access to the UN General Assembly were not successful,
although the debate on what was appropriate and beneficial for ECOSOC to recommend
continued until the final text was negotiated. In the event, only a weak recommendation
that the General Assembly should examine the question of NGO participation in its work
remained: ECOSOC agreed 'to recommend that the General Assembly examine, at its
fifty-first session, the question of the participation of non-governmental organizations in
all areas of the work of the United Nations'.'03
•	 Although there are a wide range of issues not addressed in ECOSOC, many of these
(including trade and disarmament) are dealt with by UN Conferences, to which
ECOSOC-accredited organisations would have access. Thus the agreement reached not to
make recommendations on access to other parts of the UN system does not fully resolve
problems arising from the initial suggestion that details should be agreed of the areas to be
addressed by NGOs with accreditation. The final text resolves these by avoiding mention
of issues altogether. References to different types of issues were removed before
agreement to the final Resolution.
•	 The Review addressed the legitimacy of NGOs in two broad contexts, and resolved many
of the problems arising from the gaps between prevailing practice and the provisions of
Resolution l29&° - in particular from its inconsistency with practice established through
UNCED. It considered, and rejected, various alternative typologies for NGOs (most
notably various articulations of the 'major groups' approach from Agenda 21); and it
made significant alterations to the access open for national NGOs and to the contexts in
which applications for accreditation could be rejected.
yL,lLiM*	 44U*IXfl
103 E/I 996P297 ECOSOC Decision on Non .Govcmmcntal Organi7alions, 25 July 1996.
104 ECOSOC Resolution l296 (XLIV) Statute for NGOs' 23 May 1968.
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The first draft submitted by the Working Group Secretariat, CRP.1 [Conference Room Paper, set out
a detailed introduction, to be added to a revised Resolution 1296. This sttessed that the participation of
'organisations representing the major groups defined in Agenda 21, including the private sector,
should be obtained') 05 The vague and arbitrary nature of the major groups structure, as defined in
Agenda 21, made it impossible for these to be used as the basis for a procedural resolution. A number
of established NGOs objected to its inclusion in this context. The World Federation of United Nations
Associations, for example, argued against 'unnecessary ideological or political references'.'° 6
 A
subsequent attempt by a group of countries including Canada and the European Union to introduce a
list of types of organisation which mentioned the major groups but stressed that these were illustrative
rather than comprehensiv&°7 was also rejected as a basis for defining the involvement ofNGOs in the
work of ECOSOC.
In two related areas, however the IJNCED process can be understood to have led to significant
change to the existing Resolution. It had been established practice that national organisations should
not generally be able to participate in the work of ECOSOC, and that, wherever possible, they should
be represented at the UN by international 'umbrella' NGOs. The presumption that this form of
hierarchical structure adequately involved national NGOs is evident in Resolution 1296, which states
that 'National organisations shall normally present their views through international non-
governmental organisations to which they belong'.' 08 However, the imperatives in sustainable
development to devolve decision-making to the appropriate level, and to emphasise the inter-
relationships between local, national and global contexts presented direct challenges to these
presumptions. Despite opposition from many established international NGOs, and divisions between
governments on the principles to be pursued and the implications of the different options, a
compromise was eventually reached. Resolution 1996/31 states that 'Regional, subregional and
national organisations, including those affiliated to an international organisation already in status, may
be admitted'.'°9 This surprisingly strong formulation derived much of its legitimacy from the
105 E/AC.70/1995/CRP. I 'Working Document for the Second Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Review of Anangements for
Consultation with Non-Governmental Organisations' para.3. I 9')5.
106 EIAC.70/1995/NQO/3 'Genend Review ofAnnguments for Consultations with Non .Govcmmental Organizations: Stalewent submitted by the World
-..--	 uaimi...',...,- .irsuii.
107 E/I995/X3/Add. L
	
of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Review of ArTangcmcnts for Consu1tation with Nort-GovernmntgI
Organi7ations - Compilauon of Proposals' pe 3.1. June 1995.
108 ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV) 'Statute for NGOs' para.9. op. cit.
109 Resolution 1996/31, 'Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organisations' para.9, 25 July 1996.
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precedent established through UNCED, and from the participation of significant numbers of 'UNCED
NOOs' who fitted this description in the regular work of the CSD from 1993 onwards.
The new Resolution also attempted to regularise arrangements for NGO participation in UN
conferences. The decisions taken in this area constituted the most detailed alterations to the previous
arrangements, but the specific provisions reflect a range of concerns which are not greatly relevant
here. The final text offers no real advance for NGOs, and is perhaps a reflection of the 'lowest
common denominator' from previous conferences, rather than the compilation of best practice which
might have been anticipated. The G77 group of developing countries asserted the right of states to
revise the list recommended by the conference Secretariat for accreditation, which in various contexts
could constitute a very retrograde step, while the use of UNCED Decision 1/1 as the basis for text on
the circulation of written statements by NOOs places greater restrictions than bad applied in practice
in many other areas. By contrast, a new general right for NGOs to speak at all stages of a conference
process and at all levels of conference bodies was established. As with Resolution 1296, there is still
considerable scope for flexibility in the interpretation of these provisions for individual events,
although their general tenor is not very positive for NGOs.
As an exercise in 'institutionalising the Earth Summit', the final text of Resolution 1996/31 must be
understood as a failure. The spirit of Agenda 21, with its emphasis on establishing partnerships
between the UN and NGOs and broadening participation in the work of the UN, is not really reflected
in the conclusions of the Open-Ended Working Group at all. The final text agreed did not lift the
restrictions placed on the circulation of NGO documentation and rights to address the plenary during
CSD sessions, noted earlier. Nevertheless, the concerns from some NGOs that the Review might place
greater restrictions on their activities also proved groundless. It should also be noted that innovative
arrangements, including the introduction of dialogue sessions involving governments and NGOs in
both the Commission on the Status of Women (1996) and the Commission on Sustainable
Development (1997), as well as the incorporation of an extensive set of stakeholder dialogues during
the Second UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in June 1996,' '° constitute ad hoc
advances which question the influence of some of the more restrictive aspects of the new Resolution.
* T	 IqIJIIJT 1111111L r JLr-1- j. 	 -111
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4.5 Networking and the Commission on Sustainable
Development -- The CSD NGO Steering Committee
By 1994, the Commission on Sustainable Development had established a programme of work and put
in place a New York-based Secretariat. The UN had also initiated a system of task managers,
appointed in other relevant UN bodies to oversee production of reports and recommendations for
action drawing on the expertise of other parts of the UN system. It was only at its second session, two
years after the Rio Summit, that the CSD held its first substantive session, at which the principal
issues addressed were health, human settlements, and fresh water.
As we have seen, NGO attention also focused principally on organisational issues during the period
following UNCED, addressing both the instigation of new, permanent arrangements in the UN to deal
with Rio follow-up, and new structures for NGO seif-organisation. However, initially these
collaborations were relatively ad hoc, providing a specific service to NGOs for a limited period rather
than a more general and permanent focus for NGO interaction. By 1994, a number of factors led to
creation ofa new body	 *
interaction with the CSD Secretariat on organisational issues (booking of rooms;
provision of computer facilities and so on)
•	 the need for an organisational structure to support the work of issue caucuses attempting
to influence the CSD's decisions. (A number of these had continued to function after the
UNCED PrepComs, including the International Task Group on Legal and Institutional
Matters [INTGLIM] and groups working on oceans and agriculture.)
the need for an identifiable interlocutor for CSD member governments, the CSD bureau
and Secretariat wishing to communicate with NGOs - this was of particular relevance in
determining whether NGOs would be able to address CSD sessions, and which
organisation could most effectively represent broader perspectives
amono other sectors, .most notably trade unions and
.	 ** .
industry increased pressure on NGOs to do likewise
2U
events held elsewhere (most notably the UN Conference on Small Island Developing
States [Barbados 1994] and the UN International Conference on Population and
Development [Cairo 1994] had led to the involvement of new NGOs in regular UN work;
a number saw the CSD as an appropriate context for their future activities
appreciation of both the need for and the feasibility of collaboration between CSD
sessions, particularly to prepare adequately for the next meeting, increased interest in a
central co-ordinating body with a remit to function throughout the year
•	 tensions between Northern and Southern NGOs (notably over issues of access and
funding, but also on policy) also accentuated the need for an impartial body which could
assume responsibility for some of the contentious organisational issues
One of the principal sources of impetus for change was the CSD Secretariat Two documents
produced in preparation for the 1994 CSD session illustrate the extent to which improved co-
ordination among NGOs was seen as a necessaiy element in the overall success of the organisation.
The first, titled 'Frameworks for the Long, Medium and Short-Term on Major Groups Related
Activities of the CSD Secretariat', was produced following the first meeting of the Major Groups
Focal Points (the points of contact in the various secretariats for non-governmental organisations in all
relevant parts of the UN system). 11 ' The second, 'Commission on Sustainable Development
Consultation with Non-Governmental Organisations / Major Groups' is a report disseminated to
NOOs and Major Groups on relations with the CSD which 'proposes some modalities for making this
important partnership work'."2
The 'Frameworks' document argues that UNCED achieved two results beyond the official
agreements: unprecedented involvement by non-governmental actors; and raised expectations of the
global community regarding the UN's ability to 'maintain and foster the sustainable development
momentum achieved at Rio'. To build upon these two achievements required the creation of a 'truly
111 'Frameworks br the Lcng..Medium and Shoti-lenu on Major Groups Related Aetivitiqs of the CSD Sccretaiiat- Draft' UN Dcpanmcnt for Policy Co-
idMa'tion and Sus ainableDevdopm1,NewYo.tNovanb.1993.
the ncwslducr of the ('cntre flr Our Common Future, with a rcqut for comments to be sent to the CSI) Secretthiat. NoM'or* No.30, o,i cit September
l9')3.
112 'Commission on Sustainable Development Consultation with Non-Governmental Organisations I Major Groups - Non.Pap& UN Department br
Policy Co-ordination and Sustainable Development, New York Fcbwaiy 1994. Reproduced in Appendix 10.
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international partnership' between the UN aiid Major Groups; the global community 'expects the CSD
and its Secretariat to be the protector and nurturer of this partnership'. Iii order to achieve this, a
proactive role is envisaged for the CSD Secretariat in building links and collaboration with non-
governmental actors: the CSD's responsibilities should include 'enabling linkages between Major
Groups, as well as linkages between major groups and governments and international organizations';
the CSD Secretariat should '[provide] the missing link as a central exchange forum for information,
activities, networks, resources and the like, between major groups and inter-governmental
organizations'."3
The document concludes that the CSD should play an active role in promoting greater interaction
between Major Groups, and that this would in turn foster social and economic transition. The
associated costs should not detract from the importance of these activities: 'Required investments will
have a high return in terms of both promoting the implementation of Agenda 21 and increasing the
visibility of the Secretariat'. Thus, in addition to its more passive responsibilities to collect information
from, and provide information to Major Groups, the document advocates that the Secretariat shoul±
1.Participate in Major Groups Meetings and Conferences to work as a multiplier for the
objectives laid down in Agenda 21 and in decisions of the Commission on Sustainable
Development and to advise major groups with regards to effective access to the
intergovernmental machinery 	 -
2.For different topics, organize conferences involving major groups to facilitate interaction and
communication among them and with the UN system and the exchange of information
3.Mobilize special support to major groups in developing countries in the form of logistical
inputs, information and fund raising, if possible."4
While the first Secretariat document was never formally released to a general audience, the second
paper mentioned above was widely circulated and was intended to promote dialogue with NGOs
about the role of the CSD and ways in which NGO participation in its future work could best be
* realiSedvAgain it emphasises
I 13 Framcwotics for the Long. Medium and Sho-Teim on Major Groups Rcated Activities of the CSL) Secretariat - Desft, cii.
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'facilitating the global transition to sustainability' and the need to develop working relations between
the CSD and Major Groups. It outlines the guidelines for NGO involvenfent in the CSD, as set out in
ECOSOC decision 1993/2 15, and stresses the principle of 'equitable representation of all NGOs /
Major Groups' in the CSD's work. What is noteworthy about this paper is the extent to which it
implies that the strengthening of co-ordinating mechanisms for NGOs is desirable for the Commission
as a whole, and that as a result it is appropriate for the CSD Secretariat to exert pressure on NGOs to
comply with a model for interaction which is not necessarily self-generated:
NGOs / major groups are encouraged to coordinate inputs among themselves - either related to
substantive issues or regionaliy. NGOs are encouraged to establish advisory committees
constituted on a regional or constituency basis to facilitate their communication with the
Secretariat and the CSD during sessions and intersessionally."5
Advocacy of such advisory committees was very much the initiative of the Secretariat, with no evident
support from existing NGO coalitions, yet their putative role in this paper is clearly influential. Among
their proposed responsibilities are:
determining who will speak on behalf of constituencies
enabling the CSD Secretariat to establish contact with NGOs / major groups and
distributing material on the work of the CSD
•	 taking part in pre-session consultations with the CSD Bureau, and meeting with the
Bureau during CSD sessions to assess the relationship and explore ways to make it more
productive for both sides
The paper also includes a general reference to the cost implications of these proposed consultation
mechanisms, suggesting that some financial support might be available for these new advisory bodies:
'it might be worth exploring the means of voluntaty financial support for NGOs / major groups on an
ongoing basis for the above activities'." 6 Finally, the Secretariat paper specifically advances the
CSD's relations with NGOs as an example of relevance for the review of UN relations with NGOs,
which had been initiated the previous year: 'the ECOSOC open-ended working group on NGO reform
- 
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I 14 Ibid.
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should be encouraged to take into account the CSD's own experiences with NGOs during its
deliberations'. 17
No record exists of responses to this consultation document, and the proposal to create advisory
committees was not subsequently taken up. The CSD Secretariat also failed to act upon the
recommendation to explore ways in which financial support for NGO activity might be provided."8
Nevertheless, this consultation paper and the internal document on Major Groups-related activities
establish clear positions on some of the principal issues which would govern creation of non-
governmental alliances around the CSD. They demonstrate that the Secretariat actively supported such
networking and recognised its value to the work of the Commission. They stress the need for
geographical and gender equity in NGO participation and advocate that NGO alliances should
determine who would have access to formal speaking opportunities during CSD sessions. They also
suggest that such networks are the most appropriate means by which to engage local and national
organisations, and specific sectoral constituencies, in Agenda 21 implementation.
In setting out a position on the significance of a structure to guide NGO interaction with the CSD,
both papers are unduly selective in their consideration of recent history. They avoid any reference to
the precedents for NGO collaboration established before UNCED, and imply that initiation of a
formal collaborative structure would fill a void. They also fail to acknowledge the Alternative Treaties
process, and indicate that the key purpose of Major Groups collaboration is to ensure the CSD
functions more effectively, and to establish an intermediary between the CSD Secretariat and
individual organisations. The need for NOOs to use this type of apparatus to establish common
principles, or to advance fundamental alternatives, as envisaged by INGOF, is not alluded to at all.
Rather, the Rio agreements are presented as the unequivocal articulation of sustainable development,
Major Groups are considered as essentially homogenous, and the possibility of differences on
ideological or political grounds is not acknowledged.
117 ibid.
1 18'Although the.CSD Sec iatdidn bea4u1y.idcfith	 wppoittheaitiofmajqrgnups
Government Liaison Service (NGT.S) continued to bjcratc a fund ror Southern participation in CSD sessions, as it had done during the UNCED process.
l)onor governments toxe encuur.*ged to tr.&nsfcr funds to NGI..S, and participants wcn then identified by NGLS and pros ided vith Ilnancial support to
attend the CS!). This had a much more limited scope than the support for major groups activities in developing countries outlined in the draft Framework
document.
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At the second CSD session in May 1994, participating NGOs agreed to creation of a new mechanism
to regularise the work of NGOs and other Major Groups in the CSD context. The extent to which the
CSD Secretariat's pre-emptive strikes foreshadowed the responsibilities and the remit of the CSD
NGO Steering Committee is significant. The terms of reference adopted by the new body in May 1994
emphasise the importance of information dissemination to constituent groups and provision of
information from NGOs to the CSD. Steering Committee members are elected to 'serve as focal
points to ensure participation of issue and regional networks within the NGO community through their
ability to disseminate information'." 9 Particular responsibilities include disseminating UN reports;
supporting capacity building and regional consultative meetings; and promoting preparations for and
participation at future CSD sessions.
The Terms of Reference for the Steering Committee also rule out any use of the new body as a vehicle
for advancing fimdamental alternatives to existing models for global governance: 'The activity of this
committee would in no sense be one of political or policy representativeness for the NGO
community'.' 20 Rather, its role was to be procedural, acting as the apolitical conduit for relations
between the CSD and NGOs envisaged by the CSD Secretariat Thus the NGO Steering Committee's
responsibilities included:
• Arranging meetings - evening NGO-Government dialogues; morning strategy sessions;
and so on;
• Negotiating with the CSD Secretariat ECOSOC NGO Unit etc. on procedural matters,
including rights to speak and participate in meetings
•	 Ensuring that facilities for NGO representatives are adequate
• Undertaking to disseminate information through existing networks and to relevant contact
points.'2'
While the support of the CSD Secretariat and Bureau for this model of NGO seif-organisation was
undoubtedly a spur, pressure to take the apolitical, principally procedural set of functions outlined also
-	 - - rt U
	 - t1ii
I I 9 NGO Steciing Committ to thc UN Commission on Sustainable Development Tams ofRefrence' agreed at an NGO PIenay Meeting during CSD
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came from less positive sources. First, the application of the Agenda 21 Major Groups schema to the
work of the CSD as a whole obliged the Steering Committee to attemptlo involve other sectors in its
work, including the private sector. This inevitably reduced the possibility of the Steering Committee
becoming the context in which alternative visions and shared norms could be advanced by NGOs. A
second limiting factor was the growing lack of trust between Northern and Southern NGOs active in
the CSD. This mirrored the acrimony increasingly evident in dialogue between governments over the
failure of the North to deliver financial and technical assistance as its part of the 'Rio deal'. Particular
ill-feeling among NGOs was evident at the start of the 1994 CSD session, which took place shortly
after the Barbados Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States (SIDS). Although SIDS governments had produced a Plan of Action, there had been little
involvement from Northern governments in the Conference process, and the willingness of the North
to consider the particular problems experienced by such states as an integral part of future global
collaboration to realise sustainable development had not been in evidence.' 22 NGOs present in
Barbados had drawn up a widely endorsed action plan which had been used to influence delegates
negotiating government positions. They had also adopted the Major Groups approach with some
success, setting out cross-sectoral stances and developing proposals for future collaboration.
A number of NGO delegates went straight from Barbados to the CSD, and found that a preparatory
NGO meeting had been organised by IUCN Netherlands, to which they had not been invited.
Participants at this event, which took place on the weekend before the CSD started, were principally
from Northern countries. They met to draft preliminary position papers on the issues on the CSD's
agenda, to be further considered by other NOOs subsequently. Considerable ill-feeling resulted from
the failure to involve SIDS NGOs, or to take into account the model for consultation and lobbying
which had met with success in Barbados. As a result, the creation of the CSD NGO Steering
Committee can be understood to have arisen as much from the lack of trust between NGOs at the
second CSD session, and the need for agreed rules for their interaction, as from the more positive
objectives identified by the CSD Secretariat. This atmosphere of distrust also militated against
attempts to identify shared issues of principle, and increased attention on procedural and
saarranement&
122 Similar disquiet was expressed bycleveloping country governments. most notably from Atlica. involved in the clabonition 01 the Framework
Convention to Combat Drought and Descniuication [INCD).
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Advocates of the Alternative Treaties as a significant set of commitments entered into by an
unprecedented gathering of NGOs found their views were marginalised as of little significance in
these circumstances, while others who attempted to revive some of the debates on issues of principle
which had been prevalent during the UNCED process, or to reintroduce issues which had been
dropped from the post-UNCED agenda (trade and militarisation, for example) had little success. By
contrast, through a combination ofjudicious probing and good fortune, the CSD Secretariat had
gained the NGO partner it would appear to have been looking for.
In subsequent years the Secretariat continued to play a proactive role in initiating a series of events
during annual CSD sessions which focused on the activities of major groups. During the 1994 meeting
a day was dedicated to consideration of the role of local authorities; in 1995 the focus was on trade
unions; and in 1996 on indigenous peoples. From 1997 onwards, the Secretariat also created space for
dialogue sessions involving major groups organisations. The first of these, held in preparation for the
General Assembly five year review of the UNCED agreements, entailed half-day discussions between
each of the nine major groups and government delegates. These were held in parallel with other
negotiations, and were poorly attended by government officials.
Since 1998, dialogue sessions with major groups have been held without any competing official
events or negotiating sessions. These have been conducted with considerable preparation, involving
eighty nominated representatives - twenty from each of four of the major groups. These have been
from trade unions, the private sector, NGOs and one other, depending on the issue to be addressed.
Papers are prepared in advance by each group, and discussion focuses on a particular theme: in 1998,
this was the role of industry in achieving sustainable development; in 1999, the topic was tourism; in
2000 it was agriculture; and in 2001 it was energy. These include appraisal of what each sector is
doing to meet challenges arising in the area under consideration, and the opportunity to raise issues
and question the activities of the other sectors.
The CSD NGO Steering Committee has played a central role in co-ordinating these preparations, and
bringing together the participants for the NCO 'team' in the dialogues. Interaction between major
gipjpjasJed to sôneJ teng devent& The 1998 dialogue session was marked b y a call
-
from NGOs for an official review of the eflicacy of voluntary codes f conduct from the private
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sector, which was supported by governments and endorsed by the CSD. This can perhaps be
understood as a revival of some of the organisational principles which characterised the NGO
networks active in the UNCED process. In drawing attention to the status given to these industry-led
initiatives, participating NGOs emphasised the overarching necessity for governments to provide a
strong regulatory framework. They also stressed the conceptual differences underlying the evident
tensions between NGOs and private sector representatives:
The effort to establish a Multi-stakeholder Review of Voluntary Initiatives is nothing less than
the effort to defend the voice of civil society at the United Nations. As industry sets up its
partnership to coordinate its efforts to stabilize the globalization process, NGOs and trade
unions must insist on mechanisms to communicate the needs and concerns of local
communities and citizens.'23
4.6 Wider impact of post-UNCED relations between the UN and
NGOs
Space does not permit a detailed appraisal of the impact of UNCED on relations between non-
governmental actors and governmental or inter-governmental organisations, but this broader context
should be briefly sketched out. UN Secretary General Boutros Boulros-Ghali stressed the significance
of the UNCED precedent in his Agenda for Democratization, published in 1996:
With [UNCED], the United Nations began a series of international conferences that have
brought together not only all States, but also relevant non-governmental organizations and other
representatives of civil society, to focus on interlocking economic and socIal Issues by
considering their impact on the human person and human communities.'24
In a wide range of UN-initiated international conferences during the 1990s, both the general principles
elaborated though UNCED regarding notions of social partnership with official bodies and the
'alternative' prioritisation of networking in order to promulgate shared norms globally are evident.
The translation of these perspectives to national contexts can also be discerned: the former in the
creation of National Councils for Sustainable Development to engage a wide range of social actors in
lTrLjJrlrU.ILI	 r t1Iiauu
23 N(X) 1a.ck Iune on I3usins and Industry Ca,, Cwponuions be Tncied? Towaith Social wad Envi,v,uaac'ual Responsibility and Accountability in
glw Coq,orate Sector p.61. the Northern Alliance for Sustainability (ANPED) Amstenlam, February 1999.
124 Boutros-Ghali, BoutrosAn AgendaforDemocm gization United Nations New Y otk 1996 p.22.
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dialogue on sustainable development issues; 125 the latter in a growing focus during the 1990s on the
destabilising impacts of processes of globalisati Ofl on social and environmental security.
4.6.1 UN Processes
Two instances of UN events and processes which addressed these issues are the International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD - Cairo 1994) and the World Summit for Social
Development (WSSD - Copenhagen 1995).126 Martha Alter Chen records the development of a
global campaign which had its origins in the polarised debate on population issues during UNCED.
Collaboration between organisations which had been involved in the Rio process and the International
Women's Health Coalition led to the formulation of the 'Women's Voices '94 Alliance' and the
drafting of a 'Women's Declaration on Population Policies'.' 27 Participating NGOs convened a series
of events to review the Declaration, reaching 'remarkable consensus on key values (gender equality,
reproductive rights and male responsibility) across the divides of ideology, culture and relative wealth
and power'.' 28 The capacity to create effective alliances and connect diverse policy areas characterised
the women's movement during the series of UN conferences in the 1990s - one leading activist
identified the promotion of a core set of shared values through these processes as a particular element
in the involvement of women's networks:
It is important to see this work as part of a move occurring with women internationally to claim
all issues as women's issues and to claim a women's voice in shaping global policy. It isn't just
human rights that women have targeted, but a kind of collective understanding on the part of
women that we have to be more present in all the discussions of peace, democracy,
development environment, human rights etc.'29
125 See for example d'Evie, Fayen, Mazy MacDonald and Francisco Mats uls. NCSD Repml 1999-2000: National Erperiences ofInlegratiw
MultlsakeholderProciesserforStalnableDeveiopmeruThe Earth Council, San José Costa Rica 2000.
I26 A fuller list would include the mechaniazns devised to promote follow-up to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, and the International Convention to Combat Drought and Desertification, the Global Environment Facility; the Conference on Small Island
States (Barbados 1994); the Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (New York 1994); the Fourth World Conference on
Women (Beijing 1995) and the Second Conference on Human Settlements (Istanbul t996).
127 Alter Chen, Martha 'Engendering World Conferences: The International Women's Movement and the UN' in Weiss, Thomas and Leon Gordcnker
NGOs. the UN and Global Goveniance pp.139-155, op. cii.
128 1bid Sec also Keck, Margeret 5, and Kathryn Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks th lnzernwional Politics Cornell
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Lobbying Success Stcxy' Human Rights Ttibune, vol.2 no.1 pp.486.498 June 1993.
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While these types of collaboration had occurred before 1992, in a number of particulars their
effectiveness was greatly enhanced by precedents established through UNCED) 3° The involvement of
large numbers of Southern organisations,the legitimisation of national-level participants, and the
blueprint of the Alternative Treaties process as a means by which to build credibility around an
alternative agenda all informed the activities of the women's movement in preparations for the Cairo
Conference:
At Cairo, in particular, a coalition of NGOs and women's groups - above all, from developing
countries, which suffer most from the problems of family size - played a major role in
preventing the representatives of [governments] from making concessions to the Vatican, and
other dominantly conservative and male religious groups, that tried to destroy the effectiveness
of the Conference's final documents.'3'
The ICPD demonstrated the capacity of NGOs to have a significant impact in shaping global
negotiations when ideological differences between states on contentious issues were extreme. The
WSSD focused particularly on the role of civil society, addressing key areas of social policy
(employment, poverty and social integration).A number of negotiators and commentators
acknowledged that the attempt to articulate general principles governing the role of international civil
society, and the close inter-relations between domestic policy and the global context derived to a
significant extent from UNCED. For example, an informal seminar convened by the UN in Mohonk,
New York State and attended by representatives from leading NGOs, UN departments and
governments, identified 'global forces, essentially economic and financial' as an emerging set of
factors in international affairs which NGOs are uniquely placed to respond to:
A number of organizations of civil society are observing these developments with concern,
notably because of the linkage they perceive between global economic and political powers,
structures and policies and social conditions of today and tomorrow. They consider it essential
to be involved in international fora, to present their view on the state of the world and to
contribute to strengthening the ability of the United Nations to develop its own philosophy on
economic and social progress. Many of the non-governmental organizations involved with
130 A 1997 appiisa1 of the UNCED legacy by the Women's Environment and Devekpment Organisauon stressed connections ith subsequent
conferences Since Rio. other international gathetings have occumxl that cannot be separated (mm an evaluation of post-UNCED progress. The
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo, in 1994, and the World Summit for Social Development, held in
Copenhagen in March, 1995, hac gradually deepened, elaborated upon and extended the recommendations of Agenda 21 and other Rio accords. ... Five
ieaisafier Rio, though the consensus retnains iipperiect and can be s*xangthened, an imfi&table international political foundation has been built, largely by
na&e1nft1atives Ofomen aiund the wedd.' Women's Envirooment uiid Development OonWED0) '[igIling the Path
Progress: Women's Initiatives and An Assessment of Progress since the 1992 United Nations COnference on Environment and Develojmcnt (LJNC'ED)'
submitted to the F.arth Council Rio '-5 ('onference. llranl I')97.
131 Toulniin, Stephen 'The Role of NOOs in Global Aflairs' unpublished paper. University of California 1994, quoted in Rosenau. James Along the
Domestic-Foreign Frontier: cq,loring governance in a turbulent iroddCambndge University Press, Cambndge l997p334.
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economic and social development have been vocal proponents of participation, empowerment,
capacity building and a concentration on the grass-roots. Som see this approach as a
complement to the increasing globalization. Others would like to build a balance, a counter
power, or even an alternative. Overall, most non-governmental organizations see themselves as
watchdogs and supporters of those peoples who question the dominant trends, and those groups
and nations that are left behind.'32
It is ironic that the Social Summit, which considered in detail the role of civil society, and addressed
issues of particular concern in both domestic and international politics, appears to have had so little
impact on ongoing relations between the UN and NOOs. As noted in chapter 2, the Summit led to
formation of the Social Watch NGO network, which aims to introduce the commitments and
objectives agreed into Copenhagen into domestic policy. Nevertheless, awareness of the Social
Summit is negligible in most countries, despite widespread interest in the phenomena of globalisation.
It has been suggested that one factor in the apparent discrepancy between interest in these issues at the
national level and the absence of widespread awareness and use of the framework established in
Copenhagen is the lack of significant numbers of organisations able to make links between local
activities and global change. While NGO networks collaborating before and since UNCED on issues
of environment and development have been able to build broad-based international coalitions upon
the implicit understanding of the relevance of the local to the global (and vice versa), groups focusing
on poverty eradication or employment do not yet have this capacity. Juan SomavIa, Secretaiy General
of the WSSD, frequently drew the analogy between the Copenhagen Summit and the Stockholm UN
Conference on the Human Environment, stressing that international collaboration on the social agenda
was twenty years behind the systems and the shared conceptual framework evident in global
environmental processes.
4.7 Conclusions
4.7.1 The Degree to which NGOs' Concerns were met in the Work of the CSD
As noted earlier, without exception commentators reviewing implementation of and follow-up to the
-.CED	 towarcis me onjecuves se
	 RiMi
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222
Even for organisations which were prepared to accept the prevailing understanding of what could be
achieved through the CSD, and the significance of realising adequate institutional arrangements, the
reality must have been of mixed value. A review of the objectives advanced by the CAPE 2000
consortium of NGOs for the CSD in October 1992' demonstrates the gap between a relatively
conservative assessment of the Commission's future capabilities and its actual achievements:
The CSD's mandate should not be limited to reviewing UNCED agreements. The General Assembly
and ECOSOC did mandate the CSD to 'make recommendations, as appropriate, on the need for new
cooperative arrangements related to sustainable development'.134 However, this formula has not led to
many examples of Agenda 21 being treated as 'a dynamic programme that could evolve over time' in
the work of the CSt).'35 Annual sessions of the Commission have been characterised far more by
attempts to renegotiate sections of Agenda 21 than by efforts to build upon existing agreements. In this
respect, the CSD's mandate was agreed but has not subsequently been utilised.
The Commission Secretariat should have independence and stature to allow it to review the work of
other UN bodies. The NGOs expressed concern that the Head of the Secretariat should deal directly
with the heads of UN agencies and with the Secretaiy General through 'a revitalized Administrative
Committee on Coordination', rather than having to report to the Department for Economic and Social
Development, 'which might pose conflict of interest problems for the Commission and reduce its
stature'. As an example of what this positioning would entail, they suggest a CSD review of World.
Bank and IMF lending policies and practices in preparation for the 50th anniversaiy of the Bretton
Woods Institutions. In the event, the CSD Secretariat has had the capacity to liaise with other UN
bodies through the ACC's Inter Agency Committee on Sustainable Development and its system of
task managers. This has not been at the level of heads of agencies, however, and its effectiveness in
challenging existing policies and prevailing practices has been negligible.' 36 In practice the CSD
Secretariat (and by association the Commission as a whole) has lacked stature and independence in its
relations with other parts of the UN system.
prepan.d by UN stafi', Mohonk Mountain house New Yoii State, USA 22-23 June 1995. The full text of this repoit is repmduced in Appendix 12.
133 'Commenet on the Commission on Sustainable Development' wibuted to Cape 2000, op. ciL
't34 A/47l191 pio	 1n&,ed?PCX)SOC	 993a$JS.	 th1WDJPU1 1W$
135 'Comments on the Commission on Sustainable Development' attnbutcd to Cape 2000. op. cii.
136 In an inlumial discussion in early 1999, a senior World Bank official cxpress4xl regret that thcCSD secretariat had not acttxl in a 'pmactive way' in
initiating inter agency co.operation and pushing for involvement of the Bank in its rk. He contrasted it with the Secretariat lbr the l'ramcwork Convention
on Climate Change in this respect.
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The CSD should adopt its own rules of procedure and adopt the arrangements for NGO accreditation
used at UNCED. Apart from some significant modifications to the ECOSOC rules of procedure
governing NGO involvement, the CSD is fairly rigidly defined as a subsidiary body within ECOSOC.
Most of the innovative arrangements floated byNGOs and some governments for establishing more
participatory processes for the involvement of major groups and the creation of an 'ombudsbureau'
within the CSD structure proved unpalatable to the majority of governments. Despite this, the
Commission has consistently been seen as a context in which new ways of working can be tried, and
the panel sessions and intersectoral dialogues held in subsequent years can be understood to derive
from these original aspirations.
Creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development presented a unique set of organisational
challenges for the range of organisations involved in efforts to establish the new body. The solutions
which were arrived at during the year following UNCED provided the basis for the work of the CSD
for at least the following five years, and have thus warranted detailed consideration.
In some contexts, arrangements put in place in the years following the Rio Summit resulted in
coherent arrangements which evidently reflect a well-understood and widely shared understanding of
the role of the new body, and its relations with other parts of the international system. The
restructuring of relevant parts of the UN secretariat, and the instigation of a system of task managers in
other parts of the UN to provide support for the CSD are exam p1es of this, in other areas, the decisions
reached reflected disagreement between states and the absence of a common perspective on the issues
under consideration. The debate on creation of the CSD had been hard-fought, and illustrated the
widely divergent views on the appropriate means and context for follow-up to UNCED which were
evident after the event.
Deliberations on the appropriate arrangements for NGO participation in particular revealed
considerable differences and resulted in a muddled formula which contained a number of
contradictions. National organisations were able to participate in regular UN sessions in large numbers
for the first time, but the UNCED NGOs would only be able to attend CSD sessions and would be
exclue&ftonthe UNEconomic and$ocial unc cQSQ p	 eunberof
organisations participating in annual CSD môctings would be boosted by inclusion of 550 newly
224
accredited groups, but their rights to circulate documents and to address CSD sessions were more
restrictive than those in other ECOSOC bodies.
In other words, in transforming the general principles for NGO participation outlined in Agenda 21
into specific arrangements, negotiating governments ran into difficulties in three areas in particular:
1.The broader implications of arrangements made in this context were often problematic. If
accreditation of national NGOs were to become the norm in the UN, the impact in other policy areas
(most notably human rights and disarmament) would have to be considered. There were also conflicts
between the understanding of the nature and role of NGOs in existing UN procedural documents
(most notably ECOSOC Resolution 1296 [XL1V]) and the more vague and expansive representation
of the functions of the 'major groups of civil society' in Agenda 21.
2. The time available for arrangements to be finalised required governments to reach decisions before
the first CSD session in June 1993. In practice this led to a number of ad hoc provisions which
subsequently had to be revised, and confiated consideration of issues which might otherwise have
been addressed separately (the status of the European Union and ofNGOs during the ECOSOC
organisational session, for instance).
3. Diversity among NGOs also presented difficulties. If the CSD were to deal in a consistent fashion
with organisations from the nine major groups, and with organisations operating in local and national
contexts as well as international, this would go well beyond the methodologies governing relations
with non-governmental actors used in other ECOSOC Commissions. To what extent should the CSD
take an active role in advocating networking in order to simplifr relations with this burgeoning
number of very varied actors? And how should dialogue within and between different sectors be
incorporated into the regular work of the Commission?
Each of these problematic contexts arose from attempts to translate the impetus from the UNCED
process into the regular work of the UN. In each, difficulties which had not been anticipated
threatened to undermine realisation of the broader objective - to instigate ongoing, high level attention
toissuesof sustainAble deveiopment as a integral pait of the overall work of the thi g t1t
in each area the (SD Secretariat took a proactive stance. The Secretariat wrote to non-ECOSOC
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NGOs accredited to UNCED and invited them to apply for Roster status, but took the unauthorised
step of stating that their registration would apply only to CSD meetings) 3 The CSD Secretariat also
played an active role in encouraging non-governmental networks to collaborate and focus on the
CSD's agenda and advanced a model for such initiatives which, as we will consider, bears close
similarities to the co-ordinating body which was formed in 1994.
We must therefore consider the Secretariat as a significant actor in the development of relations
between the CSD and non-governmental sectors, and even in the elaboration of more formal
associations between NGOs. Over the five years following its creation, the CSD Secretariat appears to
have taken a consistent position, and advocated by various means the creation and maintenance of a
structure for non-governmental collaboration which was consistent with its own requirements. While
some parts of the UN system viewed NOOs as irrelevant, and others, such as the UN Commission on
Human Rights, had developed working arrangements for their participation, the CSD Secretariat
appears to be unique in playing an active role in attempting to influence the ways in which NGOs
worked together and in taking a proactive role in arrangements for relations with the UN.
4.7.2 NGO NetworkingAfter UNCED
The INGOF process, and the subsequent event held in Manila in 1995, identified collaboration
between existing international NGO networks as a means by which coherent responses to systemic
problems in the global polity could be formulated. There was widespread support from participating
organisations for the development of some form of coalition to identifr and challenge the negative
aspects of globalisation.
Yet the initiative foundered because of a number of endemic failings or weaknesses, which are present
to some extent in all efforts to forge and maintain links between divergent international NGO
networks. It was unclear whether the purpose was to provide a service platform, or to initiate a new
political movement. No clear position was reached on whether to aim to achieve incremental change
or to prioritise more holistic challenges to the prevailing international system. The best means of
operating was also in doubt - some favoured a form1ly co-ordinated approach, while others felt this
1-	 j	 LJL WUJI
137 United Nations Sccmtariat ECOSOCJNGO Unit, Notification. 3 March 1993. reprinted in WiDens, Petered. The Conscience ofihe Wo4dop. cit.
pp.308.9.
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would lead to unnecessary bureaucracy and would prefer ad hoc arrangements. Organisational
questions also presented problems: should participants work through electronic communication, or
rely instead on face-to-face meetings? Should the basic unit for collaboration be individual NGOs or
networks?	 -
Despite these difficulties, the INGOF process, and other related initiatives established during
preparations for UNCED, provided significant precursors to more recent attempts to create the means
by which networks of NGOs could collaborate effectively, such as Jubilee 2000,138 the anti-MAI
Coalition, and NGO coalitions formed around international events such as the series of UN Summits
held during the 1990s, and the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organisation. Thus The Guardian
emphasises the significance of Jubilee 2000 in resisting the negative impacts of globalisation: 'Not
only has Jubilee 2000 been comfortably the most successful mass movement of the past 25 years, but
it has also shown how the process known as globalisation is nurturing its own opponents."39
Perhaps as notions of economic globalisation have become more tangible, the associations identified
in the UNCED process between different policy areas have become more evident and the general
principles advanced in the Alternative Treaties have been realised in these collaborations. Conversely.
one might conclude that these initiatives fail to build upon the challenge issued from the Global
Forum for NGOs to advance programmes and principles to be pursued by civil society regardless of
the activities of governments. Either way, although some measure of continuity can be discerned,
many of the challenges posed to global civil society networks during UNCED remain unresolved.
138 The Guanhan nphasiscs the significance of Jubilee 2000 in isis1ing the negative impacts of globalisation: 'Not only has Jubilee 2000 been
comfortably the most successful mass movement of the past 25 years, but it has also shown how the process known as globalisation is nurturing its own
opponents.' Elliott, Larry 'Candle lit for debt telici's unfinished business' The Guardian 27 November 2000.
139 Elliott, Lany 'Candle lit for debt telicrs unfinished business' The Guardia,: 27 November2001).
p,NELr1rffi4Luruu..p----i	 lIiL4w
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Chapter 5
Condusions
We the people of the world will mobilise the forces of transnational civil society behind a
widely shared agenda that bonds our many social movements in pursuit ofjust, sustainable and
participatory human societies. In so doing we are forging our own instruments and processes for
redefining the nature and meaning of human progress and for transforming those institutions
that no longer respond to our needs. We welcome to our cause all people who share our
commitment to peaceful and democratic change in the interest of our living planet and the
human societies it sustains.'
It is important that our visions of future global governance include roles for the people of the
world. But it is vitally important that we build our visions of future roles for organisations from
civil society on a solid understanding of the present. As always, it is necessary to know where
you are now before you plan a journey into the future.2
The previous chapters have established a complex and often contradictory picture of the impact of
civil society networks on the global politics of sustainable development. While the value of a strong
focus on global networks has been emphasised, the inherent weaknesses and limitations of these
structures have also been apparent. The particular value of such alliances to participants has often
derived from their ability to challenge perceived shortcomings in inter-governmental decision-making;
yet in many instances their own legitimacy as wielders of global influence has been questioned. On
these grounds alone, any attempt to represent civil society networks as a kind of moral arbiter in global
affairs would be open to sustained criticism.
It is important also to acknowledge the conceptual constraints which have characterised many of the -
examples and processes cited which tackle the impact of civil society organisations in global politics.
Notions of political influence are still predominantly framed in the national or regional context
Distincfions between North and South, -or between grassroots apcL
I Intcmational NCR) Fonim I'eopIe Iaith DxIanttiun: A ('wacuve Agenda tr the Futuni' pan.23, Rio dejaneuu I3rdzII 1992.
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as chasms between different NGO groupings. Pressure to accentuate what distinguishes organisations
from each other (to secure funding, widespread recognition and prestige) conflicts with efforts to
establish common ground.
Despite these qualifications, there is sufficient evidence that global civil society networks have
assumed increasing significance in a range of contexts, and that these structures impact on global
politics in a multiplicity of ways which are not always adequately acknowledged. How are we to
understand this influence? What trends and significant developments can be identified? A review of
the material presented to this point will help to identify answers to these questions, and to set out some
conclusions to this thesis as a whole.
5.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of International NGO Networks
From 19th to 22K1 July2001, tens of thousands of protestors and demonstrators gathered in Genoa to
make their feelings known to leaders of the most powerful industrialised countries who were meeting
as the 08. While most media attention focused on the actions of a violent minority, there was also
growing interest in the phenomenon of a loose international movement built on opposition to
economic globalisation as it is currently occurring. John Vidal, writing in the Guardian, drew a telling
analogy
Just as the 08 leaders, world bodies and businesses talk increasingly from the same script, so
the protestors' once disparate social and political analyses are converging. The long-term project
of governments and world bodies to globalise capital and development is being mirrored by the
globalisation of protest.3
The extent to which this is true is questionable - a number of prominent organisations did not
participate in the main demonstrations in Genoa, and disagreements over tactics were widely evident.
Nevertheless, the desire for, and prioritisation of this kind of convergence is significant. What are we
to make of these trends? What recurring characteristics or patterns can we identify from the examples
and processes explored earlier? A useful way to group the disparate points this raises is to consider the
strengths an4 weaknesses demonstrated by NGOs collaborating internationally and the issues on
4
2 Alger. Chadwick F. 'Suuigthcning kclatiosu. bctn NOOs and the UN System: To-anis a Research Agenda' in Global Socicty vol. 13, no. 4pp393
-408, University of Kent at Canterbury UK 1999 p.408.
3 Vidal, John 'The battle for Genoa' The Guardian London 18 July 2001 p.15.
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which tension or disunity is evident, as perceived by a range of commentators. General conclusions
arising from the empirical and analytical material addressed earlier provides a useful basis for a more
focused appraisal of the core themes of this thesis.
5.1.1 Strengths
For international civil society networks, the key determinant of their own relevance in global politics
is the degree to which they bring vital perspectives, expertise and ideas to the global polity which
would not otherwise be taken into account. Previous chapters have explored the particular significance
of such networks to global processes dealing with issues of sustainable development. The intrinsic
importance of devolving decision-making to the appropriate level, engaging all relevant 'stakeholders'
in dialogue in order to reach broadly accepted solutions, and providing a global perspective on shared
environment and development challenges are all elements of the established conceptualisation of
'sustainable development'. These have been advanced in an extensive range of United Nations
agreements and texts from other inter-governmental and governmental institutions. As explored in
chapters 2 and 3, this understanding has been contested by many non-governmental actors, who have
suggested that the principal role to be played by transnational civil society alliances is to articulate the•
problems caused by processes of economic globalisation and to advance alternative visions and
policies: 'most non-governmental organizations see themselves as watchdogs and supporters of those
peoples who question the dominant trends, and those groups and nations that are left behind'.4
This divergenceis central to an understanding of the politics of international NGO networks, and their
wider significance in influencing the global politics of sustainable development. At this point it is
important to note that both approaches recognise the necessity for civil society involvement in global
dialogue, and consider its participation a prerequisite for the legitimacy of the polity. This common
ground can be located in two factors which non-governmental networks are widely understood to
contribute to the political process:
Complementary claims to representation. The authority of democratically elected governments in
international decision-making rests principally on their claim to represent the interests of their
4 'Report of the Seminar on the Involvement of Civil Society in the Follow-up to the Social Summit' para.s 3 & 4. Unpublished account of the meeting
prepared by UN stalT Mohonk Mountain House New York State, USA 22.23 June 1995. The full text of this report is reproduced in Appendix 12.
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electorate. Yet a multiplicity of other forms of authority have been identified which are also
understood to legitimise the participation of different actors in global politics. Representatives from
local government and trade unions have generally been elected, and claim a mandate to speak on
behalf of their constituency which is comparable to that invoked by national governments. Actors with
shared knowledge, or 'epistemic communities' as Peter Haas has defined them, are seen as legitimate
participants because they bring valuable knowledge and expertise to international deliberations. 5 Non-
governmental organisations point to the support of their members as one source of legitimacy, but
more centrally to the relevance of the values they exist to advance. For example, the UNCED
agreements acknowledge the interests of future generations and non-human species —NGOs which
aim to safeguard such interests derive their legitimacy from their claims to represent these interests
(although the means by which these claims could be verified and the accountability of such
organisations may be open to question). Other groupings, such as indigenous peoples' organisations,
women's groups, the private sector and parliamentarians all claim distinct validity as participants in
global politics. These can all be understood as distinct forms of authority which cumulatively
legitimise the international process with which they are associated. As a consequence, networks
created to enable interaction between non-state actors at the global level may be considered as an
intrinsic element in the overall legitimacy of the global polity.
Presenting a 'counter-nanative' to prevailing international processes. Widespread consensus can also
be discerned to support the notion that transnational NOO alliances play a valuable role in inlrodncing
alternative perspectives to challenge ascendant ideologies or approaches. This may entail presenting a
critique of a specific policy or set of objectives, or advancing a more sustained argument against the
mainstream. One key context for this type of activity has been identified as arising from growing
threats to citizenship rights at the national level, particularly as a result of economic activity which is
beyond the control of any one government. To counter these trends, 'people interact on a global scale
in order to develop new sets of rights and obligations that may or may not be enforeed primarily
within a national political context'. 6 By the same token, transnational networks may be identified as
the source of momentum and enthusiasm behind the presentation of new priorities and imperatives at
t	
.	 .
SI Iaas, Peter M. 'Do regimes mattci? Epis*cmic communities and Mcditcnncan pollution contml' pp.377-403 International Ckganiation vol.43, no.3.
Summer 19W).
6 Research Actiritics 1995/6 United Nations Rcscareh Institute for Social Development report. Geneva Swit'eiiand 1996. Located online at:
httpllunrisd.orglcngind&pubVlistfpmgreplres9álrcs9o.htm. Accessed on 1 September 2001.
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the global level. For example, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan focused on this aspect of NGO
collaboration in his address to the UN-sponsored NGO Millennium Foruni-in May 2000:
Surely such worldwide alliances among like-minded NGOs, which have already proved so
successful on issues like debt relief and the International Criminal Court, are the shape of things
to come — on a much wider scale and on a more continuous basis. They make you an effective
force for dealing with governments, and with us in the United Nations; they allow you to
expand your capabilities and your reach. I hope they will enable you to make a real difference on
many broad issues in the future.7
5.1.2 Inherent Weaknesses
Factors widely understood as inherent limitations or weaknesses in international civil society networks
also provide valuable means by which to understand broader questions in global politics. The
assertions that civil society is 'still predominantly nationally framed' 8 and that 'the emergence of
political internationalism and the creation of international governmental organisations' are required to
give international NOOs 'contextual relevance and permanence' 9 were explored in chapter 2. Both
infer that a gulf exists between the national and the global which civil society organisations are ill-
equipped to bridge without the prior existence of an inter-governmental framework for their activities.
An additional shortcoming which has been widely noted in analyses of the activities of international
NGO networks is their inability to establish and maintain links across diverse issue areas. Peter
Padbury illustrates some of the consequences of this failing graphically: 'Every time NGOs start a new
initiative, we have to start from scratch. The well-known and overworked people are called. We
ignore the capacity of thousands of NGOs to analyze, to research, to mobilize, to influence, to
implement, to learn, because we have not taken the time to get organized!"° Evidence from NGO
collaboration in the UNCED context supports this contention: even though many organisations
piioiitised 'the building of equitable, transparent and mutually supportive relations between different
7 UN Press Release SG/SM/741Z GA19710 'Secretaiy-Gaieial,
May 20O0.	
"NGO Revolution", 22
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It Shaw, Martin 'Civil Society and Global Politics: Reyond a Social Movements Apponach' Millennium vol.23 no.3 pp.647-67, Winter 1994 p.655.
9 McConmck, John 11,e Global Fnrbv.umnual Mot'e,ncnt: Reclaiming l'amdise l3clhaven Press London UK I 989 p. 102.
10 Padbury, Peter 'The Alternative Treaties Eperimcnt' Fostci John and Anita Anand eds. Whose World Lr it Anyway? Civil Sociely. the United Nations
and the Multilateral Future pp.4I4.423, The United Nations Association in Canada, Ottawa Canada 1999 p.419.
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networks' which would be 'the foundation for a new era of cooperation'," no alliance which remotely
realised this ambition was ever mobilised, either during the UNCED process or subsequently.
Three further inter-related factors are widely invoked by commentators which call into question the
role of non-governmental networks in global politics:
Questions over legitimacy. Is there a valid scale for measuring the legitimacy of advocacy networks?
On the one hand, we can identify deeply embedded values of accountability, participation, and equity,
which cut across different groupings and issue areas; but on the other, the constituencies served,
methods of working, and measures of success are widely divergent Jn addition, many NGOs do not
demonsirate these values in their own operations or decision-making structures. This diversity was
noted earlier as a strength in that it helped to engage a multiplicity of different fonns of authority in the
global polity. However, problems arise when these sources of influence are perceived to be in conflict.
Paul Nelson's exploration of the functioning of NGO networks lobbying the World Bank identifies
tackling the 'diverse and often contradictory claims to legitimacy' as a key challenge to these alliances
in their attempts to achieve effective self-governance.'2
This presents a daunting challenge. While states' legitimacy as actors in global affairs is not contested
by most JR theorists, and the influence of multinational companies derives predominantly from the
economic ramifications of their activities, no clear form of validation exists which will fit all
international NGO networks. On the contrary, to take the UNCED context as an example, the
International Facilitating Committee (JFC) set up by the Centre for our Common Future, the
Environment Liaison Centre International's International Steeiing Committee (ISC), and the UNCED
NGO Strategy Group cannot be assessed using the same criteria. The IFC took a pragmatic stance, and
derived legitimacy from its ability to bring diverse sectors together and feed their consolidated
perspectives into the official negotiations - a role attacked as 'Green Pollution' by ELCI. The ISC
prioritised the presentation of ideological alternatives to those in the mainstream, and emphasised the
if a
	 Centre krOur Comnion s*.**#',
Futum Nei,,yy* 92 No.3. COCF Geneva December 1990. AvajIablejn Eivlh Sun,,,, it: The NGOArchi yes CD ROM. op. cit
12 Nelson, Paul i., 'Con Iliet, l.egitimacy and Effectiveness: Who Speaks for Whom inTransnational NGO Networks Lobbying the World l3ank?'
Occasional Paper No.7 Hanison Programme on the Future Global Agenda, October1996. Located online at
httJIww.bsos.umd.edu/hanison/papa/paperI7.htm . Accessed on 3 ianuaiy 2002.
importance of advancing the priorities of grassroots and Southern organisations.' 3 The UNCED
Strategy Group constituted a group of experts, with a detailed knowledge Of proceedings and the
capacity to operate effectively in influencing official negotiations; however, it was criticised at this
time for being dominated by Northern organisations.'4
While these distinct groupings co-existed uneasily during the Rio process, no appraisal of the degree
to which they provided complementaty services to NGOs and input to official deliberations was ever
carried out, and no concerted attempt was made to build durable links between them. Failure to
reconcile, or even to address these differences represents a serious weakness in self-governance.
Conceptual limitations. Coalitions formed or reinvigorated as a result of UNCED faced (and continue
to face) a dilemma. They are challenged to take on the holistic perspective required by notions of
sustainable development while maintaining a distinct focus on the issue, sector, or region which they
exist to advance. Difficulty in balancing these two stances was evident in the Manila Meeting of NGO
Networks, which attempted to transcend divisions and clari1r the emergent common ground in shared
efforts to contest the detrimental impacts of economic globalisation. This association ultimately
proved too nebulous for participants (and more significantly still, for their funders).
The contrast with the development of a global coalition in another context is instructive here. Keck
and Silckink argue that opposition to violence against women emerged 'with remarkable speed' as a
common advocacy position around which women's organisations in many parts of the world could
agree and collaborate. They argue that women's groups were able to attract new allies and oblige human
rights organisations to rethink their agendas by presenting new 'metanarratives' of violence and rights.
These drew on correlations between violence against women and abuse of human Tights, and thereby
extended the international understanding of rights to incorporate opposition to physical injury of women.
At the same time, the general framework adopted (opposition to physical violence against women)
gave them the responsibility for doing so on hehalfof the poor and marginalised groups with iiom they were in partnership or. for ,,orc adical groups, in
solidarity, have never been satislactorily supported'. Cleary. Scamus 77w Role of NGO.r under. Iu:lueriw,-ian Political .Stems Macmillan Pn.ss
l3asingstoke UK 1997.
14 Reoo,1 of convetialions with UN Non-Government Liaison Service officials.
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encouraged consideration of universal root causes, and reduced charges of cultural imperialism and the
imposition of Western values.' 5 	-
No comparable coalescence has occurred around issues of sustainable development. One reason for this
is the amorphous, all-encompassing span of the concept, as noted above.' 6 A second difficulty arises
because 'sustainable development' itself is widely contested, a debate which will be revisited later in this
chapter. Finally, charges of 'cultural imperialism' have never been comprehensively countered. The
contrast with the emergence of a global coalition identifying common root causes in violence against
women is particularly instnictive in considering the last of these three. Women's groups have been able
to locate oppressive practices in analogous patriarchal systems, and establish mutual understanding
based on this commonality. Environmental groups have no comparable common ground, while
Northern organisations focusing on international development have much more equivocal claims to
articulate the interests of the world's poor in global politics. If a 'metanarrative' is to emerge in global
advocacy work on sustainable development, a key element must be the involvement of organisations
which have legitimacy as representatives of the most disadvantaged in the North.
Conflicting priorities. Two problems are inescapable for advocacy networks: first, if common ground
is sought between participants, this frequently entails compromise and a dilution of the principles or
the strategic approach pursued by individual organisations; second, accountability is not as fixed as it
is for the network members themselves. These structural difficulties exacerbate inequalities between
network participants, and in turn impinge upon the alliance's external effectiveness. Jane Covey
elaborates the resultant challenges this highlights:
Structurally, alliances incorporate many of the inequalities in wealth power, knowledge and
resources they are tiying to reshape. Where many actors are involved, to what and to whom is
the alliance accountable? Each member has unique interests in addition to those encompassed
by the shared agenda. Competing interests must be negotiated and renegotiated in some fashion
as the alliance canies out its campaign. As the alliance interacts with policy-makers and
opponents, goals and tactics must be changed. Decision-making reflects the power dynamics of
the alliance itself. To what extent do these dynamics perpetuate existing patterns of influence in
15 Kck, MazWrct E. and Kathiii Sikkink A yhisfs lkd8onIc:AthvcayNciturkc hi lizienwilonal PoIiiic (omdI Univosity Ptcss. Ithaca USA 1998
p.195-6. See also Audie Klutz sdiscussion of US activisis sucçcasful ieliiming of apailhcid as an issue of zacial equality, which lin1axIdomcicavi1 ñg1ts
actfvitywith thefrcampaign amwi&Sotnh AfricL Ki Audie ,,i,b,bui,natkiüalRd	 igIe(gfthist4pthei1Caneil L	 sityPzs, hlwia
USA I995.
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society, albeit in the service of a shared purpose? To what extent is the alliance internally
democratic?'1
a.
If unavoidable internal tensions on ideological or organisational issues are compounded by structural
imbalances which disadvantage the less well-resourced participants, the credibility of the network
itself and its more powerful members will be in question. These problems present a challenge to those
involved with networks to establish credible, verifiable means by which objectives can be agreed and
progress assessed through iterative processes.
We should also set Covey's analysis against two other factors: the emergence of communication tools
by which network activities can be much more immediately and comprehensively accountable to
participants; and the dearth of attention in much academic analysis of International Relations to the
broader significance of international relations between non-governmental actors to the global polity.
Gordenker and Weiss suggest that new technologies may oblige international networks to
acknowledge new institutional imperatives: flexible new means for communication, coupled with
existing norms of accountability will require them to regularise much more comprehensive
interactions with local and national participants.' 8 Michael Edwards and his colleagues suggest that
unless financial support 'to promote the voices of smaller organisations and marginalised groups' is
provided by wealthy NGOs, 'public questioning of NGO legitimacy and accountability will continue
to mount fatally undermining the credibility that NGOs will need if they are to play a part in global
debates'.' 9 There is little evidence from the peiiods examined in detail in this thesis to suggest that this
threat to their credibility has provoked a shift in priorities from individual organisations and within
international NGO networks.
5.1.3 Creative Tensions?
The significance of relations within transnational NCIO networks to an assessment of their impact in
any area of global politics has been emphasised in consideration of both the inherent strengths and the
weaknesses evident in the material explored previously. Dialogue, information-sharing, and the
17 Covey, Jane 'Aecountability and Effectiveness in NGO Policy Alliances' in Edwards, Michael and David Holmcs als. Non -Govcnunenzal
&gjnLsattons. Po	 wdAbuI(eBe,ndtheMagk8ulletpp.167.l82, Ea1hscan Lcndon 1995 pJ69. a&.w
18 Gordenkcr. Leon and Thomas 0. Weiss 'Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions' in Weiss. Thomas 0. and Lean
(iordcnker cds. NGOs. i/ac UN. and Global Goivnuuacc pp.l7-50, Lne Ricnncr Boulder USA 1996 p.35.
l9 Edwards, Michael, David Hulme and Tina Wallace NGOs in a Global Futu, Manng Local Deliveiyto Worldwide Leverage' Coniunmec paper
(undated) hupd/w	 c.titech.ac.jp/ng&g-futuia.hmal . Visited on I September 2001.
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negotiation and promotion of norms in the global polity have been identified as particularly important
functions such networks exist to play. In most instances, it is legitimate to stress that diversity in
context, perspective, expertise, priorities or constituency adds further complexity to the internal
politics of these networks. This presents further justification for paying more attention to transnational
relations between non-governmental actors in academic understanding of international affairs.
Examples of divergence within international NGO coalitions include the following:
Local - global. Keck and Sikkink identify the multiple interactions of global and domestic politics as
key sources of change in the international system. Their focus on transnational advocacy networks
leads them to conclude that 'complex global networks cany and re-frame ideas, insert them in policy
debates, pressure for regime formation, and enforce existing international norms and rules, at the same
time that they tiy to influence particular domestic issues'. 2° Princen and Finger suggest that the role of
environmental NGOs is particularly significant in this respect - they are able to make links between
biophysical realities and political processes, and between local circumstances and global decision-
making. As a result, they constitute the principal motivation for action by articulating the problems to
be confronted, generating pressure on governments to respond, and providing viable alternative
models where possible. They conclude that their effectiveness depends upon activity at both extremes:
'NOOs make their contribution when they translate biophysical change under conditions of global
ecological crisis into political change and do so at both the local and the global levels'.2
By contrast, as noted earlier, relations between the local, national and global levels have often been
weak in international NGO networks, and uncertainty over their relative significance and resultant
issues of accountability have sometimes undermined networks 'effectiveness and credibility. The
models inferred by Keck and Sikkink, and Princen and Finger assume an ability to transcend barriers
between location, issue, and constituency which are not much in evidence in the UNCED process, or
in some of the other contexts I have considered. Preparations for the Rio Summit provide one telling
instance of an attempt to recognise civil society organisations 'ability to deliver diverse perspectives
from local and global levels and initiate pressure for change. The Bergen Conference organised by the
UN Economic Council for Europe incorporated a 'new and unique participatory process', in which a
.q*'. '*3	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 . .
range of civil society organisations negotiated with governnient . delegations man attempt toreach 'the'
20 Keck, Margaret 13, and Kathiyn Sikkink Acüvists Bc.wnd Bonici:	 Networks àe liileneaiionalPoliuic.c op. cit. p.199.
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broadest possible consensus'. It was anticipated that this approach was 'set to become the model for
the 1992 process'. Related initiatives would occur at national level, as part Ma continuum intended to
build consensus at every level in preparation for the Summit. 22 Subsequent backtracking by the
UNCED Secretary General Maurice Strong, and the absence of any strong lobby from NGOs to
support the Bergen model suggest that this initiative was not well-rooted in existing non-governmental
priorities. Shortly after this, a considered critique asked whether the principal purpose of UNCED was
to be the advancement of viable models for national-level sustainable development, with some co-
ordination globally, or the identification of international solutions to problems which transcend
national boundaries. 23 In attempting to operate on both planes simultaneously, UNCED would appear
to have confiated distinct policy levels without any clear recognition of the distinct necessities of each.
In tacitly accepting this process, NGO networks failed to assert the role Princen and Finger set out for
them.
As noted above, stnictural inequalities within international NGO alliances can compromise their
capacity to achieve the societal change they desire. These factors are particularly evident in relations
between small, grassroots organisations and large, well resourced transnational NGOs, where the
values and rationale of the dominant partners can subsume those of the others. Despite this, a strong
notional commitment to norms of accountability and equality is evident in the vast majority of
international NGO networks. A collection of documents constituting efforts at self-regulation by
NGOs collaborating at the international level has been collated by Tatsuro Kunugi and Martha
Schweitz. The authors conclude that
[a]lthough the texts and contents of these documents are important, what maybe more valuable
in the long term is the highly participatory process each adopting network or group has gone
through in the course of reaching agreement on the text. In many cases, as explained in the
accompanying commentaries, this has been an unparalleled exercise in self-identification of the
groups of organizations, as they collectively try to define their purposes, their methods,
standards, and values.24
21 Princen, Thomas and Mauhias Finger Envuvnmc,ua! NGOs in ø'orld Politics: LAn/Jag the Local and the Glotal, Routledge, London 1994 p.222.
22 Centre fbr Our Common Futwe R,w,dddnd Buileth, No.8 qdL, Jwie 1990. 	.. 	 g.	 j
23 Thomson, Koy'ThiTwo Faces of the UK National Rcpcat' Centre fbrOur Common Puture Network '92 No.2 op. cit., October1990: Available on
lwth .Sunu,iit: 77w NGO ,1r(hive CD ROM. op. ü.
24 Kunugi, latsum and Martha Schwe,tz uls. Codes of Conducifor Parn:eishsp a. Govesnance. Texts and Conunenlwies presented at the World Civil
Society Conference, Montreal 7-Il December1999.
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In addition, networks dealing with environmental issues or sustainable development share at least a
theoretical obligation to recognise the significance of the small-scale and specific, through devolving
decision-making to the lowest appropriate level and acknowledging the particular needs of the local
environment. Technological innovations are presenting new ways in which these principles can be
translated into effective practice, and presenting new imperatives for international alliances.
The same principles of accountability and equity shape interactions between Northern and Southern
NGOs within international networks. The existence of these shared concepts (sometimes spelt out in
negotiated codes of conduct, but often assumed and not made specific), coupled with structural
inequalities noted earlier provide sustained impetus for Northern NGOs to attempt to establish
working relations with Southern organisations. Their own legitimacy as international actors depends
to a significant extent on their capacity to develop mutually beneficial working relations with Southern
partners. For the latter, access to the expertise, information, and resources of Northern groups can be
beneficial. Participation in a global network can enable national organisations to benefit from the
'boomerang effect' noted in chapter 2, whereby links forged through the network lead to additional
international pressure on the country's government to pursue particular policies. The EarthAction
Network is an example of a collaboration predicated on this trade-off between needs and interests.
Such relations often support assumptions that expertise and influence are the preserve of Northern
NGOs, while Southern organisations have little to offer but a clearly circumscribed understanding of
their particular context and, through their endorsement, the capacity to confer greater legitimacy on the
(Northern-led) policies of the network as a whole. Paul Nelson recognises the systemIc Imbalances
which make it difficult for Southern organisations to access necessary information and relevant
government officials, and prevailing assumptions that their main input to the policy dialogue relates to
their domestic circumstances. 25 However, Nelson also identifies an instance where this imbalance is
not evident in the leading role played by Southern organisations in building an alliance to support
replenishment of IDA 11 (the World Bank 's International Development Association). This occurred
despite the initial hostility of US-based organisations in particular and demonstrates the capacity of
•	 a
25 Joanna Ke quotes a Nigerian aciivist who complained that northdm NGOs claim to represent Soâthem groups in ottlerto gain finding and influcnce:
'Wily should we link hands? Local NGOs cannot get support for their woi1 so we have to affiliate with international NGOs. Then we all hold up our kinds
to the 'gates of heaven'. When the international NGOs amve at the gate, they drop us and do the talking on our behalf? Kerr, Joanna 'Strategies br Action'
in Kerr, Joanna ed. Ou,r by Right: Women s Right aslluniw, RighLc pp.157-167, Zcd Books, London 1993 p.166.
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Southern NGOs to play the leading role in determining positions taken by a global coalition. 26 A
comparable influence can be discerned in the UNCED process - Bill Hinchberger concludes that
'Third-World non-governmental organizations as a whole were credited with encouraging some of
their more traditional northern counterparts to take a harder look at the social ramifications of the
environment-development dichotomy',27 while Martin Khor of the Third World Network states that:
Northern officials and especially Northern NGOs have become much more sensitised to the
development needs and perspectives of the South ... Many environmental groups which in the
past focused only on saving plant and animal life have come to a new understanding that
resolving environmental problems requires tackling North-South and rich-poor inequities at the
same time.28
Conflicting imperatives should also be acknowledged: Southern non-governmental organisations
participating in the global polity often have much closer relations with their governments than their
Northern counterparts, identifying shared objectives from a common understanding of the (Northern)
responsibility for resource depletion and the perpetuation of inequalities in use and access to
resources, for example. In this schema Northern NGOs are not much better than their governments,
advancing unrealistic visions of the South which maintain 'structural Southern underdevelopment and
dependency'.29 Tension can also arise between the national and global contexts in which NGOs are
operating. For example, difficulties experienced by the Brazilian NGO Forum in delivering a
'grassroots perspective on environment and development issues' while slrengthening international
collaboration leading to 'the establishment of new, equitable and sustainable development paradigms'
were explored in Chapter 3 Probletna in reconci1in o &tit cetz of stW &atica1
global levels were not adequately acknowledged or tackled by the Forum's principal international
partners.
The value of international NGO Networks. Questions also arise over the degree to which subsuming
individual NGOs'perspectives in attempts to achieve a shared position or understanding dilutes their
particular voice. Chatterjee and Finger suggest that this marginalises Southern organisations and
26 Nelson, Paul J. 'Conflict, Legitimacy and EfFcctivcncss: Who Spcaks ftir Whom in Transnational NGO Networks Lobbying the World Bank?', op. cit.
27 Hinchberger, Bill 'Non-Governmental Organition.v The Third Fonc in the 1]inI World' tn Berga, Ilcige Ole and Geurg Pamiann eds. Green
Globe Yeerbbok 1993 Oxfbrd UnlvaiiftyPre* Oxfi,ni 1993. Avalbble orrEa,ih Sunmift: The NGOArctdws CD ROM,
28 Khor. Martin 'Third World Network's Analis of the Earth Summit: Disappointment and Hope' Terra Vns 9 June 1992 pt
29 Krut. Rita GIoL'aljzatjo,, and Civil Society: NGO Influence iii International Dethion-MaLing United Nations Reteareh Institute lbr Social Development
Discussion Paper No. 83, Geneva Switzerland 1997. Available online at httpJ/www.rrojasdatabank.orgitoc83.htm. Aceessrd on 3 Januaty 2002.
30 Brazilian NGO Fomm 'Prepaxataiy Fonim of Brazilian NGOs' Bulletin I, Sao Paulo Brazil October 1990.
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reinforces the interests of 'rich and powerful lobbyists', while 'the culturally diverse environment and
development movement diluted its inherent strength stemming from its very diversity and unique
approach to local situations'. 31 By privileging a lobbying model which favours the rich and well-
connected, both NGO networks and those of the private sector have been able to satisfy the
requirements of their most influential constituents and establish for themselves a pivotal role in future
international diplomacy on issues of environment and development.
This seems to distort and over-generalise the roles played by, and the diversity that exists among,
NGO networks. Chatterjee and Finger downplay the significance of networks as the contexts within
which dialogues on issues of principle and the establishment of widely applicable norms are
conducted, and consequently posit a spurious polarity between a scenario in which a wide variety of
organisations with diverse perspectives are given a collaborative role in negotiating international
agreements and an assumed reality where NGO coalitions are complicit in ensuring the homogeneity
and sanitising of non-governmental input to UNCED.
An alternative articulation of the significance of NGO networks can also be discerned over this period.
Writing of the creation of the Alliance of Northern People on Environment and Development
(ANPED) in 1990, Tord Bjork concludes:
So far the environmental and similar movements in the industrial countries have been fairly or
very single-issue oriented. They also tend to become more and more specialized in a specific
way of working. It has been easy to gain quick victories through this narrow issue orientation
and specialization. But these victories tend to be unimportant as the bigger issues and problems
are left unchallenged. To get a working cooperation between movements working with different
issues as well as in different regions of the world is a way to counteract the political contra-
productivity the specialization is creating in the long run. Without this is it hard to maintain an
independent critical position towards international established institutions.32
Tackling 'the bigger issues' requires co-operation between organisations working on different issues
and in different parts of the world. This is a necessary precondition for the maintenance of an
'independent critical position'. Bjork 's conclusion could be understood as the antithesis of that
propounded by Chatterjee and Finger— pluralism is of limited value if it is expressed through
_____________________________ S	 . ..	
.
31 Chatteijec, Pratap and Matthias Finger The Earth Bmkers: Pony.r. Politics and World Deielopincnt Routkdgc London 1994 p.170.
32 lljork.TonI 'Northern ,\Iliance: l:urnpe. North Arnenca and (JNCI1I) 1992 AllianceufNoithem Peupleon Iinviwnnicnt and Development' written as 'a
contribution to the discussion between environmental federation in Sweden and ecological groups in Latin Ametica prior to UNCED' unpublished 1991.
Available on Instituto dcl Teeca Mundo The Earth Summit CD Ron,: the NGOArchwes ITEM, Montevideo Uruguay 1995.
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disjointed campaigns on unconnected issues. Inferaction between organisations leads to development
of a coherent ideological framework which can also function as a critique of the inter-governmental
process. A rare example of such interaction is the production of A Vision from the South —How wealth
degrades the environment: sustainabilily in the Netherlands by ANPED and the Dutch Alliance for
Sustainable Development in 1992 for which authors from Brazil, Indonesia, Tanzania and India were
invited to research Dutch society and assess its impact on the global environment.33
Others. Additional contexts explored previously include the divergence between ideological and
pragmatic rationales evident in the functioning of the International Steering Committee and the
International Facilitating Committee during UNCED preparations, and tensions between networics
focusing on development and environment issues over the same period.
A theoiy of global politics which adopts a pluralistic interpretation of influence must attempt to tackle
some of the broad conceptual contexts outlined above. How, for example, can notions of legitimacy
and accountability be reframed so that a diversity of overlapping, at times conflicting versions are
recognised as co-existing? Does analysis of the politics of international civil society networks provide
useful analogies for the study of inter-state relations? There are instances in which attempts to
negotiate international shared principles or plans of action by NGOs provide much more insight into
conceptual difficulties and societal conflicts than corresponding dialogue between governments. The
Alternative Treaties formulated at the Global Fonim in 1992 can be interpreted in this way. Efforts by
international NGO networks to transcend barriers between distinct issue areas may also prefigure
comparable challenges arising in official proceedings. The potential for conflict between international
investment agreements and global environmental conventions and social commitments was identified
by the loose coalition of NGOs opposing the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investments before any
coherent recognition of these difficulties was acknowledged by governments.
Technological advances, which are progressively transforming the activities of international NGO
networks, present new challenges for the study of global politics. Networks are increasingly obliged to
maintain regular contact with their members, and to devise means by which they can be answerable
for their policies and activitie. DQes this presage Comparable reintpretations of the mechanics of .
33 Gomes, Mcrcio, Chandni Kimna, Sami Songanbele & Rajiv Vora A Vision from the South - How wealth degrades the eswuvnment: sustainabilizy in the
Nelher!ànds International Books Utmcht the Nhalands 1992.
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accountability for other actors? Changes in access to data and information are also significant: Jessica
Mathews states that 'In every sphere of activity, instantaneous access to inrormation and the ability to
put it to use multiplies the number of players who matter and reduces the number who command great
authority'. One consequence of this is a revised understanding of accountability for governments:
'NGOs' easy reach behind other states' borders forces governments to consider domestic public
opinion in countries with which they are dealing, even on matters that governments have traditionally
handled strictly between themselves'.34
Having established the key contested questions and issues which those involved in international NGO
collaborations prioritise, it may be beneficial to revisit various theoretical understandings of global
politics to assess the degree to which they accommodate issues raised here.
5.2 Creating space for civil society networks in global polity
frameworks
5.2.1 A broader conception of influence - beyond the state-centric
In his principal work The Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull is explicit about the fact that in considering
international society he was dealing with a society of states. This society of states exists, he maintains,
'when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in
the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with
one another, and share in the working of common institutions'. 35
 Bull rejected the notion of an
international society made up of individuals, identifying the difficulties posed by the development of
international human rights agreements as a clear indictment of this approach:
Carried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is
subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organized as a society of sovereign
states. For, if the rights of each man can be asserted on the world political stage over and against
the claims of his state, and his duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as a servant or a
citizen of that state, then the position of the state as a body sovereign over its citizens, and
entitled to command their obedience, has been subject to challeng; and the structure of the
socicty of sovereign states has been ptaced in jeopardy. The way is lçft opeh for the subverion
34 Mathews. Jessica 1. Power Shift'. Foreign Affairs vol.76 No. I pp.50-66. Wa.hingion DC January / February 1997. Located online at
http//ww.yalc.edu/iasfsimson/stimson99africa/power_shift.htm . Visited on 3 January 2002.
35 Bull, Hedley The Anarchical Society: A  Study ofOrder in World Politics 2nd edition Columbia University Press, New Yo* 1995 p.13.
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of the society of sovereir states on behalf of the alternative organizing principle of a
cosmopolitan community.3
Bull implies that authority can shift from the state system to an 'alternative', presenting a dichotomy
between these possibilities. Keck and Sikkink agree that non-state actors are beginning 'to undermine
state sovereignty'. They suggest that 'new global actors' - most notably transnational advocacy
networks —are contributing to the formulation of 'a new system with overlapping authority and
multiple loyalty',37 and place these phenomena in the context of the 'erosion of [state] sovereignty'.38
The assertion that some form of transformation has occurred in global politics which has led to the
emergence of political actors other than governments is contentious. Robert Wolfe asserts that we
have always lived in a 'multicentric world'. Change has occuired in 'our assumptions, now exposed as
fictions. The actors of interest today are not new, but we literally could not see them within a
Westphalian worldview.' 39 Wolfe argues that the state is only one of many sources of normative
order, and suggests that we should 'see law and authority not only as derivatives of states, but of other
sources as well, including the private sector'. 4° A further perspective on these developments is
presented by Jan Aart Scholte, who writes of 'the general contemporaiy trend whereby 'international
organisation' of the Westphalian system has mutated into 'global governance' involving complex
interlinkages of states, multilateral institutions and civil society'.4'
Wolfe also calls into question Keck and Sikkink's claim that state sovereignty is being eroded. In his.
consideration of various sources of authority, Wolfe introduces the 'lump of power fallacy', to show
that governments' loss of authority is exaggerated. Those who are misled by the fallacy assume there
is only a finite quantity of authority, and that it can be sliced up and assigned to different levels in the
political system and to different political participants. When one level is given jurisdiction or
authority, another must relinquish it. It is a 'zero-sum game'. But if we understand that this
assumption originates in a state-centric perspective, we can see that authority and power can have
several sources and can multiply as people come together for various purposes. NGOs, inter-
36 Thid., p.13.
37 Keck, Margant it and Kathiyn Sikkink Actin'cts I3crnnd Bonle.cop cit. pp.2O9.I()
38 Ibid. p.215.	 .	 .
39 Quoted in Wolfish,'Ijaniel and Qordon Smith 'Goiemanoe and Policy in aMulticaninc Wosid' Cana4lan hthlic Po&y-k edePoiiiiqués ,.
vol.XXVI Supplement / Numéro Special 2. 2000 p.560.
40 Ibid. p.S59.
41 Schol(c, Jan Aart 'In the tbothills: Relations between the IMF and civil society' in Higgolt, Richard A., Cieollrey RI). UnderhilL and Andnas Bieltx ads.
Non.SgateAcgo, and Authority in the Global Syctcm pp.256.273, Routlodge! Warwick Studi in Globalisation London 2000 p.271.
244
governmental organisations, central banks and multinational corporations have gained power and
authority over the past twenty years, but not necessarily at the expense of the state. The state remains
authoritative, but it must work with other actors. This is a 'non-zero-sum process'.42
Cooper and Hocking explore similar ideas about the authority of NGOs in their consideration of
changes in the world of diplomacy arising from emerging awareness of NGOs' influence in
international affairs. In considering the impact of anti-MA! [Multilateral Agreement on Investment]
campaigners, they conclude '[tb say that transnational NGOs have become more significant is not to
suggest that governments no longer are endowed with abundant resources provided by the
sovereignty-related niles in the international system'. On the contrary, the long tenn strategy of such
organisations is to gain access and status within institutions conducting trade negotiations, and they
require support from governments to achieve this. Consequently, 'in the complex interactions of
contemporary world politics, it is often difficult to determine the points of discontinuity between
governmental and non-governmental policy and processes'. 43 Yet despite this increasing interaction,
the authors identit' a central paradox in analyses which suggest that processes of globalisation have
bolstered the positions of transnational NOOs, which have legitimacy and transparency in their
activities 'unavailable to governments'. Cooper and Hocking point to 'a growing sense of unease and
frustration over the loss of functions by governments', and conclude that 'there is a growing concern
that any over-enthusiasm for the emergence of civil society masks a counter-productive anti-statist
agenda'.
Brad Roth proposes a reinterpretation of notions of sovereignty, based not on the Westpbalian
precedent so much as on events of the past fifty years - sovereignty is a 'dainic principle' that has
'developed through the series of declarations, resolutions, and concrete acts associated with
decolonization and the enhanced participation of the less powerful in world affairs'. 45 To frame the
debate as sovereignty versus human rights is 'to ignore that sovereignty can itself be characterized as a
42 Wollih. Danici and Goniun Smith 'Ciovemance and Policy in a Multicentric World' Canadian Public Policy-..Ina!ysedc Politiques. (. cit. p.563.
43 Cooper, Andrew F, and Brian Hocking Govemments, Non-governmmtai Oianisaüons and the Re-calibratton of Diplomacy' pp.363-376 Global
Societjvo1.14 no.3,2000 p.369	 •	 .	 -	 .	 "• *'
44 Ibid. pp.3(,9-70.
45 Roth. l3rad R. 'What Ever I lappenod to Sovcnigntv? Reflections on International Law Methodology' in Ku, Charlotte and Thomas G Wciss ods.
Towards Llnderstandiiig Global Governance: The lnternatio,,aI Law and International Relations Toolbar pp.69-107. Acaclemic Council on the United
Nations System Rcpoils and Papers no.2 Brown University, Rhode Island USA 1998 p.96-7.
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human right', most clearly embodied in the right of self-determination enshrined in Article 1 of the
two main human rights covenants.
These various arguments centre upon the ambivalence inherent in Hedley Bull's term 'cosmopolitan
community'. Bull infers a relocation of individual rights from national to international level, which
would consequently displace sovereign states from their central role in international politics. Keck and
Sikkink believe that a new system with 'overlapping authority' is emerging. They focus on the impact
of transnational advocacy networks, which include representatives from states and international
organisations in their work. As a result, 'this process of negotiation within the emergent cosmopolitan
community is not "outside" the state. Instead it involves state actors in active reflection on state
interests as well'. This should be understood as an extension of Krause and Knight's work on the
'state / society perspective', which considers that 'the state cannot be considered in isolation from civil
society: it is defined by the series of links that form both the state and the societal groups''7
5.2.2 International Relations theory revisited
To what extent does this formulation differ from the theoretical models developed in the study of
International Relations considered in previous chapters? Three broad approaches have been explored:
realism; regime theozy, and global governance theoiy. The first two focus predominantly on the
interaction of states, and posit a hierarchical, essentially static stnicture evident in their relations.
Hedley Bull's defence of state sovereignty, noted above, illustrates the former, while Peter Haas
outlines the assumptions underlying regime theory
Within the analytic framework explicitly or tacitly accepted by most proponents of international
regime theory, regimes are valued as stable forms to order international behavior and mitigate
conflict in an anarchic world.48
Haas suggests that regimes may contribute to the empowerment of new groups - 'epistemic
communities' with particular expertise which connotes authority in international affairs. The
involvement of new actors may transform regimes from static frameworks into 'evolving
46 Kedc, Maiaiet E. mid Kattuyt Silddnlc AdMU Be$rond BonIe* op. dt pit6. 	 ''	 .
47 Krause, Keith and W Andy Knight ods. Slate. Society ai,d i/ic UNSyttem: changing penpectiivs on niultilatemlisni United Nitions University
 Tokyo
1995 pp.4.5.
481 Iaas, Peter M. 'Do regimes matter? Epistcmic communities and Mcditcnanean pollution control' pp.459-85 International Organization vol.43 no.3
Summer 1989 p.484.
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arrangements that contribute to greater understanding, recognition of common interests, and
convergence on a new set of policies'. 49 This suggests some similarities with the global 'cosmopolitan
community' referred to above. However, Haas recognises only a small and circumscribed collection of
experts as 'epistemic communities', and locates their influence directly with the authority of the state:
'under recent conditions of uncertainty ... leaders, in order to attenuate such uncertainty, maybe
expected to look for individuals who are able to provide authoritative advice, on whom to pin the
blame for policy failure or simply as a stop-gap measure to appease public clamour for action' .° This
constitutes a relatively minor adjustment to the established framework, not a radical reworking. Haas
does not acknowledge transnational networks beyond this narrow clique of experts, who are able to
function as international actors principally through the authority conferred by governments. He does
not consider their interactions with other non-state actors worthy of any detailed appraisal. As
explored in chapter 2, international NGO networks perform a diverse range of functions which do not
all comply with this state-centric approach; it is also significant to note no clear hierarchy of authority
can be corroborated from the activities of these alliances which might place collaboration intended to
influence governments or inter-governmental bodies above other forms of interaction. -
The third theoretical construct explored in earlier chapters is global governance. This cannot be
reduced to a coherent set of principles or a framework for interpreting global politics - it has been
employed in such diverse and often contradictory ways that any attempt to do so would be futile. Even
so,it is still valid to assess the ways in which various theorists have interpreted the term, as this
contested ground is central to the context for the thesis as a whole. Chapters 1 and 2 outlined some of
the principal understandings of 'global governance', introducing Oran Young's notion of 'governance
without government' in international affairs, 5 ' and the distinction drawn by James Rosenau:
'[governance] is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority ... whereas
governments can function even in the face of widespread opposition to their policies'. 52 These authors
relocate authority in certain contexts from individual governments to a more diffuse level of
interaction within international society. While regime theory posits the existence of international
communities (perhaps including non-state actors) addressing the governance of particular issue areas,
49 Ibid. p.482.
	 .	 ..	 '.	 .'	 .
5OiJaas. PeterM. 'Obtaining International Envnnrnen al Prntectionthrnugh Fpistcrnic Consensus' .4fi/k,,niurn pp.347-363, LI9 no3, 1990 p.350.
SI Young. Onto R International Go;s.s'nance: I'svIectii.g she Environment ü, a Ssazclets Society Cornell University Press. Ithaca USA 1994 p.7.
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this approach to global governance explores evidence for more holistic structures playing comparable
roles. This shift in focus does not constitute a significant challenge to the state-centric presumptions
underlying mainstream JR theory - the model is still implicitly hierarchical. Thus Don Hubert, in his
consideration of means by which to gauge the impact of NGOs in global politics, concludes that '[a]
focus on NGO effectiveness vis-à-vis states is crucial since global governance or social change,
regardless of the specific definitions, will depend to some extent on the agreement of states'.53
Kees van der PijI defines 'global governance' as 'the world-wide integration of economic, social and
political organisation into a mediated complex of state and quasi-state authority'. From this Marxist
perspective the capacity of NGOs or 'civil society' to constItute a viabe poitIcal opposition is
fundamentally compromised by their organisational limitations, The degree to which they are
representative and accountable is frequently unclear, and the likelihood of co-option by the state, the
'international quasi-state' or international corporate actors is very high. As with the above analyses,
there is little scope for NGO networks to constitute a distinct and sustained sphere of influence in
processes global governance.
An alternative understanding of 'global governance' is advanced in various contexts, which challenges
the centrality of the state. The Commission on Global Governance states that '[alt the global level,
governance .. must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organisations, citizens'
movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market..' 55 Georg Kell and John Ruggie
argue that the formation of a 'global compact', a set of norms designed to govern the behaviour of
transnational corporations, did not require the involvement or the support of national govermnents,56
Ruggie has championed the Global Compact through his role as advisor to UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan, emphasising that, while the nine core values comprising the Compact derive from various core
agreements negotiated by states, including the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the Rio
Declaration on the Environment and Development, the authority and legitimacy of the Compact arise
52 Roscnau, James N. 'Governance, Order and Change in World Politics' in Roscnau, James N. and Emst-Ouo Czmpid nds. Governance Withow
Governn,ant: Order and Change in World Politics pp.t-29, Cambridge Univessity Press, Cambridge UK 1992 p.4.
53 Hubcri, Don 'lnfemng Influence: Gauging the bnpact of NGOs' in Ku, Charlotte and Thomas G Weiss ads. Towards Understanding Global
Goveniance: hit' lnternalio,,al Law and International Relations Toolbox pp.27.S1, op.cit. p.43.
54 Van der Piji, Kees Transnianal Classes and Isuensadonal Relations RIPE Sics/ Routledge Press, London 1998. Soc also RowelI, Andrew Green
Backlash: Global Subwivlon of the H VnMenMMOveS,Ib,J Routiedge 199 p.I62	 .	 -
55 The Commission on Global Govomance Our Global Neighborhood Oxford Univetsity Press, Oxford 19S p.3.
56 Kell. (k'org and John Ruggie 'Global Markets and Social Legitimacy: 11 Case of the TMGlobal Compact", paper presented at the conference Governing
the Public Domain bcyond the Era ofthe Washington Consensus? Redrawing the Line between the State and the Market, York Univenity Tomnto 4-6
November1999.
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from the coming together of the United Nations and NGOs with corporate actors. The direct
involvement of states is not necessary.
A further conceptualisation of global governance is put forward in the 1995 Benchmark Survey of
NGOs. This suggests that NGOs collaborate at the international level because states are 'unable to
solve key global problems'. Consequently, 'the international NGO community sees itself— and is
increasingly seen by governments - as part of embryonic institutional structures that will define a
different form of global governance, a model in which citizen action occurs at the global level'. 57 This
is a startlingly close echo of Hedley Bull's nemesis, the 'cosmopolitan society', and provides a further
justification for privileging the interaction between non-governmental actors through various fonns of
international alliance as of intrinsic importance in understanding global politics.
Global advocacy networks coalesce around shared values and priorities. They often prioritise
opposition to the detrimental impacts of neo-liberal economic globalisation, asserting principles of
equality, self-determination, sustainability and other values which unite them. Michael Edwards et al.
point to a set of challenges to such 'embryonic institutional structures' which emphasise the
significance of their self-governance, and suggests that the opportunity exists for these networks to
'become vehicles for international co-operation in the mainstream of politics and economics',
engaging in crucial challenges such as the relative importance of economic growth, political equity,
and social benefit within and between societies.58 The corollaty of this is that NGOs have to
demonstrate the principles they espouse in their interactions, using networks as the means by which to
illustrate the viability of alternative approaches. Unless this happens in areas such as the provision of
financial support to assist small and marginalised groups, members of international NGO networks
will increasingly be seen as a self-serving elite, using status and credibility derived from principles not
evident in their activities.
57 Norwegian Royal Minisuy of Foreign Allaits Democratic Global Chil Gow!rnanCe Report of the 1995 Bcncl,mv* Surt'cyoJNGOs Oslo Noriiy 1996
993-S.
58 Edwards, Michael, David Hulme and Tina Wallace tQc) in a Global Future: Manying Local Delivety to Worldwide L.everagc' op. CIL
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5.3 UNCED and Beyond: Precedents or Anomalies for the
Study of Global Civil Society Networks?
This is not the story of good NGOs confronting evil governments ... This is the story of
humanity assuming responsibility for its own future through increasingly representative forms
of political organization and through a fuiiy engaged civil society.59
Understanding of the significance of UNCED has subtly shifted since the event. While attention in the
immediate aftermath focused principally on the official texts and agreements negotiated between
governments, or perhaps on the treaties and positions formulated by NGOs, now commensurate
attention is given to the scale of the Summit, and the presence of huge numbers and diversity of
interests. These are understood to constitute a significant phenomenon in themselves and a source of
distinct legitimacy for what has been widely termed 'the spirit of Rio'. 6° Because sustainable
development requires the acceptance that multiple forms of legitimacy exist, diversity assumes a
particular importance - but the link between the two is often assumed and not substantiated.
Subsequent initiatives at national level, such as the formulation of Local Agenda 21s and the creation
of National Councils for Sustainable Development, which are predicated on the importance of
engaging societal actors in efforts to achieve sustainable development, can be understood in part as the
transference of that legitimacy to related processes.
Both the official UNCED proceedings and the International NGO Forum attempted to redefine civil
society. In both instances, two factors combined to provide the impetus for this effort: first, the
rationale of sustainable development, which emphasises the need to devolve decision-making, engage
all social actors and acknowledge distinct needs and priorities; and second, the unprecedented nature
of the event itself; which offered the opportunity to establish new understandings and imperatives
which would resonate subsequently.
How should we interpret the impact of UNCED on theories of global politics? While the texts
negotiated have been of questionable value in shaping understanding of the role of civil society in the
global polity or at other levels of governance, the conflicts evident in the UNCED process between
59 Schweflz, MaiTha NGO Participation in International (hwcnianec: Ibe Question of legitirnacy' Proceedings, Annual Mecling ofthcArnencan Society
of International Law, 1995.
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different perspectives, organisational models, and ideological frameworks provide some valuable
insights.
One clear lesson lies in the differences between the short term and the longer-term effects of UNCED,
and the ways in which its significance has been interpreted subsequently. in the period before and
immediately following the Rio Summit, the NGO Treaties and other means by which NGOs could
articulate alternative visions and approaches to achieving sustainability were seen as major
achievements. However, they quickly became marginalised as networks established to influence inter-
governmental decision-making and streamline NGO interaction with the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development and other bodies assumed a more central role.
During the period from 1993 to the late 1990s, the notion of international NGO networks developing
perspectives on sustainable development which were deliberately separate from inter-governmental
processes was not widely supported. However, a number of separate alliances developed (such as the
MA! Coalition and Jubilee 2000) which touched on issues of sustainable development, and drew on
the legacy of the Alternative Treaties and similar initiatives. With hindsight, these networks picked
approaches developed through existing, issue-specific networks (the International Baby Food Action
Network for example) and from the UNCED process (in that they focused on issues central to
sustainable development). They were overtly political, building on conviction rather than pragmatism,
but they addressed a limited agenda, rather than attempting to establish coherence across a broad lange
of issue areas.
A second significant focus has been on relations between Northern and Southern organisations. Again,
there are precedents for networks functioning globally and involving NGOs from all parts of the world
(on gender issues, at least since the second World Conference on Women in Mexico in 1985; the
World Federation of United Nations Associations; and so on). Imbalances of power and capability in
structures involving NGOs from North and South were identified earlier as the cause of particular
problems within a number of global networks. Recurrent difficulties experienced by Southern
organisations include the loss of senior staff to jobs in developed countries, and inferior
communications technology. However, it is also significant to note that in a number of instances
60 Scc fbr example Mabcy, Nick Rio +10: Doomed Wonklst or Critical Political Opportunity? Green Globe Task Fone Discussion Papa, London
August 2000.
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Southern NGOs have assumed a leading role in the functioning of international networks. This was
the conclusion reached by a number of commentators on UNCED and on the work of transnational
NGO networks lobbying the World Bank, as noted earlier.
Is it legitimate to claim that sustainable development necessarily privileges Southern experience and
perspectives? Certainly attention to issues of Northern over-consumption in general, and resultant
problems such as climate change suggests that this is valid. A range of NGOs (most notably Friends of
the Earth International) have asserted that Northern countries owe an 'ecological debt' to the South,
resulting from the over-exploitation of limited environmental resources, and current and anticipated
difficulties due to ecological degradation.61 This perception of established and continuing injustice
could help to fuel the types of financial and technical support from Northern NGOs to Southern,
marginalised organisations identified by Michael Edwards et at. as essential if NGOs are to play a
continued role in global debates.62
Thus on various issues of principle, Southern NGOs are already playing leading roles within
international networks, and can be expected to continue to do so. Many Northern organisations,
particularly those working on development projects, are increasingly challenged to use local expertise
rather than employing Northern consultants. ActionAid has split up its programme departments and
located them in its offices around the world, rather than having them all based in London. The
International Institute for Environment and Development has appointed an Executive Board with
participants from all regions of the world, in place of the principally European and North American
body which took decisions previously, lIED has also initiated a series of Regional Advisozy Panels,
held to date in New Delhi, Accra and Buenos Aires, to help gauge the value of its work to Southern
organisations and to explore areas for future policy work and collaboration.63 In some instances, the
implicit recognition that Southern experience should be privileged has resulted in tensions -
ideological divisions in Friends of the Earth International were noted in Chapter 2; the Jubilee 2000
Coalition did not always endorse positions advanced by its members which collaborated as Jubilee
South.
6! Sec for example the website	 Ecologica / Ecological Debt' maintained by Acción Ecologica in Ecuador
httpflcosmosvisiuncs.com/DcudaEcologica . Visited on I Scptonbw 200 I.
62 Eds, Michael, David Hulme and Tina Wallace p(3() in a Global Future: Manying Local Delivery to Worldwide Leveige', op cit
63 International Institute for Environment and Development lIED Annual Repofl 1999-2000 lIED, London 2000.
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It is not clear whether these practical changes in the structures of individual NGOs and coalitions can
begin to address systemic imbalances between well-resourced and well-cnnected organisations
(principally based in Northern countries) and those which do not have adequate funding and have little
capacity to engage with global processes (notably from Southern countries). However, evidence of
action in reducing inequalities between Northern and Southern NGOs is increasingly seen as a central
element in the credibility of better-resourced organisations.
One area in which dramatic change could occur is in communications technology." The use of
listservers and email was already evident among NGOs during the UNCED process 65 and has
substantially expanded since. The accessibility of official documents and data, and the ability to share
information quickly and extensively have had major impacts in all parts of the world. Although there
are still huge numbers of people with little access to these technologies, their existence creates the
possibility of much greater interaction in future. Helping to provide access to these technologies has
become another responsibility incumbent on Northern NGOs in their dealings with Southern partner
organisations. It is also Iransfonning the nature of NGO networking, as noted in Chapter 2, by
reducing the limitations of distance and increasing expectations that consultation will take place
before significant positions or decisions are taken on behalf of the network as a whole. These trends
look set to continue as access to communications technology increases and the extent of the possible
and the accessible expands further. However, for the foreseeable future the vast proportion of the
world's population will continue to be on the wrong side of the 'digital divide'.
5.3.1 What makes some international NGO networks succeed while others
fail?
Of the range of networks considered, those which have been most successful exhibit a high degree of
consensus on policy issues. IBFAN has functioned for over twenty years, and maintained the same
core objectives and principles; more recent campaigns to eliminate Third World debt (Jubilee 2000)
64 For ecan	 the RING (the Regional and International Networking Group) is an alliance of pnncipally Southern policy research organisations,
tablishcd poor to UNCED to work on issues of sustainable dcvelopmcM. For much of its existence, there has been little scope for joint prnjecls as
communications between members have been difficult and the potential Ibr interaction between policy experts on a regular basis has been limited More
iccently, the wideapteati adoption ofereail and the internet has uesulted in dramatic improvements; concurrently, increasing interest in the potential of a
global network ofc*ediblc sustainable development research organisations has lcd to greater willingness from potential finders to take on the logistical
difficulties in establishing efFeetive collaboration.
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and to support the creation of an International Criminal Court have been built upon a similar shared
set of core values and goals.
On this evidence, ad hoc coalitions, created for a specific purpose, can be very successful. Time-
bound campaigns to achieve specific objectives by a certain date and alliances pursuing limited goals
or targeting particular actors provide tangible instances of success - not least because it is
considerably easier to gauge their effectiveness than for networks with less clearly defined goals. The
ongoing boycott of Exxon / Esso is an example of an international collaboration to highlight the role
of a particular company in shaping global policy. While this tactic may have a significant effect on the
company targeted (such as change resulting from opposition to Shell's policies in Nigeria, for
example), its effectiveness in galvanising industry-wide change is more open to doubt. Time-bound
initiatives such as Jubilee 2000's campaign help to raise pressure for action to a peak which coincides
with a particular opportunity for significant policy changes to be initiated. However, if it is anticipated
that the campaign will subsequently die away, there is a danger that decision-makers may issue vague
commitments and do little to realise them afterwards.
Conversely, those networks which have bad least success (both in building stable coalitions between
participants and in achieving well-defined objectives) have been those which lacked a coherent
consensus on the principles which brought them together. These fall into two broad groupings - those
which aim to play a facilitating role for a broad range of organisations and those which attempt to
build links between organisations working in different issue areas. The former, such as the Centre for
Our Common Future's International Facilitating Committee, emphasise access to decision-making
and dialogue between different stakeholders as their principal rationale. The latter, the Rio-focused
International NGO Forum for example, identify the need for broader alliances on issues of principle in
order to articulate holistic visions which can be endorsed by from a diversity of perspectives.
On this evidence, it is possible to conclude that these types of general coalitions of NGOs can never
succeed. Apolitical consensus is not possible on issue areas that unavoidably involve political
contention and opposing values, as well as differences on questions of strategy and tactics. Broad
65 Fora more detailed account, see Preston, Shelley 'Elecunnic Global Networking and the NGO Movement: the 1992 Rio Summit and Bend' in SrnnIs
and P/oug/,sharc'.c: A  ('luvnklc of Inwn:ationalAffafrs vol.3. no.2. Washington D.C. Spring 1994. Available online at
http//stiIe.lbott.ac.uk/—gxlb/STlLli/Email0002089/mI2.htrnl. Visited on I September2001.
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networks cannot articulate a meaningful vision of sustainable development because the diversity
among them on issues of principle, as well as differences of interest and knowledge, limit the scope
and significance of their shared views. Both forms of alliance lack strong support from participants,
who do not devote significant time or resources to sustaining the network. In turn, beyond the specific
context of global summits or other similar rationales, it has proved difficult to gain secure funding to
maintain stich networks.
However, it is important also to recall the succession of analyses which emphasised the need for cross-
cutting alliances. The UN CSD Secretariat stressed the need for a facilitating body to improve NGO
participation in, and input to its annual sessions. Similar requirements have been expressed in the
preparations for the 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, to take place in
Johannesburg. As noted earlier, Tord Bjork stressed that 'a working cooperation between movements
working with different issues as well as in different regions of the world.. [is needed] to maintain an
independent critical position towards international established institutions'. 67 A succession of
commentators have identified the importance of articulating opposition and alternatives to current
processes of economic globalisation as one of the principal motivations for NGOs to collaborate
globally. Rita Krut asserts that 'the crucial role of civil society today is to advocate democracy against
the rising anti-democratic tendencies of global capital',68
 which suggests a very broad remit.
Alliances which focus on these areas are increasingly active, most notably mobilising around meetings
of the World Trade Organisation and the International Monetary Fund, and more recently at European
Union summits and 08 meetings of leading industrialised countries. The World Social Forum took
place in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January2001 as a counterpoint to the concurrent World Economic
Fornm in Davos, Switzerland; it represents the most ambitious effort yet to explore alternatives to
globalisation. Yet the messages emanating from these events and groupings do not represent a
common vision, only a shared belief that the actions and decisions of global inter-governmental
organisations and transnational companies are increasingly shaping the lives of everyone in ways
which are detrimental and unaccountable. As such they function more as a magnet for very disparate
66 Initiated because the company suppoilcd Prcodcnt Bush's election campaign and isa prominent member of the Global Climate Coalition, which has
opposed most attempts to agne and implement multilataI commitments on climate change.
67 l3jork, Toni 'Northern Allianec', . cit.
68 Knit, Rita Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in Inlen,ationai Decision-Making, op. cit.
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viewpoints, which find common cause only in their opposition to certain institutions and the economic
and social models they are advancing.
In the final analysis, UNCED failed - and was bound to fail - in creating general networks. However,
it has provided inspiration to NGOs to establish and support alliances which address issues of a global
nature. The current debate about the so-called anti-globalisation movement would seem to deny the
conclusion that broadly-based networks cannot succeed. However, if this thesis is correct, specific
campaigns, such as opposition to an MA!, reduction of debt or boycotting companies, will mobilise
support, but a generalised anti-globalisation coalition will not materialise in any organised network of
the diverse range of issue-specific NGOs.
5.3.2 Summaty of research findings
At the beginning of this thesis a number of research questions were posed and introduced. It is useful
now to reflect on the principal findings presented and the ways in which they address these initial
challenges.
What is meant by 'civil society and how is this relevant in the global context?
'Civil society' is a nebulous concept - it was recognised at the outset that the term encompassed a
much broader range of social actors than 'non-governmental organisations', though the principal focus
of the thesis has been on the latter.
Examples from a broad range of contexts have shown the impact of civil society organisations on
policy formulation in inter-governmental processes, and the distinct prioritisation of other activities at
the global level. These justi{y a more diffuse conceptualisation of 'influence' than in many analyses of
the roles played by civil society organisations in global politics.
This broader perspective admits a consideration of tensions and conflicts between civil society actors
as significant in understanding global political processes - this includes attention to tensions between
NGOs and transnational companies (see 2.4.5 and 3.4.5.1). It also justifies the assertion that the
activities of civil society networks at the global level are a significant arena for the contestation and
propagation of norms.
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In what ways does 'the environment' dfJ'erfrom more established concerns of international politics?
Notions of security and threats to stability arising from environmental chane present very different
challenges to those of more mainstream international affairs. Where under traditional models of
security the country could be considered as a unit, and its interests determined and pursued by the
government in international fora, here there are a multiplicity of perceived interests, all of which are
legitimate given the complex and diffuse threats posed by environmental change. Jn the former,
protagonists in international negotiations are exclusively governments, deriving authority through their
ability to represent the interests of their citizens; in the latter, civil society as a whole is responsible for
problems arising and should be actively involved in attempts to devise solutions.
Increasingly, this distinction is resulting in a shifting understanding of the mechanisms for addressing
environmental problems at the global level - evident in the official preparations for UNCED (see 33)
and more recently the World Summit on Sustainable Development, both of which sought to recognise
and to allow space for the views of a range of social actors. This understanding has also extended to
include non-governmental, parallel dialogues and processes which articulate diverse perspectives and
priorities (see 3.4).
H7ia1 Lc meant by 'sustainable development and what has been the effect of its widespread
acceptance in global politics?
The examples cited earlier demonstrate that sustainable development was initially understood to have
two broad characteristics: first, it brought together concerns of environmental protection on the one
hand and social and economic development on the other, and sought to find ways in which pursuit of
both could be compatible; second, it was understood as an innately political construct, requiring
choices, trade-offs and value judgments. However, sustainable development has increasingly come to
be seen as representing a set of management tools rather than political choices - this is particularly
evident in the work of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (see Chapter 4). Where
values are invoked at all, sustainable development is now widely seen as a vague but worthy concept
with which no-one could disagree - not as a set of policy options which could challenge or threaten
dominant international economic and social institutions and processes.
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The lack of coherence in interpretations of 'sustainable development' in itself contributes to the
plurality of the political process and legitimises a much wider range of ideglogical and knowledge-
based understandings than is possible in more consensual issue areas. Conversely, since the basic
principles and objectives are disputed, the potential for unequivocal agreement around a negotiated
policy framework is extremely limited. This creates considerable problems for civil society networks
which have articulated common positions but have not been able to translate these into clear
manifestos for action (for example the UNCED Alternative Treaties, see 3.7.1 and 4.2.1).
How have academic theorists explained the exercise of influence by non-state actors in international
affairs?
The thesis illustrates how mainstream IR theory privileges the interaction of states and gives only
peripheral attention to the activities of non-state actors and sociological studies have not extended
consideration the relevance of 'new social movements' in global politics. However, a broad range of
other analyses are also cited which have acknowledged the impacts of non-governmental actors in
global politics and developed an increasingly useful set of tools with which these issues can be
considered.
The current study contributes to this emerging body of thinking in two principal ways: first, it focuses
mainly on the politics of environment and sustainable development and considers their particular
significance to the more general trends and analytical approaches developed by others; second, it
presents an extended empirical study of the various ways in which civil society organisations have
interacted at the international level around the Rio Summit and the UN Commission on Sustainable
Development. The functioning of four principal NGO networks established prior to UNCED and the
creation of the CSD NGO Steering Committee provide significant evidence of the motivations to
collaborate and the simultaneous differences and divisions which impeded co-operation.
K1zichfaci.Orsjustji afocus on the impact ofglobal non-governmental networks on global politics?
ø7at countervailing perspectives should be taken into account?
three further factors support a focus on networks of global civil society in addressing the central
question posed earlier: first, the role of civil society in what could be termed the 'globalisation of
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ideals'; second, the particular challenges and debates which arise from attempts to realise forms of
'self-governance' in the functioning of global networks; and third the broader questions of legitimacy
and accountability which accompany the assumption of greater authority and influence in the global
polity.
Eg table on UNCED networks, p.l29
Eg. Nelson's 'sources of tension' p.65 & application to BNGOF p.124 on
What is the impact of civil society networks on the global politics ofsustainable development?
Bullets on pp.53-4 re network functions
Eg. impacts 0nUNCED agreements—pp.146-157, including Alt Treaties
Eg. Manila meeting, p.75-77
Table on INGO networks, p.174
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The Hague 4-6 November 1992.
Websites and documents sourced online
Amnesty International website: http://www.amnesty.se
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Unpublished documents and papers
Hill, JieGreen	 Loudon July 1992. See Appendir 3.,
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Appendix I
Environment Liaison Committee International
'Stop Green Pollution'
Nairobi Kenya August 15, 1990
The following is the statement from the Environment Liaison Centre International (ELC1), Global
Coalition for Environment and Development (in special working relationship with UNEP) handed out
to all of the delegates to the UNCED PrepCom meeting on 9 August 1990 in Nairobi, Kenya.
Stop Green Pollution
The world knows many fomis of environmental pollution. A new, more insidious form is developing:
green pollution. Based on false propaganda consumers are sometimes asked to buy certain products
falsely claimed to be environment friendly. But for ELCI the strategy developed, now known as the
"independent sector strategy", is yet another form of this green pollution.
This strategy implies two objectives, both denounced by ELCI:
• to promote the idea that everyone is working for the protection of the environment -
implying there are no more polluters;
• to effectively disempower the environmental movement by forcing NGOs to bargain
directly with the polluters and arrive at common viewpoint before being heard by
public authorities, in this case governments.
What Are NGOs?
For ELCI, NGOs are non-profit, non-party political organizations including groupings such as
environment and development, youth, indigenous people, consumer and religious. Organizations of
industry, trade unions, parliamentarians, academics and local authorities are not NGOs.
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ELCI Suspends Its Partnership With The Centre for Our
Common Future
A number ofNGOs see the Centre for Our Common Future as promoting this 'independent sector'
concept. The Centre, with its pretence of serving the independent sector as a whole, has recently been
strongly criticized by ELCI members in the North and South and by Friends of the Earth International.
Environment and development NGOs ask the Centre to adopt a policy of openness particularly in
respect to the following questions: What is its constituency? Who constitutes the Board of Directors?
Who are the donors? What is its role in the politics of the United Nations and of certain countries?
Until further consultations with its members, ELCI suspends its partnership with the Centre and
withdraws its support for the public forums being organised by the Centre.
ELCI will reconsider its position regarding the Centre at its Annual General Meeting in Cairo in
November 1990.
The Mandate of the International Facilitating Committee
At the initiative of the Centre for Our Common Future, organisations belonging to the so-called
'independent sector' selected by the Centre, met in Zyon, Switzerland where they decided to form the
International Facilitating Committee (IFC), a multi- sector coalition to facilitate and organise
independent sector activities devoted to the UNCED 1992.
ELCI was invited to represent the environment and development NGOs on this International
Facilitating Committee. ELCI is prepared to dialogue openly with other sectors of society, to discuss a
general approach, and cooperate on specffic issues. However, the Executive Committee of ELCI can
only accept to participate further in IFC if the following conditions are met
• the lFC on which industiy is represented by the International Chamber of Commerce, disassociate
itself from the definition of NGOs given by the U.N. and appeal to the Secretaiy General and the
Preparatoiy Committee to renounce this definition;
• the term 'independent sector' be replaced to underline the diversity of the different sectors;
• the !FC renounces its plan to organise a parallel forum in Brazil for ECO '92 common to all the
different sectors;
• the composition of the 1FC be reviewed.
If these conditions are met ELCI would be prepared to participate in the IFC with a view to defining
the terms of the dialogue among the different sectors and identif'ing the points on which agreement
among the various sectors is close enough to justify negotiating an eventual common position. ELCI
would report to its constituency and to the Steering Committee of the NGOs Campaign Towards 1992
which comprises representatives from global and grassroots environment ad development
organisatios.	 .	 .	 -
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Appendix 2
How to Develop a Code of Conduct for Voluntary
Organizations
[paper prepared by ELCI, post-Rio 1992]
What is a Code of Conduct for Voluntary Organisations?
A Code of Conduct for VOs is a document consisting of a number of general principles which will
serve as a guideline for Voluntary Organizations in defining their policy. The principles touch on
issues such as accountability, transparency of operations, relations with other organizations and
groups, etc.
Why a Code of Conduct for Voluntary Organizations?
There are several reasons why a Code of Conduct for Voluntary Organizations has become a matter of
urgency
• One is to properly define the identity of the GO movement. During e3CD prepcotns nert
was considerable uneasiness within the NGO community about being put in the same category
with business and industry. To many NGOs it became clear that being defined in terms of "what
you are not" is very confusing. Several, among them ELCI, decided to start using the term
Voluntary Organizations instead.
• A second reason is the issue of representativeness. The establishment of some VOs has been
clearly the result of peoples' movements campaigning for specific environmental or developmental
goals. As a result of this it was perceived that the work of Voluntary Organizations in general is a
reflection of democratic forces, wherever they are working and whatever they are doing. While
this might be true for many VOs it is definitely not a claim that can be made by all. Many VOs
have been initiated by individuals or small groups with genuine objectives to combat certain social
or environmental threats, but without the support of peoples' movements. Some of these VOs are
trying, through awareness raising, to mobilize peoples' movements, while others focus much more
on non-profit consultancy work, lobbyipg advocacy etc. A method of categorizing VOs is needed 'r
to create more clarity in the definition of Voluntary Organizations.
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• VOs are mushrooming everywhere. There is no doubt that most VOs are based on bona fide
intentions. However it is also true that for VOs themselves, donors and other governmental
agencies it is becoming increasingly difficult to assess VOs in terms orcredibility, transparency,
accountability, quality of work etc. A Code of Conduct would provide some useful guidance in
working with VOs. In the future ELCI will use the Code of Conduct in setting up criteria for
membership.
• A VO Code of Conduct will also raise awareness on the function and responsibilities of Voluntary
Organizations in society which diverge from those of business, industry and governments.
Industry is driven by the principle of profit and sees people as consumers whose purchasing power
is to be tapped for the remuneration of invested capital. The modem state is driven by
governmental control and people are perceived as citizens with democratic rights whose votes are
needed to legitimize the exercise of state power.
The operations of industry and state, guided by the logic of profit and state power, do not necessarily
follow the criteria of sustainable development unless people exercize their role as consumers and
citizens to pressure industry and state to do so. This is where the function of VOs comes in. VOs are
initiated by people who are concerned about certain developments they are confronted with in their
everyday life or through media. VOs mobilize people as citizens and consumers in order to influence
the functioning of industries and state. That is why VOs have their own mission in society which
should not be seen as instrumental to the aims of governments or business and industry. A clear
understanding of the role of VOs is often lacking. A Code of Conduct for VOs will provide more
clarity for governments and business and industry on what to expect and what not to expect when they
are cooperating with VOs.
What has happened on the V.0. Code of Conduct so far?
From late 1991 through the VO Conference in Paris several VOs have been working on a Code of
Conduct. At the NGO forum during the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro an NGO treaty on the Code of
Conduct was developed which, however, needs more elaboration. ELCI was given the task of
coordinating the follow up of the alternative treaty on the VO Code of Conduct. This background
paper is about setting up a network of VOs that will cany on the work which will result in a widely
accepted VO Code of Conduct.
The Network
Objectives:
• to develop a VO Code of Conduct
• to promote the VO Code of Conduct and get as many VOs as possible to sign on to it
• to provide a useful set 9f qiteria for, identii'ing organizations to engage in partnerships and
networking for sustainable development
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Strategy:
ELCI will start a network of VOs who want to participate actively in developing the Code of Conduct.
The working method will be "a conference on distance" with the purpose of drafting a Code of
Conduct. The "conference" will be coordinated by ELCI. In concrete terms this means that ELCI will
compile all the material that has been developed on the VO Code of Conduct, identify subjects for
further discussion and circulate these to the VOs of the network. The VOs cans end their inputs to
ELCI who will forward them to the network. The VOs can send their inputs to ELCI who will forward
them to the network. If necessary special working groups will be established to elaborate specific
topics, and a steering committee of selected NGOs will be identified.
Communication tools that will be used are:
. an E-mail conference on the V.0. Code of Conduct
• circular letters through which participants will be enabled to exchange views
• 5 regional meetings, one in each continent
• media strategy (both, public and ECO press)
This process will result in a final draft which will be presented at a Conference on the VO Code of
Conduct to which all the VOs of the network and others will be invited. In this conference a consensus
document on the Code of Conduct for VOs will be "negotiated". The Conference will also develop a
strategy for promoting the VO Code of Conduct. Whether the Code of Conduct will be a document
reflecting a number of principles to which VOs agree to strive for, will be decided at the Conference.
1) Activities
• an E-mail conference on the VO Code of Conduct
• circular letters through which participants will be enabled to exchange views
• 5 regional meetings, one in each continent
• a Global Conference on the Code of Conduct for VOs
2) Output
• A VO Code of Conduct and a strategy on how to promote it
• Increased awareness of the nature of Voluntary Organizations
• Improved transparency and accountability on the part of Voluntary Organizations
.	 .	 .	 .	 ... ..	 .	 .. ..	 .	 .	 .
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Code of Conduct for NGOs
Preamble
1.1 The following represents the work of several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) -
working from late 1991 through the NGO Conference in Paris, the outcomes of the Agenda
Ya Wananchi, from meeting during the New York PrepCom and in the intervening months
up to and including the Global Forum in Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992.
1.2 The goal of this NGO Code of Conduct process is to eventually have a Code that NGOs can
sign on to.
1.3 We pledge to continue to engage in the process to analyze and deepen this activity and make
recommendations that groups may adopt.
1.4 There has been a dramatic growth of community groups and NGOs during the past 10 years.
The work of community and citizen groups and organizations and NGOs now constitutes
the best option for citizen action to change the forces against a sustainable future.
1.5 In order to build up our constituency base, to truly serve the people within our community /
organization, certain ethical and accountable agreements need to be acknowledged.
Principles
An NGO Code of Conduct could contain the following principles:
National and local NOOs (in North and South) should.
• be rooted in issues at home
• have some definable constituency or membership
• have open democratic working systems, gender parity, consultative problem-solving, non-
discriminatory practices
• have clear conflict of interest guidelines
• have a code of ethics for staff
• publish an annual report and audited financial statements
• be non-profit, non-patty political
• fosterjustice and equity, alleviate poverty and preserve cultural integrity
• endeavor to enhance the total environment - physical, biological and human
have a fair wage structure, witha credible scale between highest and lowest paid worker . •
• be truly iiith people and not impose their agendas on them
	 S
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• base all their work on the resources available to the people, their expertize, existing institutions,
culture and religions; be self-sufficient while remaining open to the assjstance offered by their
various partners
• avoid being corrupted both materially and spiritually
• facilitate people's efforts
• share information with all members; set up necessary mechanisms to gather and exchange
experiences; and get actively involved in environmental education (awareness-building) and
training
• articulate a broad political framework and code of ethics to guide their internal operations and
their work with community groups and people's organizations, as well as their relations with the
South, NGOs and the North
• ensure the highest levels of accountability, starting with their own constituencies - the people.
This includes uncompromising evaluations involving the participation of the local populations.
Campaigns
Northern and Southern NGOs often have non-project or non-funding based relationships. Generally,
these relationships are the basis for campaigns to protest certain social or environmental problems in a
Northern or Southern countly; or the campaigns may be on international issues, like the World Banks
Global Environment Facility (GEE).
This treaty should be designed to make clear the process of consultation and decision-making among
all the participants to facilitate a process of dialogue between Northern and Southern NGOs on
campaigns. At this point, we have only questions, not answers:
The overriding principle this treaty seeks to ensure is consultation among NGOs before anyone takes a
position that might affect another. But that is not as easy as it seems.
If a group in one country sends out an international action alert about a problem in its country, what
obligation does it have to first assure that there is a consensus among the NGOs in that country about
that problem? Conversely, what obligation has a group that receives an action alert to first assure that
the alert is the result of a consensus position in the country of origin before responding to the action
alert?
Who has the obligation to compile a reasonable list of NGOs in each country (without a list it is not
possible for groups elsewhere to consult with NGOs in one country before taking positions on issues
that might affect that country)?
What constitutes reasonable consultation? How many groups is 'enough'?
How long should the consultation process be allowed to take? Can deadlines be set for responses if
there is a hearing or legislative action coming up? What if there isno response— is that consultation?
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Can a contract person be chosen in each region or countly to facilitate communications and
consultation? How would that person be chosen? In a crisis, may that person speak for their
constituency without consultation?
What if groups within a region disagree? Who gets listened to? What if regions disagree?
Declaration of Solidarity
Before making public expression of solidarity for NGOs and individuals a proper consultation process
should be undertaken to ensure the safety of the affected parties.
Regarding NGOs working outside their count,','
Northern and Southern NGOs should collaborate on the basis of:
• equitable and genuine partnership
• two-way flow of all information, ideas and experiences
• financial transparency
Southern NGOs not Northern NGOs have the major responsibility for activities within their own
countries.
Northern NGOs when working in the South must have transparent advisory systems within the
country of operation; there must be transparent criteria for selection of worldng partners.
Northern NGOs should monitor Northern government / corporate activity in their host countiy.
Northern NGOs in their host country should live in an appropriate comparative level as counterpart
NGOs, not in expatriate style.
Northern NOOs should develop effective policy on international issues.
Because development groups get most of their funding from their national governments, most
Northern NGOs hardly question the policies and activities of their governments in the South. On the
contraiy, they have become accessories to the hidden agendas pursued by their governments and
transnational corporations in gaining control over the resources of the South. In order for Northern
NGOs to be able to forge genuine people-to-people solidarity, they should:
• build a relationship that is based on mutual respect and collaboration as equal partners, and that
fosters self-determination and self-reliance
• use their comparative advantage of easy access to information and pass it Qn to their partners in the
.South
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• challenge their governments and educate the public in order to change the prevailing inequitable
international economic order and development paradigms which have been largely responsible for
the deteriorating global environment
• campaign for genuine grassroots democracy in their own countries
• campaign for sustainable life-styles based on their own local resources as much as possible, and
paying fair (ecological) prices for imported products.
Action Plan for Follow-up
• Regional focal points to publicize and maximize NGO input
• Broad correspondence
• 1993 meeting to prepare final copy for widespread adoption.
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Apiendix 3:
UN CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
RIO DE JANEIRO JUNE 3-14 1992
GREEN ALLIANCE REPORT
I. SUBSTANTWE OUTCOMES OF THE CONFERENCE
Many people have written reports and summaries of the conference. Rather than do it again,
I thought it might be more helpful to provide a list of key documents.
UNCED Official Documents
The Qlmate Convention
• The Blodiversity Convention
• The Forest Principles
• Agenda2l (4Ochapters-alistisattachedasAnnexl)
• The Rio Declaration
The NGOs who attended Rio as observers to the UK delegation have been sent preliminary
copies of the official documents, which will not available in final form until the Autumn.
The Green Alliance would be happy to copy the documents but would have to make a
charge. They can also be obtained via electronic malk for details please contact
Poptel-OcoNet, 30 Naples Street London NI 5AA Tek 071 249 2948 E-Maik
0E02:SUPPORT
Reports and Summaries
• A Summary of 93 heads of state speeches written June 15; 8 pages; printecl in the.
Br,ilifiq Journal 'ram Viva.
• Earth Summit Bulletin Final Report written June 17; 19 pages; compiled by the
tcam who produced the indispensable daily Earth Summit Bulletin throughout the
repcoms azidj for each chapter of Agenda 21, the Forest Principles and the Rio
Declaration it lists the essentials elements and summarises the final argument.
• UK Department of the Environment Report written June 23; 12 pages; lists the UK
Government's objectives for the Earth Summit and summarises outcomes, including
chapter by chapter summary of Agenda 21.
• Address by Michael Howard at the Natural Hislory Museum June 24; 10 pages;
gives initial Government views on Rio follow-up; brief dicussion of the Darwin
Initiative.
• Twelve Days of UNCED written July 8; 11 pages; written by the Issues Director of
U.S. Citizens Network; summaries final outcomes on the key issues; includes a brief
assessment of the NGO Global Forum and NGO performance in general.
All the above are available from the Green Alliance office. The Earth Summit Bulletin
and Twelve Days of UNCED are available on Greennet under gn.en.uncednews 'ESB
NO.13 Final Report of UNCED' and gn.en.unced.gener 'Network Final Report on Rio'
RSPB and lIED have also produced reports.
LI. GOVERNMENT FOLLOW-UP
Priorities for follow-up are reflected (in very broad terms) in the Lisbon Declaration from the
European Council, which the UK Government proposed. A similar set of points appeared
in the final communique from the Munich G7 meeting (copies of both attached as Annexes
II and III).
In his speech to the Conference, John Major also announced three specific UK Government
follow-up initiatives (A copy of the speech is attached as Annex IV).
(i) The Darwin Initiative
The attached sheet (Annex V) gives some details. The Department of Environment would
welcome views from environmental groups, and will be holding a follow-up meeting in the
Autumn. Please contact Kate Mayes on 071 276 8107.
(ii) Global Technology Partnership Conference
The stated aim is 'to ensure that developing countries can share the benefits of technology
through partnership with British companies' and will have a broader relevance than just
climate change, to which it was linked in the speech. It will be a one-off initiative, led by the
Dli, and costing the Government some £114 - £112 million.
(iii) Global NGO Forum
This was preseie the speech as 'a major global forum of the NGO community to
examine and clarify their role in the practical implementation of Agenda 21' and is scheduled
to take place next year, possibly in June. The idea is select (or allow self-selection of)
representative NGOs from different regions to come to London to talk about their
experiences of Agenda 21 implementation. This could mean anything from grass-roots
actions that they have been able to implement themselves, to the realities of lobbying
governments on implementation. Then, these groups would be given the opportunity to
present their conclusions to a mixture of UN and governmental officials.
The idea raises a number of difficult issues, including:
• Participation: there are a great many NGOs (especially if NGO is interpreted in the broad
sense as including industry, science etc) and a great many countries - it will not be easy to
come up with a 'representative' se1ect4çn.
• Breadth of agenda: Agenda 21 and the other UNCED documents cover a vast range of
issues - there would have to some selection and prioritisation.
• Format: detailed accounts of'on-thc-ground' experience in various countries, while
interesting, may not have universal relevance. At the othef extreme, discussion of the
problems of lobbying governments could get very quickly into such universal issues as
i.. .;;.	 i.	 1;.;rpv cmhu-rasincz by
participating Govei-n.rnents, and potentially dangerous for some NGOs.
• Organisation: there is an issue over how far NGOs should be directly involved in the
organisation, and how far NGOs outside the 15K would be consulted.
• Timing: it is ambitious to think of organising an international event in less than a year.
A paper outlining the Government's thinking on the event is expected to be issued for
consultation in the early Autumn.
The idea, and in particular its presentation, was not generally well received by NGOs present
in Rio. Most felt that they should have been asked for their opinion, or at the very least
briefed in advance of the speech. It was particularly embanassing for the NGOs acting as -
observers to the UK delegation that they knew nothing of it, and had to deny any ownership
of the idea to the press. Despite this initial reaction, many NGOs I spoke to felt it could be a
useful exercise if properly handled.
The United Nations Association (UNA) hosted a preliminary discussion on the Forum at a
meeting for UK groups who had attended Rio, on 31st August and have organised a further
meeting on 4th September.
(iv) Second Anniversary Report on the Environment White Paper
Not specifically mentiond in the speech, but with obviix td iai t iJCt	 cis,
is the second anniversary report on 'This Common Inheritance', the Government's White
Paper on environment, which is due in early October. The issue for Government and NOOs
alike is whether the 'White Paper process' can be adapted to produce the 'National
Sustainability Plan' called for in several of the UNCED documents including Chapter 8
'Integrating environment and development in decision-m1cing'. Since no-one has very
developed ideas as to what a 'Sustainability Plan' would look like, this is a difficult question
to answer.
In preliminary discussions with officials in Rio, some of the NGOs acting as observers to the
delegation sugested that this yea? s anniversary report should at least start to acknowledge
that there are policy areas outside those traditionally in the remit of environment that are
crucial to acbieving'sustainability'. At national level these include most notably transport,
energy, industry and agriculture policy as well as aspects of economic policy such as
internalising environmental costs and valuing environmental resources.
At international level, many NGOs want to see addressed the UK's role in policy areas such
as trade, aid, debt, technology transfer, and in institutions including the UN, World Bank
and IMF; the rationale being that all these are central to'development' and thus 'sustainable
development' in both industrialised and less industrialised countries. One possibility is that
the second anniversary report could have at least a chapter acknowledging these issues, with
a view to expansion lii subsequent reports. The orginal White Paper did include a chapter
on 'Britain and the World Environment' which touched, albeit briefly, on debt and population
as well as dealing with global environmental resources. The tirst annlvcrsaiy report had a
similar level of coverage.
The DOE issued a note asking for comments on the second anniversary report process (this
has been circulated to the 'Putting our own House in Order' group). However, they have
consistently made it clear that this October's effort will look verj much like last year's, and
that effort to produce a 'National Sustainablity Plan' will not begin in earnest until next year.
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been canvassing the views of some groups as to what a süstainability plan should include.
Ill. NGO ROLE IN FOLLOW-UP
The participation of a large number of NGOs in the UNCED process, and the issue of
participation in follow-up, have raised some key questions. I thought it might be helpful to
lay some of these out below.
Definitions
In the past the term 'NGO' has been used priinarlyto describe pressure groups, or public
interest groups, working on environment and development issues. At the 1990 Bergen
Ministerial conference on environment, five groupings of NOOs were recognised -
environment (taken to include development),.youth, industry, science and labour. In the
UNCED process, all these groupings were recognised. The NGOs with observer status on
the UK delegation also included representatives of local authorities and of one of the
opposition political parties. Some groups now disagree with this broad inteipretion of the
term 'NGO' and would prefer it tobe brought back to apply primarily to environment and.
development interests. To avoid confusion, I will refer to 'environment and development
groups' in the following discussion.
I
Coverage
The UNCED outcomes (the two conventions, forest principles, Rio declaration & Agenda
21) amount to a huge agenda and encompass national and international actions. Can, or
should,envlronment and development groups cover the whole agenda? The 'UNEP-UK
NGO Agenda and 'Putting our own house in order' both layout actions to be pursued by
Government, but both are partial. On the other hand, in as much as both arc selective, they
could be seen to represent priorities. This could be more important than full coverage.
One action that'ngbe helpful would be to compile a database of which groups are
covering which areas. The Green Alliance did this for work on the 1989 Environmental
Protection Bill, and it proved useful for highlighting significant gaps.
Linkage
tJNCED has highlighted the fact that environment an development NGOs in the UK operate
largely in isolation from each other. Involvement in the UNCED process has begun to bring
the two communities together. Issues where there are clear overlaps of interest, if not always
stance, include those to do with the international economic order (ie. debt, aid, trade); those
to do with institutions delivering sustainable development; and concepts such as Primary
Environmental Care (PEC) which are seen to have Northern as well as Southern relevance.
Given these new linkages, the question arises: how are the full I'ange of environment and
development groups to be co-ordinated In pursuit of follow-un activities, if at all? The
experience q.t UINA.f-Uz%. nas ocea tflaL IL IS uizncun lo co-orwnate a oroau range ot gruups
over the full agenda - there is simply too much to disagree on as well as agree on. Even
pulling together the comparatively small number of environment groups involved in 'putting
our own house in order' involved sustained effort.
It might be worth considering pursuing follow-up in theme-specific groups. This approach
evolved spontaneously during the PrepComs amongst international NOOs eg.' there was a
poverty and consumption group, a climate group, an institutions group etc. In Rio, such
'ad-hoc' groups produced 'alternative treaties' ie. NGO versions of the subjects under
discussion by governments; they included treaties on waste, consumption and lifestyle, trade,
and debt. Some of these may form the basis of on-going international networks. The Green
Alliance has run successful subject-specific joint lobbying efforts in the past, in particular on
pesticides regulation. The advantage is involvement only of people who are really interested;
the disadvantage could be failing to acquire a rounded view of the agenda. In this country,
groups arc aiready underway linldng aid and environment, and looking at the development of
the proposed UN Sustainable Development Commission.
Central to the issue of linkage is what linkage is expected to achieve. Pure sharing of
information and updating is relatively easy, but may be considered to be too time-consuming
to be worthwhile. Producing common positions and platforms undoubtedly has an effect on
government, but the effect needs to be considered relative to the time and effort needed to
achieve consensus. Agreeing priorities areas for action without necessarily agreeing joint
action is another possibility.
Consensus-building brings in another major question that arose during the UNCED process -
can NGOs with very different Inftxests work togtther! This is pathcuiar pertinent w1iere
the broad definition of NGOs is being used ie. involving industry, science and union
interests.
Relationship to Government
Having NGOs with observer status on the UK Government delegation was an experiment
on both sides, but one that was not very fully debated within the NGO community before the
event. Here the trNGO was used in the broad sense, and the government gave observer
status to fourteen indiIduals, including 2 from environmental groups, 2 from development
groups, 2 from local authorities, 2 from industry, I from unions, I from the scientific
community, I from youth, plus representives from UNEP-UK, United Nations Association,
and the Labour Party.
Some of the UK environment and developmnt groups present in RIL seemed unaware of
the exact nature of the access gained by those attached-to the delegation, so it was difficult to
have a constructive debate about the implications of such access. Access was actually more
limited than many people thougit - for instance, those with observer status had access to the
conference working sessions (otherwise closed to NOOs) but did not have access to the
confidential official briefing documents- in tact on occasion the press were given more
detailed information than thó WOO observers. If the experiment is to be repeated in other
fora, more attention must be paid to discussing the pros and cons of the relationship.
r UNCED follow-up, the question is 'hat form of dialogue shou1d exist between NGOs
and Government. This brings in all the questions raised under 'linkage' above, with the
dirnennn of hnvinc to ensure that coherent rositionc nrc tresented to Dolicv makers.
It will also be important to get the Government to clarify what they expect from liaison eg.
how far they expect consensus between the groups coining to them; what subjects they want
covered; which bits of the Governmental machinery should have the views of NGOs fed into
them; what definition of NGO is being used. Groups might also want to consider at what
point they might want to terminate, the relationship if no concrete improvements in
Government policy can be identified.
UNEP-UK
UNEP-UK were responsible for a consultation process amongst a broad range of NGOs in
preparation for UNCED, and for feeding views into the UK Government. A number of
groups have been circulated with a questionnaire asking for details of existing networks and
liaison arrangements, in order to discuss what groupings might be appropriate for UNCED
follow-up. For details, please contact Richard Sandbrook at lIED, 071 388 2117.
Julie Hifi
The Green Alliance
July 1992
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fNOTh: this letter ws sent o rëpiesentativés of 175 jóvernnients:it. their. permanent
missions to the UNin New York Qty 11u copy is beug sent to several UN officials,
NGOs *nd others. For more mformation conta Ciif Qirtis ot his assistant, J..ydia
Obertiolizer, in WhIngto; I? C..(FCII 202462-I177 Fax 202/462-4507)]
•_	 p..	 .	 .;•_	 . .4. •': •	 -. -
1e U?4CiDIrCT!4GA. Qrnimkclon ni Suaina,1e Development
D (esentathe]:
I am writing to nvey to yo the initial views of Greenpeace Internationat on me
estabhshmcnt of th tTrmcclon on Sustainable beveiopment(CSD) It is my hope that
these vie will be given sympathetic consideration by 'ou and your government in the
forthcoming UN General Assembly di,cussons.
	 -	 -
The UN (onfence on Eiiyiromneit and Developmei4 iUNCED) in Rio de Janeiro this
past June wan historic oosioL- Rcpreseb$atives.bfgoer1thients, the UN system, non-
governmental orgnwit1ons QGOs), dustxy, me4ia and others dIffer as to the "success"
- or "faure qf UNCD, dependihg on theirq7teia. But no one has queslionecUhe critical
Importance of that first global__t of the post-Cold r era in. focusing attention on,
aid heighiemug awareness o critical envfronmenr and development sues.
-
Ibe challenge that faced UNCD was hing less than to iscue the p1ant and its capacity
to support buinaiiW— to seize the lnQmeat and. set in motion the economit, political,
sOcial and teclinologicél ansformation that the Woddplainlyxeqtures. For Greenpeace
'jnternational, the thallepgeand opportnhity!UNCED was, and xethnte the pursuit and
achievement of ecologically sound and sdcially equimbie dèielopment it is our 4iope that
• you, and your govethinent, will support •d. champion acdns-and reforms that ire
• desperately needàd to . chieve such development.
..	 .
t this 47th session of the UN General AssembTy, there are a number of iinportanf
UNCED-follorvup tasks facing governments. imong others those include: creation of a:
iieotiafing process leading tO a convention on desertification by June 1994; decisions
regarding the future negotiating ptocess for the. climate ébange convention; direction
CWPCACt OcVIctS A*OOITWA. AUSThAU& MISTIA. •ftGUM. CAMAD& COSTA *UCA. DCt4URK. LAST OCRUANY. FINLAND. FRANCS. IREA.AND. (TM.?. JAPAN,
W 7FM WT NORWAY. SPAIN. SWI. IWflZLRLAND. UNION Of SOViET SOCNJST WUSUCS. UNITED RINGOOI4.
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regarding UN conferences in 1993 concerned with small island developing States, and with
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks; much greater financial commitments by the
North to assist the South, broadly defined, in meeting UNCED-related initiatives; and the
establishment and strengthening of iiistitutioial structures within the UN system that focus
on UNCED concerns.
In this letter, Greenpeace International asks you to consider and support the establishment
of a strong, effective Commission on Sustainable Development, building on the framework
agreed to in Agenda 21. While other importait UNCED-related actions are needed, in our
view the General Assembly's actions on the CSD, in, combination with Secretaiy-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali's UNCED-related decisions, will be interpreted internationally as a
key indicator of £overnments" commitment to UNCED implemçntation.
The Scretaiy-Genèral's seond round of UN ieforms in the next 2-4 mQnt1is1sritical to
• effective implementation of UNCED within the UN system. -. Given their rlevançe to
UNGA gctions: the soóner. those, decisions aie made, the better. - In New Yodç arid
elèwhere thougl, 'anticipatipi is tempered .by: concerxL a to wheiher the Secietaiy-
qeneral's actions v(ill b6 a sufficieát çscuse ip. the hailene g t Jiand.i.
	
-'
,	 • -	 ..	
'...	 "
Despite the importance of the Secretaiy-(eneraFs reforth efforts, itis clear thai the Geneial
Assembly needs -to adopt, expedifious1y, an enabling resolution formally establishing an
effctivC CSD. Jlopefiilly, such a rçsolution w111 qñickly be agreed to jn-. the. Second
•Commfttee's working group chaired y Ambassador Razali of Malaysia,'an4 adopted 1)y the
full GénéVal.Asemb1 This year' thereby alloing Thè..Coimnissióñ ,to be addfeed at
ECOSOCs eaily 1993 orkamzational session, and to hold its first nleetmg by Mao 1993.
--	 ' •	 -	 - .• -	 - -	 .•
- There. are a number of CSD issues that requir re,s tioli by the Geiesl Assembly,
building upoil the Agenda 21, framework agreed to.by governments inRio'deJanéiio,Qf
those, Greenpece Intern tionaLwod like to biglight or your cónsieration nd support
a few issues pertaiiing to tte mandate, tructhre, tules opioGttk.
(For your conveiuence, attached is a copy of the'Agenda2l text ontie CSt)).
* Mandate
• A stated in Agenda 21(38.13), the CSD would have several relateil functions. The central
issue for Greenpeace is whether the CSD has, as a minimum requirement, a clear mandate
to ensure effective implementation of Agenda 21, It Should not be a token gesture, por a.
sort of government "greenwash". It must have a reil institutional,, as well as moral; authority
and power of injtiative By way of example, we consider that the CSD musi be' given both
the capacity and authority to:
	 '	 -
2 monitor Agenda 21 implementation, especially on finai'I'cial and technology transfer
issues, and provide oversight with respect to next steps in relation to the climate and
biodiversity conventions and forest pnnciples;
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- assess and comment on the quality and adequacy of government, international
agency (World Bank, IMF, UNDP, UNEP, FAO etc.) and private sector implementation of
Rio commitments; and	 -
- pursue other important subjects ignored or downplayed by UNCED (e.g.,
environment[development impacts of international trade, consumption patterns, aid, debt,
and transnational corporations).
FrQm Greenpeace's perspective, the SD is best suited to monitor and assess the role of
international aences and traisnational entities. Certainly, national governments have to
make major commitments' to UNCED implementation (e.g., ..Northern. reform of
consumpüon patterns), and the CSD must not ignore those.. But given the potential for
information and work-related overload, the CSD s likely to be most effective or useful,in
focusing on international initiatives
Monitoring and assessment by the CSD (or exmple ne4 to inèlude the World Bank and
• other fliçtton Woods 1ntitutions: Given the remeIy'disappointing Ièel-of financial
commtu1nts made, to date,by the North to asist the South in the implementation of
UNCEt) initiathres, the need for efféètive, targeted assistance by those insthutions is crlticaL.
7	 •..	 .	 -	
•	 -	
-	 -
	
.	 t	 -	 -	 .
tjnfotunately, the commitment of institutions like the World Bank to refqrms in governance
and qther areas remains suspect ? at best. ..The Bank ha 'et to adopt, for example, a policy
on global. warrnjng or ,rovide' borrowers with least-cost analysis, including demand-side
nanagenent,Ior energy prójects. - Strengthened institutional connections between the
• 'Bretton WQodg institutions and UN departments, agencies and pàgraIns re needed, and
	
tb&CSD coi Id assist in that effort. - . 	 -	 -. ; '	 .. -
I
-
A number of CSD issues iivol,6 matters of structure. As iised5here, structure includes the
rank of the CSD's chief executive omcer, and 4ts institutional home within the UN ystèmn.
-:	 •.	 -	 .	 .	 •	 •	 - -	 a -
With respect to the level of the head of th Cmmission, our view is pretty basic: s/he has
to be of sufficientlg high rank to ensure that those in charge of key UN departments and
agencies will take that person, and his/her staff, seriously. From that perspective, given the
rank of others who oversee departments and agencies that early out important UNCED
initiatives, the CSD should be headed by a UN official at least as high in rank as Director-s
General. Along these same lines, if the Secretaiy-GeneraFs reforms were to include
creation - of a new Deputy Secretary-General pOition encompassing environment/
development responsibilities, that individual also should head the Commission's Secretariat.
Regarding its institutional home, in Gree'n;eace Internation view the CSD Secretariat
needs to be an independent unit, reporting directly to the Secretary-General. While some
have suggested the Department of Economic and Social Development (DESD) as the most
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appropriate "home", we believe such placement would hinder the Commission's review and
monitoring functions of that Department as well as other UN bodies it would be dealing
with (e g, UNEP, UNDP and UNCTAD -- each of which are outside DESD; have their own
governing boards; and report directly to the Secretaiy-General).
* Rules of procedure
Under this heading, several issues will be considered, including which rules of procedure the
Cojrimission will use, what reporting or decision making requirenients will be followed, 'and
what access and role NGOs will have. In Gree,npeaee International'S view the procedures
çhoseli on. these issues are among -the most critical to 'he decided by the UN9A. - -
-	
-	 I	
I	
• -'
	 ?
Regarding the ruleS to be used, there ae three pptions: ECOSOqs .nile.s; tile kules 'of
procedure Qf functional coMmissions; or rules to be. drawn up by the CSI) it^elonce
constituted. Given the 'special tasks facing th Cornmission, there'isa 1otof•.meri1 ixr.that
bodj creatinE its own rulesof proedur. :The CSD yvill be dealing with	 ln1enda
	f issues and actors, as well as evolvin yay of- working,with different 	 ie.hile
operating withinits terms of reference, it ihe freedom4O adapt, and tbshift'd!rections
without the risk of delays-occasioned ly gojn back toECOSOC for approval, ItaJo would
facilitate. fiedbility in responding to Agenda 21's calL for stthngtlened partidpaon in the
Commissicm's work by relevant intergovernmenial organizatkn ndNGOs. 	 •.
-	
- -: * — -
	 - 
-.	
. .
	 -
The rules of procedure, broadly ddlned, iio hOild address r porting and decisio.pinithg
mechanisms and requrements-Whileth& CSD .woul&reportto COSOCn-th4rcqntext
of the Councils role un1erthe Charter is-a:visthe GneralAssmii? (38.ii),Greñpeace
International believes the CSD also needs'tO ensure efftiye1nteraceóiis theeierai
Assembly and the Security CounciL* Alori Those Ines we support The ea'of:a Adl
session of the UNSA focused on UN(3ED implemAntati6fi no later Ilian 1997.
	
b	 •	 •..	
•	 ..._•	
V%,_
1	 -	 -	
. :
	
'.	 ..	
--.	 -	 .	 •	
.'.	 - -
Conerning decision inaking, new approaches are needed, and sho'uld be considered wiuini
the CSD. Raving observed and participated in The UNCED process, as eWas ny other
issue-specific treJnd other negptiating forums within ihe UN system,' (teeuipeace
International believes That,, while consensus decision making plays an important iole, it ban,
on occasion, substantially tiindçr and nderct necessary reforms. :This rex5mmendation
further attests to the importance of broader reforms, including the UN Charter review in
conjunction with its Oth anniversary . — e.g., the ieed to revise the Securitr Council's
permanent member "veto" power rule, as well as voting requirements (e.g.,qualified majority
and/or two-chamber approaches) in the UNGA and other Charter bodies..	 -
* NGd participation
Concerning NGO participation, Agenda 21 is straightforward itc saying that NGO access to
UNCED-related forums like the CSD will adhere to "accreditation based on the procedures
used in [UNCED]" (38 44). That approach makes a lot of sense, and was reaffirmed by verb
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positive statements regarding NGOs made in Rio de Janeiro lat June by dozens of heads
of state/government. At present, ECOSOC's rules only address the more traditional
categories of international NGOs. Those organizations, which includes Greenpeace,
certainly are relevant, but such procedures exclude critically important local and national
IGOs from both the North and South.
While ''e agree with the use of UNCED prQcedures as the basis for CSD accreditation of
NGOs, that in no way means that UNCED was a "perfect" rnodel for future relationships
among NGOs and the CSD, other parts of the UN system, and governments. In the UNCED
process, for example, many working groups where mportant issues were negotiated were
inappropriately closed to NGO observers. As the rules of procedures are developed; it is
essentiLthat the CSD be "transparent", ensure public gccess to information, and provide
assistance taNGOs waiting to partkipate (e.g through an Ornbudsbureau).
S..	
-.	 , •
	 -	
-	 .r, - -- -	
•.
On eâch of the abo,e hsues, it. i& Greenpeace hñernationi?i hop& that you,. and your
govemmn .will give seiious conidration' and support fo Ihe ápproáches,wè by
recämmnded. In this regard, itis our hope that you will convey ourviewsto your &mpitaL
Moreover, I would welcome the opportunity to meet wfth you in New York to discuss these
.rnatters fu.rthr.
We ioolcjorward to working with you to ensure that the * UNCED legacy .is one
coibutes'sinificaiitIyto solving the eiMronment and development challenges inwaj
benet 'all tie p1aiet' inbabtains '-
Sincerely yours,
on urtis
Political Division
Greenpeace International
(202)319-2473
Attachment
Appendix 5:
* Bread/or the World * Center/or the Development of International Law * Environmental 1
Environment and Ene,y Study Institute * Friends of the Earth *Inter,w.tional Council of V.
* National Audubon Society * National Wildlife Federation * Natural Resources Defense Cot
* Panos Institute * Sierra aub * Union of Concerned Scientists * United Nations Associatios
Washington, October 23, 1992
Dear Colleagues	 *
At the fiat meeting of the UN General Assmhly since the Barth Snmmk the
1mp1eniitation of UNCED agreements will be debated. The centerpiece of this debat
be the ereation of the UN Comniednn on Sustainable Development (CS])).
On November 2, we expect the General Assembly to start three to four days of g
debate on UNCED follow-up. Negotiations over the CS]) and.other UNCED follow-i
then move into a special working group of the GA Second Committee, which will me
throuh November and into December. A primary task of the working group will be t
negotiate a resolution establishing the CS]). We understand that Ambassador Tmail Ri
of Malaysia will bead this working group. The language pertaining tothe role of the
nongovernmental organizationS (NGOs) and other major groups and the taturc, scopes
openness of the new body will feature prominnf1y in these discussions.
As you know, pressures.to return to 'b n nen' as usual" already thieaten to unden
much of the montnm ereated by UN). There is still time for NGOs and others'
make their views known when the debate begins in the GA. It is vital that the voices
perspectives of the independent sector be beard, by both governments and the UN Sec
Gen"'aI, expressing support for the cstab1khm nt of an effective CS]) and for the acti
participation of NGOs and major groups in the work of the new Cornniimion.
We urge you to oummunicfe with your governments before November 2 to discu
their positions regding the CS]). We hope that you will voice your support for pzov
which allow for fulipaxticipalion of international, national, and local NGOs and majoi
: groups in the works of the Commission (as was agreed to at UNCED). If you think'
may be able to come to New York to observe the General Assembly negotiations in
November and/or December, 1992 - or send another representative - we urge you to
so. A strong NGO presence in New York could prove to be decisive.
What is at issue? We believe that among the important elements that should be
addressed in the CSD resolution are:
The mandate:
Chapter 38.11 of Agenda 21 recommends the creation of a CS]) to "ensure
effective follow-up of the Conference, as well as to enhance international
cooperation and rationalize the intergovernmental decision-making capacity for
the integration of environment and development issues, and to examine the
progress of the implementation of Agenda 21 at the national, regional and
international levels.
38.11 recommends that "the Commission should provide for active
involvement of organs, programs and organizations of the UN system,
international financial institutions and other relevant intergovernmental
organizations." Therefore:
1. The mandate should be broad enough to allow the Commission to grow into
an effective and respected political force in the United Nations.
2. The mandate should not be limited to reviewing the agreements reached at
UNCED, but should be forward-looking, including new agreements based on
evolving political, economic and social concerns and emerging scientific
understanding.
Organization:
1. The Secretariat of the Commission should have the resources and staff it
needs, and independence and stature within the U.N. system to allow it to
review the work of other U.N. bodies.
2. The CS]) should be truly Thigh-level," preferably with a rninictexial segment.
3. The CS]) should adopt its own rules of procedure (which would give it the
authority to establish its own NGO participation procedures, set up subcdiary
bodies or initiate consultative processes involving other intexnalional
organizations and NGOs and other independent groups, and nl2lce studies and
recommendations on its own initiative).
4..The. CS]) should, as agreed in Chapter 38 of Agenda 21, use the NGO
accreditation procedures used at UNCED. This will ensure that NGOs that
participated in UNCED will be able to participate in the work of the CS]).
Additionally, the UNCED accreditation procedures should be used to accept
other "relevant and competent" NGOs for the CS]) meetings and the working
groups it may set up. (PalBgraph 38.44 alsO recommended that procedures
should be established for an expanded role for NGOs within the UN system.)
Additional procedures will need to be developed for receiving meaningful
input from NGOs such as. the working-party model used in the UNCED pre-
paratory process, and the "Ombudsbureau" proposed by the Netherlands.
5. The.CSDhould have the mandate and resources to provide and receive
information .toBn&from governments, UN bodies, other international
organizations, including public financial institutions, international agreements,
and NGOs.
While some issues related to the CSD were already addressed by governments
during the negotiations of Chapter 38 of Agenda 21, many important questions were
left open for resolution by the General Assembly. In a few areas, there may be
attempts to renegotiate issues agreed to at UNCED. Jor example, although Chapter
38 specifies that NGOs should participate in the UN's follow-up-to UNCED, based
on the UNCED accreditation procedures, some are proposing that the CSD use the
rules of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). These rules favor well-.
established international NGOs and are likely not to enable full participation of
national and local grassroots groups.
We would like to have your comments on the ahcve out1ned rnts. AF'.
please tell us oi any points we may have overlooked. We hope that this material can
be of help to you in your work. Please feel free to share this letter with ali who
might be interested in this matter. If you have developed proposals and
recommendations to your government or the UN Secretary General, please send a
copy to: Angela Harkavy, National Wildlife Federation, 400 16th St. NW #502,
Washington DC, 20036
Tel:(202)797-6609 - Fax: (202)797-5486 electronic mail— econet:nwfip
Sincerely,
Nancy Alexander, Bread for the World (BFW)
William Pace, Center for .Development of International Law (CDIL),
International NGO Task Group on Legal and Institutional Matters
Scott Hajost, Environmental Defense.Fund (EDF)
Gareth Porter, Environmental and Energy Study Institute (EES1)
Jim Barnes, Friends of the Earth (FOE)
Deimar Blasco, Intrnflonal Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
Charlotte Fox, National AUdUbOII Society (NAS)
Barbara J. Bramble! Angela Harkavy National Wildlife Federation (NWF)
Elizabeth Bariaft-Brown, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
Donald Edwards, PANOS Institute
Larry W11thm; Sierra Club
Alden Meyer, Union of Concerned Scientists (tJCS)
Kathy Sessions, United Nations Association USA (UNA)
NOTE from International NGO Task Group on Legal and Institutional Matters
NTGLIM):
Let's communicate! We have established a conference on econet for
exchange of information and analysis about the Commission - entitled
wunced.csdu
 - which might be of some beneftt.
Appendix 6:
Creation of an Interim Networking Group of
NGOs to Monitor Establishment of the
Commission on Sustainable Development
[Document prepared by the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) end of
1992]
International NGO Network on the United Nations Commission
on Sustainable Development
During the 47th UN General Assembly debate and negotiations on the follow-up to the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) a number of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and indigenous peoples from many regions of the world met. They agreed to
continue to organize as an interim networking group to monitor the proceedings at the U.N. as it
establishes a Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), until the first substantive session of
the CSD concludes.
The primary purposes of the networking group will be to provide information-sharing, clearing house
and networking services. NGO-CSD will also help facilitate and organize the input of NOOs and
indigenous groups during the establishment of the CSD. NGO-CSD will work with other similar
working groups, networks and organizations to hold meetings and provide fora for NGOs and major
groups to discuss issues relating to the CSD.
The NGO-CSD will not take positions or speak on behalf of the group, except in relation to the
following:
1 To work to achieve open and inclusive policies and procedures for the involvement of NGOs and
major groups in the work of the CSD, based upon the procedures used in UNCED.
In particular, taking into account the rules of procedure for UNCED; decisions Ill and 2/1
(especially paragraphs (2e) and (4)) of the Preparatory Committee for UNCED; paragraphs 38.11
and 38.44 of Agenda 21, NGO-CSD will work for the adoption of procedures which provide that
NGOs and major groups which were accredited to UNCED shall be deemed to have satisfied the
requirements for accreditation to the CSD. It is vital that the Secretary-General, ECOSOC and the
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CSD adopt procedures which will allow UNCED accredited NGOs and major groups to
participate in the initial meetings of the CSD
2 In addition, the UNCED procedures for the accreditation of NGOs and major groups should be the
basis for accredtting NGOs and major groups who apply to participate in the CSD in the future
3 Building upon the precedent implemented dunng PrepCom W of UNCED, NGO-CSD will work
for adoption of arrangements and procedures by the CSD which will allow NGOs and major
groups participating in the meetings of the CSD to receive documentation and to hold NGO-
Government dialogues and NGO forums utilizing the conference and Interpreting facilities of the
UN.
We mvite other NGOs and major groups from all regions to network with us on the wide range of
issues relatmg to the establishment of the Commission on Sustainable Development and to support the
mandates above.
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Append ix
REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
KATHY SESSIONS
JULY 1993
Exactly one year after the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), the new United Nations Commission on Sustainable
Development (CSD) held Its tlrst substantive session at U.N. headquarters in New York
from June 14-25. The CSD was created to review progress towaeds the goals established
at UNCED - particularly the implementation of Agenda 21, the broad action plan
adopted at UNCED - as well as a forum for ongoing discussion of sustainable
development Issues.
I attended the CSD session as a non-governmental member of the U.S. delegation, having
been nominated by the atizens Network (or Sustainable Development (a broad coalition
of U.S..based nongovernmental organizations. of which UNA-USA is an active member)
and selected by the Department of State. Among my functions serving as a liaison
between nongovernmental organizations (NCOs) and the delegation, induding organizing
regular meetings between delegation members and NGOs advising the delegation on
substantive issues, Induding preparation of a paper on options for C3D lntersesslonal
activities; and observing CSD meetings. The other public sector member of the US.
delegation was Norine Kennedy of the U.S. Council of International Business.
Attending the CSD session were representatives of the 53 states which currently sit on the
Commission, as well as representatives of other interested states, internationaL
organizations, and some 300 accredited NGOs.
WHAT HAPPENED DURING ThE SESSION
The Commission opened with a ceremony featuring speeches by the CSD Chairman,
Ambassador Razall Ismail of Malaysia; U.N. Under Secretary General for Policy
Coordination and Sustainable Development Nitin Desal.. speaking for the Secretary
Cenerab Ambassador Ronaldo Mote Sardenberg, Brazil's Permanent Representative to the
U.N. and Vice President Al Core. Core's speech emphasized the urgency of global
environmental and population problems and called (or greater national responsibility and
new international partnerships. The speech was very well-received, both because the
presence of the Vice President was seen as a demonstration of keen US interest in the -
CSD and because k,epresented the first time a U.S. spokesperson in a U.N. setting so
openly sdaiowledged'tbedisproportionate Impacts on the earth of persons living in the
United States and other Industrialized countries.
After the opening most of the session was devoted to negotiations over the ways in
which the Commission will do its work. Given that the CSD's primary mandate is to
review national and International implementation of Agenda 21 - which indudes some
2500 recommendations in 150 program areas - this was no small task. Because the main
focus was on procedure less than substance, the negotiations tended to be somewhat dry
and tedious. Many participants. lnduding numemus veterans of the UNCED process,
appeared to have hoped (or a more substantive session, particularly given that the CSD
meeting was the first global gathering on sustainable development since UNCED. And
few participants - either (mm governments or NGOs - came sufficiently prepared for the
procedural agenda. The procedural focus, coupled with perhaps unrealistic expectations,
exacerbated latent suspicions that the Commission might prove to be a "talk Shop"
producing little of substance.
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Further dampening the tenor of discussion was the scarcity of financial resources
available for sustainable development. At UNCED, governments had agreed that
ignificant new funds would be necessary to implement Agenda 21 and the other Rio
agreements, but few industrialized countries were unable to come up with significant
nledces at that June 1992 meeting. One year later, not only were new pledges apparently
not torthcoming, but cuts to existing development assistance fla just been anaounceu a.
the United Nations Development Program's Governing Council meeting just preceding
the CSD session.
Despite these concerns, the results of the negotiations on the CSD's working methods
were generally quite positive, including agreements on:
(1) a three-year agenda, through which the Commission will review in- depth roughly a
third of Agenda 21 each year from 1994-1996, followed by an overall review of Agenda 21
in 1997 in preparation for the General Assembly's Agenda 21 review that year. Under
this three- year agenda, each CSD session will focus on certain "cross-sectoral" issues, such
as finance, technology poverty, consumption, and roles of major groups; as well as on
certain clusters of "sectoral'1 issues. The sectoral clusters scheduled for consideration in
1994 are (a) health, human settlements, and freshwater and (b) toxic chemicals and
hazardous wastes.
(2) reporting processes to channel information on efforts to implement Agenda 21 into
the CSD for its review. The annual reporting processes, intended to focus on those issues
under consideration by the CSD that yea; will include submissions both fmm national
governments and from international organizations. The CSD secretariat will receive and
analyze these submissions and produce consolidated reports of efforts to implement
Agenda 21 at the national and international levels. Non-governmental organizations may
contribute to these reports, both through submissions to national governments and
through submissions directly to the CSD secretariat.
(3) intersessional meetings to prepare for the next annual CSD session. The Commission
agreed to establish two intersessional working groups, one to tackle issues of financial
resources and the other to focus on issues of technology transfe; cooperation and
capacity-buildin& These working groups, under the direction of the CSD's bureau of
officers, will be made of governments who will nominate experts to partidpate they are
ad hoc, intended as experiments in intersessional preparation rather than as permanent
fixtures. A number of governments made offers to host expert meetings on the sectoral
issues being taken up by the (D next year as welt; wblte tkes etttc wW tct1t t
of the official CSD process, they are expected to provide considerable substantive input to
the CSD's work.
The Commission aIsogotiated decisions on issues of financial assistance, technology,
and progress made by the U.N. system in incorporating UNCED decisions.
The June session took some important first steps towards establishing the CSD's standing
as a forum which will review the performance of relevant U.N. agencies and programs
and of international financial institutions. Some twenty-two representatives of U.N.
bodies attended the CSD session, making presentations of their respective organizations'
efforts related to sustainable development, and engagin in dialogue with CSD members
and NGO observers. Several of the CSD decisions include specific policy
recommendations to other international organizations, including to the Global
Environment Facility, reaffirming initial hopes that the Commission may become an
effective mechanism for monitoring international organizations' performance as well as
fnr building consensus on new directions for international policies and activities.
On Wednesday and Thursday of the last week of the session, the SD held a high-level
segment which was attended by some 46. ministers from national governments as well as
O ambassadors and numerous NGOs. The ministerial meeting was surprisingly lively:
while some ministers could not refrain from reading prepared statements, many offered
cfrr, cnn,ments affirming their governments' commitment both to the SD and to
implementing sustainable development at home, and pledging to use the CSD as a forum
to give political direction to the international system, not just as a meeting of technicians
or diplomats.
A long series of offers by ministers to host experts' meetings began to seem almost like a
battle for greatest demonstrations of commitments, perhaps topped by the statement on
the last afternoon by U.S. Under- Secretary of State-Designate Tim Wirth announcing a
joint U.S.- Colombian partnership to help prepare for the CSD's intersessional working
group on technology issues. (This offer had considerable political symbolism:
suggesting a new North-South partnership, with Colombia having served as the chair of
the Group of 77 developing countries; and the issues of technology transfer having been
among the most contentious for the Bush Administration during the UNCED process.)
Pledges for increased financial assistance by Japan, among others, also were well-received.
Another positive feature of the ministerial session was the inclusion of NGO and
indigenous spokespersons in the ministers' meeting and the broad acceptance of the
contributions to be made by NGOs.
NGOs AT THE CSD
There were some three hundred-odd accredited NGOs at the Commission meeting about
130 of which were U.S.-based. NGOs held daily strategy meetings every morning,
organized into about 20 meetings each day of various regional and sectoral caucuses,
produced oral and written statements, observed CSD sessions, and lobbied government
delegates. UNA-USA and the Citizens Network for Sustainable Development collaborated
with the Earth Council, the United Methodist Church's Women's Division, the Quaker
UN Office, the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC, the UN
Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), and the Women's Environment and
Development Organization (WEDO) to operate an NGO Host Center across the street
from the UN, providing meeting space, daily calendars, briefings, and other information
services for NGOs attending the CSD meeting. Participation of Southern NGOs was
facilitated by travel funds provided through NGLS (from the Government of Canada and
Cape 2000), the Netherlands Committee of the IUCN, WEDO, UNA-USA, and others.
The majority of the NGOs in attendance were advocacy groups; many of these had
participated in the UNCED process, and many came to the CSD meeting with a specific
issue of primary concern (e.g, forests, structural adjustment, climate, militarism). Many
of the NGO meetingsere only indirectly related to the CSD negotiations, gIven greater
NGO interests in (and knowledge of) sectoral and political issues rather than procedural
ones. The absence of a functioning NGO coordinating committee also meant that
considerable time was spent discussing ways in which the NGOs might self-organize.
These constraints notwithstanding, a number of NGOs made effective interventions Into
the official process. And the relationship between NGOs, the CSD secretariat and
governments was quite positive, with a number of miniters at the high-level segment
affirming the importance of NGO participation in future CSD sessions.
There's work still to be done: while many NGOs at the CSD session, particularly those
from developing countries, expressed a desire for better communication,
information-sharing and strategizing among NGOs interested in the CSD, the June session
ended with no organizational plan for ongoing NGO work. It is also important that
efforts are made to reach out to nongovernmental groups and institutions with expertise
in the specific issues to be considered by the CSD next year, to ensure that those with the
nost to contribute to the process each year are involved.
US DELEGATION
The U.S. delegation enjoyed an unusually warm reception to its statements at the CSD
session, marking a distinct change from the experience of the Bush Administration
throughout the UNCED process. Delegation members held regular meetings with U.S.
NGOs, including one led by Ambassador Elinor Constable and two by Under-Secretaty of
State-Designate Tim Wirth. Statements made by the Vice President, by Wirth, and by
EPA Administrator Carol Browner - emphasizing national responsibilities and
international partnerships -- were all very well-received, both by NGOs and by other
governments. The main criticism heard concerned the lack of new U.S. financial
assistance, a criticism made of most industrial countries. During negotiating sessions, U.S.
representatives at times appeared to be reviving old U.S. habits, for example by objecting
to the inclusion of references to "lifestyles" in the guidelines for national reports on
sustainable production and consumption patterns (then later withdrawing the objection).
These incidents were, however, overshadowed by the very positive reactions to perceived
changes in U.S. policy and attitude.
What remains to be seen is whether the new rhetorical commitments - to the CSD, to
sustainable development, to new approaches to international negotiations - will be
backed up by actually policy changes and financial offerings. The first test will be the
success of the U.S.-Colombian partnership to prepare for the intersessional working group
on technology transfer and cooperation.
Kathy Sessions is a Senior Policy Analyst in the Washington Office of the United Nations
Association of the USA (UNA-USA), 1010 Vermont Avenue, NW Suite 904, Washington,
DC 20005. Phone: 202-347-5004; fa,c 202-628-5945; email: unaofusa@igc.org
For a more complete summary of the June 1993 CSD session, see "Earth Negotiations
Bulletin," Vol. 5, No. 12,28 June 1993, published by the International Institute for
Sustainable Development. Available from IISD, 161 Portage Avenue East, 6th flooi
Winnipe& Manitoba, R3B 0Y4, Canada, or on the APC's econet computer conference
"csd.general".
ippendix 8:
INTERNATIONAL NGO FORUM (INGOF)
NGO Treaty Process - a proposal (or Phase 2
( December 11, 1993 )
CONTEXT
The International NGO Forum (1NGOF) is a group of existing networks, coalitions and initiatives wh
are Interested In working together internationally on alternatives to the dominant economic developmt
models. Its focus Is to develop a credible set of alternative proposals to the present social economic
political system which Is Inequitable and unsustainable. It will link International, national and local
organizations who are working in research, analysis and practical experimentation In order to learn fri
experience and propose and test alternatives. The process within the group alms to be open, democra
and transpareflL
The process began during the preparatory phase of UN
	 and created a series of NGO statements
called the Alternative NGO Treaties. The Treaties were In t ed to be agreements on principles and
conimitmenta for NGO action on environment and development Ismes regardless Of what government
decided at Rio. A number of the MOO Treaties have been used successfuliy In many countries In a
variety of ways since they were developed In Rio. However underlying many of the Treaties Is a
common thread Illustrating the lack of substantive credible alternative models.
FOUR PROPOSITIONS UNDERLYING THIS PROPOSAL
I) The cause of the environment/development crisis In the world is based In the dominant econom
model. Therefore NGOs need credible and coherent alternatives to propose, which we do not ye
Ii) MOOs and peopl&s organizations can help develop this alternative vision.
m) An innovative dialoguernegodazing process (using facilitators and regional and gender balanced
coordinators) was developed for preparing the Alternative Treaties. This can be further refined as
used lo help the MOO discussion of fitndnenta1 alternatives.
IV) In this way, the International NGO Forum (INGOF) can help NGOs step back from the busy a
of Immediate lobbying and public education, to facilitate a dialogue among South/NorthlflastlWe
NGOs on new fnn.4meana1 alternatives. The results of this dialogue will feed Into ongoing NOC
work on the CSD, the Social Summit and others.
%
PROPOSED ELEMENTS FOR WORKPLAN
The objective Is not to duplicate inittives of other networks or occupy their political space. Instead.
will draw upon work that Is already being done (Including the NGO Treaties). The process will brini
together groups who want to work together and contribute to the development of fundamental ahernr
tives. There are several key pieces of the jew paradigm that arc missing and need special attention.
Conversations so far Indicate a strong Interest in the following topics being included in the work pin
1. Accountable, democratic decision-making institutions, for both governments and NGOs, includin
financial Institutions.
2. Alternative economic models that promote socialiy and ecologically sustainable development.
3. Visions and values of sustainable communities in sustainable societies. Elements of sustainabilit
PROCESS TO GET STARTED
I. Pfanning meeting in each region:
agree on a process to identify groups who would like to work together internationally to develop
0	 S -
II. Regonat and Sub-regional meetings
(funds received will support neetings in the South, Eastern and Central Europe):
to share experiences, successes and failures in using the treaties so far, and the participants' ideas'
how to adapt them for future use.
- to discuss their goals for international cooperative work.
- to decide on the priority subjects for an international work plan on fundamental alternatives.
- to select a mechanism for coordination of action (i.e. regional committee or existing network, etc.
- to decide which organizations want to cooperate on this work plan and how they want to contribu
- to discuss resource needs (capacity building needs)and other concerns that would facilitate inter-
regional NGO cooperation on this joint work plan (for example, funding needs to support NGO
input into the work plan, or perhaps negotiation of an NGO Cooperation Treaty).
to decide on a member for each sub-region to replace existing INGOF Steering Committee, and
delegates to attend Inter-regional meeting. 	 -
III. Inter-regional Meeting.
to discuss Input front regional and sub-regional meetings.
• to agree on how NGO networks and regions can cooperate on a joint work plan (perhaps an NE
Cooperation Treaty).
L 
toagreeonasetofprioritylssuesfortheworkplan.
- to agree on the first stage of the work plan, including division of labor.
The process will bring together groups who want to work together and contribute to the development c
a larger alternatives
Time Line
The proposed phase II of the INGOF process would cutminte with the Inter-regional meeting, plannec
to take place in October or November 1994. The JNGOF process should allow the NGO community to
articulate some fundamental alternatives and a plan to work together on them by then. The process
should be useful to participating NGOs and networks in their work around different UN and internaxio:
negotiations. For instanccii&isproposed that NGOs collaborating in the INGOF process aim to make
collective contribution on fundamental alternatives to the Social Development Summit.
NOTES:
1. The INGOF steering committee has selected a five-member "executive committee" composed of 0:
co-chair from each continent.
2: See attached for a list of current members of Steering Committee.
3: If your NGO or network is interested in participating in that process, contact a committee membei
your respective region.
-	 _____
- _	 - _______________________
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Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development
Division for Sustainable Development
Human Development, tntitutions and Technology Branch
DRAFT
FRAMEWORKS FOR TIlE LONG, MEDIUM AND
SHORT-TERM ON MAJOR GROUPS RELATED
ACTIVITIES OF THE CSD SECRETARIAT
First i&ing of the Major Groups Focaif*n
18 November 1993. New York
Designing Sustainable Development Division functions related to Major Groups
A Preliminary
 Pronosat
UNCED achieved two very important results beyond 'the adopted resolutions: (i) an
unprecedented involvement and commitment by non-governmental actors and. organizations both
in the Conference preparatory process and at the Conference itself, and (ii) raised expectations of
the global community regarding the UN system's ability to maintain and foster the sustainable
development momentum achieved at Rio.
One 01 the most extraordinary aspects of the UNCED process was the quantity and quality of
non-governmental actor involvement both in the conference preparatory process and at the Rio
conference itselt This unprecedented participation created a refreshing feeling of a global
community reaching for the same objective which in turn is at the root of the sustainable
development momentum that is expected to carry Agenda 21 activities into fruition.
Agenda 21 recognized this phenomenon by dedicating 9 of the 40 chapters to the role of non-
governmental actors which the Agenda collectively refers to as "major groups." Similarly, The
CSD, at its first session, adopted its Multi-Year Thematic Programme of Work in which activities
related to the role of Major Groups in sustainable development are placed within a separate
cluster rather than dispersing them throughout the other clusters. The CSD Secretariat, especially
its Sustainable Development Division, should also reflect this international recognition regarding
the role of non-governmental actors as it designs its work plan based on the clusters.
The raised expectations of the global community regarding the UN's ability to move the world
into a more environmentally sustainable future is another important fact that should • steer the
Division's current design of its coordinating and monitoring functions. One of the most
• highlighted expectations stem from the "new" role of the non-governmental actors and
organizations as recognized by Agenda 21 and the Programme of Work of the CSD. The global
community feels that the UNCED tradition and the Agenda 21 have provided the basis of a truly
international partnership towards the most important goal in human history and expects the CSD
and its Secretariat to be the protector and nurturer of this partnership. In designing the Division's
work framework, these expectations should also be kept in mind very clearly.
•	 .This note is a proposalon how the CSD Secretanat., especially its Sustainable Development
Division, might organize its work related to the Major Groups Cluster so as to respond to the
observations above.
Analysis of the chapters under Cluster E on Major Groups. and the CSD's Programme of Work,
show the following synthesis of tasks to be of importanQe in the implementation of Agenda 21 and
the role of major groups:
a Collecting, analyzing and reporting of information on major groups' contributions to
progress under particular thematic chapters or clusters
Fnabljng linkages between major grr)upc. s well c lin1ces between major QroUflc
and governments and international organizations (including information and institutional
networks)
Enabling greater inputs from major groups to sustainable development decision-
making at national, regional and international levels
Enabling greater sharing of human, financial and information resources for education,
environmental awareness, training, and other sustainable development activities between non-
governmental and governmental actors
The first task in this list is the main firnction of the Sustainable Development Division as the
substantive arm of the CSD Secretariat. (The main flmction from hereon is referred to as the
"substantive services.") In other words, the Division's primary responsibility is to present to the
CSD. as best as it can, the progress achieved under each theme so that the Commission can make
informed decisions when setting global environmental sustainability priorities at each annual
session.
The last three broad tasks, however, hint that the Division's "coordinating and monitoring" role
will be incomplete if it were satisfied with accomplishing its main function alone: that, in fact, the
substantive firnction would benefit greatly if it is carried out in tandem with the other tasks rather
than separate from them.
More specifically, the Division may choose to focus on its monitoring mandate and be passave
observer and reporter of majo	 s' activities. Or it may choose to focus on all of the
ibove and therefore take inter/active r : facilitating the ways and means that would lead to
progress as well as monitoring an
	
g the progress achieved. Choosing such an active role
by the Division may help achieve several objectives simultaneousl y including:
(i) better and more direct access to information needed for various progress and monitoring
reports.
(ii) fulfilling the expected role of being an active facilitator and mediator of sustainable
development activitieg major groups at all levels,
(iii) providing the missing link as a central exchange forum for information, activities, networks.
resources and the like, between major groups and governmental inter-governmental organizations.
and.
(iv) better fulfilling the expectations of Agenda 21 and the global community from the CSD and
its Secretariat in general.	 -
Such an active role would indicate, two other services provided by the Division in addition to its
ubstantive services: that is. information services and support services. (See the figure attached
fbr a schematic view) Brief descriptions and activities under each of these functions are provided
below. The examples are based on the suigested activities of chapter 27 on the role of' NCO
UILilQUWI we same examples ai-e useful in the context of all other chapters on major groups
In formation Services	 I
Coordination of sustainable development activities will require the highest possible level of
information flow among all the relevant actors. The CSD and itS Secretariat as the main
coordinating body can provide services that enable and enhance a two-way forum of dialogue not
only between major groups and the CSD but also exchange of information:
between major groups (for example, between women's groups and industry),
within major groups (for example, between women' s groups across countries and
regions), and.
between major groups and governments at the regional and international levels.
The service could involve such tools as data-bases, or recurrent or non-recurrent publications that
increase access to available experiences, skills, resources, as well as lead to greater sharing of
sustainable development concerns, problems and solutions.
For example, Chapter 27 has a number of specific activities to be carried out by governments and
international organizations, including reviews of:
existing mechanisms for NGO input into lOs
mechanisms for NGO input into Governments
communication between NGOs: national with case studies, regional and
international
tbrmal procedures for NGO involvement and contribution to recommend
improvements
financial and administrative support for NGO contribution
national education systems to identify ways to exparid NCO role
From these a number of information service projects can be derived:
•	 Informing rnajWroups on the thematic programme of work of the CSD to enable better
local groups to effectively organize activities around the themes.
Ihe D&vision. in cooperation with the existing NGOlmajor group liaison services of the (IN
sstem. can prepare brief information packages to mail out to as many major groups as
possible. informing them of the selected themes for 1994-1997. This would help direct the
activities to contribute to the selected themes and therefore to progress in these areas.
The Division may also consider submitting anides along the same lines to major
3
newspapers and journals in order to disseminate the sustainable development priorities as
adopted by the CSD. Similar articles can be disseminated through the existing publication
services of the UN DPI and its field offices.
z:abl!, ±.tz5:zo( of c:v:o4:cnt arid devciopmen NGCs and make e Lj-bae
contents available globally
Data base would contain, among other things, names, speia1ized contact person(s) along
major group labels or environmental themes, addresses and other contact information, level
of participation in international and regional organizations, specific contributions to Agenda
21 chapters and themes, particular expertise areas, procedure for sharing with other non-
governmental organizations.
The data base(s) can be the basis for the Division to conduct referral services to NGOs and
other major groups around particular themes, problems, and solutions. The data-base can
also help run regular analyses of the state of non-governmental organizations vis a vis their
role in sustainable development. (This activity would closely involve the existing
information and data-base formats such as that of the NGLS, Centre for Our Common
Future and others. Although there are already some electronic networks of environmental
and development NGOs their accessibility is often more favorable in' the industrialized
countries and they are often based on commercial electronic services which may not be
affordable by many developing countiy NGOs.)
Monitor and survey NGO activities regularly (every 3-5 years for example) to assess the
followings:
°	 access and participation in the international and regional inter-governmental bodies,
'	 access and participation in local problems and solutions
access to sharing with each other (cross-major group interaction)
'	 real and perceived barriers to their increased participation in the international
regional bodies
'	 real and perceived barriers to sharing with other major groups regionally and
internationally
°	 the critical success factors in those cases where new connections with inter-
governmental organizations or other major groups were made
These surveys would not only help update information in the data-base(s) and enhance
the information included in the progress reports prepared for the CSD but they could
also be the'.sis for regular publications available to both governmental and non-
governmental groups/institutions.
The surveys could also be ftirther developed into detailed case studies that focus on
success and failure experiences on NGO involvement in national, regional and
international processes on sustainable development. The results of the case studies can
be disseminated among governmental and non-governmental groups/institutions either as
background papers at inter-governmental meetings, or as case-study publications. (the
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case studies can be carried out as joint projects of the Division and Major Groups, or
they can be commissioned out to outside experts)
Support Services	 I
Under this category the Division would have a catal ytic role that facilitates major groups' role and
contribution to the national, regional and international sustainable development activities. As such.
the Division would take the lead to suggest (and help organize) various local, regional and
international meetings, workshops, round-tables and seminars around the identified themes of the
Multi-Year Thematic Programme of Work of the CSD.
These events would increase direct linkages between NGOs that are normally not accessible to
each other (due to geographical, financial and other reasons for example). U would also increase
direct interaction between NGOs and other major groups which is largely lacking at present.
(For example, although it may be the case that environmental NGOs know and work with each
other but they are less likely to know and work with Industr y Groups, or Farmers or Local
Authorities.)
Particular examples of support services could include, among other things:
activities under thematic clusters could include•
Round-table on Clean technology assessment— perhaps regional. (might produce a
report/glossary of terms or a booklet on technology assessment methods for use by
other groups in local training programmes)
Training seminars for/by NGOs in developing countries on specialized sound
technology assessment methods (toxics, metal processing, leather industry and
others. The Division could suggest experts . for the training courses, help with
funding ctc)
Regional or national seminars on improving the NGO involvement in the national or
regional inter-governmental process (related to decision-making cluster)
activities that bring together several major groups
Regioal conference(s) on health and environment with Industry and Local
Autho1i,..Women's Groups
°	 Forum on Sound Human Settlements with Industry (Professional societies of
Engineers and Architects) and Local Authorities
Round table of Agri-business representatives with Farmers groups on management
of toxic chemicals
activities that increase the interaction between CSD. and the non-governmental communities
'	 Meetings with one major group, one specific theme and the CSD Bureau (open to
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interested governmental representatives).These could follow particular themes or
thematic clusters:
THEMES: Women and Environment involving Women's group representatives
(nl rnci	 "ith ir Wrrni&s Cnfrenc&; Energy and Environment involving
energy industries. City Design and Environment involving Local Authorities.
CLUSTERS: Health and Environment involving Medical communities: Land and
Farmers etc.
o Meetings that combine several major groups, on one theme and the CSD Bureau—
For example, meetings on Toxic chemicals involving industry, environmental
NIGOs with particular expertise in toxics. and farmers
Meetings of Major Groups as a whole and the CSD Bureau
This would be a "mirror CSD" involving major groups as representatives of
countries rather than Governmental representatives (draw back is the national
selection process to identify which non-governmental organization should represent
the country at the Commission.)
Regular exchange forum mechanisms
Such as Non-governmental advisory Councils. (UNCTC/TCMD's Corporate
Responses 10 Agenda 21 paper reported several proposals from the industry along
these lines.)
(Substantive Services 	 I
The main duty of the Division is to assist the Commission in reviewing what is being done in the
held so that the Commission can take decisions that enhance the positive developments, prevent
the negatives and set the optimally beneficial sustainable development priorities for governments
and international organiztions and by extension for the major groups. Since the role of major
groups in the actual implementation process is of paramount importance. it is crucial for the CSD
Secretariat especially its Sustainable Development Division to organize its work programme as an
interactive process. Thus, the Division would be able to accomplish more than re-reporting of the
reports received from other UN bodies and national governments. In this context, the contribution
of the above activities is clear: they bring in tangible information from the NGO and other non-
governmental communities based on their survey, networking and interaction through facilitated
events.
L
conciusion	
I
The above indicates that. vis a vis the major groups. the Division can and should assume a greater
role than what its obvious reporting role may suggest. Since the Division's resources are limited, a
broader role as described above needs to draw upon the existing mechanisms and to start on a
small scale designed to grow over the years. Initial steps would involve designating the major
groups focal point(s) within the Division: and setting up coordination meetines with the NGO
units at the UN Headquarters (DPCSD NGO Liaison Office. UN NGLS Office, UNDP NGC)
T.,j 
"'ild h th initial tariets for such a meeting).
Agenda 21 can only be implemented if contributions from all actors are enabled. Its extensive
nature may tend to paralyze individual actors who will need support and leadership on a
consistent and continuos basis. Though simple, the most necessary message for Agenda 21
implementation is that it can be done. In this context, the already visible commitment of thousands
of non-governmental organizations and groups to sustainable development activities should not be
taken lightly as true sustainable development is a social and economic transition which means
local involvement. However, how the DPCSD in general and the Sustainable Development
Division in particular approaches to catalyzing greater interaction between major groups and
between the CSD and the major groups will determine the outcome. If the Division has a passive
role and limits itself to summarizing the collected reports the outcome would be mere
maintenance. An active role, on the other hand, would be making a change.
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Function related to Major Groups1
Introduction
This paper presents a brief background and outline for a work programme to deal
with the Agenda 21 cross-sectoral issue of Major Groups.
Non-governmental organizations and other major groups have been a key player in
the UNCED process. Letter and spirit of Agenda 21 as well as the deliberations of
the first session of the Commission on Sustainable Development acknowledge the
important role of major groups and call for their active involvement in the
implementation of Agenda 21 (Major groups are involved in nearly all of Agenda 21
activities. 9 of 40 chapters of the Agenda are exclusively dedicated to Major
Groups).
While the involvement of major groups in intergovernmental processes is not a new
phenomenon at all, it appears that this issue for the first time is not considered as a
mere "add-on" to other issues. Rather, the involvement of major groups must be
considered as a "stand-alone issue" which deserves particular and separate
attention in addition to its obvious linkages to substantive issues.
Major Groups have actively pursued and welcomed the invitation of the UNCED
process. They will amplify their role by adopting more effective means of
articulation and coordination and by demanding even broader access to the inter-
governmental process based on their substantive role in the implementation of
Agenda 21. Some of them have established themselves as effective channels for
the "grass roots" level in the implementation of Agenda 21 and are ready provide
vital information' for the UNCED process. Others - particularly groups in many
developing countries - are calling for support from the international community to
fulfill their missions in the process of promoting sustainable development.
II Functions c the Secretariat - (HOIT Branch of Sustainable Development
Division, DPCSJDJ
	
-
The most obvious function of the secretariat in dealing with Major Groups is the
report function. The issue of major groups has to be addressed
' References to M.jor Groups in this paper refer to the definition of Agenda 21. In this definition the following groups
er. specified: Women, children and youth, indigenous people end thaur cornrnuniHes. non-governmental organizations.
local authorities. workers and trade unions, business and industry, scientific and technological community, farmers
as a distinctive part of the annual overview reports to be presented to CSD
on progress made in the implementation of Agenda 21
i part rf the thematic rporzs cocspnUiig to Agea 21 secwra issues
Following the spirit of Agenda 21 the secretariat has to adopt an additional function
which goes beyond traditional reporting and can be labellpd as suo port function.
Under this function the secretariat is expected to serve as a protector and nurturer
of a new partnership comprised of major groups and the traditional governmental
and inter-governmental machinery. The secretariat is required to
encourage and promote the active, full and informed participation of major
groups in the process of implementing Agenda 21	 -
Report and support functions are not disconnected but two sides of the same coin:
Traditional reporting as pure collection of information will be not possible facing a
heterogenous variety of major groups. Reporting is to be understood as an
interactive process in which the generation of information has to be stimulated and
encouraged by the secretariat. Such interaction will further strengthen the role of
major groups in the process of Agenda 21 implementation. In this respect the
secretariat has the opportunity to play the role of a catalyst in an ongoing
interactive process.
Ill	 Work Programme
The work programme of the secretariat will include the following tasks
(1) Collecting and synthesizing information about the involvement of major
groups through:
(a) monitoring of annual country reports on the progress in the
implementation of Agenda 21
(b) collecting information related to Major Groups from all United Nations
bodies
(C)	 interacting with major groups directly and ask for specific information
(in the form of meetings, workshops, individual requests or surveys)
(d)	 interaction with United Nations task, managers for different aspects of
Agenda 21
(2) Providing information in the form of
(a) mandated reports to the Commission on Sustainable Development
(b) listings of major groups working in different fields and characteristics
of their major activities (case studies, success stories. etc.) to be
provided to Major Groups UN task managers for different issues of
Agenda 21 implementation on others
(C)	 general information about the UNCED process and the implementation
of Agenda 21 (basic information as well as information about ongoing
activities like inter-sessional working groups, tc to be provided to
Major Groups and others
Such information under b and c could have -the character of recurrent
publications (bulletins, newsletters, etc.) or could be made available
upon request (database searches)
(d)	 articles to be published in journals and newspapers
It should not be overlooked that dealing with Agenda 21 is one of the
very few occasions where the work of the secretariat in the economic
and social field has "news-character". The public interest in the
implementation of Agenda 21 should be actively satisfied by the
substantive units in the secretariat
(3) Supplementing task 1 and 2 the secretariat will
(a) participate in Major Groups Meetings and Conferences to work as a
multiplier for the objectives laid down in Agenda 21 and in decisions
of the Commission on Sustainable Development and to advise major
groups with regards to effective access to the intergovernmental
.machinery
(b) organize for different topics conferences involving major groups to
facilitate interaction and communication among them and with the
UN system and the exchange of information
(C)	 mobilize special support to major groups in developing countries in
the form of logistical inputs. information and fund raising, as possible
IV	 Organization of Work
The work of the secretariat will be facilitated by creating an identifiable focal point
serving as a visible partner for the UN system itself and for major groups. Given the
scope of the task the focal point should consist of at least two professional staff
and should make use of existing NGO focal points within the UN system. As
immediate actions the focal point/unit will
(a) ta'vith the exiiting NGLS within DPCSD
(b) identify other relevant focal points throughout the United Nations
System and will
(C)	 try to set up a working strategy which will make the most use of
possible cooperation within the United Nations System
(d) produce a directory of Major Groups involved in issues relevant for
Agenda 21 (taking stock of existing directories and data bases)
(e) start fund raising and partnerships ìà conduct workshops
(f)	 provide detailed break downs for the work plan as specified in the
work programme above
Dealing with major groups will involve considerable staff resources both for
analytical and technical work (e.g. set up of data bases). Since this man power is
not available within the division it urged to allocate funds for consultancies
immediately.
Required investments will have a high return in terms of both pron)oting the
implementation of Agenda 21 and increasing the visibility of the secretariat
Suggested Projects for the short-tern 	 working towards the long-term
Project 1: Identifying the Major Groups
Starting on a small scale and building over time.
C"r	 ''id he the Themes for each year (indicates intcr-Brch decision on ov.' to)
could be based on who can be reached now (indicates a level of arbitrariness)
could be based on the nine major groups cluster without a thematic basis but
trying to reach to more than those who are available (indicates a possible gap of information
for the thematic reports but is likely to provide information for the overview report)
Venue:	 field offices of UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank, Regional Commissions, NGLS
network, and other NGO networks
Output 1: information for the thematic reports; Output 2:Directory of Major Groups
Project 2: Identifying Programmes and Projects relevant to Major Groups needs
Survey, of what programmes for sustainable development exist in the intergovernmental
arena, showing level of resources allocated, available funding and cooperation potentials
Venue:	 UN Agencies. funding institutions, non-UN international and regional
organizations
Output I: Guidelines for increased access to potential funding and cooperation
opportunities for Major Groups
Output 2: Inputs to CSD reports under future recommendations/potentials for cooperation
and collaboration for governmental/non-governmental partnerships
Project 3: Identifying the collaborative efforts in the Major Groups sphere
Survey of collaborative programmes involving, for example, developed country industries
and developing country industries etc.
Venue:	 Interviews and survey of target major groups
Output 1: Inputs to the CSD reports on major groups' cooperation and collaboration
Output 2: (publication) Sustainable development cooperation in the Major Groups sphere.
Project 4: Evaluating the potentials and bottlenecks in greater Major Groups
involvement in Agenda 21 implementation
Survey of the identified Major Groups in terms of their level of access to governmental and
inter-governmental process, including the problems encountered.
Targets: could include reviews of accreditation processes used by UN and non-UN
international organizations, by Governments; surveying the perceived and real bottlenecks
experiences by the çiroups, assessment of innovatIve approaches that increase Major
Group participation in national and international processes.
Output I: Guidelines for increased participation of Major Groups
Output 2: Inputs into the CSD reports
DPCSD, Sfainabl Delo
	 iibFvision
Human Development, Institutions and Technology Branch
ITEM 2
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION THROUGH EXISTING NETWORKS
Some questions for discussion:
I- does your organization have a network of major groups, especially reaching those in
developLig countries?
2- which possibilities exist for cooperation with the CSD Secretariat in disseminating information?
3- what would be the procedure to start the process?
4- can you suggest other organizations for CSD Secretariat to contact to increase its outreach
activities?
DPCSD, Sustainable Development Division
Human Development, Institutions and Technology Branch
ITEM 3
JOINT PROGRAMMES AND ACTIVITIES
Some questions for discussion
1- what are your views on the ideas presented in the frameworks?
2- do you feel these ideas are useful? If yes which particular ones seem to be on target in terms of
what you feel are areas that need urgent assistance?
3- what are your expectations from the CSD Secretariat in terms of facilitating Major Groups
participation and contribution to the CSD process and the overall sustainable development
efforts?
4- do you have on-going programmes related to Major Groups in which you would need CSD
Secretariat's inputs, assistance and/or participation?
DPCSD Sustainable Development Division
Human Development, Institutions and Technology Branch
1.1ST OF ACTI\'ITIES FROM THE FRAMEWORKS
INFORMATION RELATED
from Short-term list
- 1dentifying the Major Groups- survey (thematic and! or group focus)
2- identiFying the programmes and projects releyant to major groups -- survey
3- identifying the collaborative efforts among major groups -- survey
4- evaluation of bottlenecks and potentials in major groups involvement in Agenda 21 -survey
from medium.term list
5- collecting and synthesizing major groups involvement
a. monitoring information in country reports
b. collecting information through UN agencies
c. direct contacts with major groups
d. interactions with Task Managers
6- Providing information to major groups and from major groups to CSD
a. reports to
b. master listsmajor groups for use of UN agencies and major groups
c. information to major groups on on-going activities (CSD meetings, intersesional
meetings, country of UN agency sponsored meetings etc)
d. articles in newspapers and journals and other publications
from lonz-term list
7- packages of informationon thematic information needs, tailored to the area of eachmajor
group (cross-referenced activities check-list)— also includes # 6.d
8- databases on major groups available for increasing links between major groups - related to #
above
9- monitoring and rveying major groups activities in Agenda 21 regularly with periodic
publications -- related to # 1,2,3, and 4
DPCSDSustainableDevelopment Divisloir-
Human Development, Institutions and Technology Branch.
• Support and Facilitation related
from the medium-term list
I 0- organize conferences involving major groups to facilitate interaction and communication
II- mobilize logistical inputs, information and ftind raising to support activities of developilg
country Major Groups
from the long-term list
12- Thematic meetings (examples only-- not a work programme) -
a. Round table on clean technology assessment
b. training seminars in developing countries on technology assessment methods
c. regional and international seminars on imçicoving natio-ria an regional major groupS
nvolvement
- Two or more major group meetings
a. regional conference on health with Industry, local authorities and women's groups
b. forum on Human settlements with industry based professional societies of engineers and
architects and local authorities
c. roundtable of agri-business with faimers groups on sound management of agricultural
chemicals and alternative methods 	 -
14- meetings with CSD and Major Groups
a. One target major group, one selected theme and the CSD Bureau
eg: Health and environment with women medical professionals and the CSD
b. several major groups, one theme and CSD Bureau
eg: Toxic chemicals with industry, environment and development NGOs with
expertise in toxic chemicals and the Bureau
c. meeting of major groups with the CSD
eg: "mirror C SD" with non-governmental sectors representing their countries with
the CSD Bureau (open to governmental representatives)
d. regular exchange mechanisms between standing Major Groups committees and the CSD
eg: Business Advisory Council
eg: Itdigenous People Advisory Council etc.
-'i---- -'-'---r	 ---	 -.--------- - -
Appendix 10:
COMMISSION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
CONSULTATION WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS!
MAJOR GROUPS
NON-PAPER
Major groups, including non-governmental organizations, play a significant role in facilitating the
global transition to sustalnability. The CSD. k.s bureau and Its secretariat value the working relationships
with major groups. This paper proposes some modalities for making this Important partnership work.
A.	 ackrrotin4
1. In February 1993, ECOSOC adopted supplementary arrangements (ESOSOC decision
1993/215) regardIng the representation of and consultation with non-governmental
organizations (NGOsYmajoc groups solely for the ConmiscIon on Sustainable
Development. These have been used as basic guidelines In developing the
recommendations for this paper and include the following:'
(a) Representatives of NGOsImajor groups may, at their own expense, make written
submissions to tEe Commission and its subsidiary organs through the Secretariat
in one of the official languages of the U.N:"Those written representations will
not be Issued as official documents. 	 -
(b) Representatives of NGOs/znajor groups may be given an opportunity to briefly
address the meetings of the Commission and Its subsidiary organs. The
Chairman of the Commission or Its subsidiary organs may request the
NGOsknajor groups concerned toiddress the meetings through one or more
spokespersons.
(c) Representatives of NGOsfrnajor groups shall not have any negotiating role in the
work of ie Commlcsion and its subsidiary organs.
(d) The Comnthslon may consult with representatives of NGOslniajor groups either
directly or flrogh a committee or committees established for that purpose.
(e) The Commkslon should encourage equitable representation of NGOsImajor
groups from the developed and developing countries and from all regions.
(1)	 Representatives of NGOs/major groups are invited ,
 to consider or continue
organling themselves In i,arious constituencies and Interest groups and to setup
non-governmental networks, Including electronic networks, for the exchange of
'cicvant information and documentation.
Other key considerations In establishing consultations with NGOslmajor groups
considered in this paper include:
(a) Equitable representation of all NGOs/major groups. This includeS environment
and development NGOs, business and industry, women, children and youth.
indigenous peoples, local authorities, farmers, workers and their trade unions and
the scientific and technical community.
2(b) Timing of consultations.
(c) Costs of consultation mechanisms.
B.	 JECOMMEDA&T1ONS
I.	 !100SLMAJOR GROUPS INPUTS DURING SESSIONS AND
fi4TERSESSIONALLY
1.	 Written Inputs
(a) Where possible, NGOs in consultation with the Secretariat should provide a
standardized format/guideline for Input from representatives of NGOslmajor
groups on CSD issues. The format should include: the name of the NGO/major
group and whom they are representing (if this Is a regional, individual or group
submission); statement of the issue(s); relationship to the agenda; and any
specific recommendations. Submissions from NGOsImajor groups should be
encou aged on a regional basis andlor constituency basis and they should be as
concise nd brief as possible.
(b) Input on substantive Issues could be provided so the Secretariat (preferably to a
substantive contact person not an NGO/rnajbr group contact) and would, as
• appropriate, beuaed In the preparation of Secretariat documents. A list of all
NGOsImajor groups substantive submlsslons,relevant to the Commission's work,
including Dames of orgntatIons and a contact person for each, should be
compiled and made available to the- Commission at Its relevant session.
(c) NGOs/major groups are encouraged to coordinate Inputs among themselves -
either related to substantive Issues or regionally. NGOs are encouraged to
establish advisory committees constituted on a regional or constituency basis to
facilitate their communication with the Secretariat and CSI) during sessions and
Intersessionally.
(ci) Advisory committees would need to be constituted of representatives of
NGOshnajor groupè including representatives of environment and development
NGOS, business and Industry, women, children and youth, Indigenous peoples,
local authorities, farmers, workers and their uade unions and the scientific and
technical community. This wil1 require that NGOs/major groups organize
themselves In order to providerepresentatives to advisory committees.
Appendix 11:
CSD NGO Steering Committee Terms of Reference
Approved 26 May 1994, NGO Plenaiy Meeting CSD-2
What follows is the agreed terms of reference for the CSD NGO Steering Committee. This body
facilitates the involvement of NOOs and other Major Groups in the CSD.
NGO Steering Committee Structure
1 It has been the sense of the collective gathering at the CSD2 (1994) that it is important that we
organize ourselves in such a manner that enables us to continue collective work between meetings
of the Commission on Sustainable Development
2 We have identified as follows a series of tasks and activities that should be conducted by such a
Steering Committee.
3 To enhance the flow of information about the CSD process to regional, focal points and networks
for NGOs, Indigenous Peoples and Major Groups and their constituents.
4 Steering Committee members will serve as focal points to ensure participation of issue and
regional networks within the NGO community through their ability to disseminate information
using communication tools such as mail, telephone, fax and E-Mail.
5 To help coordinate the transmission of positions generated by regional and national networks and
major groups to the CSD during intersessional and CSD meetings.
6 To aim to assist efforts of regional networks to organize capacity building and consultative
regional meetings.
7 To help monitor and disseminate reports from tiN conferences, conventions and intersessional
meetings and assure wide distribution of said information and outcomes.
8 To prepare for the subsequent meeting of the CSD, and to insure maximum preparation for and
participation in said meetings.
9 The activity of this committee would in no sense be one of political nor policy representativeness
for the NGO community. No such mandate would be delegated to the committee and political
representatives or interventions will remain the domain of the entire NGO and Major Groups
community.
10 Individual NGOs and groups, as always, will determine their own politics and policies, and will
not be excluded from NGO participation, regardless of their activity with the Steering Committee.
11 The composition of the continuing Steering Committee of NOOs participating in the meetings of
the CSD.
12 The Steering Committee shall consist of regional representatives and representatives of caucuses
of major groups accredited and participating in the CSD meetings.
13 The following regions have been identified and approved: Africa, Pacific Ocean, Caribbean, Latin
America, Asia, Indian Ocean, North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Australia and
New Zealand and the Multi Region (Northern and Southern).
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14 Should other regions want to be recognized they should come with a proposal to the CSD
community. Focal points designated at CSD will consult with regional and national NGOs and
networks to determine their participation at CSD, and the definition of 4regional' for the purposes
of accessing the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee may re-determine the regions at
each assembly with regard to number, size and representatives etc.
15 The Major Groups identified are those recognized in Agenda 21 and other sectoral groups as
needed.
16 Each category shall by an electoral process identify a representative and one alternate, and a
process for their replacement, to serve on the Steering Committee.
17 The Steering Committee shall serve for the period from one CSD meeting to the next CSD
meeting. There will be a meeting at the beginning of each CSD to confirm the representatives
during the first week when a new representative shall be elected.
• On the last day of the Steering Committee at each CSD, a Northern Co-Chair and a Southern Co-
Chair shall be provisionally selected by the constituted committee.
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Appendix 12:
Report of the Seminar on the Involvement of Civil
Society in the Follow-up to the Social Summit
(Mohonk Mountain House, New York State, 22-23
June 1995)
Background
A common feature of all international conferences organized by the United Nations on matters of
development and social progress is the difficulty to give sufficient attention to their implementation
and follow-up. The Seminar on the Involvement of Civil Society in the Follow-up to the Social
Summit, held at the Mohonk Mountain House, New Paltz, New York on 22 and 23 June 1995,
brought together representatives of governments, the United Nations system and non-governmental
organizations to develop ideas for the implementation of the objectives, commitments and policy
recommendations adopted by the Social Summit Participants served in their individual capacity. No
attempt was made to reach consensus on all points raised. This report, prepared by the Secretariat,
aims at reflecting the views expressed and the suggestions made during the two days of discussions.
The World Summit for Social Development, held at Copenhagen, Denmark from 6 to 12 March 1995,
reviewed the current global social situation and focused its attention on three core issues: poverty,
employment and social integration. The participation and contribution of organizations of civil society
in the preparation for the Summit and in its deliberations in Copenhagen, demonstrated, as had already
been done in Rio for the Conference on Environment and Development, that an active partnership
between government and non-governmental forces was feasible and useful.
Global forces, essentially economic and financial, are becoming increasingly pervasive and powerful.
They reflect, and propagate, a liberal view of global economics, including open markets, growth,
competition, free trade, structural adjustment, and the free flow of capital. They lead to an increasing
concentration of economic and political power and to an increasing conformity in culture and
aspirations. Some governments are active instruments of this process of globalization. Others are
tiying to capture some of its economic benefits. Very few are willing, or in a position, to keep a
margin of autonomy in their policy making or to offer an alternative. International organizations are
also invited to join the dominant current, either to contribute to its universalization, or to mitigate its
negative social effects.
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A number of organizations of civil society are observing these developments with concern, notably
because of the linkage they perceive between global economic and political powers, structures and
policies and social conditions of today and tomorrow. They consider it essential to be involved in
international fora, to present their view on the state of the world and to contribute to strengthening the
ability of the United Nations to develop its own philosophy on economic and social progress. Many of
the non-governmental organizations involved with economic and social development have been vocal
proponents of participation, empowerment, capacity building and a concentration on the grass-roots.
Some see this approach as a complement to the increasing globalization. Others would like to build a
balance, a counter power, or even an alternative. Overall, most non-governmental organizations see
themselves as watchdogs and supporters of those peoples who question the dominant trends, and those
groups and nations that are left behind.
Thus, many non-governmental organizations are concerned with the choices societies and the world
are making and which shape the future of humanldnd. They seek to promote a new, global notion of
the common good. They wish to avoid a narrow structural or legal approach to the search for the
common interest. They strive to change the relationships between people and power.
Within national boundaiies governments know that they alone cannot confront all problems of
society. They need to enlist citizens' participation and the assistance of all elements of civil society
whose role is to complements public activities, to make proposals, to represent those who have no
voice and, sometimes, to disagree and dissent This is a healthy and necessaiy process, in a context of
consensus building. The tendency toward polarization and exclusion is getting sinrnger and needs to
be resisted. Consensus must be achieved through dialogue and co-operation.
The Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action explicitly place poor and disadvantaged
people and their organizations in the arena as actors and contributors to social progress and
development, and strongly proclaims the need to involve the civil society in the follow-up to the
Summit. The practical modalities for this involvement need to be clarified. For example, at the
international level, can the doors of the United Nations be open to every organization which seeks
admittance? Js it desirable to have community organization involved in United Nations discussions?
The task is to translate the opening of the United Nations which occurred during the Social Summit
and other recent conferences into pennanent arrangements for participation and partnership.
Clarifying the Concept of Civil Society
Although it has been used with increasing frequency in recent years, including in the Copenhagen
Declaration and Programme of Action, the concept of civil society remains unclear, conceptually and
politically, and has different meanings in different contexts:
(i) As a concept, several "definitions" coexist
1) the "third sector"; the first being government and public authorities and the second private
business; a shortened formula for the distinction is: from the State: public action for public
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good; from the Market: private action 'or private good; from the Civil Society: private
action for public good;
2) everything which is not public;
3) everything which is not military.
(ii) Politically, the notion and practice of civil society is ambivalent:
1) in some regions it emerged in the context of the struggle against military dictatorship; it is
largely equivalent to democracy, participation and respect for human rights; it evokes the
notion of full citizenship;
2) in other political and historical settings, "civil society" can become a tool for maintaining the
status quo in the distribution of power; for example, a strong concentration of the activities of
the actors of civil society on welfare and social sectors leaves critical economic and financial
decisions outside the reach and understanding of the majority of people; at the international
level, the same applies with regard to the process of "globalization" and the relationships
between rich and poor countries.
(iii) "Civil society" may have a different meaning in developed and developing countries, in countries
with a welfarist political philosophy and in countries with a liberal tradition, as well as in countries
with a centralized government apparatus and in countries with a decentralized distribution of
administrative power.
It is difcult and perhaps unwise to look for a universal definition of civil society. One needs to
consider the individual national context in which civil society functions. The community of non-
governmental organizations is not uniform; it has various interests and a great diversity of forms,
strategies and activities to address the vastly different conditions in different countries. It is useful to
look at how non-governmental organizations are being developed and used by people in their own
contexts. An overly precise definition would stifle this diversity. However, it is useful to describe the
characteristics of civil society. Civil society is made up of voluntary associations formed forpuiposes
of common interest or collective action on the sphere between the family and the market and the
family and the state. Ideally, an organization of civil society is private but with a public puipose,
oriented towards the public good, not-for-profit, accountable committed to transparency, civilian and
civilized, and dealing with problems and conflicts in a consensual and non-coereive way. It must also
have a degree of representativity. Actually, for this type of organization, the term "public interest
organization" might be better than "non-governmental organization".
1) Civil society is "non-governmental", but not just residual. It should be defined by what it is
rather than by what it is not. It should not be presented in a defensive manner. To improve
social conditions and to gain economic and political power, those who are excluded need to be
organized, at both national and international levels.
2) The finality, or raison d'etre, or philosophy of a voluntary organization, the motivations of
those who create it, are most important factors. Non-governmental organizations are generally
motivated by a desire to alter current social structures, to compensate for the centralization of
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power in many societies and to mitigate the shortcomings of markets and the political process.
Many organizations seek to advocate for or represent the interest of people who are removed
from the centres of power. They attempt to identify who is absent ot left out, in every policy
arena.
3) A non-commercial objective is a prerequisite for organizations of the civil society. Business
enterprises should not be grouped together with volunteer or representative organizations, nor
should they be considered a part of civil society, with the possible exception of non-profit
business organizations and co-operatives. Businesses or their industry representatives and
organizations which seek to promote business interests are motivated by private gain rather
than the public good. Organizations of the civil society are more interested in democratizing
the market, brealdng down privileges and monopolistic tendencies.
4) Civil society is marked by autonomy. Its organizations are independent and internally
democratic, not relying for their existence on the dictates of government or the financing of the
private sector.
5) The legitimacy of the organizations of civil society stems primarily from their contribution to
the common good. In addition, organizations are legitimate when they represent faithfully and
democratically their constituents. The objectives of these, however, have to be compatible
with the promotion of good relationships between social groups and with the standards of
what constitutes a good society.
6) The representativeness of non-governmental and other organizations of civil society is
particularly important when they seek to participate in national and international deliberative,
legislative or executive organs. Representativeness may also be determined by recognized
standing within a particular field of competence; otherwise, and notably at the local level, all
citizens of good will should have the capacity to play a role and exert their responsibility.
These issues of legitimacy and representativity will become more and more relevant as organizations
of the civil society gain more of a role in the process of governance. Questions such as the capacity of
these organization to express the aspirations of people, while providing information and education,
will become increasingly relevant Governments have to balance the demands of very different groups
and attempt to be broadly representative. It is also important to recognize that non-governmental
organizations are not perfect and do not constitute a "holy world". They are always in danger of
becoming authoritarian and bureaucratic.
Governments remain ultimately responsible for providing public services and clear distinctions of
status and roles between governments and the civil society must be maintained. Governments lead,
decide, mediate, raise resources and shape policies. Civil society cannot replace public authorities and
is not an alternative to govenunent.
Organizations of civil society have a critical role because of their reach, of their capacity to represent
people who are excluded from the dominant culture, and also because of their expertize and
experience. Non-governmental organizations can mobilize the poor, organize the delivery of services,
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and assist in the evaluation of programmes and contribute to the development of new policies. Above
all, they can identify and publicize the social problems of their communities. Non-governmental
organizations also have a role in disseminating information and expanding the knowledge of the
disadvantaged.
Overall, civil society is about developing citizenship. By nature, civil society must promote
democracy, a better distribution of power and opportunities, and the control of people over their own
lives and destiny. Voluntary associations and organizations of all types mediate the relationship
between citizens and the State. They also generate a pressure for good governments at all levels of
society.
On matters of social development, there is no need nor real usefulness for an adversary relationship
between the State and civil society. Partnership, which does not mean automatic acquiescence, should
be the overall framework for the relationship between public authorities and non-governmental
organization. The search for common grounds and the common good implies mutual respect and a
clear recognition of different roles. Even in highly democratic societies where levels of information
and participation are high, the State should not abandon its main functions and social responsibilities
to the civil society. The "privatization" of services should be seen in the perspective of a redefinition
of the role of the State towards greater guidance to the society and all its actors. For example, in
education, as well as health of social welfare and benefits, there are many possible combinations of
responsibilities and roles for the State, the civil society and, in some cases, the private sector.
It was suggested that civil society had four main functions:
1) to elaborate policies and initiate movements which lead to policy changes;
2) to implement policies, act as a bridge between communities and government, and deliver
services;
3) to monitor implementation and help determine whether policies are in the interest of people;
4) to mobilize people at the community level, ilL Implementation and Follow-up of the World
Summit for Social Development
All institutions, groups and individuals, including the private sector, which is profit oriented, and the
media, which aim at providing information, have a contribution to make to the common good and to
the implementation of the goals and objectives adopted in Copenhagen. It is particularly important to
underline that the private sector, although generally considered as different from the civil society,
should play a role in this follow-up to Copenhagen and should recognize the very important
responsibilities it has for the future of all societies, notably with regard to employment.
Non-governmental organizations can contribute directly to the implementation of the Copenhagen
Programme of Action by creating a "social watch" to keep track of the status of implementation and
follow-up. It is well known that a sort of"collective amnesia" can be the next stage after the adoption
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of very generous objectives and commitments, Civil society can serve as a reminder that the
implementation of the commitments made in Copenhagen is a matter of necessity.
National level
There is a pressing need to take concrete action to begin the process of implementation. Immediate
tasks, to which the civil society ought to contribute, include the elaboration of national plans or
strategies for social development and the adoption of targets and a set of measures for the reduction c
extreme poverty and of inequalities by 1996. Other tasks include, for those countries interested to do
so, the application of the 20/20 concept for an increase in the share of resources to be devoted to soci
programmes.
The setting up or strengthening of national co-ordinating mechanisms, including commissions or
committees, with the organized and active participation of non-governmental organizations, might be
a first step. It might be useful to review at the national level the experience achieved with the
implementation of previous United Nations conferences, notably the Rio Conference on Environment
and Development. A major function of such national anangements is to contribute to the process of
consensus building around the principles, goals and commitments adopted in Copenhagen. The
monitoring of the outcome of the Social Summit at the national level might in a number of cases,
imply the development of appropriate indicators of social conditions and social problems.
Co-ordination mechanisms. for non-governmental organizations themselves, are sometimes necessary
and useful. This may require the strengthening or development of umbrella mechanisms or networks
of non-governmental organizations around specific issues and the creation of alliances. Through
national seminars or Round Tables, non-governmental organizations which participated in
Copenhagen could report back to other non-governmental organizations, share experiences and
provide ideas for the elaboration of national plans of action.
Examples could be derived from the implementation of Agenda 21 at the local and national levels. In
Agenda 21 nine major groups were identified as having a role to play in the implementation of the Rio
Programme of Action: women, farmers, local authorities, indigenous people, youth, business and
industzy, workers and trade unions, non-governmental organizations, and scientific and technological
communities. Comparable groups could be instnimental for the implementation of the Copenhagen
Declaration and Programme of Action. It was noted that religious institutions had a very important
role in most societies.
There is a need to produce a methodology for a "people's follow-up" to the Social Summit This could
be initiated through dissemination of the results of the Summit in easily understood language. It was
suggested that non-governmental organizations at the national level should prepare a "User's Guide to
the Social Summit".
It was pointed out that the United Nations organizations, agencies and programmes should assist local
and national non-governmental organizations, particularly in developing countries, to participate in the
elaboration of national plans for implementing the Copenhagen outcome. Resident co-ordinators had a
particular role to play in this regard.
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The civil society, as well as the business community, have a role to play in the mobilization of
resources for the implementation of the commitments adopted in Copenhagen. In particular, non-
governmental organizations should contribute to the political efforts which are required to convince
the Bretton Woods institutions that they have an essential role to play for social development,
including through changes in their policies.
It was noted that 91 national reports had been produced in the context of the preparation of the
Summit. The general availability of those reports in electronic format would be helpful. They provide
a picture of current national social policies and objectives. They could also be used as a benchmark to
measure progress.
Regional level
Regional co-ordination and co-operation are essential to the successful implementation of the
Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action. Partnership among governments, the private
sector and the civil society, is possible and useful at the regional, as well as the national and
international levels. The regional commissions of the United Nations should play a role in promoting
regional co-ordination and co-operation. It was suggested that consideration be given to the
accreditation of local, national and regional non-governmental organizations directly to the regional
commissions.
Non-governmental organizations do attempt at rationalizing their activities at the regional level. They
should be encouraged to continue these efforts which are important for representativity and
participation into the work of inter-governmental institutions. The regional commissions should play
an active role in this process.
International level
While implementation at the national level should receive priority, action at the international level is
also required to support national initiatives and to counter the growing concentration of economic and
financial power. Action at the international level implies shared responsibilities by governments, the
United Nations system and non-governmental organizations.
Intergovernmental structures
Some participants considered that the existing intergovernmental structure of the United Nations was
no longer adequate to serve the current needs of the international community. In particular, the
Economic and Social Council and the Commission for Social Development were perceived as
increasingly ineffective. Other participants, while agreeing on the need for a review of the agenda and
method of work of the various inter-governmental fora, believed that revitalization was possible and
saw in the follow-up to the Summit a perfect opportunity. One of the underlying principles of the
Social Summit was consideration for the need to create new forms of governance. The presence of
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non-governmental organizations in inter-governmental bodies could help create a "political space"
which would facilitate exchange of views on issues of development and social progress.
Commission for Social Development
A suggestion to combine the Commission for Social Development with the Commission on
Sustainable Development was not generally favoured. Such a merger could actually result in a further
weakening of the status of social development in the United Nations. It was, however, recognized that
the Commission was grossly under-utilized, that its debates were not focused and that the attention
given to specific groups was currently detrimental to its voice being heard within the United Nations
system on overall issues of social progress.
At its last session, in April 1995, the Commission had called for an "opening of its debates to experts
and representatives of the civil society". This was a most important matter which was to be considered
by ECOSOC at its forthcoming 1995 session.
The notion of' "experts" should be understood as referring topo having a specific knowledge on
the issues before the Commission, notably the question of social integration. Experts can be from
governments and public services, from the academic world and the research community, or from
private associations and organizations, including non-governmental organizations.
At this juncture, representatives of civil society participating in the work of the Commission are non-
governmental organizations accredited with the Economic and Social Council. This participation is
rather weak, in terms of numbers of NGOs attending the session of the Commission, and takes the
traditional form of delivery of statements. To strengthen this participation of the civil society, a first
option would simply be to encourage accredited NGOs to participate more actively in the work of the
Commission. This participation could then be organized in a variety of ways, including panels or
consultative groups. Another option would be to identify broad categories ofNGOs and members of
the civil society, such as youth, organizations involved in development matters, religious groups, trade
unions and similar organizations of workers and farmers, business organizations, media, consumer
groups, etc. It was stressed that the elaboration of such categories would have to be done with the full
participation of all concerned. Within each category, mechanism of"selection" would have to be
elaborated by the organizations themselves for ensuring a representative participation in the work of
the Commission. These and other options should be actively pursued, once the Economic and Social
Council provides the necessary overall guidelines.
Apart from a better representation of experts and elements of the civil society, the Commission could
be strengthened through the political support it should receive at the national level, and through the
degree of attention it should also receive within the United Nations. Support should also be given to
increasing the membership of the Commission and to making its meetings an annual event.
If
The follow-up to the World Summit for Social Development should become central to the agenda of
the Commission. This agenda should reflect the relationship between the globalization of the world
economy and the structural causes of social problems. The United Nations should identify a place
within its intergovernmental structures where governments and the United Nations system, including
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the Bretton Woods institutions, would be requested to report on their actions to implement the
Programme of Action and on the social impact of their policies and programmes. Non-governmental
organizations could also report on their activities and on their perception of the results of the policies
of governments and the United Nations system. The Commission for Social Development could
conceivably play this role.
In order to encourage greater participation of experts, academics and interested individuals, and to
encourage more media attention to the discussions of the Commission for Social Development, it was
suggested to hold a series of public hearings on topics of relevance and importance during sessions of
the Commission.
Some participants considered that the Commission could not and should not be responsible for the
entire follow-up to Copenhagen, although it will make important substantive inputs. The Economic
and Social Council should oversee system-wide co-ordination, and the follow-up to Copenhagen
should occur primarily within the framework of the Agenda for Development
Consideration should be given to the activities that should take place between the annual sessions of
the Commission. It is important to establish institutional arrangements and mechanisms to promote a
continuous dialogue. Suggestions were made for the organization of intersessional meetings on
specific topics. Expert meetings could also consider issues identified by the Commission. A steering
committee on non-governmental organizations could also be a useful mechanism.
Other arrangements
The participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Commission on Sustainable
Development provides an example to be considered for the Commission for Social Development.
There are, however, sometimes practical difficulties with the large number of non-governmental
organizations which are interested in attending the meeting of the Commission on Sustainable
Development.
It was noted that non-governmental organizations could be given access to the deliberations of the
General Assembly and the Security Council. Even of more obvious relevance would be access of non-
governmental organizations to the Bretton Woods institutions. In this regard, there was an interesting
precedent with the Global Environment Fund, in which a day is devoted to open dialogue with non-
governmental organizations. Participation by non-governmental organizations in trade negotiations
and deliberations concerning peace and disarmament is weak, at best, and not very transparent
Further consideration should be given to modalities for the participation of non-governmental
organizations on the work of the World Trade Organization.
A forum of civil society, that is, a separate parallel conference of non-governmental organizations,
should meet each year, prior to the General Assembly, to discuss current global issues. This forum
would offer direct access for organizations of civil society to the United Nations system.
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It was also suggested that non-governmental organizations be allowed the right to "question time" to
address government delegates; in addition, non-governmental organizations could be given the
opportunity to contribute their views in writing through a "shadow report" on specific issues. Other
participants felt that these suggestions were not workable.
Arrangements within the United Nations system
(a) A secretariat
It was felt that there was a need for a strong "focal point" within the United Nations to cany forward
the implementation of the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action. A permanent
secretariat should be established as one of the actors responsible for the follow-up to the Social
Summit. It would provide support to governments and the civil society and serve as a clearinghouse
for information.
The United Nations Secretariat should seek a variety of sources of information in preparing
documentation for intergovernmental bodies. One suggestion was to "sub-contract" assignments to
non-governmental organizations and research institutions for the collection of data and information.
Consideration should also be given to an involvement of civil society in the drafting of reports for
intergovernmental bodies. One possibility was for the Secretariat to send questionnaires to non-
governmental organizations to obtain information and views, and then to involve them in the drafting
of documentation. This would be particularly helpful to non-governmental organizations without
standing representation in New York.
It was suggested that the cost of documentation could be reduced substantially if more widespread use
were made of the Internet and other means of electronic communication. Similarly, it was suggested to
create or strengthen a data base of non-governmental organizations, to provide easy access to
information about the registered organizations and their objectives and activities.
(b) Interagency arrangements
A working committee on the follow-up to the Social Summit could be established. It would be
composed of relevant United Nations programmes and agencies, govermnent delegates and
representatives of non-governmental organizations. The purpose of this committee would be to
oversee the distribution of responsibilities for follow-up activities and to provide on-going co-
ordination of the implementation. Cunently, it would seem that agency responsibilities are scattered
throughout the text of the Copenhagen Programme of Action.
As was done with the Commission on Sustainable Development and the implementation of Agenda
21, a system of"task managers" within the United Nations system could be established for the follow-
up of the Social Summit The implementation of special aspects of the Programme of Action would
be entrusted to these task managers who would also serve as focal points to keep a record of activities,
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provide information and gather feedback from all the actors involved. Such division of labour ought,
however, to be compatible with the holistic approach recommended in Copenhagen.
A priority for international co-operation is to provide international support for the elaboration and
implementation of national plans of action to eradicate poverty. The United Nations system should
come together to provide assistance and stimulate the development of national plans. It was suggested
to establish a committee of agencies to identify how each can contribute to support countries to
implement the Copenhagen Programme of Action. The donor community should also be approached
for commitments on resources targeted to implementation.
At the operational level, non-governmental organizations can assume greater responsibility in the
implementation of programmes and projects because they often possess expertize, devoted individuals
and highly motivated staff. Sometimes, such organizations have also reached a high level of
efficiency.
Accreditation of non-governmental organizations
(a) Views regarding the accreditation process
The current arrangements for accreditation of non-governmental organizations to the Economic and
Social Council are generally perceived as unsatisfactory. There are no clear guiding principles on
which organizations should participate. At present, an organization which is interested in receiving
accreditation applies and is considered on its individual merits. Little thought appears to have been
given to how the United Nations might require the participation of organizations with a particular
expertize or experience for its deliberations on issues of development and social progress.
Furthermore, a periodic review of the list of accredited organizations would be useful. Also,
accreditation should bring more responsibilities and more benefits to all concerned.
Currently many of the rules and procedures regarding consultative status are not being respected. This
has led to confusion. It is important to maintain proper order in the functioning of the
intergovernmental bodies and adequate responsibility on the part of the non-governmental
organizations. If no norms are established, no transparency is possible. Accreditation needs to be
simple, clear, effective, and adequately implemented.
Participants considered the current arrangements for accreditation with its different levels of status -
Category I Category II and Roster - and wondered whether this system was necessary or whether
there should be a single consultative status for all non-governmental organizations. It was suggested
that perhaps an overall list of acceptable non-governmental organizations themselves would then be
free to determine their degree of participation in individual meetings based on their own criteria, such
as their resources or degree of interest or involvement in particular issues. It was recognized that
organizations with specific interests can be accredited to individual United Nations programmes or
specialized agencies and may not want or need to be involved in the deliberations of the
intergovernmental bodies.
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Several participants stated that there is a need for.consistency and fairness in applying accreditation
rules to all organizations. Reference was made to the important work currently taking place in the
open-ended working group on the review of arrangements for consultations with non-governmental
organizations.
Non-governmental organizations working at the United Nations could establish improved
organizational structures, including expanded caucuses on specific issues, co-ordinate more actively
their activities and introduce more rigour into their participation. However, any attempt to organize
civil society to enable it to take part in the follow-up to the Summit should emerge from the civil
society itself and not be imposed on it. This would be in line with the intrinsic capacity of civil society
to organize itself, within the framework of the United Nations.
Another aspect of accreditation is whether the national branches or affiliates of international non-
governmental organizations or networks should be eligible for accreditation in their own right Some
participants felt that this was, in effect, double representation. There are different roles and purposes
for different non-governmental organizations at different levels. The overall goal should be to create
space for those groups which don't have power and the most important consideration is the degree of
flexibility afforded to non-governmental organizations to participate.
Increasingly, the informal benefits of participating in United Nations meetings - such as the sessions
of the functional commissions of ECOSOC - have begun to outweigh the formal benefits. The
opportunity to interact with government representatives and present views directly to them is
becoming more important than delivering a formal speech.
As noted above, there is a difference between civil society and the private sector. However, the
participation of the private sector in the work of the United Nations and in the implementation of the
objectives of the Social Summit is critical. To keep the distinction while ensuring a participation of all
actors, it was suggested that those organizations which represent businesses or are primarily concerned
with promoting business interests should be accorded a different consultative status. It was mentioned
that the tri-partite structure of the ILO seems to work in a satisfactory manner.
(b) Organizations which participated in the Summit
The status of the non-governmental organizations which were accredited to the Summit remains an
open question. Should they be eligible for Economic and Social Council Roster status? Should a
distinction be kept between non-governmental organizations accredited to conferences and non-
governmental organizations involved in the regular work of the United Nations? An aspect of this•
question is the time required to gain Economic and Social Council status.
Should all non-governmental organizations which participated in the preparations for the Summit seek
accreditation with the Economic and Social Council, a number of bottlenecks might be created,
including with regard to meeting facilities and requests for documentation. It was suggested that, in
practice, many organizations which would seek accreditation would not actually attend meetings. To
restrict them in advance, however, would create problems. Perhaps it would be best to adopt a
343
generous policy concerning accreditation, while allowing the individual non-governmental
organizations to work out for themselves their attendance and degree of involvement.
It was suggested that a possible answer to the question of how to maintain a relationship with those
non-governmental organizations which participated in the Summit would be to offer those
organizations the option to be accredited directly (and only) to the Commission for Social
Development. Ultimately, however, there should be no linkage between the accreditation of non-
governmental organizations with the Economic and Social Council and the follow-up to the Summit.
All non-governmental organizations with an interest in social issues should be encouraged to
participate in the implementation of the objectives and commitments of the Summit, irrespective of
their official status with the Economic and Social Council. All elements of society, including the
private sector— large and small corporations, farmers and trade unions and co-operatives, as well as
the media - have a role to play.
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